Financial incentives for maternal health evaluation of a national programme in Nepal by Powell-Jackson, Timothy
Powell-Jackson, Timothy (2010) Financial incentives for maternal
health evaluation of a national programme in Nepal. Doctoral thesis,
London School of Hygiene Tropical Medicine.
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/682416/
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: Copyright the author
Q 
v 
X0, 
to 
0 
2 
n 
Dx 
O 
O 
1N 
Financial incentives for maternal 
health: evaluation of a national 
programme in Nepal 
Timothy Powell-Jackson 
2010 
Thesis submitted to University of London 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Health Policy Unit 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
University of London 
To Anna 
2 Page 
ABSTRACT 
People often behave in ways that are not in their best long term interest. Financial incentives are 
increasingly being used by governments to persuade individuals to improve health-related 
behaviours. In developing countries, financial incentives have been shown to increase uptake of 
preventive health interventions, but it is not well understood whether financial incentives are 
effective when targeted towards more complex types of care or when implemented at scale in 
low-income countries. This thesis explores the impact of financial incentives on health seeking 
behaviour, in the context of the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) in Nepal. Launched 
nationwide in 2005, the SDIP seeks to encourage greater use of professional care at childbirth by 
providing cash to women after they give birth in a health facility, as well as an exemption from 
user fees for those residing in the least developed districts. 
The thesis develops a theoretical model of the programme's causal pathway and draws on 
consumer choice theory to derive a set of predictions. These are tested empirically using a variety 
of econometric methods applied to household data (from a secondary data source and a primary 
data source). The analysis comprises three main parts. First, it estimates the demand for maternity 
care using discrete choice models to understand the most important factors influencing a 
household's decision of where to give birth. By focusing on the role of price, this analysis serves as 
an ex-ante evaluation of the SDIP. Second, it investigates implementation of the SDIP. The 
analysis uses a number of key process indicators that emerge from the conceptual framework to 
explore what factors may have constrained the implementation process. Third, it estimates the 
impact of the SDIP on health seeking behaviour at childbirth in two areas of Nepal using 
propensity score matching and longitudinal methods of analysis. It finds that the programme had a 
modest impact on utilisation of women who had heard of the SDIP, but because programme 
uptake was low, it has led to only a small increase in skilled birth attendance across the entire 
population. Implications for financial incentive programmes and maternal health care in low- 
income countries are explored. 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The promise of financial incentives 
The way we behave has important implications for our health. In rich countries, health problems 
generally reflect the "giants of excess" - such as smoking, drinking, high calorie diets, and 
sedentary pursuits (Le Grand 2008). In developing countries, though major health problems may 
differ, they remain closely linked to individual behaviour. Certainly, the provision of health care is 
important to improving health. However, a big part of the challenge, and one that is being 
increasingly recognised, is persuading individuals to undertake changes in behaviour that promote 
their own health and the health of their families. Fiscal policy has long been used by governments 
as a means to influence behaviour through financial disincentives (taxes) and incentives 
(subsidies). Taxes on cigarettes and alcohol are obvious disincentives and have been shown to 
change behaviour (Sutherland, Christianson et al. 2008). 
The basic premise underpinning the use of financial incentives is that people often behave in ways 
that are not in their best long term interest. Individuals may not be able to afford or are not 
capable of doing what is best for them. Incapable, because they make decisions based on 
erroneous or incomplete information, lack bargaining power within the household or behave 
myopically. These reasons justify why a "social planner" may place greater value on a good or 
service than the value placed by individuals themselves (Besley 1988). 
Financial incentives are one of a number of policy tools used under the umbrella of what is termed 
libertarian paternalism. While individuals remain free to do what they want to do, the state 
provides a "nudge" to encourage behaviour that is better for them, as defined by their own 
preferred preferences (Sunstein and Thaler 2008). It represents a middle ground, if you will, 
between aggressive state intervention (eg. an outright ban or requirement by law) and more 
modest policy measures (eg. providing information). While a nudge may be acceptable, pushing 
individuals to behave in a way that is inconsistent with the preferences of their fully informed 
rational selves can be considered unacceptable (Marteau, Oliver et al. 2008). Anecdotes of 
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mothers being incentivised to take their children to unsanitary clinics lacking drugs and skilled 
health workers are suggestive of an unacceptable "shove". 
Financial incentives are controversial, having been described both as "close as you can come to a 
magic bullet in development" and "superfluous, pernicious, atrocious and abominable" (Dugger 
2004; Freeland 2007). The use of financial incentives to change behaviour is seen by some as 
bribery or a form of coercion, an impingement on individual autonomy and ultimately unfair, in 
that people should not be paid to do what they should do anyway (Marteau, Ashcroft et al. 2009). 
A more balanced view recognises that they can be an effective way of encouraging changes in 
behaviour, but have the potential for unintended consequences and are unlikely to address the 
systemic causes of poor health-related behaviour (Cookson 2008; Popay 2008; Brooks 2009). 
In the development field, recent enthusiasm for financial incentives is based on evidence showing 
that payments aimed at initiating take up of preventive health interventions can be effective 
(Lagarde, Haines et al. 2007; Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2008). Financial incentives provide an 
immediate reward to individuals for behaviour that leads to health gains in the future and have 
been used to target a range of health-related behaviours. They have been used in a positive sense, 
to encourage uptake of health technologies and attendance at health clinics (Lagarde, Haines et al 
2007). They have also been used to encourage individuals to refrain from certain behaviours, such 
as smoking and contracting sexually transmitted diseases (Brighton and Hove NHS Trust 2006; 
Jack 2008; North East Essex NHS Trust 2009). 
Financial incentives or "demand-side incentives" may seem an attractive policy option for several 
reasons. They may be more acceptable to a country's electorate than just cash handouts and the 
notion of paying individuals to influence their behaviour is both simple and intuitively appealing. 
However, the simplicity of the idea should not be confused with the complexity of implementing 
a demand-side incentive programme. Enthusiasm should be tempered in respect of the fact that it 
is not known whether demand-side incentive programmes work in low-income countries, 
particularly when implemented at scale. The available evidence comes largely from middle- 
income Latin American countries, where government capacity is relatively strong. 
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1.2 Challenge of maternal health 
Demand-side incentives are often used in response to low levels of service utilisation. Nowhere is 
this more obvious than in maternal health. Professional care at childbirth, a strategy considered 
critical to improving maternal health (Campbell and Graham 2006), has stagnated in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia over the past decade, in part, because the provision of and the reluctance to 
use maternity services are inextricably linked to deep-rooted issues such as the state of the health 
system and the place of women in society (Koblinsky, Matthews et al. 2006). In Nepal, despite a 
remarkable improvement in maternal health outcomes in recent years, utilisation of maternity 
services remains unacceptably low (Pradhan, Aryal et al. 1997; Government of Nepal 2001; 
Government of Nepal 2007). 
In light of the country's slow progress in raising the proportion of women who give birth with 
professional care, the Government of Nepal has turned to the use of financial incentives. 
Introduced nationwide in July 2005, the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) provides a 
cash payment (conditional cash transfer) to women who give birth in a public health facility, as 
well as an exemption from user fees for those residing in the least developed one third of districts 
(Government of Nepal 2005). It also provides a financial incentive to health workers who attend 
deliveries either in the health facility or at the home of the woman giving birth. The SDIP is a 
high-profile policy initiative that has attracted considerable interest from both national and 
international policymakers. 
This thesis explores the impact of the SDIP on health seeking behaviour. While the programme 
offers an incentive to both health providers and recipients of health care, the general orientation 
of the thesis, reflected in the literature review, the methodological approach and the empirical 
analyses, is on the financial incentives given to women. Interactions between the supply-side and 
demand-side incentives, however, may not be trivial and attention is given to these where 
possible. 
The PhD project was centred around an evaluation of the SDIP, conducted over the period 2006- 
2008. The evaluation was commissioned by the Support to Safe Motherhood Programme in 
Nepal, and its purpose was to study both implementation and the impact of the SDIP. This was 
with a view to providing recommendations to the Government of Nepal to guide further 
development of the programme. The thesis is based on several components of the evaluation. It 
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uses insights from standard consumer theory and a model of the programme's causal pathway as its 
starting point, before embarking on a number of econometric analyses that provide evidence on 
the performance of the SDIP. The analysis is based on primary data from a household survey in six 
districts, and secondary data from a community surveillance system of births in one district of 
Nepal. 
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1.3 Structure of thesis 
The organisation of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the determinants 
of demand for health care, with a specific focus on maternal health. It considers the main theories 
that have been used to provide insights into the determinants of demand for health care. In the 
synthesis of empirical evidence, the review pays particular attention to the role of price as 
informed by findings from analyses of cross-section data and evaluations of financing reforms 
(removal of user fees and demand-side incentive programmes). The review also includes a survey 
of the literature on approaches to policy evaluation. 
Chapter 3 describes the empirical methodology. It gives the research aim and objectives and then, 
building on the literature review, develops a conceptual framework to aid understanding of how 
the SDIP is expected to affect health seeking behaviour. The chapter introduces the empirical 
methods for each of the analyses and includes a detailed description of the various data sources. 
Chapter 4 provides relevant background information on Nepal, including an overview of the 
financing and provision of maternal health services in the country, as well as some background 
information on the SDIP. 
The thesis contains four results chapters. Chapter 5 estimates a demand model for maternity care 
to understand what factors matter most in a household's decision of where to give birth. Chapter 
6 investigates implementation of the SDIP. The analysis focuses on a number of key process 
indicators that emerge from the conceptual framework and explores what factors may have 
constrained the implementation process. The last two results chapters estimate the impact of the 
SDIP on health seeking behaviour at childbirth in different areas of Nepal. Chapter 7 uses 
propensity score matching methods to estimate programme impacts. It performs a subgroup 
analysis to explore heterogeneity in the effect of the programme. Chapter 8 estimates the impact 
of the SDIP through a longitudinal analysis of outcomes that include a health outcome measure in 
addition to the standard utilisation indicators. 
Chapter 9 brings together the findings from each of the empirical analyses and places them in the 
context of the broader literature. The limitations of the thesis are described as the basis for a 
discussion of the policy implications of the findings. These focus specifically on demand-side 
incentive programmes, as well as maternal health care. The chapter concludes by suggesting 
avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The demand-side incentives of the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) are analogous to a 
subsidy on the price of maternity care. Economics provides clear insights on the role that price 
may play in influencing health seeking behaviour. The predominant theory underpinning this type 
of analysis in relation to health comes from Grossman's seminal work on human capital and the 
demand for health. He argued that demand for health care is derived from the demand for health, 
for it is health that people want, not health care per se. The price of care, however, is one of many 
factors that might influence a household's decisions on health seeking and theoretical frameworks 
to incorporate such a range of variables are found in disciplines outside of economics. 
Empirical studies on the role of price come from two quite distinct literatures. For this reason, 
they are reviewed in separate sections in this chapter. First, there is the literature focused around 
the debate on whether to impose user fees for health care in developing countries. Central to this 
literature is the question of whether having to pay for health care discourages use and, if so, to 
what extent. The second body of literature comprises evaluations of programmes that provide 
positive financial incentives conditional on certain health-related behaviours. These programmes 
have provided an excellent opportunity to study the effects of price on health seeking and health 
outcomes. 
The empirical literature has to contend with the econometric challenge of establishing causality in 
the relationship between price and utilisation of health services, which is the central concern of 
the majority of studies. A question raised less often is the generalisability of the findings beyond 
the specific context of the study. If findings have no relevance beyond the study setting, the 
research can offer little guidance on policymaking elsewhere. 
Owing to the breadth of the topics covered, no literature review on Cochrane principles was 
conducted (Higgins and Green 2005) but rather one based on a transparent search strategy. The 
focus of the thesis on demand-side incentives dictated the scope of the literature review. The first 
.......... 21 Page 
step was to search a number of electronic databases (PubMed, Embase, ISI Web of Science, and 
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences) for literature reviews using search terms related 
to the following topics: 1) health financing combined with health care seeking; 2) maternal health 
combined with health care seeking; 3) financial incentives in health (demand-side only); and 4) 
impact evaluation and specific policy evaluation methods. 
The bibliographies of review articles identified via the above search terms were then screened for 
relevance, as were articles that referenced the same review articles. In addition, reference was 
made to economics and policy evaluation textbooks, as well as gray literature on the websites of 
numerous organisations (World Bank, World Health Organisation, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Institute of Fiscal Studies, Poverty Action Lab, Brookings Institute, RAND, 
Department for International Development, Initiative for Maternal Mortality Programme 
Assessment and International Initiative for Impact Evaluation) and development gateways (Eldis, 
id21). The first three topics were limited to low- and middle-income countries, as defined by the 
World Bank, and articles concerning health or health care. The entire literature review was 
limited to articles in the English language. 
The literature review is structured as follows. Section 2.2 considers the demand for health care, 
including its theoretical foundations, empirical approaches to estimation and the evidence on price 
and other determinants as influencing factors. Section 2.3 then synthesises the evidence on 
demand-side incentive programmes to understand whether and in what contexts they work. 
Section 2.4 reviews the literature on approaches to evaluation. This section brings together 
insights from the medical and economics literature to inform discussions around internal and 
external validity. Finally, section 2.5 identifies the gaps in the literature and priorities for future 
research in reference to this thesis. 
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2.2 Demand for Health Care 
2.2.1 Theory 
Human capital model 
Much of the literature on the demand for health care uses, as a starting point, the pioneering work 
of Grossman (Grossman 1972; Grossman 1972). Building on contributions by Becker (1965), he 
developed the theory of human capital in relation to the demand for health. Grossman (2000) was 
motivated by what he saw as fundamental differences between health capital and other forms of 
human capital as well as between health as an output and health care as one of a number of inputs 
in the production of health. He was able to build a theory around a number of observations rarely 
considered until then. First, health rather than health care is what individuals want; the demand 
for health care is derived from the demand for health. Second, health capital is produced through 
the use of health care, along with time and other health inputs (such as diet, exercise etc). Third, 
the theory contrasts a pure consumption model, in which health capital enters the utility function 
directly, with an investment model, where health capital determines the amount of time available 
to work and earn income. With this in mind, the demand for health care is a rational response to a 
health shock and leads individuals to shift resources away from consumption towards the purchase 
of health care and other inputs that might improve health. 
The main predictions of Grossman's model concern the effect of age, wages, and education on the 
production of health capital (Folland, Goodman et al. 1997). The optimal level of health in the 
investment model depends on the cost of capital (the interest rate plus the depreciation rate). It 
will decline as a person ages, but because the amount of health capital produced by a given 
amount of investment in spending on health care also diminishes, the elderly may demand more 
health care than the young. The effect of wages is ambiguous. The model provides a mechanism 
by which increases in wages can increase demand for health care, through an increase in the 
demand for health capital (via the increase in the returns from healthy days) and a substitution 
away from time inputs in the production of health to health care (Lindelow 2005). However, the 
increased wage rate also increases the opportunity cost of time in producing health and the 
marginal productivity of health capital may in fact shift downwards depending on factors such as 
technology. Since wealth has no impact on the marginal productivity of health capital or the price 
of time inputs, its influence on the demand for health care is a pure income effect. Education can 
be expected to increase the marginal productivity of health inputs, thus generating health capital 
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at a lower cost and explaining why higher educated individuals might choose a higher level of 
health capital stock. From a demand-side perspective, educated individuals may also recognise the 
importance of a healthy lifestyle. 
In a static framework, consumer theory provides the analytical basis to study the trade-off a 
consumer faces between the use of income to purchase health care and other goods (Folland, 
Goodman et al. 1997). The trade-off is imposed by the budget constraint and consumers seek to 
maximise utility given their preferences. Demand for health care is determined by its price, the 
price of related goods, income, consumer tastes, and other good-specific elements (Varian 2003). 
Like other goods and services, the demand for health care slopes downwards, such that a rise in 
the price of health care leads to a fall in its demand. If, as is commonly assumed, health is a normal 
good, then health care will also be a normal good. 
Theoretical extensions 
Standard consumer theory and the human capital model impose strong assumptions on individual 
behaviour. Even if there is a competitive network of health providers, there are often other types 
of market failure that imply some of the assumptions are unlikely to hold in practice. The 
microeconomic theory behind these market failures can give clues as to why consumers might 
under-invest in health and can provide a rationale for government intervention (see section 
2.3.1). ' 
A first type of decision-making failure concerns uncertainty. When certainty around future health 
states is relaxed, investment in health can be seen as a potentially risky endeavour (Chang 1996). 2 
Insurance markets have developed partly in response to this uncertainty, allowing consumers to 
spread the risk of illness across the population and over time. 
A second theoretical extension relates to time preferences. Investment in health capital is 
characterised by the decision to incur a current cost for a future benefit. Individuals with low 
discount rates might invest more in education and health. This idea lies behind Fuchs' (1982) 
' It should be noted that a barrier to health seeking does not necessarily constitute a market failure. A reluctance to 
use care may be a perfectly rational choice on the part of the consumer (Ensor and Cooper 2004). 
2 Faced with a risk of falling ill, an individual's decision to invest in health will depend on whether the increased 
investment from a shift in the marginal productivity of health capital outwards outweighs the decrease in investment 
from a lowering of the return of the health investment. 
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hypothesis that the correlation between health and education is driven by heterogeneous time 
preferences. ' Inconsistent time preferences may provide clues as to what may determine the 
decision to invest in health, and ultimately the demand for health care. If the assumption of time 
consistency is relaxed and a decision-maker's preferences are allowed to change over time, 
individuals might avoid immediate costs such as paying for health care, a decision that is seemingly 
at odds with their own long-term attitude towards the future (Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and 
Rabin 1999). 4 
A third reason why individuals may not consume as much health care as is privately optimal 
concerns conflict in the household. This can lead to incomplete altruism because the decision- 
maker, say the husband, discounts the future more heavily than the wife. The husband prefers the 
wife to hold an amount of health capital that is different from what the wife prefers to hold. ' Bolin 
et al. (2002) extend the human capital model and shows that, if spouses act strategically, they will 
not in general have the same preferences of investment in health capital, leading to inefficiencies 
in the allocation of resources within the family. 
Fourth, information problems are a well recognised type of market failure (Stigler 1961). 
Individuals may not be able to make informed decisions because they lack information or are 
unable to assimilate and use information effectively. One particular type of information failure, 
misguided beliefs, are likely to be closely linked to education and cultural barriers (Ensor and 
Cooper 2004). Addressing this information problem may be too costly for the family or certain 
beliefs may be self-reinforcing such that when an individual acts on it the outcome confirms the 
belief even though an alternative belief would have led to a better outcome (Piketty 1995; 
Benabou and Tirole 2006). 
Other textbook examples of market failure include imperfect or missing capital markets that 
prevent families from making profitable investments (de Mel, McKenzie et al. 2009), and positive 
externalities that arise from altruistic preferences (Jacobsson, Carstensen et al. 2005) or 
preventive interventions such as insecticide treated bednets (Gimnig, Vulule et al. 2003). 
3 Alternatively, but closely related, he also argued that time preferences are influenced by education, such that more 
education could result in more investment in health inputs and ultimately better health. The empirical evidence, 
however, seems to be stacked against time preferences as an explanation for the correlation between health and 
education (Grossman 2004). 
Hyperbolic discounting is one of a number of possible functional forms representing inconsistent time preferences. 
It is assumed that there are differences in antra-household bargaining power between members. 
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Health seeking behaviour models 
Outside of economics, there is an abundance of models of health seeking behaviour. These are 
founded on social psychology, medical sociology and medical anthropology (Hausmann-Muela, 
Ribera et al. 2003). The models serve to provide a catalogue of potentially relevant determinants, 
but fail to offer a generalisable understanding of why these factors may influence behaviour. The 
models cover a similarly large spectrum of possible determinants, although the emphasis of each 
model tends to vary. The Theory of Planned Behaviour, for example, gives a central role to social 
networks (Conner and Sparks 1995), while the Health Care Utilisation Model emphasises 
structural factors that determine treatment (provider) choice (Andersen and Newman 1973). 
New institutional economics provides quite a different perspective on health care seeking. 
Applied to health care, it places quality of care and the role of institutions in influencing the 
motivation of health care providers at the centre. Thus, Leonard explains patterns of health 
seeking via the influence that different types of health provider have on incentive structures within 
health institutions (Leonard 2003). 
2.2.2 Empirical approaches to studying demand 
A number of approaches have been used to explore empirically the determinants of demand for 
health care. These include descriptive analysis of cross-section household surveys, qualitative 
investigation of consumer views, ethnographic methods, econometric analysis of cross-section or 
panel data and randomised experiments. A different type of approach, not considered here, 
analyses the stated preferences of consumers over hypothetical choices rather than looking at 
decisions that have actually been made (revealed preferences). 
Descriptive analysis of cross-section surveys uses bivariate and multivariate techniques to explore 
health seeking behaviour. These studies are typically motivated by psychosocial models of health 
seeking behaviour or, in some cases, new institutional economics (Andersen and Newman 1973; 
Andersen, Harada et al. 1995; Scrimshaw 2001; Leonard 2003). Bivariate analysis describes the 
relationship between reported behaviour and each of the household or provider characteristics. 
Multivariate analysis goes one step further and evaluates the relative weight of these 
characteristics by controlling for all other variables. In doing so, such studies are able to 
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demonstrate the marginal effect of an independent variable on behaviour and offer some 
predictive power of how a policy change might affect the wider population. However, they can 
offer little guidance on why factors are important or on pathways of influence. 
Qualitative methods have the advantage of being able to explore issues in more depth and analyse 
those factors that are less amenable to quantitative measurement. They use tools such as key 
informant interviews, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to learn about the reasons 
for observed health care seeking behaviour and unravel some of the more complex issues. There is 
a growing literature, for example, on the influence of interpersonal dimensions of care and the 
importance of trust between service provider and patient (Gilson 2003). 
Static economic models of demand for health care have been used extensively in the study of 
health seeking behaviour in developing countries and have been influential in informing policy. 
These are typically motivated by Grossman's framework (Gertler, Locay et al. 1987; Gertler and 
Van der Gaag 1990). 6 While different settings have been explored, the theoretical foundations 
and analysis techniques remain applicable across countries. Econometric analyses of provider 
choice are founded upon the random utility model using discrete choice logit or probit 
specifications (McFadden 1981). The most credible empirical strategy is that of the randomised 
experiment, although issues around feasibility often preclude its use and the method is by its very 
nature narrowly focused on one variable of interest. 
A number of relevant issues and challenges have emerged from studies exploring the demand for 
health care over the past three decades. These are summarised as follows: 
Most studies lack exogenous variation in price (or in any of the variables of interest) and are 
thus likely to suffer from bias due to unobservables (Gertler and Hammer 1997). For 
example, any variation in fees might reflect government policy or unobserved quality of care. 
Estimating demand when there is little or no variation in the independent variable is 
problematic. This has been found to be particularly pertinent in developing countries, where 
the price of government provided medical care is often zero. A response has been to include 
the opportunity cost of time as a price, although this introduces problems of measurement 
(Gertler and Van der Gaag 1990). 
6 Owing to data limitations in developing countries, there are few studies based on Grossman's dynamic framework. 
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Demand functions that take on a multinomial logit form suffer from a restriction imposed by 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption that requires the conditional utility 
functions to be identical across alternative providers - ie. the cross-price elasticities must be 
the same across all alternatives (Gertler and Van der Gaag 1990). The validity of findings 
based on the multinomial specification have been questioned (Bolduc, Lacroix et al. 1996) 
and therefore specifications other than the multinomial logit have been used. 
Establishing appropriate measures of income, quality, perceived severity of illness, and 
knowledge is a challenge commonly faced. Proxy measures of income have become 
reasonably standardised. Data limitations, however, make it difficult to incorporate objective 
measures of quality and there is little consensus on what dimensions of quality are most 
important for household decision-making. Omission of process quality variables and a focus 
on just structural attributes, for example, can lead to biases (Mariko 2003). 
Self-reported morbidity can be misleading. It is well recognised that individuals of higher 
socioeconomic status are more likely to report illness, leading to problems of endogeneity 
(Akin, Guilkey et al. 1998; Sen 2002). 
A difficulty in modelling demand is obtaining ex ante data on provider characteristics, for it 
is expectations that shape behaviour. Not only may an individual's expectation of price (ex 
ante) be modified by the actual price paid at the chosen provider (ex post), data on 
perceptions of providers not chosen by the individual are unobservable (Gertler, Locay et al. 
1987). While the average price of alternative providers experienced by others can act as a 
proxy, it is unlikely to be representative for that individual and raises the problem of 
selectivity bias. Data from health facilities can get round this problem, but it is not clear how 
accurately they reflect perceptions. 
There is the added difficulty of how to define the set of provider choices for which behaviour 
is being modelled (Bockstael 1999). This is of concern in the case of childbirth when health 
needs may be preventive or curative depending on complications (Gabrysch and Campbell 
2009). 
The indirect costs of travelling and waiting must be accounted for and valued appropriately 
(Sauerborn, Nougtara et al. 1994; McNamara 1999). This is particularly challenging in rural 
communities where much of the work is non-wage labour and seasonal (Chima, Goodman et 
al. 2003). 
28 Page 
There has been debate over the empirical specification of the discrete choices models (Dor 
1999). As Gertler et al. demonstrate, specification of linear utility functions in previous 
studies with alternative specific coefficients on income violates the transitive and order 
assumptions of preferences (Gertler and Van der Gaag 1990). 
2.2.3 Determinants of demand for maternal health care 
There are a number of characteristics of delivery care that set it apart from other health services. 
Childbirth is not inherently pathological and for the majority of women, it is a positive, natural 
experience free from illness. For an unfortunate few at the other end of the spectrum, childbirth 
can lead to death. The risk of maternal conditions and the fact that they can be unpredictable, 
severe and prone to rapid escalation means women may require access to emergency obstetric 
services (Graham, Cairns et al. 2006). A balance must be struck between maintaining the 
normality of childbirth on the one hand and being prepared to manage complications should they 
present themselves on the other hand. For this reason, the determinants of demand for delivery 
care may not exactly match those for general health services. With the exception of price, the 
literature review focuses on the former rather than the latter. 
Before reviewing the determinants of demand, it is worth noting that studies in this body of 
empirical work are rarely grounded in theory. Not surprisingly, studies that have explored the 
role of economic variables, such as price and income, give greater consideration to the economic 
theory underpinning the analysis. It remains the case, however, that few empirical studies of 
demand for health care are linked to economic theories that incorporate market failures. 
Prices and access to health care 
Studies exploring the role of price in determining demand for health care are usually motivated by 
the question of user fees. The user fee debate has a long history and still continues unabated 
(James, Hanson et al. 2006; Yates 2009). On this issue, there is a growing body of evidence 
emerging from randomised experiments. A number of studies have looked at the effect of price 
on uptake of specific health interventions, including deworming drugs in Kenya (Kremer and 
Miguel 2007), insecticide treated bednets for malaria prevention in Kenya (Cohen and Dupas 
The evidence of conditional cash transfers, which are analogous to price subsidies, is considered in a later section of 
the literature review. 
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2008; Hoffmann 2009), water disinfectant in Zambia (Ashraf, Berry et al. 2007), and curative 
care for malaria in Ghana (Ansah, Narh-Bana et al. 2009). They found that price is important and 
even a small price above zero dramatically reduces take up of the intervention. There is evidence 
of heterogeneous effects. For example, Ansah et al (2009) find that removing payments for 
curative care had the greatest impact on utilisation of formal health providers among the 
wealthiest quintile and those living between 5km and 10km from a health centre. 
The evidence is mixed on the issue of whether higher prices stimulate use (Ashraf, Berry et al. 
2007; Cohen and Dupas 2008). In terms of health impact, the study in Ghana found that 
removing direct payment for health care had no effect on anaemia, mortality, or parasite 
prevalence despite the increase in utilisation of curative care (Ansah, Narh-Bana et al. 2009). The 
few studies in which the price of a broad set of health services was randomised showed a negative 
effect of price on utilisation, with price elasticity of demand inelastic (Manning, Newhouse et al. 
1987; Newhouse 1993; Gertler and Hammer 1997; Dow, Gertler et al. 2001). $ 
The non-experimental evidence from economic models of demand for health care has historically 
provided conflicting messages, with some studies reporting no statistically significant price effect 
and others concluding that demand is sensitive to changes in price (Gertler and Van der Gaag 
1990). However, with evidence emerging from policy evaluations of user fees (both introduction 
and abolition) (Lagarde and Palmer 2008), the consensus more recently has veered towards the 
latter, that price elasticities are not zero but inelastic (Gertler and Hammer 1997; Van de 
Voorde, Van Doorslaer et al. 2001; James, Hanson et al. 2006). Evidence suggests that demand 
tends to be more elastic amongst poorer groups and any price increase is likely to adversely affect 
these groups disproportionately in terms of access to health services (Dor, Gertler et al. 1987; 
Gertler, Locay et al. 1987; Gertler and Van der Gaag 1990; Ching 1995; Xu, Evans et al. 2006). 
The picture emerging from the literature specific to maternal health seeking is mixed. Economic 
models report a negligible effect of price on utilisation of maternity services (Heller 1982; Akin, 
Guilkey et al. 1985; Schwartz, Akin et al. 1988; Li 1996; Hotchkiss 1998), while policy 
evaluations of the removal of user fees suggest a large negative effect (Wilkinson, Gouws et al. 
2001; Deininger and Mpuga 2004; Nabyonga, Desmet et al. 2005; Penfold, Harrison et al. 2007; 
8 The RAND experiment, although not in a developing country, is included on the basis that it is the largest ever 
study of the effect of price on the demand for health care. 
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Witter, Armar-Klemesu et al. 2008). The discrepancy in results may lie in the poor quality of 
data used in some of earlier modelling exercises, although the methods used in the policy 
evaluations do not stand up to much scrutiny either given the absence of credible comparison 
groups. Whether these findings suggest a difference between maternal health care and other 
health services is hard to establish (Witter 2009). 
The official user fee is only one of many cost items likely to influence demand. These costs 
include the pecuniary value of items such as transport, medicines, supplies, food, as well as the 
time cost incurred while travelling, waiting, and receiving care at the health facility. While user 
fees are not unimportant, the non-medical costs of delivery care can outweigh the official price 
charged by health providers. A growing body of evidence suggests that the costs of delivery care 
place a substantial economic burden on the household and serve to discourage use (Borghi, Ensor 
et al. 2006). Studies in a number of developing countries have found the household cost of a 
normal delivery in hospital to vary between US$9 (3 percent of annual GDP per capita) and 
US$67 (26 percent of annual GDP per capita) (Nahar and Costello 1998; Kowalewski, Mujinja et 
al. 2002; Borghi, Hanson et al. 2003; Afsana 2004; Borghi, Ensor et al. 2006). Seemingly 'free' 
delivery care in hospitals can involve substantial hidden costs, which delay care seeking and act as 
an important barrier to utilisation, particularly among the poorest (Nahar and Costello 1998). 
There is great variation in the cost of different health care seeking options. The cost of 
complicated deliveries is between three and ten times greater than a normal delivery (Borghi) 
Ensor et al. 2006). A lack of access to money at the time of need has also been found to constrain 
service use at hospitals and delay decision making (Thaddeus and Maine 1994; Nahar and Costello 
1998; Pitchforth, van Teijlingen et al. 2006). Access to social networks can enable women to 
overcome some of the financial costs associated with seeking care (Parkhurst, Rahman et al. 
2006). Moreover, flexibility in the payment method, such as acceptance of gifts in kind and 
delayed payment, has been shown to be an important consideration in the choice of providers. 
Traditional birth attendants providing delivery care at home, for example, can prove attractive for 
those requiring greater flexibility in the amount and means of payment than that offered by 
professional care services in facilities (Borghi, Ensor et al. 2004; Borghi, Ensor et al. 2006). 
Distance and time costs are most important when the price of medical care is low or zero (Dor, 
Gertler et al. 1987; Borghi, Ensor et al. 2006). Family members often accompany the patient 
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when seeking care inflating time costs even further (Sauerborn, Ibrango et al. 1995). Research 
findings from countries in Asia (Schwartz, Akin et al. 1988; Raghupathy 1996; Borghi, Ensor et 
al. 2004; Rahman, Mosley et al. 2007; Mayhew, Hansen et al. 2008) and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Hodgkin 1996; Thaddeus, Nangalia et al. 2004) confirm the negative impact of distance on the 
use of skilled attendance at delivery in health facilities. Other findings based on qualitative 
research methods also cite distance as a barrier to accessing maternity care (Amooti-Kaguna and 
Nuwaha 2000; Griffiths and Stephenson 2001; Phoxay, Okumura et al. 2001). However, 
evidence suggests distance may no longer be a deterrent when women have severe complications 
(Chakraborty, Islam et al. 2003; Borghi, Ensor et al. 2004), consistent with findings regarding 
severity of illness from the general health care literature (Borah 2006). 
Other determinants of demand 
Numerous other factors emerge from the literature as being important in determining maternal 
health care seeking (Thaddeus and Maine 1994; Say and Raine 2007; Gabrysch and Campbell 
2009). Quality of care is expected to be of particular importance in maternal health because many 
preventive practices related to childbirth can prove to be iatrogenic when performed by unskilled 
providers, violating the principal precept 'first, do no harm. ' (Graham, Cairns et al. 2006). 9 Poor 
perceived quality is an important variable in explaining provider choice and the observed practice 
of by-passing the nearest provider (Kyomuhendo 2003; Bawa, Umar et al. 2004; Duong, Binns et 
al. 2004; Audo, Ferguson et al. 2005). 10 Studies of women's views cite a lack of drugs, supplies, 
and qualified staff, the attitude of health professionals and cultural acceptability of services as 
common grievances and reasons for choosing to deliver at home (Prevention of Maternal 
Mortality Network 1992; Griffiths and Stephenson 2001; Duong, Binns et al. 2004; Blum, 
Sharmin et al. 2006). Other researchers, using more objective measures of quality that are 
defined in structural terms, have found a positive association between service use and quality 
(Schwartz, Akin et al. 1988; Acharya and Cleland 2000; Lindelow 2004). 
Quality of care is commonly understood as "the degree to which health services for individuals and populations 
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge" (Institute 
of Medicine 2001). 
1° There are likely to be considerable problems in interpreting subjective measures of quality of care because of 
courtesy bias and the fact that perceptions of quality are probably influenced by patient beliefs around health care 
standards and how well informed clients are of their own health needs (McGlynn 1997; Annandale and Hunt 1998). 
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The influence of predisposing factors or traits of the individual on demand has been explored 
extensively, particularly through analysis of Demographic and Health Survey data sets. 
Socioeconomic status - whether it is measured in terms of income, wealth, occupation or 
education - is consistently found to be an important determinant of service use and choice of 
provider. Women of a higher socioeconomic status are more likely to deliver in the presence of a 
skilled attendant or in a health facility (Elo 1992; Thaddeus and Maine 1994; Raghupathy 1996; 
Addai 1998; Bolam, Manandhar et al. 1998; Addai 2000; Celik and Hotchkiss 2000; Magadi, 
Diamond et al. 2000; Griffiths and Stephenson 2001; Falkingham 2003; Letamo and Rakgoasi 
2003; Mekonnen and Mekonnen 2003; Anson 2004; Bawa, Umar et al. 2004; Lindelow 2004; 
Stekelenburg, Kyanamina et al. 2004; Matthews, Ramakrishna et al. 2005; Chowdhury, 
Ronsmans et al. 2006; Furuta and Salway 2006; Ikeako, Onah et al. 2006; Islam, Chowdhury et 
al. 2006; Chowdhury, Islam et al. 2007; Rahman, Mosley et al. 2007; Sharma, Sawangdee et al. 
2007; Anwar, Sami et al. 2008; Sepehri, Sarnia et al. 2008). Education is likely to proxy not only 
socioeconomic status but also reflect multiple factors linked to assimilation of information, 
perceptions of need and the value attached to skilled delivery care (Furuta and Salway 2006). As 
Leonard argues, consumers do not conform to the medical model of health seeking behaviour as 
ill-informed, passive recipients of care, but rather take an active role in the choice of treatment 
options and do differentiate between caregivers, assessing attributes of both their illness and the 
providers (Leonard 2000). 
Numerous other characteristics of the individual or household are shown to be associated with use 
of maternal health services. These include age, parity, ethnicity, caste, religion, marital status, 
residence (urban / rural), migration, household size, concern of the husband, autonomy of the 
woman in household decisions, and past experiences of illness and contact with service providers 
(Bolam, Manandhar et al. 1998; Addai 2000; Celik and Hotchkiss 2000; Magadi, Diamond et al. 
2000; Bloom, Wypij et al. 2001; Chakraborty, Islam et al. 2002; Kyomuhendo 2003; Letamo and 
Rakgoasi 2003; Anson 2004; Bawa, Umar et al. 2004; Furuta and Salway 2006; Gyimah, Takyi et 
al. 2006; Ikeako, Onah et al. 2006; Chowdhury, Islam et al. 2007; Koenig, Jamil et al. 2007; 
Magadi, Agwanda et al. 2007). Qualitative research has shed light on further barriers to health 
care seeking for maternal care such as societal expectations, fear of and trust in service providers, 
stigma of abnormal birth, cultural acceptability of services, social influence of spouse, beliefs in 
the normality of childbirth, security, and women's knowledge of obstetric care (Prevention of 
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Maternal Mortality Network 1992; Amooti-Kaguna and Nuwaha 2000; Afsana and Rashid 2001; 
Phoxay, Okumura et al. 2001; Blum, Sharmin et al. 2006; Parkhurst and Rahman 2007). 
Last, morbidity and severity of morbidity are found to be positively associated with use of 
professional delivery care services (van den Heuvel, de Mey et al. 1999; Amooti-Kaguna and 
Nuwaha 2000; Afsana and Rashid 2001; Paul and Rumsey 2002; Glei, Goldman et al. 2003; 
Matthews, Ramakrishna et al. 2005; Islam, Chowdhury et al. 2006). Over a third of women in 
Nepal, for example, gave an absence of complications as their primary reason for delivering at 
home (Borghi, Ensor et al. 2004). Few women are cognisant of the risk of complications at 
childbirth (Thaddeus, Nangalia et al. 2004) and thus perceptions may not reflect the true value of 
skilled delivery care. 
2.2.4 Summary 
The human capital model provides the basic theoretical framework to examine investment in 
health. Standard consumer theory has then typically been used to study health care seeking 
choices. Further theoretical insights on market failures in health and inconsistent time preferences 
throw light on potential mechanisms which may lead individuals to consume less health care than 
is privately and socially optimal. However, they have rarely provided the basis for empirical work 
in health. 
The broad consensus from the empirical literature is that the price of health services has a negative 
effect on utilisation. Demand appears to be relatively inelastic with own price elasticities often 
well below unity. In contrast, the uptake of simple health care technologies seems to be highly 
sensitive to price changes at around zero. The literature also points towards many other factors 
that are associated with health seeking at childbirth, including quality of care; income, education, 
and other measures of socioeconomic status; severity of illness; and other individual or household 
characteristics. The next section reviews the evidence on where demand-side incentives have been 
tried and whether they have been successful. 
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2.3 Demand-side incentives 
2.3.1 Rationale for intervention 
Low utilisation of health services is a familiar problem in developing countries. A combination of 
both supply and demand side barriers restrict access to services, particularly for poorer 
households who are in greatest need of health care (Gwatkin 2003; Ensor and Cooper 2004; 
Gwatkin 2004; Travis, Bennett et al. 2004). Government strategies to address this challenge have 
traditionally focused on the provision of health services, but increasingly more attention is being 
given to demand-side interventions. One possible measure is to provide financial incentives to 
individuals in return for positive behaviour in health, otherwise known as demand-side incentives 
(Ensor 2004; Eichler and Levine 2009). Such incentives, given as cash or vouchers, serve to 
subsidise the price of the health services that they target in the expectation that a fall in the price 
will raise demand and, and in turn, utilisation. 
Equity and market failures are the two main economic arguments put forward to justify 
government intervention (Jack 1999; Hurley 2000). There is strong evidence that the poor have 
inferior access and make lower use of publicly allocated resources and services (Demery 2000; 
Institute of Policy Studies 2001; van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2006). This is for a variety of 
reasons, including physical access to facilities, the allocation of resources away from diseases 
proliferating amongst the poor, ignorance of treatment options and household constraints 
preventing health seeking behaviour. Therefore, a common feature of many demand-side 
incentive programmes is a focus on poor socioeconomic groups within the population (Fiszbein, 
Schady et al. 2008). 
The presence of market failures leads to a welfare loss as individuals under-invest in health. To 
argue, however, in favour of the use of demand-side incentives over any other type of 
intervention requires a closer examination of the various market failures given that the root cause 
of under-investment in health may determine the most appropriate action to be taken. If, for 
example, families fail to invest in health because they are unable to get access to credit, the 
economic argument would favour an unconditional cash transfer instead of a demand-side 
incentive because it gives the family the freedom to invest in whatever is most highly valued. 
There are other reasons, however, why individuals may not be capable of behaving in ways that 
are in their best long term interest. 
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As mentioned in section 2.2.1, private investment in health capital may be too low if individuals 
have inconsistent or heterogeneous time preferences, if they live in a household in which there is a 
conflict of interest yet are unable to take individual decisions and if they have erroneous beliefs 
that are persistent or too costly to correct through better information. In all these cases, 
individual welfare will be higher with a demand-side incentive rather than the equivalent amount 
given as a cash transfer with no conditions attached (Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2008). In essence, this 
is the argument behind merit goods, in which a social planner places a greater weight on the 
consumption of a good than that placed by the individual herself (Besley 1988). Beyond private 
inefficiencies, positive externalities in health may justify demand-side incentives. Preventive 
interventions are often thought to hold the qualities of an externality. Individuals may under- 
consume preventive health care if they do not fully internalise the cost of future curative care, 
which is likely to be subsidised by society and unable to be credibly withheld (Jack 1999). 
2.3.2 Design, scale and country uptake of programmes 
Demand-side incentives reward individuals or households for positive behaviour in health. The 
literature review encompasses two types of demand-side incentive (Table 2.1). The first, 
conditional cash transfers (CCT), target poor households, providing a schedule of relatively large 
payments that are conditional on household members engaging in specific health seeking 
behaviours. The programme rules require that households undertake the specified actions, 
otherwise they may be at risk of having their benefits withdrawn. The programmes are intended 
not only to encourage investment in human capital but also to act as a social safety net to guard 
against poverty, as implied by the amount and regularity of the cash transfer. " A common feature 
of CCT programmes is that the financial incentive is provided in addition to highly subsidised 
health services, generating in effect a negative price. CCT programmes have been implemented 
across Latin America and a number of other developing countries, the most well-known being 
Mexico's Oportunidades. 
A second set of programmes are distinct in that they provide just a one-off financial incentive to 
encourage certain health-related behaviours. Typically, the sums of money are small, the benefit 
is universal rather than targeted towards the poor and the focus is purely on incentivising greater 
Note that the definition used by Lagarde et al. (2007) in their review of conditional cash transfer programmes 
differs, in that they do not require the intervention to target poor households. 
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use of a specific health interventions. Note that the distinction made between the two types of 
demand-side incentive programmes should not be confused with the distinction between 
conditional and unconditional cash transfer programmes. The question of whether to impose 
conditions on cash transfers is a separate issue and of limited relevance here because unconditional 
cash transfers do not fall within the definition of demand-side incentives. 
Table 2.1 Overview of demand-side incentive programmes in health (non-exhaustive) 
Scale Programme Payments 
A. Conditional cash transfer programmes 
Nationwide Mexico (Oportunidades) CCT (poor) 
Brazil (Bolsa Familia) CCT (poor) 
Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo Humano) CCT (poor) 
Colombia (Familias en Acciön) CCT (poor) 
Jamaica (PATH) CCT (poor) 
Regional Chile (Solidario) ... CCT (poor) 
Turkey (Social Risk Mitigation Project) CCT (poor) 
Small (pilot) Honduras (Programa de Asignaciön Familiar) CCT (poor) 
Kenya (CT-OVC) CCT (orphans) 
Nicaragua (Red de Protecciön Social) CCT (poor) 
B. Financial incentive programmes 
Nationwide India (JSY scheme) CCT (poor); provider payment 
Tanzania (NVS-ITN) Voucher (universal) 
.......... Small (pilot) Bangladesh (DSF) Voucher (universal); provider payment 
Malawi (HIV test status) CCT (universal) 
The scale of CCT programmes varies considerably, from 11 million households targeted by 
Brazil's Bolsa Familia to just a few thousand families in Kenya's programme. They range from 
national programmes that play a central role in a country's welfare system to small pilot projects 
testing the concept of financial incentives. The geographical spread of CCT programmes shows a 
concentration in mainly middle-income countries, " which are characterised by adequate health 
infrastructure and strong administrative capacity, at least when compared with low-income 
countries (Lagarde, Haines et al. 2007). The conditions imposed by the CCT programmes are 
preventive health visits for young children (eg. vaccination, growth monitoring, and nutrition 
supplementation), and health education workshops. The size of payments ranges from 6 percent 
of household consumption in Ecuador to. almost 30 percent in Nicaragua. The payment systems 
cover a range of possibilities - from the use of automated teller machines in Brazil to post offices 
in Kenya. The costs of administration range from 4 percent to 12 percent (Grosh, Del Ninno et 
12 In the case of Honduras and Nicaragua, they were low-income countries when they launched the CCT 
programmes 
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al. 2008). Many of the CCT programmes have been subjected to rigorous evaluations, typically 
undertaken by external independent evaluators. 
Financial incentive programmes focus on encouraging use of specific health interventions and tend 
to have been implemented in low-income countries. They include programmes that provide 
financial incentives conditional on: use of maternity services (Bangladesh and India); purchase of 
insecticide treated nets (Tanzania); and the collection of HIV test results (Malawi). The payments 
are small (ranging from US$1 to US$36) and are given as a one-off benefit. The payment systems 
are more basic than those used in the CCT programmes, relying on cash in hand or vouchers. 
The literature contains little evidence on the implementation of demand-side incentive 
programmes beyond a description of programme design. One review of CCT programmes 
provides estimates of programme uptake, using programme coverage of the poor as a proxy 
measure (Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2008). " It finds that 54 percent and 64 percent of eligible 
households received the benefits in Brazil and Ecuador respectively. Individuals with more income 
and education were less likely to participate suggesting self-selection provides a reason for non- 
participation. In Honduras, 78 percent of target households received the health-related voucher 
(Morris, Flores et al. 2004). The payment system in Mexico works well, with 98 percent of 
payments made on time (Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2008). Qualitative evidence from a study of 
India's programme points to various problems in implementation, including low awareness 
among the target population, burdensome administration, and delays in the women receiving the 
conditional cash transfer (Devadasan, Elias et al. 2008). 
2.3.3 Empirical evidence on impacts 
The neglect of implementation issues in the literature is in sharp contrast to the relatively rich 
evidence on the effect of demand-side incentive programmes. In many instances, evaluations of 
CCT programmes have been able to benefit from randomised designs. There have been a number 
of reviews of the impact of CCT programmes on health seeking behaviour and health outcomes 
(Lagarde, Haines et al. 2007; Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2008; Glassman, Todd et al. 2009). They are 
consistent in their finding that CCTs can encourage greater use of simple preventive interventions 
and, in some cases, improve health outcomes. The findings from evaluations of demand-side 
" It is not obvious that this a good measure of programme uptake because the programme never intended to cover all 
of the poor. 
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incentive programmes are summarised in Table 2.2, which is reproduced using information from 
tables contained within the reviews of the literature mentioned above. 
Demand-side incentive programmes have had a positive impact on the utilisation of various types 
of health services. In Malawi, a pilot project was found to increase the percentage of individuals 
who collected their HIV test results by 44 percentage points (Thornton 2008). The programme in 
Honduras increased utilisation of prenatal care by women, routine paediatric examinations and 
child growth monitoring services (Morris, Flores et al. 2004). Similarly, in Jamaica, Colombia 
and Nicaragua, the programmes encouraged greater use of child preventive health visits 
(Attanasio, Battistin E et al. 2005; Maluccio and Flores 2005; Levy and Ohls 2007; Macours, 
Schady et al. 2008). No significant impact on health visits was found in Mexico, Chile, and 
Ecuador (Gertler 2000; Galasso 2007; Paxson and Schady 2008). The results of the impact of 
these programmes on immunisation coverage were mixed. There were positive impacts on 
immunisation rates in Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua (based on administrative data but not 
household data) and Turkey (Morris, Flores et al. 2004; Attanasio, Gomez et al. 2005; Ahmed, 
Adato et al. 2007; Barnham and Maluccio 2008). Oportunidades in Mexico, however, failed to 
have any impact on immunisation coverage, perhaps because rates were already so high, at over 
90 percent (Barnham 2005). As is clear from Table 2.2, the evidence on financial incentives is 
limited almost exclusively to the use of simple health technologies. More complex health services, 
whose quality of care is more difficult for patients to assess, have rarely been targeted using 
financial incentives. 
In terms of anthropometric outcomes, a number of programmes showed positive impacts for 
some age groups. The programmes in Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua increased height for age 
(Gertler 2004; Rivera, Sotres-Alvarez et al. 2004; Attanasio, G6mez et al. 2005; Behrman and 
Hoddinott 2005; Maluccio and Flores 2005). There was no significant effect on child growth 
indicators in Ecuador and Honduras (Hoddinott 2008; Paxson and Schady 2008), and in Brazil the 
impact was even negative (Morris, Olinto et al. 2004). There were further mixed results in terms 
of programme effects on anaemia or haemoglobin levels (Gertler 2004; Paxson and Schady 2008). 
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Table 2.2 Impact of demand-side incentives on measures of service utilisation and health status 
Programme Outcome 
Age 
group 
Treatment 
effect 
Size of incentive Evaluation 
design 
Brazil Height-for-age Z score <24 months -0.110 9% of per capita R 
(Bolsa Alimentacao) (0.130) spending 
24-28 months -0.190 
(0.110) 
49-83 months -0.040 
(0.090) 
Chile Regular checkups (%) 0-6 years 2.4 7% of per capita RDD 
(Solidario) (2.7) spending 
Colombia Child had growth 0-1 years 22.8*** 17% of per capita PSM with 
(Familias en Acciön) monitoring (%) (6.7) spending DD 
2-4 years 33.2*** 
(11.5) 
>4 years 1.5* 
(0.8) 
DPT vaccination (%) <24 months 8.9* 
(4.7) 
24-48 months 3.5 
(2.6) 
>48 months 3.2 
(3.9) 
Height-for-age Z score <24 months 0.161* 
(0.085) 
24-48 months 0.011 
(0.055) 
>48 months 0.012 
(0.033) 
Probability of diarrhoea <24 months 0.106*b 
reported in rural areas (0.059) 
(%) 24-28 months -0.109**° 
.. _ 
(0.037) 
Ecuador Child had growth 3-7 years 2.7 10% of per capita R 
(Bono de Desarrolfo monitoring (%) (3.8) spending 
Humano) 
Height-for-age Z score 0-23 months -0.030 
(0.090) 
24-47 months -0.060 
(0.090) 
48-71 months -0.080 
.......... . __ .. .... .... ... ... 
(0.090) 
Honduras Child taken to health 0-3 years 20.2*** 9% of per capita R 
(Programa de centre in past month (%) (4.7) spending 
Asignaciön Familiar) Women who completed Pregnant 18.7*** 
>5 prenatal (%) n/a 
DPT vaccination (%) <3 years 6.9*** 
(3.0) 
Tetanus vaccination (%) <3 years 4.2 
(7.1) 
Measles vaccination (%) <3 years -0.2 
(4.7) 
Height-for-age Z score 0-60 months -0.02 
n/a 
Jamaica Number of visits to 0-6 years Yý N 0.278**** 10% of per capita RDD 
(PATH) health centre for (0.085) spending 
preventive care 
Malawi -- Individuals who went to Adults 43.8*** $0.1-$0.2 voucher R 
(HIV test status) centre to collect HIV test (2.2) 
.......................... ....... .................. _...... ... _ 
result (%) 
_.... _... _...... _............. ....... _.......... _.............. . _...... _........... -........................ ........... .. _....... ........ ... .... _............ _...... .. _..... _. 
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Programme Outcome Age 
group 
Treatment 
effect 
Size of incentive Evaluation 
design 
Mexico Number of visits to 0-2 years -0.0.32' 20% of per capita R 
(Oportunidades) health facilities in past (0.037) spending 
month 3-5 years 0.027' 
(0.019) 
Tuberculosis vaccination <12 months 1.6 
(%) (2.4) 
Measles vaccination (%) 12-23 months 2.8 
(2.8) 
Height (cm) 12-36 months 0.959*** 
(0.334) 
4-12 months 0.503 
(0.524) 
Change in height (cm) 12-36 months 1.016** 
(0.398) 
36-48 months -0.349 
(0.529) 
Children whose mother <3 years -4.7""' 
reported they were ill in (2.0) 
past month (%) 3-5 years -3.2""" 
(12)_. 
_. _. Nicaragua Child taken to health 0-3 years 8.4 27% of per capita R 
(Red de Protecciön centre (%) (5.9) spending 
Social) 
Child weighed at health 0-3 years 13.1' 
centre (%) (7.5) 
Full vaccination (%) 0-3 years 13.0 
(9.0) 
Height-for-age Z score <60 months 0.17"' 
(0.080) 
Underweight (%) <60 months -6.0" 
Tanzania Children sleeping under <1 year 18"" $2.45 voucher BA 
(NVS-ITN) an insecticide treated n/a 
net (%) <5 years 14** 
...... . _..... . ............. . Turkey Fully vaccinated <6 years 13.6*** 6% of per capita RDD 
(Social Risk Mitigation (4.2) spending 
Project) 
Note: Treatment effect is the reported coefficient, with the standard error in parentheses. The unit of measurement is in 
percentage points, unless stated otherwise (see outcome). "' denotes coefficients are significant at 1%, " at 5%, and * at 
10%. The unit is number of visits. b The unit is relative change in the probability. CCT = conditional cash transfer. RCT = 
randomised controlled trial. PSM = propensity score matching. DD = difference-in-difference. RDD = regression discontinuity 
design. BA = before and after. 
In addition to improved nutrition, demand-side incentive programmes are expected to reduce 
mortality and improve health status. The only evidence on mortality comes from Mexico, where 
the programme showed a negative impact on infant and maternal mortality (Barnham 2005; 
Hernandez, Ramirez et al. 2005). Moreover, in Mexico and Colombia (but not Jamaica), studies 
reported a reduction in the incidence of some childhood illnesses among recipients of the 
programme (Gertler 2004; Attanasio, Battistin E et al. 2005; 
Levy and OhIs 2007). Finally, 
Oportunidades in Mexico was shown to have a positive impact on adult 
health status (Gertler 
2000). 
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There remain a number of key gaps in the literature. First, few studies were able to capture 
unintended consequences of the programmes. The exceptions include Honduras, in which there is 
some evidence of increased fertility as a result of the programme, and in Brazil where the negative 
impact on child growth indicators may be the consequence of mothers misinterpreting the 
eligibility rules and keeping their children malnourished so as to qualify for cash transfers (Morris, 
Flores et al. 2004; Morris, Olinto et al. 2004; Stecklov, Winters et al. 2006). 
Second, the issue of efficiency has also been given only limited consideration (de Janvry and 
Sadoulet 2006). It has been noted that paying all beneficiaries, regardless of their expected 
compliance with the conditions, will lead to high costs per marginal visit. Efficiency can be 
improved through effective identification and then targeting of only those individuals, whose 
behaviour is altered by the financial incentive. Relatedly, not many of the programmes have been 
subjected to an economic evaluation. There is a cost-benefit analysis of the Familias en Accion in 
Colombia (Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometria et al. 2006) and a cost-effectiveness analysis of 
Progresa in Mexico (Coady and Parker 2004). 
Third, few of the evaluations are able to disentangle the various pathways or mechanisms through 
which the effects may have operated. For example, it is important to know whether the effect of 
the cash transfer on behaviour is due to an income effect or a substitution effect. Filmer and 
Schady (2009) tease out the two effects and conclude that it is in fact a substitution effect of the 
cash transfer that influences education outcomes. 
Fourth, further questions relate to which components of the programme are most important. 
Many of the CCT programmes include health promotion and supply-side strengthening activities 
alongside the provision of cash transfers. However, evaluation findings almost always attribute the 
impact to the CCT, ignoring potentially important interaction effects between supply and 
demand. In some cases, the supply-side was strengthened only in intervention areas, such that it is 
not clear which component of the programme worked. " In other cases, the supply-side was 
strengthened in both intervention and control areas. Thus, it may be the interaction between 
supply and demand, and not just the CCT, that generates the positive impact on health seeking. 
This issue is rarely given explicit recognition in the literature, although there is some evidence 
" The programme in Nicaragua, for example, strengthened the provision of services in intervention areas that also 
received the conditional cash transfers. In contrast, mobile health teams were deployed in both intervention and 
control areas in Mexico. 
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that weaknesses on the supply side inhibit the effectiveness of CCTs (Bchrman, Parker et al. 
2005). 
2.3.4 Summary 
The economic rationale for providing financial incentives to encourage greater use of health 
services is based on the premise that private investment in health, particularly among the poorest, 
is inefficiently low. To date, CCT programmes have been adopted mostly by middle-income 
countries in Latin America targeting simple health-related behaviours. Other demand-side 
incentive programmes in low-income countries focus solely on raising demand for health services 
and are not designed to act as a social safety net. For this reason, they tend to offer a smaller sum 
of cash as a one-off payment once individuals meet the health conditions. 
Programme evaluations provide a rich body of evidence as to the impact of demand-side 
incentives on health care seeking and, to a lesser extent, health outcomes. Broadly, the literature 
suggests that financial incentives to consumers can be an effective means to encourage greater use 
of simple preventive interventions and, in some cases but certainly not all, improve health 
outcomes. However, there is a paucity of information on processes, which means little is known 
about the factors that constrain or facilitate implementation, and an insufficient understanding of 
the mechanisms through impacts are generated. 
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2.4 Approaches to evaluation 
2.4.1 Purpose of an evaluation 
It widely recognised that policymaking should be informed by evidence if interventions are to 
improve the health of individuals and families (Eriksson 2000). 15 Moreover, there is growing 
support for rigorous evaluations in response to demands for greater accountability of how funds 
are spent. Past evaluations that have simply interviewed programme managers about processes are 
no longer regarded as satisfactory (Ravallion 2008). 
An evaluation should aim to fill knowledge gaps of highest priority and not be driven by 
preferences for any particular empirical method (Ravallion 2009; Rodrik 2009). In fact, the 
research questions identified by policymakers are likely to determine the feasibility and choice of 
empirical methods. It is widely recognised, for instance, that health systems are key to 
determining health outcomes, yet assignment of health system reforms can rarely be influenced by 
a researcher, let alone randomised (Mills, Gilson et al. 2008). Different decision makers might be 
interested in different questions, and thus these competing demands are also likely to influence 
the design of the evaluation (Habicht, Victora et al. 1999). On rare occasions, for example, 
policymakers may be satisfied with knowing whether targets set before the start of an intervention 
have been achieved. In most cases, however, policymakers are concerned with attribution and 
expect an evaluation to make inferences about causation. Thus, one of the main challenges of an 
evaluation is to establish internal validity. 
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that it is impossible to observe at any one time the 
outcome of an individual exposed and not exposed to an intervention (Holland 1986). An impact 
evaluation must assess an intervention's performance against an explicit counterfactual, which is 
typically a situation in the absence of the intervention. Sometimes, however, it may be 
appropriate to evaluate one intervention in tandem with another plausible alternative to reflect 
the fact that policymaking is often about making choices. 
A number of reasons why evaluations often fail to address important gaps in knowledge have been 
identified (Savedoff, Levine et al. 2006; Ravallion 2009). First, the demanders of evaluations may 
IS The terms "policy", "programme" and "intervention" are used interchangeably in this section to refer generically to 
what is being evaluated. 
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be poorly placed to assess the quality of the research and therefore opt for methods that are quick 
and less costly, unappreciative of the fact that they might lead to weak causal inferences. Second, 
programme managers and other stakeholders often have considerable control over what gets 
evaluated, leading to a bias towards programmes that are expected to work well. Third, 
evaluations are likely to reap knowledge benefits beyond the specific programme, but this 
externality is not considered by programme managers leading to an underinvestment in 
evaluations. 
There have been calls recently to shift the emphasis, or rather the scope, of evaluations. It has 
been argued that little has been learnt from the evaluation of interventions or projects in the past 
few decades because the focus has been solely on whether the intervention worked and not 
extended to exploring why it worked (Pawson and Tilley 1997). The current feeling is that more 
needs to be understood about the fundamental mechanisms that determine why an intervention 
works and the conditions in which it can be expected to work (Deaton 2009). This viewpoint has 
been articulated across a range of disciplines, in the economics, development and medical 
literature (Heckman 1992; Heckman and Smith 1995; Craig, Dieppe et al. 2008; White 2009), 
and essentially refers to the problem of external validity. For an evaluation to guide future 
policymaking, its findings should be generalisable to other populations and settings. 
2.4.2 Complex interventions in health 
The medical literature refers to some interventions as complex (Craig, Dieppe et al. 2008). For 
evaluation purposes, this is often motivated by the need to distinguish between simple biomedical 
products and more complicated interventions. While there is no sharp distinction between a 
simple and a complex intervention, drugs trials are often in mind when the former are mentioned 
(Shiell, Hawe et al. 2008). The evaluation of a drug is an entirely different proposition to the 
evaluation of, say, a national health financing policy because the causal pathway of a drug is short 
and its biological effect generally universal (Victora, Habicht et al. 2004). Complex interventions 
are akin to the type of intervention a social scientist is typically interested in, that is, one that 
seeks to influence behaviour. 
Interventions may be described as complex if they contain several interacting components. 
Complexity may also refer to the range of outcomes affected by the intervention, the number of 
different stakeholders involved in its delivery, how prone the intervention is to being changed 
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during the implementation process, the number of different groups targeted by the intervention, 
and the number and degree of behavioural responses required by implementers and recipients 
(Pawson, Greenhalgh et al. 2005; Craig, Dieppe et al. 2008). The complexity of an intervention 
is likely to have implications for its evaluation (Pawson, Greenhalgh et al. 2005; Craig, Dieppe et 
al. 2008). First, and most importantly, external validity is generally a much greater issue. A 
vaccine that works on a child in one country, for instance, is likely to work on a child in another. 
In contrast, the effect of a complex intervention may be influenced by variations in preferences 
and constraints between individuals and the context in which it operates (Victora, Habicht et al. 
2004; Imbens 2009). Second, a strong theoretical understanding of how the intervention leads to 
outcomes is needed. Third, sample sizes may need to be larger in order to understand better the 
variability in treatment effects. Fourth, a larger range of outcomes may need to be studied, 
including those that pick up unintended consequences. Last, attention will need to be given to 
implementation processes to allow interpretation of impact findings. These issues are discussed in 
greater detail below. 
2.4.3 Empirical methods to identify impacts 
A standard evaluation aims to provide a quantitative estimate of an intervention's impact. The 
method with perhaps the longest tradition is the randomised controlled trial, which has been used 
in medicine for decades to assess the efficacy of drugs. For largely ethical reasons, it had rarely 
been used in economics until recently (Duflo, Glennerster et al. 2008). In non-medical 
disciplines, in particular economics, non-experimental evaluation methods have flourished. In 
general, the literature has placed great emphasis on internal validity and study design, leading to a 
deep understanding of selection bias and the assumptions that allow identification of impacts 
(Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). These assumptions are the Achilles heel of any particular 
method. Where their plausibility can be defended, causal inferences will be considered more 
credible. 
The randomised experiment offers the most credible approach to establishing causality. It assigns 
an intervention randomly to units in the population, such that the probability of assignment does 
not vary according to potential outcomes. It assumes that randomisation itself does not affect 
individual behaviour and a treatment on an individual can affect only the potential outcomes of 
that individual, the so-called Stable-Unit-Treatment-Value-Assumption (Rubin 1978). Otherwise, 
..... 
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the randomised experiment invokes few assumptions. The impact of an intervention is simply the 
difference in mean outcomes, a statistic which is easily explained to policymakers. 
Weaknesses in the internal validity of the randomised approach relate not so much to the theory, 
but rather the practical application of the approach. Issues that may arise in the implementation of 
a randomised experiment include the possibility that treated individuals drop-out, control group 
members find close substitutes for the intervention, and randomised assignment differs from 
actual participation. These represent a problem because departure from the assignment will 
almost always be systematic (McKee, Britton et al. 1999). Individuals who are least likely to 
benefit from an intervention may be the least likely to accept assignment. Double blinding is one 
solution to the problem but is rarely, if ever, feasible unless the intervention is a drug or vaccine. 
A more feasible solution is to calculate the impact of the intention to treat, which may also be the 
most policy-relevant parameter. Other responses to the problem are available but they all, at the 
very least, rest on the assumption that the impact of the intervention across individuals is the 
same. If impacts are instead heterogeneous, the estimate of the intervention's effect may not apply 
to the intended study population but rather some subgroup. 
Heterogeneous impacts pose a further, more substantive problem. Policymakers often want to 
know the proportion of the population that benefited from an intervention. However, the mean 
impact is the only statistic of the distribution of the impact that can be calculated from a 
randomised experiment without making further assumptions. An intervention may have a 
beneficial effect on average while at the same time making the majority of the population worse 
off. Responses to this problem include estimation of bounds on aspects of the distribution of the 
effect (Heckman, Smith et al. 1997; Djebbari and Smith 2008), estimation of subgroup impacts in 
a fully interacted regression model (Djebbari and Smith 2008; Ravallion 2008), and non- 
parametric tests of heterogeneity in treatment effects (Crump, Hotz et al. 2008). 
Non-experimental evaluation methods are set apart by their identifying assumptions (Ravallion 
2008; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). A first category of methods assumes that, conditional on 
the observables, there are no unobserved factors that are associated both with exposure to the 
intervention and potential outcomes. The literature refers to this assumption variously as 
unconfoundedness, conditional independence, exogeneity and selection on observables (Imbens 
and Wooldridge 2009). Methods that rest on this assumption include ordinary least squares (OLS) 
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regression and matching methods (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984). The latter represents an 
improvement over the former by carefully selecting a comparison group that is as similar as 
possible to the treatment group in its observable characteristics. Moreover, it is non-parametric 
requiring no ad hoc assumptions about the functional form of the outcome equation. With the 
inclusion of only comparable individuals in the analysis, matching methods require no 
extrapolation outside the region of common support - ie. the region in which both treated and 
untreated individuals with the same characteristics can be observed. An implication of restricting 
the sample to those found in the common support is that the treatment effect refers only to the 
selected subsample of treated individuals. If treatment effects are different across individuals, the 
estimated treatment effect will not correspond to the parameter that the analysis was originally 
intended to estimate - that is, the mean treatment effect over the entire sample. 
The strength of these methods in establishing internal validity essentially rests on the plausibility 
of the unconfoundedness assumption, which, as Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) note, is 
controversial. The richness of the available data, an understanding of the factors determining 
programme participation, the methods of data collection, and whether treated and untreated 
individuals are taken from a common setting are all factors that will influence the credibility of 
impact estimates (Heckman, Ichimura et al. 1997; Heckman, Ichimura et al. 1998; Blundell, 
Dearden et al. 2005). 
The second category of non-experimental methods relaxes the assumption of unconfoundedness. 
This set of methods includes instrumental variable estimation, regression discontinuity designs 
and difference-in-difference approaches. 16 Instrumental variables affect the outcome only through 
their influence on the treatment variable, and are at the same time uncorrelated with the 
unobservables (ie. the error term in a regression model) (Angrist, Imbens et al. 1996). The latter 
is called the exclusion restriction and is the key identifying assumption of instrumental variable 
estimation. Unfortunately, it is also untestable. In a world of heterogeneous impacts, instrumental 
variable estimation provides the local average treatment effect (LATE) as long as the influence of 
the instrument on uptake of the programme is in the same direction for all individuals whose 
behaviour changes as a result. The LATE provides the treatment effect for those individuals 
induced to take up the intervention by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist 1994). Interpretation 
of the impact parameter is difficult when this subgroup is essentially unobserved (Ravallion 2008; 
16 Other methods not considered here include econometric selection models and bound analyses. 
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Deaton 2009). Moreover, this subgroup of the population may or may not be of interest to 
policymakers. Generally, the local average treatment effect is of most relevance when the 
instrument corresponds to a policy change, but less so when it refers to individual characteristics. 
Regression discontinuity designs take advantage of known eligibility rules - such as thresholds 
defined at a particular age or income - for participation in a programme. It mimics a randomised 
experiment by comparing the outcomes of treated and untreated individuals at or close to the 
eligibility threshold. At best it can identify a treatment effect for those at the threshold, similar in 
many ways to the LATE of instrumental variable estimation. 
The difference-in-difference method is used widely in the literature (Ashenfelter and Card 1985). 
It requires data on two groups of individuals before and after the adoption of a programme. In one 
group, individuals participate in the programme in the second time period and in the second 
group, control individuals never participate in the programme. The impact of the programme is 
measured as the difference between the changes over time in each group. Identification rests on 
two assumptions, that there are common time effects across groups and participation depends on 
observed and unobserved permanent individual characteristics. It is unable to control for changes 
in unobservables that influence both participation and outcomes. 
As Cartwright (2007) argues, no single method of evaluation or study design dominates; there is 
no gold standard despite the claims of certain groups to the contrary (Banerjee and Duflo 2008). 
When the choice of method is dictated by the research question, it becomes apparent that some 
methods may not be feasible. A fixation on internal validity over all else not only neglects 
important research questions, but fails to give due consideration to the generalisability of study 
findings. 
2.4.4 Problem of external validity 
Internal validity is necessary for external validity (Duflo, Glennerster et al. 2008; Dekkers, Elm 
et al. 2009). However, if one accepts that the purpose of an evaluation is to guide future 
policymaking, the study should also be designed to inform the question of external validity 
(Rodrik 2009). In this sense, there appears to be little justification for a focus on internal validity 
over external validity (Rothwell 2005; Rodrik 2009), as sometimes argued (Cook and Campbell 
1979). The contrast in many papers between the rigour applied to establish internal validity and 
....... _. ....... ..... .... __. ..... . 49 Page 
the vague statements about the generalisability of findings serves to illustrate this imbalance 
(Cartwright 2007). Frustration with the empirical literature in improving our understanding of 
why interventions do or do not work is closely tied to this question of external validity (Deaton 
2009). 
Concerns over external validity have long been voiced in the medical literature, but it remains 
neglected (Rothwell 2005). Many of the criticisms are levelled at randomised experiments, 
typically characterised as a black-box that can reveal little outside the immediate context of the 
study. However, other methods per se are not immune to this charge and, in some respects, the 
focus on randomised experiments obscures this fact (Banerjee and Duflo 2008). Still, randomised 
experiments may be more susceptible than other methods to the problem of weak external validity 
because they often lack coverage over time and space (Rodrik 2009). The implication is that 
evaluations with greater coverage over these two dimensions will tend to have greater external 
validity. 
It is only recently that researchers have begun to conceptualise external validity. While a number 
of frameworks have been suggested in the medical literature (Rothwell 2005; Bonell, Oakley et 
al. 2006; Dekkers, Elm et al. 2009), these issues are only just beginning to be touched upon in the 
economics literature (Banerjee and Duflo 2008; Heckman 2008; Imbens 2009). As Rothwell 
(2005) states, an obvious but important first step is to ask "to whom do the results apply? ". This 
goes beyond defining what Dekkers (2009) refers to as the target population, but also defining the 
setting or context to which the findings are to be generalised. Few studies state explicitly the 
target population or setting for which the intervention is being considered. 
Victora et a]. (2005) provide a useful distinction between factors that affect impact through their 
influence on implementation and factors that affect impact directly. Implementation-related 
factors seem to fall into a number of broad categories. First, there is the issue of scale. Findings 
from a small-scale project or pilot programme may not generalise to a national policy. Yet 
policymakers are almost always more interested in the latter. Scale is likely to be an important 
influence on impact for the following reasons: large-scale programmes may be more likely to 
attract rent-seeking from corrupt officials (Deaton 2009); the intervention itself may get 
modified, particularly if local adaptation is encouraged; and resources to supervise and administer 
the programme may be more stretched. Also, general equilibrium effects - although unrelated to 
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delivery of the intervention - may operate at a national level (Heckman, Lochner et al. 1998). 
Randomised experiments are particularly vulnerable to this problem since, for logistical and 
political reasons, they can rarely evaluate interventions delivered on a large scale (Black 1996). 
This is not true in all cases and indeed there are excellent examples of randomised experiments of 
national policies, for example in politics and in health (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Gertler 
2004). " 
Second, the institutional environment and broader context around implementation may affect 
delivery of an intervention and, in turn, its impact (Pawson and Tilley 1997). For example, great 
care may be taken and considerable capacity made available in the delivery of an intervention 
during a trial or pilot (Deaton 2009). There has been criticism of randomised trials that evaluate 
interventions delivered by non-governmental organisations (NGO) because their performance in 
this regard is likely to exceed that of government, yet it is the latter which typically interests 
policymakers. 18 Aspects of the health system that are important for the delivery of an intervention 
may also be different between the study setting and the target setting. Specific factors related to 
the institutional environment might include the level of supervision, the administrative capacity of 
the institution and the incentives faced by implementers (Ravallion 2008). 
Factors affecting impacts directly tend to refer to characteristics of the study population. Again, 
this is a problem for randomised experiments because they are often conducted in small, selected 
sites whose population is likely to differ from the national population (Duflo, Glennerster et al. 
2008). External validity will also be an issue for instrumental variable estimation and regression 
discontinuity designs even when using a national dataset since the local average treatment effect 
applies only to a subset of the population. " When evaluating complex health interventions, 
socioeconomic status, baseline health status, and accessibility to health services are likely to be 
potential effect modifiers. Another less obvious factor relates to whether the appropriate 
outcomes are studied on the appropriate population group or whether the intervention is studied 
17 It is perhaps no coincidence then that these evaluations have attracted immense policy interest. 
18 Randomised experiments in developing countries are most feasible when there is no government involvement 
which probably explains why an NGO often facilitates delivery of the intervention, for example see Manandhar et al. 
(2004). It is not clear to what extent this problem for external validity can be mitigated merely by providing a 
detailed description of the implementation process or by replicating the same experiment in different location 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2008). 
19 This is sometimes framed as a problem for internal validity. 
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for a sufficient amount of time to allow impacts to surface or dissipate (Rothwell 2005; Victora, 
Schellenberg et al. 2005; Habyarimana and Jack 2008; Ravallion 2009) 
2.4.5 Understanding what determines impacts 
The discussion around internal and external validity points towards the need to supplement purely 
quantitative analyses that provide an estimate of mean impact with theoretical insights and data on 
contextual factors. Even the findings from a randomised experiment on their own are unlikely to 
convince a critical reader and must typically be supported by substantive evidence of how the 
intervention influenced the outcome (Victora, Habicht et al. 2004). This is partly because there is 
always a possibility of obtaining a statistically significant finding by chance alone, particularly 
when multiple outcomes are assessed (Freemantle 2001). 
The literature emphasises the importance of having a theoretical understanding of how an 
intervention is expected to change outcomes (Deaton 2009). 20 In some cases the theory may 
already be anchored to a strong body of evidence. A theoretical model, however conceptualised, 
is more or less divorced from time and place (Rothman, Greenland et al. 2008), and provides 
predictions of the intervention's effect, while making explicit the assumptions upon which these 
are based. It can be useful in the early stages of an evaluation to identify specific evaluation 
questions; to inform the development of the intervention; and to provide the basis with which to 
critique the intervention (Weiss 1998; Rossi, Lipsey et al. 2004; Craig, Dieppe et al. 2008). In 
this last respect, theory can play an important role in understanding whether the intervention 
really addresses the problem and whether it will achieve its stated goals, particularly in terms of 
its distributional impact (Devarajan, Squire et al. 1997). 
Perhaps the most formal link between theory and empirical work can be found in economics with 
the estimation of structural models (Attanasio, Meghir et al. 2005; Card and Hyslop 2005; Todd 
and Wolpin 2006). A behavioural model combined with variation from a randomised experiment 
can provide a set of structural parameters that remain fixed when estimating counterfactual 
outcomes. It can be used to make generalisations beyond the study population or particular policy 
20 It should be noted that the literature is not unanimous in this view. Banerjee (2005) argues that one of the strengths 
of randomised experiments is its atheoretical approach, particularly if the theory is weak. Examples exist of evidence 
preceding theory. Doctors in Vienna were advised to wash their hands after evidence suggested this reduced 
mortality. This was based on no understanding of the causal mechanism and it would not be another three decades 
until germ theory was discovered (White 2009). 
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design to understand better what might happen under different policy regimes (Heckman and 
Vytlacil 2007; Heckman and Vytlacil 2007). Similar approaches have been used in an ex-ante 
sense to model the impact of an intervention either as a key input into the initial development of 
an intervention (eg. by allowing a comparison of impacts arising from different policy designs) 
(Torgerson and Byford 2002; Bourguignon and Ferreira 2003; Eldridge, Spencer et al. 2005) or 
to provide a sense of the range of impacts that might be expected from an intervention (Todd and 
Wolpin 2006). 
A theoretical understanding of an intervention may also be useful in hypothesising its causal 
pathway and the individual processes that lead to change. This is in essence the tenet of theory- 
based evaluation (Weiss 1998; Stame 2004). It breaks down the logic of an intervention by 
charting the intermediate steps involved in reaching outcomes, making explicit the assumptions 
that underpin the process and placing emphasis on how context influences outcomes. Z' This type 
of approach has been the basis of a number of studies in developing countries, including an 
evaluation of a nutrition programme in Bangladesh (White and Masset 2007), a multi-country 
evaluation of Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) (Bryce, Victora et al. 2005), 
and the evaluation of vouchers for bed-nets in Tanzania (Hanson, Marchant et al. 2009). 
Research into implementation processes is a critical component of an evaluation (Craig, Dieppe et 
al. 2008). A process evaluation explores intermediate indicators of behaviour, uptake of the 
intervention and the context in which it is delivered (Oakley, Strange et al. 2006). In this way, an 
evaluation can distinguish between a faulty underlying mechanism (failure of concept or theory) 
and a faulty process (poor delivery or implementation) (Oakley, Strange et al. 2006). A process 
evaluation may also assess the fidelity of implementation or, put another way, whether in practice 
the intervention follows closely the stated policy or protocol. These types of information are 
critical in the interpretation of impact findings. Qualitative research is likely to be central to any 
process evaluation because the research questions, such as why uptake of an intervention has been 
low, can rarely be unravelled fully with quantitative data. 
When the analysis is grounded in relevant theory, implementation research can provide insights 
beyond a description of what happened. Frameworks, such as the stage heuristic (Lasswell 1956; 
" The stepwise approach to evaluation, as proposed by Habicht et al. (1999), seems to share many of the same 
principles. 
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Brewer and deLeon 1983), the policy triangle framework (Walt and Gilson 1994) and network 
frameworks (Thatcher 1998), provide broad guidance in which researchers can situate their 
research. Implementation theories are characterised as viewing decision-making as top-down, 
bottom-up or both (Sabatier 2007). Lipsey (1983), for example, places emphasis on how 
implementation of policy is influenced by "street level bureaucrats" or staff involved in the 
frontline delivery of services. The literature on implementation is dominated by studies 
conducted in high income countries (Saetren 2005), and is a surprisingly neglected area in health 
research in developing countries (Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008). 
Another approach to understand what determines impact is through analysis of the heterogeneity 
in treatment effects. This could be done by repeating the same experiment in settings across 
which there is variation in those factors that might be expected to matter most for outcomes (eg. 
institutional environment or scale) (Banerjee and Duflo 2008) or by identifying in one study what 
factors drive impacts, conditional on their being sufficient variation in the relevant variables. As 
Ravallion notes, geographic differences in impacts can be hugely informative, particularly if the 
evaluation is able to measure some of the factors, such as policy design, that may vary by location 
(Ravallion 2009). Ultimately, this line of enquiry is limited by what can be observed. Djebbari 
and Smith, for example, find that some of the heterogeneity in impacts in Mexico's Progresa 
programme is caused by factors unobserved to the researcher (Djebbari and Smith 2008). 
Nevertheless, theory can inform how treatment effects might vary with covariates and efforts 
should be made to obtain data on such variables (Heckman, Smith et al. 1997). Data mining for 
impacts on subgroups defined retrospectively is a concern (Freemantle 2001). 22 However, there 
appears to be some consensus amongst economists that interesting but ex ante unexpected 
subgroup findings can at least provide a set of new hypotheses for further research (Duflo, 
Glennerster et al. 2008; Deaton 2009). 
2.4.6 Summary 
Rigorous evaluations are important for informing policy decisions, but they should focus on the 
issues and questions most relevant to policymakers. Many interventions in health that are relevant 
to policymakers can be characterised as complex, and this has implications for their evaluation. 
Close attention has been given in the literature to establishing internal validity in an evaluation, 
22 The same concern applies also to the reporting of secondary outcomes. 
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and there have been considerable advancements in the development of policy evaluation methods. 
The poor record in making inferences about external validity appears to stem from a failure to 
conceptualise the issue. The findings of an evaluation will have more generalisability if the 
evaluation has greater coverage over time and space, is grounded in theory, and can shed light on 
both implementation processes and the factors that lead to variation in impacts. 
551 Page 
2.5 Research gaps and priorities 
The literature review identified a number of gaps, which this thesis intends to fill. First, there 
have been few economic analyses of the determinants of demand for maternity care and, with the 
exception of one study (Schwartz, Akin et al. 1988), sample sizes have been relatively small. 
Previous studies have estimated demand models for health care but rarely have these been linked 
to ongoing financing reforms. 
Second, the evidence on large-scale demand-side incentive programmes is limited to middle- 
income countries. The specific context in which these programmes are delivered - adequate 
provision of health services, already highly subsidised health care and relatively strong 
administrative capacity in the government - raises questions about the generalisability of the 
findings to low-income countries. This problem is compounded by the lack of implementation 
research to understand the factors that constrained and facilitated their implementation. 
Third, the evidence on the effect of demand-side incentives is limited to relatively simple 
behaviours such as attendance of children at health clinics and participation in vaccine 
programmes. None of the demand-side incentives programmes that have been evaluated have 
focused on delivery care. Health seeking behaviour at childbirth is distinctly different. Maternal 
complications are unpredictable, female autonomy around decision making may play a greater 
role and the quality of care is much more difficult to judge from the perspective of the consumer. 
The upshot may be that delivery care is less amenable to change through the use of financial 
incentives. 
Fourth, and more broadly, there is a poor record of evaluations making inferences about the 
external validity of their findings, which is essential for policymaking. The recent literature 
emphasises an approach to evaluation in which an assessment of impact retains centre stage but is 
complemented with a theoretical understanding of the intervention, an assessment of 
implementation processes that gives due attention to the context in which the intervention is 
delivered, and an understanding of the heterogeneity in impacts. 
Finally, there is limited evidence on the cost-effectiveness of demand-side incentives in health and 
thus scant information on whether they are value for money relative to other ways of achieving 
the same outcomes. In particular, there is a concern that universal financial incentives may be 
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hugely costly due to the inefficiency of paying many individuals to do what they would have done 
anyway in the absence of the programme. 
This thesis will aim to fill in turn each of the gaps identified above. In Chapter 5, it estimates a 
demand model for maternity care and, on the basis of these results, conducts simulations to 
model the effect of the SDIP on utilisation. These findings set the context for an ex-post 
evaluation of the SDIP in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 6 seeks to understand the factors that 
have facilitated and impeded implementation of the SDIP. Analyses in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 
seek to provide robust estimates of the SDIP's impact on utilisation of delivery care services at 
childbirth. An estimate of the cost-effectiveness of the programme, albeit crudely calculated, is 
provided in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 3. METHODS 
The basic premise underpinning the use of demand-side incentives is that an increase in the 
utilisation of professional care at childbirth will increase the welfare of the woman and her family. 
The literature review considered the main theoretical mechanisms that might lead individuals to 
consume less health care than is privately or socially optimal. It also found a reasonably strong 
body of evidence showing that demand-side incentives to motivate individuals to use simple 
preventive health interventions can be effective. However, it remains unclear whether demand- 
side incentives programmes can work both in low-income settings and when targeting more 
complex health services such as maternity care. 
This chapter describes the methods used in the thesis. It first describes the financial incentives 
provided by the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP). Section 3.2 sets out the research 
objectives and then section 3.3 develops a conceptual framework to aid understanding of how the 
SDIP is expected to affect health seeking behaviour. The conceptual framework draws on the 
literature concerning demand theory and approaches to evaluating complex interventions, 
reviewed in the previous chapter. It generates a set of model predictions that provide the basis for 
the empirical work. Section 3.4 outlines the empirical methods, describing the various analyses as 
well as the types of econometric methods to be used and the sources of data. It also shows the 
linkages between this thesis and the evaluation of the SDIP. Section 3.5 is concerned with the 
ethical approval and funding arrangements for the research. 
3.1 Safe Delivery Incentive Programme 
The objective of the SDIP is to increase the proportion of women who deliver with skilled birth 
attendance. The programme seeks to change the behaviour of both families and health workers 
though a package of financial incentives that include (Table 3.1): i) a cash payment (conditional 
cash transfer) to women; ii) free maternity care, in addition to the conditional cash transfer, 
for 
those women from the 25 least developed districts; and iii) a cash payment to the health provider 
for each delivery attended (Government of Nepal 2005). 
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The SDIP offers cash to women on the condition of giving birth in a public health facility. Money 
is paid by the health provider or accountant on discharge and the amount varies across the three 
main geographical regions of Nepal to reflect differences in the cost of accessing health services 
faced by households (Borghi, Ensor et al. 2006). The programme was limited to public sector 
health facilities for the entire study period of this research but subsequently expanded to include 
both not-for-profit and private health facilities. 
Table 3.1 Financial incentives offered by the SDIP 
Financial benefit 
1. Conditional cash transfer to women: 
" 1,500 NRS ($23.4) in mountain districts 
" 1,000 NRS ($15.6) in hill districts 
" 500 NRS ($7.8) in tarai districts 
Eligibility criteria 
Woman delivered in a public health facility and had no 
more than two living children or an obstetric 
complication 
2. Free delivery care to the woman and facility Woman is resident in one of the 25 least developed 
reimbursed: districts and meets the eligibility criteria required for the 
  1,000 NRS ($15.6) reimbursed to health facility conditional cash transfer 
3. Provider incentive: Doctor, nurse, midwife, health assistant, auxiliary health 
" 300 NRS ($4.7) per delivery worker or maternal and child health worker attended a 
delivery at home or in a public health facility 
Note: US dollar amounts are converted using the exchange rate of 64 Nepalese Rupees per dollar. 
Women from the 25 least developed districts are exempted from health facility charges as an 
additional benefit to the conditional cash transfer. The least developed districts are essentially 
districts in the mountain region of Nepal. The policy stipulated that health facilities are to be 
given 1,000 NRS ($15.7) by the government for each delivery provided free of charge, to 
compensate them for the lost revenue. 
The conditional cash transfer and free delivery care are available only to women with two or 
fewer children, unless the woman has an obstetric complication. The restriction was put in place 
to accommodate concerns that the programme might inadvertently increase fertility. In practice, 
however, health workers found it difficult to verify a woman's parity and the condition was 
scrapped after the second year. 
The SDIP provides 300 NRS ($4.7) to health workers for each delivery attended either at home 
or in the health facility. The policy specifies the cadres of health worker eligible to receive the 
incentive, but is intentionally vague on whether or how the incentive should be shared amongst 
59 Page 
health workers, leaving the decision to the management committee of the health facility. Initially, 
auxiliary health workers were not eligible for the provider incentive, but after one year of 
widespread protests, the policy was changed to include them. 
3.2 Research aim and objectives 
The aim of the thesis is to assess the impact of demand-side incentives to promote the use of safe 
delivery care in Nepal. 
The specific objectives are: 
To describe health care seeking behaviour at childbirth through analysis of the 
determinants of demand for delivery care 
To explore implementation of the SDIP through analysis of the level and the determinants 
of its uptake 
3. To estimate the impact of the SDIP on health seeking behaviour at childbirth 
4. To use the empirical results to discuss implications for the design and implementation of 
demand-side incentive programmes in low-income countries, and maternal health seeking 
more generally 
The intention is that the objectives together provide enough scope for a thorough evaluation of 
what is a complex intervention. The first objective is primarily a modelling exercise to understand 
what factors matter most in a household's decision of where to deliver. In this sense, the analysis 
of the determinants of demand for delivery care is an ex-ante evaluation, providing empirical 
evidence to inform expectations of the impact of the SDIP. It can also shed light on the role of 
non-economic factors, thus contributing to the discussion around the suitability of both the SDIP 
and other interventions to improve access to professional care at childbirth. 
The second objective concerns the implementation process, an area that is critical if the research 
is to distinguish between failure of the underlying theoretical mechanism of the programme and 
poor implementation. The third objective focuses on the impact of the SDIP. An important part 
of this objective is to examine the heterogeneity in impacts and, where possible, explain reasons 
for any differences between groups. 
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3.3 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework is made up of three components. The first part is a theoretical model 
of the SDIP's causal pathway. The second part focuses on the influence of price on behaviour that 
is at the heart of the how the SDIP is expected to cause change. An economic model of demand 
for delivery care provides predictions of how the demand-side incentives influence health seeking 
behaviour. The third part lays out the econometric framework of the archetypal evaluation 
problem. 
3.3.1 Model of the programme's causal pathway 
The main objective of the SDIP is to increase skilled birth attendance. The World Health 
Organisation defines a skilled birth attendant as an "accredited health professional - such as a 
midwife, doctor or nurse - who has been educated and trained to proficiency in the skills needed 
to manage normal (uncomplicated) pregnancies, childbirth and the immediate postnatal period, 
and in the identification, management and referral of complications in women and newborn 
children"(WHO 2004). This definition goes some way to clarifying what skilled attendance at 
delivery should comprise, but nevertheless remains vague in terms of the specific competencies of 
the'attendant and the enabling environment (De Brouwere and Van Lerberghe 2001). There is a 
general consensus that skilled attendance at delivery must encompass all basic emergency obstetric 
functions at the primary level with referral to comprehensive emergency obstetric care in 
secondary level health facilities when required. 
The evaluation of the SDIP starts with a conceptualisation of the pathways through which inputs 
lead to outcomes. This process can be broken down into a number of distinct steps, each of which 
is necessary if the programme is to have an impact on the stated outcomes. This method of 
assessing programme performance has been referred to in the literature as the theory-based 
evaluation approach (Weiss 1998; White and Masset 2007). Essentially, it breaks down the logic 
of the programme by charting the intermediate steps involved in reaching programme outcomes 
and making explicit the assumptions that underpin the process. 
An approach that evaluates both process and impact is important for two reasons. First, it 
provides a means of explaining not just whether a programme worked, but also why it did or did 
not work. Second, it can help in assessing the plausibility of impact findings when confounding 
cannot be completely ruled out - ie. in the absence of randomisation. If major problems are 
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identified at various stages of the implementation process, judgements about the programme 
impact arc likely to be better informed. 
Applying the framework of the theory-based approach to the SDIP leads to the identification of a 
number of steps that can be considered necessary if the programme is to lead to a change in health 
seeking behaviour, as shown in Figure 3.1.23 The model focuses on the SDIP's demand-side 
incentives (ie. the conditional cash transfer and free delivery care in the 25 least developed 
districts) in keeping with the scope of the thesis. It makes the distinction between individual 
actions and government involvement in the implementation process. 
At the individual level, the key steps include: households with a pregnant woman hear about the 
financial incentives offered by the SDIP; households perceive the promise of financial incentives as 
credible (they expect to receive the benefits); women give birth with professional care in a health 
facility (skilled birth attendance); and after giving birth women receive the demand-side 
incentives in a timely manner. The feedback loop in Figure 3.1 indicates a mechanism through 
which credibility of the payment system is influenced. Women's experience of the administration 
process is communicated to other families, which in turn affects their expectation of whether they 
will receive the demand-side incentives in the future. 
The government plays a key role in the implementation process. It must promote the SDIP if 
target households are to know about the demand-side incentives on offer and it must ensure funds 
are available in health facilities if women are to be paid on time. The latter requires a well 
functioning public financial management system since the funds must flow from the central 
treasury to each district health office and then to each health facility. 
33 The programmatic pathway model has been adapted as the research has progressed. 
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Implicit in this framework are a number of assumptions (Glassman, Todd et al. 2009). First, 
maternity services, as noted at the beginning of the chapter, are under-utilised in the sense that an 
increase in utilisation raises welfare. Second, the demand-side incentives have a greater impact on 
welfare than an equivalent cash transfer with no conditions attached. Third, maternity services are 
available or, alternatively, the supply of services will follow demand as beneficiaries hold health 
providers to account. 24 And finally, maternity services are of a sufficient quality to improve 
health. In principle, these assumptions can be tested empirically conditional on their being data 
available as means of understanding why the programme did or did not work. 
3.3.2 Economic theory 
The key mechanism through which the SDIP is expected to work is based on the most 
fundamental law of economics. The downward sloping demand function implies that the demand 
for a good or service should be negatively correlated with its price. Thus, the demand-side 
incentives - which represent a subsidy on the price of the delivery care - should induce an 
increase in the demand for publicly provided maternity services. The increase in demand is the 
result of two effects: a substitution effect and an income effect. The former occurs because of a 
change in the relative prices of alternative providers, while the latter is the result of an increase in 
purchasing power. 
Simple model of provider choice 
In a simple static framework, utility depends on health and the consumption of goods other than 
medical care (Gertler and Van der Gaag 1990). Childbirth represents a risk of illness and 
individuals must decide where to seek care. The benefit of consuming medical care is an 
improvement in health (or equally a reduced risk of illness) and the cost of medical care is forgone 
consumption on other goods or services. Individuals are essentially faced with a discrete choice 
decision between a set of alternative providers, one of which includes care at home. The various 
alternatives provide a certain quality of care at a given price, where the price includes costs 
related to delivery that are borne both inside (eg. hospital fee) and outside (eg. transportation) the 
health facility, as well as the opportunity cost of time. 
2` This assumption is likely to be particularly strong in the case of caesarean sections 
due to the shortage of inputs for 
blood transfusion, anaesthesia and surgery, in Nepal. 
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Let the utility of an individual conditional on delivering at health provider) be represented as: 
U11 = U(h , Cif, £ij; Wqj) 
where, hid is the expected health status after delivering at the provider, Cif is non medical care 
consumption, F2ij is a random error, and CUq is a parameter vector. The marginal product or 
quality of the medical care given by provider) is the expected improvement in health (or 
reduction in the risk of illness). This is determined by the characteristics of the provider (eg. 
medical knowledge) as well as those of the individual (eg. severity of morbidity). Thus, the health 
production function is given by: 
hid = h(x1, zj; a11) 
where xi is a vector of individual and household characteristics, Zj is a vector of provider 
characteristics and aid is a parameter vector. It is assumed that the health production function is 
independent of non-health consumption. This assumption can be defended on the basis that the 
onset of maternal health complications is determined largely by biological rather than behavioural 
factors and it is the latter which are closely linked to socioeconomic status. Non-health 
consumption is a function of exogenous income, yi, and the price (inclusive of costs incurred at 
the facility and outside, as well as the opportunity cost of time), pik, at provider j: 
Cif = Yi - pik 
such that income affects utility through the consumption term. The choice of provider at 
childbirth is represented by the utility maximisation problem, in which the individual has a choice 
of j+1 alternative providers, where the j=0 alternative is delivery at home. The choice of 
provider is given by the following indicator function: 
Sid = 1[Uij = max(Uio, Uti1, ... Uqj)] 
where Si j is I if the utility is the highest obtainable for individual i at provider j and 0 otherwise. 
The central feature of the model is the trade-off between health and non-health consumption. 
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Under certain conditions, a household may be able to consume more health care while protecting 
current consumption using coping mechanisms, such as savings, borrowing or the sale of assets 
(Morduch 1995). In a future time period, however, there is likely to be a cost associated with any 
means of consumption smoothing, such that this trade-off between health and non-health 
consumption remains relevant. 
Demand for health increases with income if health is a normal good. A necessary condition for 
normality is that as income rises the marginal rate of substitution of consumption diminishes, 
holding health constant (Gertler and Van der Gaag 1990). The implication of normality is that as 
incomes rise, individuals are more likely to choose the higher price / higher quality option given 
the choice between a set of discrete alternatives. This is equivalent to saying that a reduction in 
the price is less likely to encourage wealthier individuals from choosing the higher price / higher 
quality option. In other words, all else being equal wealthier individuals have a lower price 
elasticity of demand for delivery care than poorer individuals. Whether health is a normal good is 
an empirical question that is addressed by estimation of the indirect utility function derived from 
the model above. It should be noted that the package of financial incentives offered by the SDIP 
differs across geographical regions, which has implications for the model predictions. 
Incorporating credibility 
Assuming government health providers make no adjustment to prices in the presence of the SDIP, 
the price of care at a government provider (g) during the SDIP is given by: 
PI = P9 - di 
where p, 9 is price of care for individual i during the SDIP, p19 is the price of care in the absence 
of the SDIP and di is the value of the demand-side incentives received by the woman. 
Incorporating credibility into the model, the price of care at a government health provider during 
the SDIP is now given by: 
P9 =P9- k- d, 
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where k, the credibility of the promise of the demand-side incentives, is simply the expected 
probability of receiving the benefits and is limited to 0 <_ k<1. In the extreme case, when 
k=0, the utility maximisation problem will be the same as in the absence of the SDIP. When 
k=1, demand for government maternity services increases, the extent to which depends on the 
price elasticity of demand. An individual faced with a higher credibility of payment will be more 
incentivised to choose the government provider of delivery care. 
To illustrate, suppose there are two individuals and credibility of the SDIP for individual I is 
high, and credibility of the SDIP for individual 2 is low. Assuming the individuals are same in 
every other respect, ply < P29 and therefore U9 > U2 . 
At the margin, there are some 
individuals for whom the higher credibility raises the utility of the government option such that it 
becomes the option with the highest utility. 
Model predictions 
The predictions emerging from the analytical framework are as follows: 
" The SDIP will encourage greater utilisation of government maternity services, with 
women substituting away from home care and non-state providers; 
0 The impact of the SDIP on utilisation of government maternity services will be greatest 
amongst households who are poorer, all else being equal; 
0 The impact of the SDIP will be greater in regions where the package of demand-side 
incentives offered by the programme represents the greater subsidy relative to the cost of 
care; and 
" Individuals for whom the credibility of the promise of the demand-side incentives is 
greater will be more likely to deliver in a government health facility. 
3.3.3 Archetypal evaluation problem 
The main purpose of an impact evaluation is to quantify the causal impact of a programme on an 
outcome or set of outcomes. What outcomes are relevant to an evaluation depend on the 
programme itself. Those individuals who receive the programme are said to be treated. 
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An impact evaluation aims to estimate the causal effect of a treatment relative to the 
counterfactual of not receiving treatment on outcome Y experienced by units in the population. 
The counterfactual may be the absence of treatment or it may be another treatment. The standard 
formulation of the evaluation problem follows the potential outcomes framework (Neyman 1923; 
Roy 1951; Quandt 1972; Rubin 1974). Let the value of the outcome if individual i is treated be 
Y1i, and if the individual i is not treated, Ypi. The observed outcome for individual i is therefore: 
Yi = DiY1 + (1 - Di)Yoi = 1'oi + Di(Yli - Yoi) 
where Di is an indicator of the treatment actually received and the outcome of one unit is 
assumed not to be affected by participation of another. The treatment effect or programme 
impact for a single unit is ßi = Yli - Yoi. The fundamental problem of causal inference is that 
both Yli and Yoi can never be observed at the same time on any unit, which means, by 
implication, that it is impossible to observe the individual treatment effect. Characterised in this 
way, impact evaluation essentially becomes a problem of missing data. It involves using available 
data on observed Yi, Xj, Di with assumptions to identify and estimate characteristics of the 
distribution of %3i . 
In an impact evaluation, it is standard practice to give average parameters of effect. The most 
common and policy relevant of these is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Also of 
interest may be the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATNT) and the average treatment 
effect in the population whether or not one takes the treatment (ATE): 
ATT = E(Yii - YoiIDi = 1) = E(ß1IDi = 1) 
ATNT=E(Yli-YoilDi=0)-E(ßiIDi=0) 
ATE = E(Yit - Yoi) = E(ßt) 
Conditional versions of the various average effects for a set of observed characteristics, Xi, of 
individual t are: ATT - E(ßi IXi, Di = 1), ATNT - E(ßi I Xi, Di = 0), and ATE 
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E(ßi JXi). The problem of missing data, as mentioned above, extends to the identification of 
average effects, since neither E(Y0I D= 1) nor E(Y1(D = 0) is observed. 
The model can be specialised further with the introduction of the Xs (Blundell, Dearden et al. 
2005). For simplicity outcomes are assumed linear in their parameters, giving: 
Yii = mi (Xi) + Uli 
Yoi = mo(Xi) + uoi 
The parameters mj are defined such that X is exogenous (E(Yi 
I Xi) = mj (Xi) for j=0,1). 
Note also that the vector of covariates XS are measured before treatment or are time-invariant - 
ie. X1 = X0 = Xi. A single regression for the observed outcome can be derived: 
Yý = mo(Xi) + ß1D1 + u0 
where ßi = [mi(Xi) - mp(Xi)] + 
[uli - upi] = b(Xi) + bi. In this general framework, f3i 
represents the impact of the programme for individual i and is allowed to vary across individuals, 
b(Xi) is the common effect for all individuals with characteristics Xi and therefore captures 
observed heterogeneous returns, and bi the unobserved idiosyncratic effect for individual i. When 
the latent effects are the same in both the treated and the untreated group (ie. Uli = U0 = Ui), 
the treatment effect is the same across all individuals and is said to be homogeneous. If u1 # u0 , 
treatment effects are heterogeneous. The conditional average effects are given by: 
ATT(Xi) = E(ßiIXi, Di = 1) = ATE(Xi) + E(uli - uoiIXi, Di = 1) 
ATNT (Xi) = E(ßi 1 Xi, Di = 0) = ATE(Xi) + E(uii - uoi IXi, Di = 0) 
ATE(Xi) = E(ß1 X1) = mi(Xi) - mo(Xi) 
In the homogeneous impact model, all three measures of impact are identical. With 
heterogeneous returns, an important issue then to consider is whether or not selection into the 
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programme depends on unobservable determinants of an individual's marginal returns, 
conditional on observable Xi. If selection is not affected, all three measures of impact are the 
same as in the homogeneous returns model. If, however, selection is affected by person-specific 
individual returns, the impact parameters are not equal and various treatment effects can be 
defined (Heckman, Ichimura et al. 1997; Dearden 1999; Card 2001). 
A naive estimator of the average treatment effect on the treated using data that are likely to be 
available is the single difference (SD) in the mean outcomes between the treated and the 
untreated: 
SD=E(YID=1)-E(YID=O)=E(Yl-YOID=1)+B 
where B-E (Y0 ID= 1) -E (Y0 ID= 0) = Bl + B2 + B3. In the literature, B is referred to 
as selection bias. There are three principal sources of selection bias (Heckman, Ichimura et al. 
1998). First, there is selection bias stemming from non-overlapping support of the observables 
(Bl ), which means the non-participants used to infer the counterfactual do not share the same 
characteristics as the participants - ie. are not comparable individuals (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983). Second, selection bias may arise from differences in the distribution of the observables 
between the two groups over the common support (B2), leading to an inappropriate weighting of 
individuals in the comparison group. Third, selection bias may stem from unobserved 
characteristics that jointly influence selection into the programme and outcomes (B3). Any 
difference in the conditional means of the outcomes may be due to non-programme factors that 
are simply unobserved to the researcher. 
Here, it is useful to distinguish between selection on unobserved characteristics and selection on 
unobserved returns. The former may be termed ability bias and the latter, returns bias (Roy 
1951). Ability bias arises if the error term and treatment are correlated. Suppose, for example, 
that wealthier women with better health seeking practices at childbirth are more likely to be 
reached by the SDIP and that wealth is unobserved to the researcher. The two terms will be 
positively correlated giving an upward bias in the estimated mean difference in utilisation between 
the treated and untreated groups. Returns bias arises when selection into the programme is 
correlated with an individual's returns. If, given the observables, women with greater potential 
gains from the SDIP (as measured by an improvement in health seeking behaviour) are at the same 
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time more likely to be reached by the programme, the ATT will be biased upwards. The 
empirical challenge is to construct the counterfactual in the presence of selection bias such that it 
is possible to separate out the effect of the programme from the effect of confounding factors. 
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3.4 Empirical methods 
Table 3.2 provides an overview of how the research objectives link with the empirical methods 
and the data sources. The empirical methods exploit both primary and secondary sources of data 
in an effort to address each objective. The following sections describe the empirical methods and 
sources of data. It remains, however, for each individual results chapter to outline in detail the 
econometric methods used in the analysis. Similarly, specific limitations of the empirical methods 
are reserved for each results chapter and broad limitations of the thesis are discussed in chapter 9. 
Table 3.2 Empirical methods and sources of data used for each research objective 
Research objective Empirical method Data source 
1. To describe health care seeking Discrete choice multinomial models Community Surveillance 
behaviour at childbirth through System and Cost of Delivery 
analysis of the determinants of Survey 
demand for delivery care 
........ .. 
2. To explore implementation of the Bivariate and multivariate regression Survey of Women 
SDIP through analysis of the level and analysis of process indicators 
the determinants of its uptake 
3. To estimate the impact of the SDIP Propensity score matching Survey of Women 
on health seeking behaviour at 
childbirth Longitudinal analysis to identify Community Surveillance 
discontinuity in outcome System 
3.4.1 Demand for delivery care at childbirth 
The analysis of the demand for delivery care examines the influence of health provider 
characteristics (eg. price and time costs) and characteristics of the individual (eg. wealth, age, 
perceived morbidity) on the place of childbirth. Discrete choice models and full information 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques are used to make inferences about the relative 
importance of each determinant. The individual is assumed to know all attributes of the provider 
and to choose the one that maximises his (indirect) utility. The observed choice is determined by 
the difference in utility (ie. net utility). 
Multinomial models, motivated by McFadden's random utility model, are required when 
dependent variables are discrete and take unordered multinomial outcomes (McFadden 1981). 
Different models make different assumptions, some more restrictive than others. Thus, the 
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robustness of the results to different econometric models is assessed by comparing parameter 
estimates from a multinomial logit and a multinomial probit model. 
Interpretation of the parameter estimates is made easier by calculating the price elasticity of 
demand for delivery care at each health provider and conducting simulation exercises. Both of 
these methods provide an indication of how responsive demand is to changes in a single 
determinant or factor. 
3.4.2 Process evaluation 
The main rationale for evaluating implementation processes is to distinguish between a failure in 
the underlying theoretical mechanism and poor implementation. Separating out the two is likely 
to be particularly important in the case of the SDIP, given that it was implemented at scale with 
no prior piloting. 
Assessment of the SDIP's implementation is guided by the theoretical framework of how the 
programme is expected to influence health seeking at childbirth. The approach is quantitative, 
measuring the SDIP's progress at each step along the programmatic pathway using a set of 
appropriate indicators. The analysis focuses on the level of uptake by the target population at each 
step, as well its socioeconomic and geographical distribution. Bivariate and multiple regression 
analysis techniques are used to analyse in more depth the determinants of variation in uptake. 
This approach can identify if there are major bottlenecks in the implementation process, but 
ultimately provides only a limited understanding of what causes these constraints. There are likely 
to be numerous factors that are less amenable to quantitative measurement. For this reason, the 
findings from a qualitative study conducted during the first phase of the evaluation provide are 
drawn on (see section 3.4.5). The results of this component of the evaluation are not reported in 
this thesis, but instead are referred to at length in the discussion of chapter 6 (Powell-Jackson, 
Morrison et al. 2009). 
3.4.3 Identification of impacts 
There are two results chapters concerned with the impact of the SDIP. The conceptual 
framework directly informs the empirical strategy used in each analysis. In the first analysis, 
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women are defined as treated if they had knowledge of the SDIP's demand-side incentives prior to 
delivery and perceived the promise of payment as credible. The comparison group is made up of 
women who had never heard of the SDIP before they gave birth. Propensity score matching 
methods are used to estimate the impact of the programme on various outcomes of service 
utilisation at childbirth. 
The approach attempts to correct for some of the selection bias inherent in single difference 
comparisons of mean outcomes by using an appropriate comparison group to assess the 
counterfactual. The idea is to select a comparison group of non-participants that is as similar as 
possible to the treatment group in its observed characteristics. In terms of the various sources of 
bias, propensity score matching can limit bias associated with non-overlapping support of the 
observables and a lack of common support. It must, however, assume away selection on 
unobservables. 
The analysis uses primary data from the Survey of Women, designed specifically to evaluate the 
SDIP using this approach. The survey sought to collect rich data on factors that might influence 
both participation in the programme and the outcomes of interest. Further analysis tests the 
hypothesis that knowledge of the SDIP - in the absence of credibility - is not sufficient 
for the 
SDIP's demand-side incentive to influence health seeking behaviour. It also explores the 
distributional impact of the programme across geographical regions and socioeconomic groups. 
The latter is particularly relevant, given the desire of policymakers "that more benefits [will] reach 
to [the] poor, disadvantaged and marginalised women" (Government of Nepal 2006). 
The second empirical analysis of impacts focuses on one district of Nepal, Makwanpur. The 
analysis makes use of data from a Community Surveillance System of births, which contains seven- 
years of data on individual level health seeking behaviour at childbirth. Identification of a 
structural change in the relationship between time and the outcome at the time implementation of 
the SDIP began is interpreted as the causal effect of the programme. It is identified as either a shift 
in the level or change in direction of the outcome in a longitudinal analysis that controls for time, 
characteristics of the individual or household and village-level fixed-effects. The impact of the 
SDIP is assessed on a set of utilisation outcomes and neonatal mortality. While the latter is of 
interest in itself, it is not a proxy for maternal mortality. . 
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Confounding factors potentially pose a serious threat to the internal validity of the analysis. For 
this reason, a number of methods are used to improve the plausibility of the results. The first 
approach estimates the causal effect of the SDIP on an outcome known to be unaffected by it, but 
closely related to the other outcomes under investigation. A second method uses data on 
contextual factors to assess in a descriptive manner the threat of possible confounders across a 
number of relevant dimensions. The data were collected through interviews with key informants 
in the district and document review. 
3.4.4 Data sources 
The analysis in the first research objective uses secondary data from a Community Surveillance 
System in Makwanpur district, complemented by additional primary data on a subsample of 
women, collected in the Cost of Delivery Survey (Table 3.2). Analysis in the second objective 
relies on primary data from a cross-section Survey of Women who recently delivered in six 
districts of Nepal. Finally, the third objective uses data from both the Community Surveillance 
System and the Survey of Women. 
Community Surveillance System in Makwanpur (secondary data) 
The description of the Community Surveillance System in Makwanpur draws on a published paper 
(Manandhar, Osrin et al. 2004), as well as extensive discussions with the field staff based in the 
district. The surveillance system has been running in rural areas of Makwanpur district since 
2001, set up for the purposes of collecting data for a randomised control trial to assess the 
effectiveness of a participatory intervention with women's groups (Manandhar, Osrin et al. 2004). 
It is managed by Mother and Infant Research Activities (MIRA), an organisation based in 
Kathmandu but with a field office in Makwanpur. 
Between April 2001 and August 2005, the Community Surveillance System covered 24 village 
development committees (VDC), the administrative unit below a district. These VDCs were 
randomly selected for inclusion in the study from a total of 42 VDCs (see Figure 3.2). The 
women's group intervention was allocated randomly to 12 of the VDCs and 
buffer zones were 
used to limit spillover of the intervention into control VDCs. Each 
household in the surveillance 
area was allocated a unique identification number and every female aged 
between 15 and 49 years 
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providing verbal consent was identified through a household member listing exercise and also 
given a unique identification number. 
Figure 3.2 Map of Makwanpur district and coverage of the Community Surveillance System 
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Note: The map is sourced from the United Nations Development Programme, Nepal. The original 24 study VDCs 
are denoted by *. The 6 new study VDCs are denoted by ". 
Surveillance was done by 2S5 enumerators, 25 field interviewers and 9 field coordinators. 
Pregnancies were identified by female ward enumerators who visited all participants in their area 
every month. If consenting, each pregnant woman was interviewed twice: at seven months of 
gestation and one month after delivery. The questionnaires obtained information on the woman's 
health seeking behaviour during pregnancy and at childbirth, perceived health status, home care 
practices, the survival status of the newborn, and her socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics (see Appendix A2). Verbal autopsies were conducted in the case of an unfortunate 
outcome (maternal death, stillbirth or neonatal death) with the relevant family member. 
In September 2005, the Community Surveillance System was adapted. It was enlarged to cover an 
additional six VDCs, selected randomly from those not previously under surveillance (sec Figure 
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3.2). The women's group intervention was slowly expanded into the 12 VDCs previously not 
covered, and the six new VDCs acted as control areas. The two interviews were consolidated into 
a single interview, given at one month postpartum. The questionnaire was revised to collect more 
information on socioeconomic status, health care seeking and receipt of the SDIP's conditional 
cash transfer, while retaining many of the same questions found previously. 
Z" 
While the Community Surveillance System was meant to capture every delivery in the 
surveillance area since February 2001, in practice it did not record every delivery between the 
start of 2004 and mid-2005 owing to security problems linked with the Maoist insurgency and 
falls in project funding levels. This has implications for the identification of programme impact 
and is discussed in detail in chapter S. 
Cost of Delivery Survey in Makwanpur (primary data) 
Between September 2007 and March 2008, an additional module was added to the routine 
Community Surveillance System questionnaire to collect information about household 
consumption and the cost of delivery care in health facilities. The recall period was one month, 
except for questions concerning expenditure on durable items. Over the six-month period, every 
household (300 in total) in the surveillance area with a woman who delivered in a health facility 
was interviewed. 
The additional module captured general household expenditure, following closely the Nepal 
Living Standards Measurement Survey (Government of Nepal 2004), as well as household 
expenditures on delivery care and outstanding debt (see Appendix A3). The approach to 
measuring household living standards was comprehensive, capturing information on not only 
household expenditures, but also the value of home production and those goods or services 
received in kind. This allows computation of household consumption, a proxy for permanent 
income (Deaton and Grosh 2000). The cost of delivery covered facility-based charges 
(registration; delivery fee; operating theatre; bed charge; drugs; medical supplies; diagnostic 
tests; food, gifts to health staff, and spending on traditional practitioner if sought during labour), 
25 The number of deliveries recorded between April 2001 and August 2005 was 8,595 and complete data were 
available for 8,199 deliveries. Between September 2005 and July 2007, the Community Surveillance System 
recorded 8,728 deliveries (6,602 deliveries in the original 24 VDCs), giving complete data on 8,726 deliveries 
(6,600 deliveries in the original 24 VDCs). 
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additional charges (lodging and food of accompanying family; and drugs, medical supplies, and 
food bought outside) and transport charges. 
The questions relating to the cost of delivery were based heavily on those used in a previous 
survey in Nepal (Borghi, Ensor et al. 2006). It was pre-tested in the study area in Nepali by the 
lead researcher in MIRA's Makwanpur field office. The interviews were conducted by the 
Community Surveillance System's field coordinators, who were trained in the use of the 
questionnaire during a two-day workshop. Owing to the nature of the new module, the primary 
respondent for this part of the questionnaire was the household head (in the presence of the 
woman), who is typically more able than the woman to respond to questions regarding household 
expenditures. 
Survey of Women (primary data) 
The purpose of the survey was to provide estimates of health care seeking at childbirth and SDIP- 
related indicators for six districts (out of 75 districts) in Nepal. The survey was conducted 
between January and March 2008. The eligibility of interviewees was defined as follows: women 
who had a delivery between two months and three years prior to the survey. This was to ensure 
that women were interviewed at their homes rather than their maternal homes, for in Nepal it is 
common practice for women to go back to the home of their parents for about two months after 
they have delivered their baby. The recall period thus covered a five-month period prior to the 
official launch of the SDIP and a thirty-month period of the programme. 
Six districts were selected using stratified sampling. The seventy-five districts of Nepal were 
stratified by region in order to select districts with differences in the package of financial 
incentives offered by the SDIP. Two districts were randomly selected within each stratum (tarai, 
hill and mountain). The districts selected were: Morang, Rupandehi, Myagdi, Achham, Jumla and 
Sankhuwasabha. 
Sample design 
The survey used the sampling frame provided by the Population Census (Government of Nepal 
2001). In Nepal, each district is divided into VDCs and further subdivided into wards. The 
primary sampling unit (PSU) was the ward or a group of wards (in urban areas). The sample for 
the survey was based on a two-stage sample of households. In the first stage of sampling, 180 
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PStls (30 in each district) were selected using systematic sampling with probability proportional 
to size. In the second stage of sampling, the number of households to be visited was determined 
by the expected number of eligible women in the PSU. The expected number of eligible women 
was calculated on the basis of regional estimates of the annual fertility rate found in the most 
recent Demographic and Health Survey (2007), using the formula: 
Expected Eligible Women = (Fertility Rate / 1000) x Population x3 Years 
In some PSUs, the expected number of eligible women was 35 or less. In these cases, every 
household was visited and the household head was asked if an eligible woman lived in the house. If 
the expected number of eligible women was less than 25, the ward was combined with the 
previous ward in the listing to form one PSU so as to ensure that 25 women or more were 
interviewed. In some PSUs, the expected number of eligible women was more than 35. In this 
case, not every household was visited but instead every n`s household was visited to ensure that 
the expected number of interviews was 30. The first step in this procedure was to conduct a 
household listing by drawing up a detailed social map of the ward. Then the enumerator started at 
the first household in the listing, defined as the house of the female community health volunteer in 
rural areas and the lowest household number in urban areas (these houses already have numbers). 
The first household was not visited and the enumerator visited every nt household thereafter, 
following the order of the listing already conducted. This strategy ensured that the entire 
geographical area of the ward was represented. If the households selected were all visited and less 
than 25 interviews were completed, the enumerator started again at the beginning of the 
household listing and visited the first household in the listing plus 1, and every n`1' household 
thereafter until 30 interviews were completed. 
A maximum number of 35 interviews were conducted in each PSU. The survey was designed to 
obtain 900 completed interviews of women who had a delivery in the three years prior to the 
survey in each district (a total of 5,400 interviews). Although there was little information to guide 
the sample size calculation, it was deemed sufficient to identify variation in knowledge of the 
SDIP between districts and to assess the impact of the demand-side incentives using the entire 
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sample. 26 The oversampling in some districts relative to others requires the sample to be 
weighted. 
Questionnaire and consent 
The questionnaire was developed in English and translated into Nepali prior to pre-testing. It was 
designed specifically for the purposes of the study. The questionnaire is shown in Appendix A4. It 
contained the following sections: 
  Household characteristics: socioeconomic information about the woman and her husband 
  Household assets: ownership of assets by the household, income and proximity to health 
institutions 
  Knowledge of the SDIP: knowledge and source of information about the SDIP 
  Pregnancy history and experience of the SDIP: pregnancy history for all deliveries in the past 
three years, health seeking behaviour, knowledge of the SDIP during pregnancy, receipt of 
cash incentive and free delivery care, and stated preference regarding health care seeking 
behaviour. 
The purpose of the study and its voluntary nature were described to the interviewee. Each 
interviewee was given the opportunity to ask questions about the survey and then requested to 
give consent by signing a separate form. If the interviewee was not willing to be interviewed, the 
enumerator moved on to the next household. 
Preparation and fieldwork 
The survey team was made up of: one international consultant (myself), two national consultants, 
12 district supervisors (two per district) and 48 enumerators (eight per district). In addition, local 
non-governmental organisations in each of the study districts were contracted to provide some 
supervisory and administrative support. All the enumerators were recruited from the district they 
were to work in and 90 percent of them were female. 
Enumerators and district supervisors were trained in two batches for five days each by the 
consultants, with an additional two days for the district supervisors. A training manual was 
26 For instance, 900 deliveries per district is sufficient to test whether knowledge of the SDIP is different between 
two districts with coverage of 20 percent and 28 percent at the 5 percent level of significance with 90 percent power 
(one-sided test and a design effect of two). 
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developed specifically for this purpose (obtainable on request). They were given training on the 
safe motherhood programme, how to conduct an interview, fieldwork procedures, general 
procedures for completing the questionnaire, and the content of the questionnaire itself. 
The questionnaire was pre-tested in Nepali by the national consultant with the international 
consultant to ensure that the questions were clearly understood, the length of the questionnaire 
was appropriate and there were no errors in the skip patterns or wording of the questions. In 
addition, two days of the training programme were devoted to practice in the use of the 
questionnaire by the enumerators in households under the supervision of the district supervisors. 
This offered a final opportunity to make minor adjustments. 
Data entry and response rate 
Data entry was conducted in Kathmandu by 10 trained data entry clerks. Data entry was done 
using CSPro (US Census Bureau 2009), a specialised software that was programmed to ensure 
skip patterns are respected and implausible data entry errors rejected. Reliability checks were 
carried out by the international consultant based on a detailed review of summary statistics and 
the use of box graphs, with potential errors verified with the original paper copy of the 
questionnaire and, if necessary, corrected. 
Table 3.3 Response rate of interviews with women 
Result Total 
Households selected 15,141 
Households with eligible woman 6,125 
Total eligible women 6,234 
Interview completed 5,513 
Response rate (%) 88.4 
Note: Total eligible women include women that were outside of the village for a 
prolonged period of time (ie. over one week) and therefore could not be interviewed. 
Of the 15,141 households selected in the survey, 6,125 had eligible women living there (Table 
3.3). This figure includes households where an eligible woman was known to live there (in some 
cases through information given by neighbours) but was not at the household any time during the 
three visits made by the enumerators. These households had 6,234 eligible women and 5,513 of 
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these were interviewed successfully, resulting in a response rate of 88.4 percent. 27 In the analysis, 
10 of these interviews were excluded because the women were found not to meet the eligibility 
criteria. 
3.4.5 Linkages with the SDIP evaluation 
There is considerable overlap between this thesis and the evaluation of the SDIP, making it 
important to outline my role in the research. The evaluation was conducted over the period 
2006-2008 and was carried out in close coordination with the Support Safe Motherhood 
Programme (SSMP) in Kathmandu, which provides technical support to the Government of 
Nepal's Ministry of Health. The contract to carry out the evaluation was given to the Institute of 
Child Health at University College London. I was the lead investigator with Professor Anthony 
Costello as my line manager. 
As Table 3.4 shows, the evaluation was conducted over two phases of work. The first phase of 
work included a number of components and culminated in an interim report focused exclusively 
on the implementation process (Powell-Jackson, Neupane et al. 2007). A Survey of Health 
Providers was carried out in ten districts, which included the six districts sampled in the Survey of 
Women. It collected information on structural and process measures of quality in the provision of 
maternal health services at different types of health facility. The provider survey also included a 
module on revenue and expenditure in relation to the SDIP. This information was supplemented 
by financial data obtained from government offices at the district level and the central level to 
study the flow of funds for the programme. In the same districts, a qualitative study explored 
implementation practices and the experiences of a range of stakeholders involved in the process. 
Due to space limitations and the substantial contribution of other researchers in the analysis, the 
qualitative investigations are not included as a results chapter in this thesis and instead extensive 
references are made to it (Powell-Jackson, Morrison et al. 2009). 
The second phase included the Survey of Women and the Cost of Delivery Survey. It also 
included a second qualitative study, which explored the role of the SDIP and other factors in the 
" This definition of response rate differs from that used by the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey in that the 
denominator includes not only eligible women currently present in the household but also women who, although 
identified by other household members as eligible, are for some reason or another away from the house for a 
prolonged period of time and hence unavailable for interview. 
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household decision of where to seek care at childbirth. A final report of the evaluation presented 
the results from both phases of work (Powell-Jackson, Neupane et al. 2008). 
Table 3.4 Linkages between the components of the SDIP evaluation and this thesis 
Evaluation component Relationship with thesis 
Phase I of the SDIP Evaluation 
Provision of maternal health services (quality of care) 
  Survey of health facilities in 10 districts 
Financial tracking of SDIP funds 
" Survey of health facilities in 10 districts 
" Record review at district health office, district 
treasury, central government, and donor 
References made to Powell-Jackson, et al. (2008) 
References made to Powell-Jackson et al. (2008) 
Experiences of implementation (including fidelity) References made to Powell-Jackson et al. (2009) 
  Key informant interviews of district officials and 
health workers in 10 districts 
" Focus group discussion at district level in 10 districts 
Phase II of the SDIP Evaluation 
...... Impact of SDIP and process indicators 
" Household survey of women who gave birth in 6 
districts 
Chapter 6 and chapter 7 
Household cost of health seeking 
  Household survey of women who gave birth in 
Makwanpur district 
Chapter 5 
Household decision making in seeking care and the role References made to Powell-Jackson et al. (2008) 
of the SDIP 
In-depth interviews of women who recently 
delivered 
  Focus group discussion at community level 
I was responsible for all aspects of the evaluation and supported in my work by two Nepalese 
consultants, Professor Suresh Tiwari and Basu Dev Neupane. Specifically, I designed the data 
collection tools and developed the sampling strategy for each survey. Together with the national 
consultants, I trained 10 enumerators in the first phase of the evaluation, and a further 48 
enumerators and 12 data collection supervisors in the second phase of work. During data 
collection, we travelled to each study district to supervise the process. I trained the data entry 
clerks and oversaw the process of data entry in Kathmandu. I conducted the analysis of the 
quantitative data but the analysis in the qualitative investigation also involved the two national 
consultants and the researchers who had collected the data. 
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Tropical Medicine. Permission to use secondary data from the Community Surveillance System 
was obtained from Professor Anthony Costello and Professor Dharma Manandhar, the two 
principal investigators of the women's group study in Makwanpur. 
84 ý Page 
Chapter 4. STUDY SETTING 
4.1 Country setting 
4.1.1 Political context 
Nepal is a landlocked country in South Asia. It borders China to the north and India to the south, 
lying between the rugged Himalayas and the tarai or flat river plain of the Ganges (Figure 4.1). 
Half of the country's population of over 28 million people live in the tarai plains, while 44 
percent of the population inhabit the hills (Government of Nepal 2001). Further to the north in 
the remote mountain region live just 7 percent of the population. The people remain largely 
rural, with 17 percent living in urban areas. 
Figure 4.1 Map of Nepal 
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Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 
For administrative purposes, Nepal is made up of 75 districts, which are further divided into 
village development committees (VDC) and municipalities. Each VDC comprises nine wards, 
which are equivalent to villages in rural areas. In municipalities the number of wards can reach as 
many as 35. Kathmandu is the capital city and economic centre of the country. 
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Nepal is a country of huge diversity, not only geographically but also ethnically. Although the 
majority of the population are Hindu and thus part of the caste system, all Nepalis are socially 
defined by their caste (Bennett, Dahal et al. 2008). The most recent census (2001) identified 
more than 100 caste and ethnic groups, speaking more than 70 languages or dialects. Caste has an 
enormous bearing on an individual's identity, social status and life prospects. A number of recent 
studies reveal the extent of disparities across different caste groups for a range of socioeconomic 
indicators (World Bank and DFID 2006; Bennett, Dahal et al. 2008). 
With the exception of a brief experimentation with multi-party democracy in 1959, Nepal has 
been ruled by an absolute monarchy for most of its history (Pradhan 2002). It was not until 1990, 
following demonstrations fuelled by an Indian economic blockade, that the non-party panchayat 
system28 collapsed and multi-party democracy was established within the framework of a 
constitutional monarchy. However, political instability quickly ensued. A violent insurgency led 
by the Maoists erupted in 1996, as they tapped into growing resentment over caste discrimination 
and the social privilege accorded to high-caste groups. It resulted in a decade-long civil war that 
has cost the lives of 16,278 people (BBC 2009). 
In 2001, the crown prince massacred ten members of the royal family, including the King and 
himself, leading to a new monarch. Five years of hugely unpopular and repressive rule by King 
Gyanendra ended in April 2006, when mass protests across the country forced the King to 
reinstate parliament and start peace negotiations with the Maoists. These talks culminated in the 
signing of a peace accord leading to elections in 2008 that were won, to the surprise of the 
traditional political parties, by the Maoists. 
The first act of the newly formed Constituent Assembly was to abolish the monarchy and declare 
the country a federal democratic republic. For almost a year the Maoists led a coalition 
government, but this collapsed in May 2009. Despite the quick formation of a new 
administration, the entire peace process is now under threat (International Crisis Group 2009). 
The last few years have been characterised by weakening public security, frequent petrol 
shortages and long power cuts. 
28 The panchayat system was a hierarchical structure of government with which the King exercised absolute power 
through the national, district, and village panchayats. 
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The country performs poorly in terms of governance, in part reflecting the political upheaval it 
has gone through in recent years. It is ranked in the bottom 3 percent of countries for political 
stability and the bottom 30 percent of countries for voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufman, Kraay et al. 2009). 
4.1.2 Economic development 
Nepal is one of the least developed countries in the world. Gross national income (GNI) was most 
recently estimated at US$ 400 per capita and the country is ranked 142' out of 177 countries on 
the basis of the human development index (Table 4.1) (United Nations Development Programme 
2004; World Bank 2009). Economic development has lagged behind that of other South Asian 
economies in the region. If per capita gross domestic product (GDP) continues to grow at the rate 
of 1.2 percent per annum (the growth rate over the period 2000-2007), it will take Nepal 61 
years to double GDP or 52 years to reach the level of Bangladesh in 2007 (Asian Development 
Bank 2009). The country is highly aid dependent, with 34 percent of government expenditure 
funded externally in 2005 (World Bank 2009). 
Table 4.1 Key indicators on Nepal 
Indicator Year (source) Estimate 
Demographic 
Population 2008 (Census 2001) 28.6 million 
Population growth rate 2001 (Census 2001) 2.25% 
Urban population 2008 (WDI) 17% 
Economic 
GNI per capita 2008 (WDI) 400 US$ 
GNI per capita (PPP) 2008 (WDI) 1120 US$ 
Poverty incidence 2004 (NLSMS) 31% 
Poverty gap 2004 (NLSMS) 7.5% 
Gini coefficient 2004 (NLSMS) 0.45 
Education 
Women with no education 2006 (NDHS) 49% 
Men with no education 2006 (NDHS) 23% 
Literacy rates of 15-24 year olds 2006 (NDHS) 79% 
Notes: WDI = World Development Indicators of the World Bank. NLSMS = Nepal Living Standards Measurement 
Survey. NDHS = Nepal Demographic and Health Survey. Poverty incidence and the poverty gap are measured on 
the basis of the nationally defined poverty line. 
Despite a weak economy, the incidence of poverty has fallen considerably from 42 percent of the 
population in 1996 to 31 percent in 2004 (Government of Nepal 2006). The 
fall in poverty has 
been attributed, in part, to growth in remittances from workers abroad, which quadrupled over 
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the same period to reach 12 percent of the economy in 2004. At the same time, the level of 
income inequality rose to what is now the highest in the South Asia. The services sector is the 
largest sector in the economy, accounting for 50 percent of total output, followed by agriculture 
(33 percent) and industry (16 percent) (Asian Development Bank 2009). 
Indicators of educational attainment are improving. The literacy rate among young adults is now 
almost 80 percent. There remain, however, large disparities between men and women. Almost 
half of all women have no education. Under-five mortality in Nepal is considerably lower than 
other countries at a similar level of economic development (Figure 4.2). The country's 
achievements in health are studied in more depth in the next section. 
Figure 4.2 Under-five mortality and GNI per capita in low and lower-middle income countries 
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4.1.3 Health 
Nepal has made remarkable progress in improving key health outcomes over the past decade. 
There have been substantial reductions in neonatal, infant and under-five mortality (Figure 4.3). 
It has also seen an equally impressive reduction in maternal mortality. Nepal is one of the few 
countries likely to meet both the fourth and fifth Millennium Development Goal in 2015. Life 
expectancy was most recently estimated at 60 years (Government of Nepal 2001). 
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The reasons behind these impressive reductions in mortality are not well understood, particularly 
given that they have happened during a period of widespread civil unrest. Although attribution is 
difficult, a descriptive study of maternal mortality in Nepal argues that the reduction is probably 
due to a combination of factors including the drop in fertility, improved access to maternal health 
services (antenatal care, delivery care and safe abortion services), and an improvement in 
socioeconomic conditions (reduction in poverty, improved education) (Pant, Suvcdi et al. 2008). 
Figure 4.3 Trends in under-five, infant, neonatal, and maternal mortality in Nepal 
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Notes: The graph is not to scale and therefore the dotted lines do not represent the required rate of reduction in 
mortality to reach the MDGs. Maternal mortality refers to the scale on the second y-axis and was not measured in 
2001. DHS = Demographic and Health Survey. MDG = Millennium Development Goal. 
Doubts have been expressed over the magnitude of the reduction in maternal mortality, given the 
wide confidence intervals around each point estimate and the small reduction in early neonatal 
mortality. The impressive reductions in under-five mortality, however, are not contested. The 
coverage of key child health interventions has improved over the period 1996-2006 (UNICEF 
2008), which is likely to have contributed to the reduction in child mortality. 
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Access to maternal health services has increased over the past decade with most of the 
improvement occurring over the period 2001-2006 (Figure 4.4). While the trends are 
encouraging, there is still a long way to go to meet the Government of Nepal's target of 60 
percent of deliveries attended by a skilled health worker (Government of Nepal 2005). It remains 
the case that over 80 percent of women do not deliver in a health facility or with a doctor, nurse 
or midwife in attendance. The caesarean section rate has increased, but most of the rise was in 
private health facilities and there is anecdotal evidence that elective surgery is becoming more 
common (Pant, Suvedi et al. 2008). 
Figure 4.4 Trends in utilisation of maternal health services in Nepal 
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Source: Nepal Demographic and Health Surveys 1996,2001,2006. 
There arc large inequalities in access to maternity services (Figure 4.5). Over 50 percent of 
women in the richest quintile deliver in a health facility, while only 4 percent of women 
in the 
poorest quintile receive institutional delivery care. The poorest 60 percent of women in particular 
are unable to access maternity services and the disparity between the rich and poor in utilisation 
of institutional delivery care has widened over the past decade (Johnson and Bradley 
2008). 
Women who do reach health facilities typically use the public sector. Abortion was 
legalised in 
Nepal in 2002 and the number of safe abortions has risen rapidly (Pant, Suvedi et al. 2008). 
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Figure 4.5 Place of childbirth by wealth quintile in Nepal, 2006 
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4.2 Financing and provision of maternal health services 
The Nepalese health care system is dominated by the public sector, although the private sector is 
growing. In the public sector, maternal health services are delivered through a network of health 
facilities (health posts, primary health care centres, district hospital) based around a district health 
system model, supported by regional and national hospitals providing specialised care. In the non- 
state sector, there are essentially two types of provider. Not-for-profit health facilities are run by 
faith-based or non-governmental organisations. For-profit health facilities vary from small private 
clinics run by a doctor to large private medical colleges, typically supported by investment from 
India. 
Geographical access to health services varies considerably by region and the road density is the 
lowest in the region (World Bank 2007). The proportion of the population within 30 minutes 
walk of a health facility is 62 percent in the tarai region, 51 percent in the hill region and only 37 
percent in the mountain region (Government of Nepal 2004). Female community health 
volunteers, present in 97 percent of villages, act as a bridge between the community and 
government health services (New Era 2008). 
Health expenditure in Nepal is low by international standards, estimated most recently at US$ 20 
per capita (WHO 2009). This is equivalent to 5.2 percent of GDP. The government spends 10 
percent of its total budget on health, suggesting that there is a reasonable commitment on the part 
of the government. External resources from donors account for 15 percent of total health 
expenditure, but it is unlikely all off-budget projects are included in this estimate. 29 
Until very recently, user charges were levied for public health services and exemptions for the 
poor have not been implemented well (Borghi, Ensor et al. 2004). Moreover, social security and 
risk pooling are both almost non-existent (WHO 2009). It thus comes as no surprise that out-of- 
pocket expenditure by households is the predominant source of financing for health, contributing 
over 50 percent to total health expenditure. With no financial protection, a relatively high 
proportion of households (6 percent) incur catastrophic health expenditures (van Doorslaer, 
O'Donnell et al. 2007). 
29 Another report estimates that donors fund 51 percent of the national health budget (RTI International 2007) 
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Health workers skilled in delivery care, working within a supportive environment that provides 
an adequate system for referral and emergency obstetric care, are vital to reduce maternal 
mortality (Campbell and Graham 2006). The density of health workers in Nepal is low, with two 
doctors per 10,000 population and five nurses or midwife per 10,000 population (WHO 2009). 30 
UNICEF estimates that 46 percent of the population has access to basic emergency obstetric care 
(UNICEF 2008). A quarter of primary health care centres are able to provide basic emergency 
obstetric care, while half of district hospitals provide basic emergency obstetric care and a further 
20 percent provide comprehensive emergency obstetric care (Pant, Suvedi et al. 2008). 3' 
30 Moreover, Department of Health figures show that there is a critical shortage of health workers, with 47 percent of 
doctor positions, 22 percent of staff nurse positions and 9 percent of auxiliary nurse midwife positions vacant. 
" Basic emergency obstetric care comprises six specific procedures such as manual removal of placenta, assisted 
vaginal delivery and removal of retained products. Comprehensive emergency obstetric care includes, in addition to 
the six procedures, blood transfusion and caesarean section. 
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4.3 Study districts 
The data used in this thesis cover two different geographical areas, as described in chapter 3. The 
Survey of Women was carried out in six districts of Nepal that include Morang, Rupandehi, 
Myagdi, Achham, Jumla and Sankhuwasabha. There is a considerable amount of variation among 
the districts, judging by the indicators shown in Table 4.2. This is to be expected given the 
stratified sampling strategy. 
Table 4.2 Characteristics of the sample districts in the Survey of Women 
District Region (sub-region) GDP per capita 
(US$)- 
Infant mortality 
(per 1,000 
births)b 
Female 
literacy 
(%)b 
HDI rank 
(out of 75)a 
Morang Tarai(Eastern) 297 45 50 20 
Rupandehi Tarai (Western) 249 56 55 24 
Myagdi Hills (Western) 222 56 71 11 
Achham Hills (Far-Western) 141 74 35 62 
Jumla Mountain (Mid-Western) 203 97 35 41 
Sankhuwasabha Mountain (Eastern) 231 45 67 23 
Nepal - 240 48 55 - 
Note: a UNDP report 2004 (higher HDI rank means more developed). b DHS report 2006. Sub-regional estimates are 
given in the absence of district-level data. The stratified sampling strategy was based on region. GDP = gross 
domestic product. HDI = human development index 
Table 4.3 compares a set of available indicators relating to education, access to media and 
ownership of household possessions between the study sample and the nationally representative 
sample used in Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (2007). These indicators are consistently 
defined in the two samples, although there are slight differences in the selection of individual 
households and the timing of the two surveys. 
On the basis of these indicators, the two samples appear to be similar, particularly in terms of 
education and the ownership of key assets such as land. It suggests that findings from analysis of 
this dataset may be broadly representative of the country as a whole. Issues concerning the 
generalisability of the findings are discussed in more detail in chapter 9. 
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Table 4.3 Comparison of the study population and a nationally representative sample 
Variable Study 
sample 
Nepal 
sample 
Education 
Husband has no education 19% 18% 
Woman has no education 46% 53% 
Access to media by the woman 
Reads newspaper at least once a week 12% 10% 
Listens to radio at least once a week 59% 61% 
Watches TV at least once a week 46% 38% 
Household possessions 
Electricity 61% 50% 
Radio 66% 64% 
N 41% 30% 
Mobile phone 28% 5% 
Fridge 5% 4% 
Bicycle 51% 39% 
Motorcycle 7% 5% 
Land 72% 72% 
Livestock 81% 83% 
Note: The study sample includes only households in which a woman has given birth 
in the previous three years. The sample in the Nepal Demographic and Health 
Survey 2006 includes only households with a woman aged 15-49. The two surveys 
were conducted two years apart. 
The Community Surveillance System data come from Makwanpur district, which lies to the south 
of Kathmandu in the hill region of Nepal. The topography of Makwanpur varies greatly, as it 
includes both hill (pahaad) and plain (tarai) areas. The population of approximately 400,000 is 
mostly engaged in agriculture (Government of Nepal 2001). While there are over fifteen ethnic 
groups in the district, the majority are Tamang, a largely Buddhist, Tibeto-Burman group, 
followed by Brahmin-Chhetri. The district is ranked 31st out of a total of 75 districts in terms of 
the Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme 2004). The main 
urban centre in Makwanpur is Hetauda, which has reasonably good transport links to Kathmandu 
and towns in neighbouring regions. The district hospital in the municipality of Hetauda provides 
antenatal, delivery and postnatal care. Under the district hospital, the district health system is 
made up of a network of four primary health care centres and 10 health posts. 
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4.4 Background to the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme 
4.4.1 Policy development 
How the SDIP came to be has been documented by individuals who were involved in the process 
(Ensor, Clapham et al. 2009). They contend that the effective dissemination of research findings 
supporting the notion of financial incentives and, at the same time, a convergence of political 
interests were influential in the development of the SDIP and the rapid adoption of the policy by 
the government. 
A study by Borghi et al. (2006) sought to understand why so few women deliver in a health 
facility in Nepal. It found that the household cost of seeking care at childbirth was prohibitively 
high and the majority of expenditures were made outside of the health facility on transport. A 
normal delivery was estimated to cost US$ 71 and a caesarean section US$ 152. Although broadly 
expected, the results alarmed Ministry of Health officials. Concurrently, women's health was high 
on the agenda of the various political parties in the coalition government. Together these two 
factors led to the convening of a technical working group by the Minister of Health to explore 
policy options for improving maternal health, out of which emerged a consensus to provide cash 
assistance to women to encourage them to deliver in a health facility. 
A number of proximate factors were found to influence the policy adoption. First, the results 
were communicated effectively to policymakers by project staff close to the government. Second, 
a bilateral donor - under pressure from the Government of Nepal - was willing to fund the SDIP. 
Third, there was a political champion in the form of the Prime Minister's wife. Fourth, there was 
a convergence of political interests among a fragile coalition looking to secure votes and gain 
approval from both domestic and international constituencies. Political expediency probably 
explains why a pilot programme was ruled out despite concerns raised by the donor. The policy 
development process advanced rapidly and the Government of Nepal launched the SDIP 
nationwide in 2005. 
4.4.2 Critical appraisal of programme design 
The SDIP marks a departure from past government policy that tended to focus on service 
provision only. While it is not intended to act as a social safety net - it is more orientated towards 
behavioural change - it still shares many of the same characteristics as conditional cash transfer 
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programmes. The intention of the programme was never to cover the full cost of health care. 
Available data suggest that this is indeed the case. The demand-side incentives represent 14 
percent of the total household cost of delivery care in tarai districts, 16 percent in hill districts, 
and 47 percent in the mountain districts. 32 Clearly, the financial package of benefits is 
considerably greater in the mountain region than the other two regions. Even with the incentives, 
there remain substantial costs to households of seeking care at childbirth. 
Policy documents claim that the SDIP is focused on helping the poor. " However, given that the 
government chose to provide a universal financial benefit, driven by the desire to gain political 
popularity, there is clearly no targeting of the poor (Ensor, Clapham et al. 2009). 
Notwithstanding the condition regarding parity, the demand-side incentives are available to 
everyone. Thus, on a priori grounds, a large proportion of the demand-side incentives can be 
expected to be captured by relatively better-off families who already use public maternity 
services. 
It is not clear from the description of the policy formulation process how the health provider 
incentive came to be included in the SDIP. There was certainly no empirical evidence in Nepal to 
support its inclusion. Despite being well-intentioned to cater for women delivering at home, the 
provider incentive is not consistent with the policy objective of encouraging more women to 
deliver with professional care. The effect of the supply-side incentives may be ambiguous, 
possibly encouraging more home deliveries. 34 Moreover, the incentive may encourage unskilled 
attendants at delivery because it is available to numerous cadres of health worker who have no 
formal training in delivery care. In this sense, the policy reflects the compromise required to 
make the programme workable in a country where human resources in health are scarce. 
32 As a proportion of the transport cost, the conditional cash transfer represents 43 percent in tarai districts, 28 
percent in hill districts, and 48 percent in mountain districts. Percentages are calculated using household cost data 
from Borghi et a1. (2004) and Borghi et al. (2006). The household costs include those incurred in the health facility, 
transport costs and other costs related to health seeking borne, outside of the facility. 
" An information pamphlet, for example, explains that "more benefits reach to [the] poor, disadvantaged and 
marginalised women" and "the [SDIP] contributes to mitigate the barrier in seeking care, provides relief to the poor 
families... " (Government of Nepal 2006). 
"The extent to which health workers can attend both deliveries at home and deliveries at the health facility depends 
on whether there is slack in the. labour supply. If there is indeed a trade-off, how the incentive influences behaviour of 
the health worker will then depend, in part, on the income that would be forgone (both the provider incentive and 
the user fee from the patient) by not being present to attend a delivery in the health facility. A related concern is that 
health workers attending a home delivery, worried that they could forgo the provider incentive, might be reluctant to 
refer women to a health facility when required. 
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The final point concerns the use of cash rather than a voucher system, which means money has to 
be transferred from the district health office to the health facility and, once there, securely kept. 
In many health centres with no accountant or bank account, this implies the handling of large 
sums of cash by hundreds, if not thousands, of health workers. The fiduciary risk of such a system 
is surely high, without even considering issues of corruption and public security in the country. 
4.4.3 Fidelity in implementation 
Information on the extent to which the SDIP was implemented as planned is shown in Table 4.4 
and Table 4.5. Fidelity in implementation is assessed by aggregating specific examples of practices 
into broader categories that can be mapped against the stated policy. Data come from the 
qualitative study in the first phase of the evaluation of the SDIP (Powell-Jackson, Morrison et al. 
2009). 
Table 4.4 Fidelity in the implementation of the demand-side incentives 
Policy Practice 
1. Conditional cash transfer to women 
Women who deliver in a public 
health facility - hospital, primary 
health centre or health post -are 
entitled to a cash payment if they 
have no more than two living 
children or an obstetric 
complication. The cash is given at 
the time of discharge. If referred, 
the woman is to receive the cash 
from the referring facility. 
2. Free delivery care to women 
" Cash given to women delivering at home 
" Cash given to women delivering in sub-health posts 
  Cash given to all women, and not limited to those with no more than 
two living children or an obstetric complication 
  Reduced amount of cash given to women, because the health 
institution did not have sufficient funds and equally divided the money 
among the eligible women 
" Cash amount deducted from the patient's bill in the absence of any 
cash to hand over to the woman 
  Cash given on a first come first served basis or selectively due to 
insufficient funds 
" Cash not given at time of discharge but at a later time 
  Cash given to the relatives of women on proof of identity 
  Cash given to women with abortion complications (not in the policy) 
" Cash given to women by the referral hospital, rather than the referring 
facility 
  No cash given 
Women eligible for the cash   Free delivery provided to all women, and not limited to those with no 
incentive and resident in a low more than two living children or an obstetric complication 
human development district are   Health facility not reimbursed for the free delivery 
also entitled to free delivery care. 
The health institution is 
reimbursed 1,000 NRS for each 
case of free delivery care given 
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There were numerous practices in the implementation of the conditional cash transfer to the 
women (Table 4.4). There were variations in the interpretation of the eligibility criteria and the 
administration of the cash. The former included cases where health facilities simply ignored the 
eligibility criteria altogether, making the cash available to all women delivering in a public health 
facility. More serious deviations from policy were apparent when an entire district, for example, 
gave cash to women delivering at home. 
Administration of the cash varied in terms of. the amount of cash given; to whom the cash was 
given; and the time at which the cash was given. The practice of giving cash to husbands was a 
particular concern to some respondents who were worried that the money might be misspent. 
Most commonly, women were given no money at all or given it at a later date after being 
discharged from the health facility. The free delivery care element of the policy was usually 
implemented as intended. Sometimes, respondents reported that the health facility had not been 
reimbursed by the government for the deliveries provided free of charge. 
There has been substantial involvement of the central level in the implementation of the 
programme; the Ministry of Health is in charge of overall management of the programme and 
provides funds in instalments to each district and regional hospital. Implementation has been 
governed by a set of guidelines, developed at the central level then issued to districts, to explain 
the management of funds and the monitoring of activities, as well as the eligibility criteria for 
beneficiaries. There were variations in the management of funds at the district level, in the 
eligibility criteria applied to the conditional cash transfer, the payment mechanisms used, the 
promotion of the programme and the means of monitoring (Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5 Fidelity in the implementation of operational procedures at the district level 
Policy Practice 
1. Management of funds from D(P)HO to health facility level 
D(P)HO provides an advance to the health 
management committee of health facilities 
under their jurisdiction based on estimated 
utilisation of obstetric services. The health 
management committee provides incentives 
in accordance with regulations and sends an 
expenditure report to the D(P)HO, who clears 
the advance and, if required, provides a 
reimbursement. D(P)HO then sanctions the 
next advance amount 
2. Payment mechanism of cash to women 
The eligible woman fills out an application 
form to the health facility to claim for the 
incentive. The incentive is provided once the 
admission and discharge card are shown. A 
receipt is given along with the money. 
" Funds provided: as an advance and cleared on submission of 
expenditure report as per policy; and retrospectively on 
submission of claim forms - ie. not as an advance 
" Funds provided: as cash to individual health workers or the 
in-charge of the health facility; as a cheque and put into the 
bank account of the health facility; and as cash to the 
account section in large hospitals 
" Accountant refused to provide funds because of suspicions 
of misappropriation of moneys 
  No receipt or proof of payment given to the women or 
retained by health institution (and the D(P)HO) 
" Women sign maternity register on receipt of money as 
proof of payment 
" No admission or discharge card required 
  Additional conditions applied before claim and payment is 
authorised - eg. proof of eligibility from FCHV and VDC 
secretary or citizen certificate 
3. Means of dissemination of information about the SDIP 
Local authorities and NGOs should support   Forums such as meetings of women's groups and health 
efforts to raise public awareness of both the facility management committee 
incentives and safe delivery services " Word of mouth: FCHVs going door to; health workers 
informing women; NGOs promoting SDIP 
  Use of FM radio 
" Health facilities organising special events 
4. Means of monitoring and supervision of the SDIP 
Monitoring and supervision at the regional 
level is done by the regional Directorate of 
Health Services. At district level, monitoring 
and supervision will be carried out by the 
D(P)HO. The D(P)HO should send quarterly 
progress reports to the Department of Health 
Services in accordance with the specified 
monitoring format. Support will be sought 
from donors and NGOs 
" Monitoring and supervision as per the policy 
  Ad hoc monitoring in HMIS review meetings; monthly 
meeting of district health officials; monthly meeting of 
health staff in facilities to verify number of beneficiaries 
" Follow-up by health professionals of complaints from the 
community about the incentive distribution process 
  One-off supervision visits by central level health officials; 
INGO staff; and auditors asking about SDIP among other 
programmes 
Note: D(P)HO = District (Public) Health Office. HMIS = health management information system. FCHV = female 
community health volunteer. VDC = village development committee. FCHV = female community health volunteer. 
(I)NGO = (international) non-government organisation. 
100 Page 
Chapter 5. DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE AT CHILDBIRTH 
5.1 Introduction 
The role of prices in the demand for health care has been well studied, typically in the context of 
the debate around user fees. There is now a large body of evidence from developing countries. 
Notwithstanding the methodological limitations of many of these studies, the broad consensus is 
that price does affect health seeking choices, but that demand is relatively price inelastic. 
Furthermore, price elasticities tend to fall with income such that the poorest would benefit most 
from any fall in user fees. 
As the literature review highlighted, there are a number of reasons why it is worth revisiting the 
topic in this thesis. There remain few studies that have looked specifically at health seeking at 
childbirth and, in so much as the demand for maternity care may differ from other types of care, 
this provides one rationale for doing so here. Perhaps a more relevant reason relates to the Safe 
Delivery Incentive Progamme (SDIP), whose success depends to a large degree on how sensitive 
consumers are to the price of care at childbirth, a question which can explored through the 
estimation of a demand model. If households fail to respond to prices, the main theoretical 
mechanism underpinning the programme may be called into question. 
In this sense, the analysis of demand for maternity care can be considered an ex-ante evaluation of 
the SDIP. The evaluation literature recommends the use of modelling to feed into the 
development of an intervention. While this analysis is too late to inform the design of the SDIP, it 
does give useful context to subsequent chapters on the performance of the programme and 
provides a benchmark against which to assess the plausibility of impact estimates. Furthermore, 
the findings will have relevance for policy debates around the removal of direct payments for 
health care that are currently ongoing in Nepal. 
With the SDIP in mind, it is natural for the analysis in this chapter to focus on the effect of prices. 
At the same time, the household decision making process is complex and, as the literature review 
emphasised, many non-economic factors play an important role. There are a whole host of factors 
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that may influence health seeking choices and considerations of some of these determinants will be 
given. 
The analysis in this chapter is made up of three parts. The first part examines the cost of seeking 
care at childbirth from the perspective of the patient, focusing in particular on the financial 
burden this places on the household budget. The second part estimates a demand model for 
maternity care, using a number of different empirical specifications to assess the robustness of 
results. In the third part, the model parameters are used to simulate the effect on utilisation of 
changing the values of individual explanatory variables. The analysis is limited to one area of 
Nepal, Makwanpur district. 
Before describing the empirical methods, it is worth revisiting the predictions of the economic 
model in chapter 3. Prices can be expected to exert a negative influence on utilisation, which is 
greater among households of a lower income, all else being equal. Similarly, distance can be 
expected to have a negative effect on utilisation, regardless of whether it is captured as a price 
(opportunity cost of time and travel cost) or a time variable. 
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5.2 Empirical methods 
5.2.1 Cost of care and financial burden 
The definition of the cost of care used here is comprehensive, including both direct medical costs 
and other costs to the household associated with health care seeking. It encompasses the 
registration fee, delivery fee, fee for use of the operating theatre, drugs and supplies in the 
facility, tests in the facility, inpatient stay, drugs and supplies from outside, transport to and from 
facility, accommodation of family members, and food of accompanying family members. 
Beyond simply estimating the cost of care, the analysis shows the financial burden of paying for 
delivery care at a health facility. The unit of analysis is the household, and financial burden is 
measured as the share of out-of-pocket (OOP) health spending for delivery care in total 
household consumption. 35 A common extension of this approach uses measures of catastrophic 
spending to estimate the effect of health care payments on household material living standards 
(Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Xu, Evans et al. 2003). Health spending is regarded as 
catastrophic if it exceeds a certain fraction of total household expenditure in any given time 
period. It is based on the premise that health spending is likely to displace consumption of other 
goods and services if it makes up a large proportion of total household resources. 
Catastrophic payments have been defined in two ways. The first measures catastrophic payments 
as the share of health spending in total household consumption, while the second estimates health 
spending relative to household consumption net of spending on subsistence requirements, 
frequently proxied as non-food expenditure. This second measure reflects the view that non- 
discretionary expenditure may be a better indicator of a household's living standard or capacity to 
pay for health care (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Xu, Evans et al. 2003). The threshold 
above which health spending is classified as catastrophic is essentially arbitrary (O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008). The most common thresholds used are 10 percent in the case of the first 
measure of catastrophic payments and 40 percent in the second case. In addition, the 
concentration index is calculated for the incidence of catastrophic expenditure to quantify the 
degree of inequality in the indicator (Kakwani, Wagstaff et al. 1997). Results are stratified by type 
of delivery since spending on normal deliveries and caesarean sections is expected to diverge 
widely. 
It is otherwise referred to as the out-of-pocket health care budget share. 
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5.2.2 Model of health care seeking 
Analytical framework 
As presented in chapter 3, a woman faces a number of j health care options when considering 
where to give birth. The choice of alternatives depends on individual and household 
characteristics, health provider characteristics and non-health consumption. In order to 
operationalise the framework for empirical estimation, a functional form must be assumed. 
Starting with the most simple linear model (Akin, Guilkey et al. 1985; Mwabu and Mwangi 
1986), yields the following: 
Uij = cvlijhij + cI)21JC1 + Eti 
where hij = cc11j'xi + a2i'Zj. For the time being, it is assumed that individual characteristics 
are entered additively to the health provider characteristics, such that returns to health from a 
particular provider do not, for example, depend on the woman's level of education. With 
reparamaterisation, the indirect utility function is given by: 
ýý = air j'xi + a21'zj + a3 ii c; +EJ 
An analysis of the responsiveness of demand for maternity care to the price requires alternative 
specific costs. This is incorporated by taking account of the budget constraint, such that 
consumption is no longer treated as exogenous and is instead entered as the difference between 
exogenous income and the price of health care at provider j: 
vij = aiij'Xi + azi'zij + a3jjY + a4iPij + eij 
However, as demonstrated by Gertler et al. (1987) and Gertler and van der Gaag (1990), income 
in the model above has no effect on the choice of provider, which means the responsiveness of 
demand to price is independent of income. The functional form of the conditional utility function 
must not impose a constant marginal rate of substitution and must allow the utility to be concave 
in consumption. To address this problem, they proposed a specification in which utility is a linear 
function of health and a quadratic function of consumption, where: 
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Uij = Gt)lijFiij + (i)ZijCi + (4)ZijC? + £i/ 
which gives: 
V. = a'-. x. + a2i1Zij + a3tjY7 + a4ijYi + asiP + a6iPij + a7iYi ' Pij + £il 
Simplification of the notation gives: 
Vij = aiixi + Yi'wig + £ij where w= (z, p, yo y2, p2, y. P) 
This model is referred to as the 'basic model' hereafter and is the basis for the first set of model 
results. In some studies, researchers have imposed constraints on the parameters in this basic 
model. For example, Gertler et al. (1987) constrain the coefficients on the price and income- 
related variables to be equal across alternative providers and further impose the constraint 
a5 = -2Cr7 . 
In contrast, Dow (1995) proposes a 'flexible behavioural model' that relaxes a 
number of assumptions. First, the assumption of additive separability in the utility function is 
relaxed, which in practice means the coefficients on price and interactions with price are allowed 
to vary by alternative. Second, Dow (1999) relaxes the restriction placed on the relationship 
between the coefficients a5 and a7. Third, cross-prices are introduced into the utility function 
for each provider, with the theoretical justification of forward-looking behaviour by individuals 
(Dow 1995). The specification then takes the form: 
Vii = aliýxi + U2iý'ziý + asiýYý + a4ijYi + a5ijp + a6ijPi + a7ijYi ' Pik + Eii 
where p= [pi, """ , p)] 
Inferences about the relative importance of the determinants of demand for health care are made 
using discrete choice models and full information maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The 
individual is assumed to know all attributes of the provider and to choose the one that maximises 
her (indirect) utility. The observed choice is determined by the difference in utility (ie. net 
utility), not the levels of utility per se. Multinomial models are required when dependent variables 
are discrete and can take unordered multinomial outcomes. They are motivated by McFadden's 
(1981) random utility model and provide relative probabilities with respect to a base alternative. 
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Two assumptions regarding the distribution of the error terms are 
be made, yielding a particular 
empirical specification (Bolduc, Lacroix et al. 1996) and these are 
described below. 
Multinomial logit 
First, following most studies on the demand for medical care prior to Gertler et al. (1987), it is 
assumed that the demand functions take on a multinomial logit (MNL) form, for example see 
Heller (1982). 36 When data consist of both case- and alternative-specific variables, the appropriate 
model is (for the basic model): 
exp (ü/x1 + Yt'ivi j) fl2: 
K 
1 exp (ä1t'x1 + Yt'ývji) ii 
An important property of the multinomial logit model is the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption. It means that the odds of choosing one alternative over another is 
independent of the other alternatives and arises from the assumption that the errors are 
independently and identically distributed. The IIA assumption implies that if a new alternative is 
introduced all absolute probabilities will be reduced proportionately and further imposes the 
restriction that cross-price elasticities are the same across all alternatives. Many authors have 
argued that IIA is too restrictive and implausible in the context of health seeking behaviour, 
particularly when there are choices between close substitutes. Bolduc et a]. (1996), for example, 
conclude that there is little reason to believe the independence implied by the multinomial logit 
has any justification and that it may be inappropriate to formulate policy recommendations based 
on this model. 
The IIA assumption can be tested to assess whether the logit specification is appropriate. Hausman 
and McFadden (1984) suggest that if a choice is irrelevant with respect to the other alternatives, 
omission of the choice from the multinomial logfit estimates will still lead to consistent estimates. 
Hausman's (1978) test can therefore be used to compare estimates of the full choice set and a 
subset as a test for IIA. 
36 When modelling both case- and alternative-specific variables, strictly speaking the appropriate model is the 
conditional logit, which is a special case of the multinomial logit model. To maintain consistency with other studies, 
the term "multinomial logit model" is used in this chapter. 
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Multinomial probit 
A less restrictive of model, but computationally the most burdensome, is the multinomial probit 
specification. It allows correlation between all alternatives and assumes that the error terms are 
identically normally distributed with covariance matrix fl. Following Bolduc et al. (1996), the 
probability of a woman choosing provider K is given by: 
VZ fVK-1 FJ 
K= 
f-"I 
co(U; E)dU 
00 
where Vj = 
(Wig 
- Wij)ri + xi([ij - lYK), U is a (K X 1) zero mean vector, (p(") is a 
multivariate normal density function and Z is the covariance matrix of the different error terms 
from the normalised utility equations of each alternative. The integral must be approximated 
because it has no closed form using the maximum simulated likelihood approach (Train 2003). 
As a final point on the empirical strategy, there has been much discussion in the demand for health 
care literature about sample selection bias that arises when information on recent bouts of illness 
is self-reported by individuals, see for example Akin et al. (1998). It suffices to note that in this 
study inclusion in the sample is not based on subjective measures of self-reported illness, but 
rather an objective fact regarding whether the woman gave birth. 37 
Price elasticities and simulation exercises 
Interpretation of the model coefficients on the respective price variables is complicated by the 
inclusion of the quadratic function and price - income interaction. In order to assess the effect of 
price on utilisation, the own-price elasticity of demand can be estimated. It shows for a given 
alternative the responsiveness of demand to a change in its price. 38 Price elasticities are estimated 
for various specifications using the multinomial logit model to show whether the estimates differ 
according to whether the basic specification or flexible behavioural specification is used. The price 
elasticity of alternative j with respect to the price of j is derived from the following expression, 
taken from Train (1986): 
"There is, however, the need to correct for selection bias in the measurement of price, a key variable in this analysis 
of demand, as explained in the next section. 
3a Strictly speaking, the most appropriate term for the parameter of interest is price elasticity of probability since the 
study is concerned with the probability of a woman seeking care at each provider and not the number of visits 
(Greene 2008). 
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Elasticities are computed by averaging the values of individual observations. The average across 
the sample can be driven by single observations that have extreme values giving unrealistic values. 
Greene (2008), therefore, recommends calculating the elasticity once at the sample mean of the 
variables to ensure extreme values are averaged out. It is found, however, that this method makes 
little difference to the price elasticitiy estimates. Price elasticities are shown by wealth quintile 
given the theoretical predictions of the demand for maternity care. 
The influence of the other explanatory variables on the choice of provider can be gauged by 
carrying out simulation exercises in which the marginal effects depend on the level of all X. In the 
base scenario, the actual values for each observation are used and the probability of use at each 
alternative is computed by the model. In each simulation, the values of one variable are altered, 
while retaining the actual values of all other variables, to give the probability of use at each 
alternative. The simulated probabilities are then compared with the base scenario probabilities to 
show the change in health seeking behaviour as a result of the change in the explanatory variable. 
For simplicity, only the results of the flexible behavioural model are presented in the simulation 
exercises. 
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5.3 Data 
5.3.1 Data sources 
The main source of data used in the analysis is from the Community Surveillance System in the 
rural areas of the district of Makwanpur. It contains complete data on 8,874 deliveries. It is 
supplemented by primary data on the price of care collected on a subsample of women who 
sought care at a public health facility in Cost of Delivery Survey. The price data for this subsample 
are used to impute prices for the entire sample. However, given that no price data were available 
on deliveries in private health facilities or public health posts, these observations had to be 
dropped. In any case, only 0.94 percent of the sample sought delivery care privately and 0.37 
percent in a public health post, leaving 8,758 observations with complete records. A more 
detailed description of the two data sources is given in chapter 3. 
5.3.2 Definition of variables 
There are four categories of the dependent variable which reflect the health seeking alternatives at 
childbirth. The explanatory variables are categorised according to attributes of the provider and 
attributes of the individual or household. Their definitions are described in Table 5.1. 
Dependent variables 
The four categories of the dependent variable represent alternative places of delivery, including 
the home, primary health care centre (PHCC), district hospital, or regional hospital. These three 
types of health facility are government-run. Delivery at home is the comparison group in the 
analysis and is analogous to self-treatment in the demand for health care literature. There are a 
couple of reasons why the place of delivery, as opposed to the type of birth attendant or a 
combination of place and type of attendant, was chosen to define the dependent variables. First, 
the major decision a household must make when seeking care is where to go, if anywhere. It 
seems plausible that the type of health worker in attendance is more a reflection of a health 
facility's quality of care -a consequence of deciding where to deliver - rather than a separate 
choice a household is faced with. Moreover, by not using the type of delivery attendant to define 
the dependent variable, a quality variable can be constructed using information on who was 
present at the delivery. Second, delivery with a doctor, nurse or midwife is almost synonymous 
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with giving birth at a health facility ensuring that the choice set is essentially in line with 
international policy that focuses on skilled birth attendance. 
Table 5.1 Definition of variables 
Variable Description 
Choice of provider at childbirth 
Home =1 if woman delivers at home; =0 otherwise 
Regional hospital =1 if woman delivers at a regional hospital; =0 otherwise 
District hospital =1 if woman delivers at the district hospital; =0 otherwise 
Primary health care centre =1 if woman delivers at a primary health care centre; =0 otherwise 
Attributes of the provider 
Price Price of alternative j, where price is total expenditure on care 
Time price Opportunity cost of time using alternative j 
Skilled birth attendant Probability of skilled attendant at delivery in alternative j 
Attributes of the individual and household 
Asset score Asset wealth index of household constructed using PCA 
Household members Number of persons living in household 
Age Age of woman at childbirth 
School grade School grade attained by the woman 
Marginalised =1 if caste of the household is marginalised; =0 otherwise 
Road access a =1 if village of the household has road access; =0 otherwise 
Women's group =1 if household located in women's group intervention area; 0 otherwise 
Severe bleeding =1 if woman had severe bleeding prior to or during labour; 0 otherwise 
Convulsions =1 if woman had convulsions during labour; 0 otherwise 
Obstructed labour =1 if woman had an obstructed labour; 0 otherwise 
Severe fever =1 if woman had a fever or severe sickness prior to or during labour; 0 otherwise 
Note: a Only used in the imputation of prices, not in the estimation of the demand model. 
Explanatory variables 
There are two types of explanatory variable reflecting the distinction between individual 
characteristics and attributes of the health provider (Akin, Guilkey et al. 1998). The former 
remain the same, irrespective of provider, while the latter vary by provider. The selection of 
explanatory variables is informed by the literature review in chapter 2 and limited by the available 
data. 
The price comprises two components, the price of care and opportunity cost of time spent 
seeking care. The price of care is out-of-pocket expenditure on care seeking at childbirth; it 
matches the definition given previously. For a home delivery, the price captures the fee to the 
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attendant, gift to the attendant, drugs and supplies, food to the attendant, safe delivery kit, and 
materials to wash the baby. The opportunity cost encompasses time spent seeking health care by 
the woman (travel time, waiting time and time given care), as reported by each respondent. It 
was calculated as the product of the time spent seeking care and the wage rate. Since over 90 
percent of households work in farming, the mean agricultural wage rate of 73.9 NRS per day, 
obtained from the Cost of Delivery Survey, was used to value time. The price is hypothesised to 
have a negative effect on utilisation. 
Income is proxied by a wealth index, constructed using principal components analysis on 
information regarding ownership of household assets (Filmer and Pritchett 1998). The asset index 
is re-scaled, maintaining the identical distribution, to give values between 0 and 100, with zero 
representing the poorest household in terms of asset ownership. Wealth is interacted with price 
and included in the model as a variable to explore whether responses to price vary across wealth 
groups. 39 The expectation is that delivery care is a normal good - that is, wealth has a positive 
effect on demand. Women with more household members are expected to have a preference for 
home deliveries, since an increase in family size, for a given level of household wealth, will reduce 
per capita wealth. 'o 
Quality of care is measured by the probability of a woman being attended by a skilled attendant at 
delivery. A skilled birth attendant is defined as a doctor, nurse or midwife. Each observation is 
assigned the value for the trimester in which the woman gave birth to reflect variation in staffing 
levels over time by type of provider. An increase in the quality of any alternative is hypothesised 
to increase demand. Individual characteristics reflecting preferences for quality are age of the 
woman, and educational attainment. The expected influence of age on demand could 
be argued 
both ways. Older women are likely to be at greater risk and therefore may have a preference 
for 
care at higher level hospitals (Lewis 2007); at the same time it is well documented that women 
giving birth for the first time (ie. younger women) prefer to give birth in a health 
facility 
(Government of Nepal 2007). It is expected that better educated women are more inclined to use 
"The inclusion of an interacted term requires the asset index to take on only positive values to avoid the problem of 
multiplying two negative values (the imputed price has negative values for some observations) to give a positive value 
of the interacted variable. This explains why the asset index is re-scaled. 
"' Family size may also operate through an alternative mechanism, in which women in larger 
households prefer to 
deliver at home because there are more dependents to look after and more household members to assist 
during 
childbirth. 
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care at a facility (and higher levels of facility), since they are more productive in their use of health 
care (Grossman 2000). 
The caste of a household determines whether it is marginalised, as indicated by a dummy variable. 
Individual castes reported by the household are grouped into broader caste categories based on 
Bennett et al. (2008). Caste of a household provides a broad measure of socioeconomic status and 
is highly correlated with education status and household wealth (Bennett, Dahal et al. 2008). In 
the context of health seeking at childbirth, indicators of marginalisation - particularly once other 
socioeconomic factors are controlled for - may provide a measure of the woman's decision 
making power. Needless to say, marginalised women are hypothesised to have a lower chance of 
using maternity services. 
The "road" dummy variable indicates whether the village where the household is located has a 
road. Availability of a road would be expected to influence choice of provider by reducing 
geographical barriers to access. However, since it is reflected in the time and financial cost faced 
by a household seeking to reach a health facility, there is no need to include it as a separate 
determinant of provider choice. Instead, it is used in the hedonic price and time equations for 
predicting missing values, as explained below. 
A dummy variable indicates whether the household is located in a village which was selected to be 
an intervention area in the trial of women's groups. As a demand side intervention, the women's 
groups would be expected to raise utilisation of maternal health services. Indeed, available . 
evidence suggests women's groups in the first phase of the trial had a positive impact on utilisation 
of maternity services (Manandhar, Osrin et al. 2004). 
The last four variables are a set of dummy variables, reflecting maternal complications prior to or 
during childbirth, used to proxy severity of disease, as reported by the woman. These indicators 
are not objective measures of disease status - nor are they meant to be since it is perceptions that 
drive health seeking decisions. Of the major problems that were self-reported by the woman, 
only the ones that occur prior to or during childbirth are included in the model since problems 
occurring after childbirth cannot be determinants of health seeking for delivery. Women who 
report a maternal complication during labour are expected to turn away from self care at home to 
health facility care. 
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5.3.3 Imputation of prices 
A person with ill health is faced with a menu of prices and levels of quality of care offered by 
available health providers. Discrete choice models require values of these variables for all 
alternative health care providers. However, ex-post price information is available only for the 
provider from whom the individual chose to receive delivery care. Estimates of the price and 
opportunity cost must be imputed using hedonic price equations, since only the price of the 
chosen provider can be observed (Gertler, Locay et al. 1987). Selection bias may be present as the 
observed distribution of prices paid will not be representative of the ex-ante distribution of prices 
across all individuals, who are likely to choose lower price options. Put another way, the price 
faced by an individual choosing a given alternative may not be representative of those faced by the 
average individual. Methods to correct for selection bias have been developed, following from the 
initial insight of Heckman (1979). 
The situation is an example of a limited dependent variable. The two-part model can be estimated 
by a logit or probit model for the probability of an individual giving birth at each of the 
alternatives, along with ordinary least squares on the sub-sample of positive observations. In the 
case where there are a number of health-seeking choices, a two part model can still be used but 
selectivity is modelled as a multinomial logit rather a univariate probit, as in the Heckman model. 
The first step is to estimate a reduced form multinomial logit model, compute the predicted 
probability and generate a set of selection correction terms for each individual. The predicted 
selection correction terms are then included as regressors in the hedonic price equations. These 
selection correction terms are consistent estimators of expected values of the residuals derived 
from the multinomial logit model. While a number of bias correction methods are available, the 
most flexible, developed by Bourguignon et al. (2007), is used. 
In the dataset, there are two sets of missing data on prices. First, among those seeking care at each 
provider, there are individuals for whom price information was not collected. Price data are 
available only for 11 percent, 24 percent and 27 percent of individuals who sought care at a 
regional hospital, the district hospital and a primary health centre respectively. " In this instance, 
" The Cost of Delivery Survey ran for only six months and therefore does not provide price data on all women 
captured in the Community Surveillance System who delivered in a health facility during the two-year period (July 
2005 - June 2007). 
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price values are predicted using a simply OLS regression since there is no reason for selection 
bias. The equation specifies price to be a function of age, road access, self-reported complications 
prior to childbirth (bleeding, obstructed labour, convulsions, and severe fever) and the 
probability of a skilled birth attendant in each provider (home, regional hospital, district hospital, 
and primary health centre). The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.2. Wealth is excluded 
to avoid attributing higher prices to wealthier households who may have purchased higher quality 
of care within each provider category. In public hospitals, for example, there is often a choice 
between general wards and paying wards, where there are likely to be marked differences in the 
interpersonal aspects of care. Since education, marginalisation, and household size arc highly 
correlated with wealth, these variables are also omitted. 
Table 5.2 Summary statistics of variables used the hedonic price and time regressions 
Std 
Variable Observations Mean Deviation 
Dependent variable 
Price of care at Regional Hospital (rupees) 
Price of care at District Hospital (rupees) 
Price of care at PHC (rupees) 
Time seeking care at Regional Hospital (days) 
Time seeking care at District Hospital (days) 
Time seeking care at PHC (days) 
Independent variable 
Age 
Road access 
Bleeding 
Obstructed labour 
Convulsions 
Severe fever 
Prob. seen by SBA at Home 
Prob. seen by SBA in Regional Hospital 
Prob. seen by SBA in District Hospital 
Prob. seen by SBA in PHC 
Note: PHC = primary health care centre; SBA = skilled birth attendant 
47 9032.45 7933.06 
143 4655.45 5496.05 
103 1080.24 1343.65 
47 6.17 5.18 
143 2.46 3.86 
103 1.59 2.83 
300 23.30 4.86 
300 0.69 0.46 
300 0.07 0.26 
300 0.23 0.42 
300 0.03 0.17 
300 0.03 0.17 
300 0.01 0.00 
300 0.97 0.02 
300 0.99 0.01 
300 0.91 0.07 
Second, price values are missing for those providers which the individual did not visit. In this 
instance, the two-step model that corrects for selection bias is required to predict missing values. 
In the first step, a multinomial logit model is estimated by maximum likelihood to generate a set 
of correction terms for each individual which are then included as regressors in the hedonic price 
equations. Imputation is based on the actual price data and not the predicted values from the 
previous regression. In the multinomial logit, the choice of provider is modelled as a function of 
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age, household size, marginalisation (by caste), wealth, education level, women's group 
intervention area, perceived severe problems prior to childbirth (bleeding, obstructed labour, 
convulsions, and severe fever) and the probability of a skilled birth attendant in each provider (see 
Table 5.3). 
In the second step, the same OLS regression above is used, except this time with the inclusion of 
the selection correction terms. An identical procedure is used to impute missing values for the 
time taken to seek care (see Table 5.4). The opportunity cost of time is then calculated as the 
product of the imputed time values and the agricultural wage rate in the district. The goodness of 
fit is high in the case of the regional hospital and primary health care centre for both sets of 
hedonic equations. 
Consistency of the two-part model for the model parameters rests on strong assumptions. 
Nonetheless, if the aim is simply to predict conditional means as it is here and not to make 
inferences about individual parameters, then the two-part model may perform reasonably well 
(Duan, Manning Jr et al. 1983). On that basis, the model will often be adequate, for example, 
when the objective is simply to predict medical expenditure conditional on a vector of individual 
and market characteristics (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). 
Table 5.3 Hedonic price regressions with selection correction terms 
Regional hospital District hospital Primary health centre 
price price price 
Independent variable Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Constant 3844778 0.58 -32338 -0.06 -116184 -2.74 
Age 956 1.59 176 1.36 -1 -0.03 
Road access 1139 0.30 -138 -0.12 -541 -1.07 
Severed bleeding 1569 0.28 524 0.31 470 0.79 
Obstructed labour 2629 0.67 1963 1.42 160 0.40 
Convulsions 9003 0.64 602 0.19 951 1.20 
Severe fever -8374 -0.44 -832 -0.26 -1948 -2.21 
Prob. seen by SBA at home (dropped) 3258766 0.28 605640 1.25 
Prob. seen by SBA in regional hospital 1077441 1.68 172338 0.20 -23774 -0.52 
Prob. seen by SBA in district hospital -1319405 -1.71 5191 0.01 158885 2.52 
Prob. seen by SBA in PHC -214902 -1.35 -186600 -0.25 -26128 -0.90 
Home selection term -14392 -1.06 -2218 -0.49 402 0.33 
Regional hospital selection term 15340 1.78 8746 0.97 -3149 -1.15 
District hospital selection term -42565 -1.98 -346 -0.25 -1776 -1.40 
PHC selection term -76222 -1.68 -17887 -1.75 1115 1.43 
R2 0.2237 0.0549 0.3906 
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The price of a home delivery was not available from the Cost of Delivery Survey. The mean cost 
to the household is taken from Borghi et al. (2004), using values from similar hill districts in 
Nepal. The price is adjusted for inflation using the national consumer price index to give a mean 
of 575.9 NRS in 2007 prices. The opportunity cost of giving birth at home is assumed to be zero. 
Table 5.4 Hedonic time regressions with selection correction terms 
Independent variable 
Regional hospital 
time 
Coefficient t-Stat 
District hospital 
time 
Coefficient t-Stat 
Primary health 
centre time 
Coefficient t-Stat 
Constant 335 0.97 534 1.78 7 0.09 
Age -0.4 -1.26 0.2 1.92 0.2 3.02 
Road access 2 0.77 -0.3 -0.39 3 3.04 
Severed bleeding 6 1.94 0.0 0.02 13 12.03 
Obstructed labour 8 3.79 2 1.89 0.5 0.63 
Convulsions -8 -1.05 1 0.51 -0.5 -0.34 
Severe fever -3 -0.32 0.5 0.24 -5 -3.12 
Prob. seen by SBA at home (dropped) -29964 -4.29 330 0.39 
Prob. seen by SBA in regional hospital -198 -0.59 -2215 -4.33 -66 -0.81 
Prob. seen by SBA in district hospital -211 -0.53 171 0.74 52 0.46 
Prob. seen by SBA in PHC 86 1.03 1869 4.21 -4 -0.09 
Home selection term -10 -1.44 2 0.61 -4 -1.65 
Regional hospital selection term -1 -0.20 9 1.68 5 1.11 
District hospital selection term -5 -0.44 -0.1 -0.13 -4 -1.71 
PHC selection term 35 1.46 -8 -1.24 0 -0.28 
R2 0.4986 0.3077 0.6517 
5.3.4 Estimation of wealth 
The dataset contains no information on the income and expenditure of households. A widely used 
alternative is an asset index, constructed using principal components analysis from information on 
asset ownership and housing characteristics. It has been argued that the asset index, as a proxy for 
economic status, performs as reliably as more conventional income and expenditure measures 
(Filmer and Pritchett 1998). In practice, the data are relatively easy to collect and may be less 
susceptible to measurement errors as many of the assets or housing characteristics can be observed 
by the interviewer. " 
The analysis includes only assets that are observable to the interviewer (land may be the only 
exception) so as to reduce measurement error. The qualitative categorical variables are recoded 
" Contrary to this, Onwujekwe et al (2006) provide evidence suggesting the data used to derive asset indices can be 
unreliable, leading to the possibility of misclassification when using wealth 9uartiles. 
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into binary variables. When running the principal components analysis, the correlation matrix is 
used since data are not standardised or expressed in the same unit. It is assumed the first principal 
component is a measure of wealth. The eigenvalue of the first principal component is 4.1. Each 
variable of asset ownership, with the exception of house ownership, is associated with higher 
wealth, as indicated by the positive factor score (result not shown). Access to infrastructure 
facilities including water and sanitation is associated with higher wealth. Broadly speaking, the 
more costly types of housing materials and cooking fuels have higher factor scores. The asset 
index generated by the principal components analysis has a mean of zero. To ensure that there are 
no negative values, the index is re-scaled to give values between 0 and 100. 
Table 5.5 assesses the robustness of the asset index, providing the mean value of socioeconomic 
indicators by asset index decile. 43 The distribution of the asset index is skewed to the right, as is 
also typical with household consumption data. There is little difference in the asset index for a 
large proportion of the sample, suggesting a certain degree of homogeneity across the sample. 
Table 5.5 Socioeconomic variables by asset decile 
Asset decile Asset index Literacy School grade 
Household 
members 
Farmer Marginalised 
caste 
1 4.57 0.09 0.58 6.25 0.91 0.96 
2 7.95 0.10 0.61 6.75 0.94 0.95 
3 10.04 0.14 0.92 7.01 0.96 0.92 
4 12.22 0.15 0.94 7.36 0.96 0.92 
5 14.41 0.17 1.14 7.30 0.92 0.89 
6 17.85 0.28 1.83 7.43 0.94 0.83 
7 23.31 0.33 2.18 7.29 0.88 0.78 
8 30.18 0.38 2.62 7.18 0.90 0.67 
9 39.97 0.56 4.22 7.72 0.87 0.49 
10 58.02 0.77 6.60 7.96 0.78 0.36 
Note: Estimates based on entire sample of deliveries (N=8,874). 
A substantial proportion of women in the highest decile remain illiterate, and the average number 
of years of schooling represents only a completed primary education. This suggests that the 
socioeconomic status of the entire sample is low, unsurprisingly for a rural population. In 
accordance with expectations, the proportion of marginalised households decreases with higher 
asset deciles. Broadly, household size increases with higher asset deciles. Within a relatively 
" Note that correlation between the asset index and annual household consumption (in the Subsample with both these 
variables) is relatively low at 0.272. A correlation coefficient between 0.2 and 0.4 is commonly found in the 
literature (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). 
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homogenous rural sample, it seems reasonable that larger households with potentially more 
productive members can afford to purchase more assets. 
5.3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.6 provides descriptive statistics on the dependent variable of the demand model. By far 
the most common place of delivery is at home, with 87 percent of women reporting to have given 
birth there. A further 4 percent, 5 percent and 3 percent of women reported to have delivered in 
a regional hospital, district hospital and primary health centre respectively. Although not reported 
in the table, it is worth noting that while the majority of women in the sample had a normal 
delivery, a substantial proportion of those giving birth in a regional hospital required vacuum 
extraction (27 percent), the use of forceps (11 percent), or a caesarean section (23 percent). In 
the district hospital and primary health centres, 50 percent of women were given a vacuum 
extraction. 
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics on the dependent variable in the demand model 
Std 
Variable Observations Mean Deviation 
Home 8758 0.873 0.332 
Regional hospital 8758 0.042 0.201 
District hospital 8758 0.052 0.222 
Primary health care centre 8758 0.032 0.177 
The price of care varies markedly by type of provider (Table 5.7). The higher the level of care, 
the higher the price faced by the household. " In part, this reflects the opportunity cost of greater 
travel and treatment time, but also probably better quality of care and severity of cases. The price 
of seeking care at a regional hospital is almost double that at the district hospital, which in turn is 
almost three times the price incurred at a primary health care centre. Almost all those delivering 
in a health facility did so with a skilled birth attendant, in contrast to home deliveries where only 
1 percent of women had a doctor, nurse or midwife present. 
The mean age of women at childbirth is 25.5 years. Women receive little education, two years on 
average, which explains why over 70 percent of the sample are illiterate (not reported). Almost 
80 percent women come from castes considered marginalised. The average household size is over 
The price of care at home is the same for all observations; hence the standard deviation is zero. 
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seven members and most families live in an area where women's groups are active. Women 
report a number of obstetric complications prior to childbirth. The incidence ranges from 2 
percent to 6 percent depending on the nature of the problem. Of the four self-reported obstetric 
complications, obstructed labour is the most common. 
Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics on the independent variables in demand model 
Variable Observations Mean 
Std 
Deviation 
Home price 8758 575.9 0.0 
Regional hospital price 8758 9085.4 6574.4 
District hospital price 8758 4554.7 2890.4 
PHCC price 8758 1737.3 1161.4 
Prob. of SBA at home 8758 0.010 0.002 
Prob. of SBA at regional hospital 8758 0.986 0.018 
Prob. of SBA at district hospital 8758 0.993 0.007 
Prob. of SBA at PHCC 8758 0.946 0.050 
Wealth 8758 21.357 15.849 
Education grade 8758 2.106 3.216 
Household members 8758 7.212 3.236 
Age 8758 25.476 6.225 
Marginalised by caste 8758 0.782 0.413 
Attended women's group 8758 0.760 0.427 
Severe bleeding 8758 0.029 0.167 
Convulsions 8758 0.019 0.136 
Obstructed labour 8758 0.059 0.236 
Severe fever 8758 0.035 0.185 
Note: Prices are imputed and include the cost of health care seeking and the opportunity cost of time. PHCC = 
primary health care centre. SBA = skilled birth attendant. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Cost of maternity care 
Table 5.8 shows that cost of maternity care to the household can be substantial, particularly in the 
case of emergency surgery. The mean cost of a normal delivery was found to be 4,042 NRS (US$ 
63.2), compared with 22,780 NRS (US$ 356.2) incurred by those with a caesarean section. For 
both types of delivery, facility-based charges and the additional costs of goods and services 
purchased outside of the health facility together account for around two-thirds of the overall cost. 
Payments made to the health provider are retained at facility level, and placed under the control 
of the health management committee (if in place). Clearly, delivery care can be a potentially 
important source of revenue for health facilities. Outstanding debts to service providers remain a 
sizable share of the total cost suggesting households, particularly those with women requiring a 
caesarean section, struggle to find any means to pay their bills at the time the service is received. 
The transport cost associated with a caesarean section is almost double that of a normal delivery, 
presumably because families need to travel further and more urgently to hospitals sufficiently 
specialised to carry out surgery. The SDIP's cash incentive, worth 1,000 NRS, is sufficient to 
cover one quarter of the cost of a normal delivery or one twentieth of the cost of a caesarean 
section. 
Table 5.8 Household costs of facility delivery care by cost category 
Cost category 
Normal 
95% CI % 
C-section 
95% Cl % (n=271) (n=29) 
Facility-based charges 1492 . (1191-1793) 36.9 7913 (5675 - 10150) 34.7 
Additional charges 1185 (1040- 1330) 29.3 7071 (4777 -9405) 31.1 
Transport costs 669 (565-773) 16.5 1415 (845 -1985) 6.2 
Debt to service provider 697 (474- 920) 17.2 6362 (2995 - 9730) 27.9 
Total 4042 (3522- 4562) 100 22780 (17045 - 28516) 100 
Note: Data come from the Cost of Delivery Survey. All monetary values are in Nepalese rupees. A normal 
delivery is defined as a vaginal delivery. It is not known whether the debt to the health provider was paid by the 
household. Cl = confidence interval. 
Table 5.9 shows that OOP payments for normal delivery care account for 3.6 percent of total 
annual household consumption, while those for a caesarean section account for a much higher 
19.3 percent. Spending on a caesarean section places a considerable strain on the household 
budget. The concentration indices of OOP budget shares for both types of delivery are negative 
indicating that better-off families spend a smaller fraction of total household resources on delivery 
care. The quintile means also show a similar pattern, although the gradient is less steep in the case 
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of caesarean sections. Given that this sample covered only households seeking delivery care, it is 
perhaps to be expected that the OOP budget share decreases with household resources. The 
proportion of households that incur catastrophic spending is considerable. Using a 10 percent 
threshold, the incidence of catastrophic spending is 7.4 percent for normal delivery care and 72.4 
percent for caesarean sections. 
Table 5.9 Financial burden of out-of-pocket spending on facility care 
OOP delivery care spending as % of total household consumption Normal delivery C-section 
Mean 3.6% 19.3% 
Quintile mean 
Poorest 20% 5.1% 22.9% 
Poorer 20% 5.6% 18.9% 
Middle 20% 2.7% 22.1% 
Richer 20% 2.5% 16.3% 
Richest 20% 1.9% 16.2% 
Concentration index 
-0.23 -0.058 
Incidence of catastrophic spending (>10%) 7.4% 72.4% 
OOP delivery care spending as % of household non-food 
consumption 
Mean 9.9% 35.9% 
Concentration index 
-0.21 -0.075 Incidence of catastrophic spending (>40%) 2.6% 41.4% 
Note: Normal deliveries (N = 271); caesarean section (N=29). A normal delivery is defined as a vaginal delivery 
Out-of-pocket spending does not include debt owed to the health provider. 
The mean OOP budget share of non-food expenditure offers an alternative measure of the 
disruptive effect of OOP payments on living standards. The mean share rises considerably to 9.9 
percent for normal deliveries and 35.9 percent for caesarean sections reflecting the large fraction 
of household resources devoted to food (basic necessities) in the sample. Again, the concentration 
indices are negative suggesting that richer households spend a smaller fraction of their 
discretionary resources on delivery care. The incidence of catastrophic spending, as defined by a 
40 percent threshold, is 2.6 percent in the case of normal delivery care and 41.4 percent for 
caesarean sections. 
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5.4.2 Model results 
Basic model 
Table 5.10 gives the results from the basic model using a multinomial logfit, and multinomial 
probit specification. The Hausman test for IIA gives a X2 (22) value of -23.88 (P>X2 < 0.65). The 
null hypothesis of assumed independent and identical distribution of the error terms of the 
multinomial logit is not rejected, implying the multinomial probit model is not necessarily the 
more appropriate specifications. 45 Overall, the results of the different specifications are similar, 
with the direction of parameter estimates and, for the most part, their statistical significance the 
same. Parameter estimates are reported with home delivery as the base alternative. 
Two of the price related variables are significant implying price does have an influence on the 
choice of any given alternative (Table 5.10). The coefficient on the price variable interacted with 
wealth is significant suggesting that responsiveness to a change in price varies across different 
wealth groups. 
Quality of care, as measured here, has a significant effect on the choice of place of delivery. 
Women are more likely to choose a health provider at childbirth when the probability of being 
seen by a skilled birth attendant is higher. Wealth has a nonlinear effect on use of all types of 
health facility. Education is an important determinant of health seeking at health facilities. Women 
with higher educational attainment are more likely to reject a home delivery in favour of an 
institutional delivery. 
Women living in larger households are more likely to give birth at home. Younger women have a 
higher chance of delivering in the district hospital or a primary health care centre than at home. 
On the other hand, older women are more likely to deliver in a regional hospital than at home. 
This pattern may reflect the fact that older women, who are at greater risk of complications 
during childbirth, have a greater need for more specialised care that can be provided by a regional 
hospital. Households from marginalised castes have a lower probability of delivering in a regional 
hospital than at home. There is weaker evidence to support a similar finding in the case of primary 
's The correlation matrix of the multinomial probit model suggests the unobserved characteristics of the regional 
hospitals are strong correlated with the district hospital choice. There is also a reasonably strong correlation between 
those of the district hospital and primary health centres (result not shown). 
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health centres, but there appears to be no suggestion that being marginalised influences health 
care seeking at the district hospital. 
The effect of the women's group participatory intervention appears to be very sensitive to the 
choice of model and no consistent interpretation is possible from the results. Women reporting 
severe bleeding or obstructed labour have a higher chance of going to a health facility than deliver 
at home. Women with convulsions are more likely to deliver in a hospital than at home, but there 
was no statistically significant effect on the use of primary health centres. Severe fever or sickness 
appears to have little influence on choice of provider at delivery. 
Flexible behavioural model 
The flexible behavioural model allows the coefficients on price-related variables and quality of 
care to vary by alternative. It also includes cross-prices. The model is estimated using a 
multinomial logit and the results are presented in Table 5.11. Three hypotheses - the price 
related coefficients are equal to zero, the cross-price coefficients are equal to zero, and the 
coefficients on own price are across alternatives - are strongly rejected, suggesting that the 
flexible behavioural model is appropriate. 
Before discussing the effect of price, a number of points are worth making. The results with 
respect to quality of care, wealth, education, household size, age and obstructed labour are largely 
consistent with those generated from the various specifications of the basic model. The effects of 
other characteristics of the individual, however, do not appear to be robust between the basic and 
flexible behavioural models. Being marginalised has a negative effect on the district hospital 
alternative. The women's group intervention appears to have a positive effect on utilisation of 
regional hospitals but a negative effect for primary health centres. Bleeding and convulsions 
encourage use of the regional hospital and primary health centre alternatives but discourage use of 
the district hospital. Finally, severe fever seems to deter utilisation of regional hospitals but 
encourage visits to maternity services at the district hospital. 
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Table 5.10 Parameter estimates from the basic model of demand for maternity care 
Variable Coefficient Std error Coefficient Std error 
Model A 
Multinomial logit 
Model B 
Multinomial probit 
Price -0.00004 0.00003 -0.00002 0.00001 
Price2 ('000000) -0.005*** 0.002 -0.002*** 0.001 
Price x Wealth ('000) 0.0012** 0.0005 0.0006** 0.0003 
Probability of SBA 3.565*** 1.355 2.093* 1.124 
Regional hospital 
Constant -8.192*** 1.402 -5.399*** 1.096 
Wealth 0.055*** 0.013 0.038*** 0.009 
Wealth2 -0.0004** 0.0002 -0.0002* 0.0001 
Education grade 0.195*** 0.020 0.135*** 0.014 
Household members -0.075*** 0.019 -0.044*** 0.013 
Age 0.043*** 0.013 0.021** 0.010 
Marginalised caste -0.392*** 0.145 -0.254*** 0.091 
Women's group area -0.404*** 0.129 -0.189 0.122 
Severe bleeding 1.191*** 0.263 0.783*** 0.156 
Convulsions 0.877*** 0.330 0.530*** 0.202 
Obstructed labour 3.087*** 0.166 2.222*** 0.147 
Severe fever -0.359 0.321 -0.003 0.182 
District hospital 
Constant -8.119*** 1.403 -5.136*** 1.338 
Wealth 0.087*** 0.012 0.053*** 0.012 
Wealth2 -0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** 0.0001 
Education grade 0.182*** 0.018 0.129*** 0.024 
Household members -0.075*** 0.017 -0.049*** 0.014 
Age -0.040*** 0.013 -0.020*** 0.009 
Marginalised caste -0.002 0.130 -0.097 0.088 
Women's group area 0.618*** 0.139 0.274 0.168 
Severe bleeding 0.929*** 0.245 0.674*** 0.171 
Convulsions 0.723** 0.303 0.516*** 0.200 
Obstructed labour 3.303*** 0.148 2.271*** 0.357 
Severe fever -0.212 0.313 -0.091 
0.161 
Primary health centre 
Constant -5.753*** 1.351 -3.803** 
1.807 
Wealth 0.060*** 0.014 0.038* 0.022 
Wealth2 -0.0005*** 0.0002 -0.0003 
0.0002 
Education grade 0.158*** 0.021 0.099* 0.054 
Household members -0.101*** 0.021 -0.062** 
0.031 
Age -0.044*** 0.014 -0.027* 
0.016 
Marginalised caste -0.219 0.148 -0.145 
0.125 
Women's group area -0.932*** 0.130 -0.524* 
0.271 
Severe bleeding 0.658** 0.298 0.456 0.312 
Convulsions 0.111 0.420 0.051 0.284 
Obstructed labour 1.520*** 0.207 1.039 0.639 
Severe fever 0.369 0.298 0.174 0.217 
Log likelihood -3302.92 -3298.61 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, at 5%, and * at 10%. Home delivery is the base alternative. SBA 
= skilled birth attendant. 
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The effect of price on the demand for maternity care is more easily interpretable through the 
calculation of price elasticities. Following Lindelow (2005), Table 5.12 provides estimates of the 
own-price elasticity by wealth quintile for four different models based on the multinomial logit 
specification. The estimates are clearly highly sensitive to the mode] used. The price elasticity 
estimates are greatest in the most flexible model and smallest in the most constrained model. In 
all models, however, the price elasticity increases with the level of care, such that the largest 
estimates are for the regional hospital alternative. Not surprisingly the estimates in model I do 
not vary much between wealth quintile. Greater variation between wealth quintiles is seen in the 
other models. For the regional hospital and district hospital alternative, the price elasticities start 
off lowest in the poorest quintile and then rise before falling again in the richest quintile. In 
general, the middle wealth quintiles (quintile three and four) seem to be most sensitive to price 
and the richest the least sensitive with regards to these two types of health provider. 
Table 5.12 Own-price elasticities by wealth quintile using a multinomial logit model 
Model 1 Regional hospital District hospital Primary health centre 
Poor -0.66 -0.32 -0.14 
Poorer -0.70 -0.32 -0.13 
Middle -0.71 -0.35 -0.13 
Richer -0.76 -0.36 -0.12 
Richest -0.68 -0.33 -0.14 
Model 2 Regional hospital District hospital Primary health centre 
Poor -1.34 -0.38 -0.10 
Poorer -1.43 -0.35 -0.08 
Middle -1.41 -0.37 -0.07 
Richer -1.45 -0.33 -0.05 
Richest -1.04 -0.21 -0.01 
Model 3 Regional hospital District hospital Primary health centre 
Poor -1.16 -0.40 0.01 
Poorer -1.22 -0.32 -0.02 
Middle -1.21 -0.62 -0.10 
Richer -1.24 -0.55 -0.20 
Richest -0.97 -0.41 -0.78 
Model 4 Regional hospital District hospital Primary health centre 
Poor -2.24 -1.09 -0.83 
Poorer -2.36 -1.01 -0.82 
Middle -2.36 -1.51 -0.91 
Richer -2.41 -1.50 -1.00 
Richest -1.93 -1.35 -1.75 
Note: Model 1 includes own price only and its coefficient is constrained to be equal across alternatives. Model 
2 includes own price, price squared, price - wealth interaction and coefficients are constrained to be equal 
across alternatives. Model 3 includes own price, price squared, price - wealth interaction and coefficients are 
not constrained to be equal across alternatives. Model 4 includes own price, price squared, price - wealth 
interaction and coefficient, cross-prices and coefficients are not constrained to be equal across alternatives. 
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These results simply show a bivariate relationship between wealth and an individual's sensitivity 
to price and it is likely wealth is correlated with other factors that may also be driving these 
estimates. For example, the poorest households may not have good geographical access to health 
services, limiting the effect that price has on this group. This means the results are not necessarily 
inconsistent with the theoretical framework which predicts that wealthier individuals, all else 
being equal, can be expected to be less sensitive to price. 
5.4.3 Simulations 
Prices and other policy variables 
Simulations in this section are based on plausible policy scenarios in Nepal. 
46 In the base scenario, 
when all variables are at their actual values, 4 percent of the sample is predicted to give birth at a 
regional hospital, 5 percent at the district hospital, 3 percent at a primary health care centre and 
87 percent at home (Table 5.13). 
Table 5.13 Simulated effects of a change in the price of care on place of delivery 
Regional District 
Hospital Hospital 
PHCC Home 
Sample proportion 4.2% 5.2% 3.2% 87.3% 
Price of regional hospital reduced 50% 9.5% 2.9% 3.8% 83.9% 
Relative change (124.5%) -(44.9%) (17.0%) -(4.0%) 
Price of district hospital reduced 50% 3.1% 6.6% 2.5% 87.8% 
Relative change -(26.2%) (26.7%) -(22.7%) (0. S%) 
Price of PHCC reduced 50% 10.6% 2.3% 4.1% 83.0% 
Relative change (151.6%) -(56.4%) (26.9%) -(5.0%) 
Price of all facilities reduced 50% 14.7% 1.2% 3.4% 80.7% 
Relative change (247.9%) -(76.6%) (5.8%) -(7.6%) 
Price of care of all facilities set to 0 and 
opportunity cost compensated for 35.8% 0.0% 1.9% 62.3% 
Relative change (746.8%) -(99.7%) -(39.6%) -(28.7%) 
Note: All simulations are based on the parameter estimates computed for the flexible behavioural 
model using a multinomial logit specification. The relative change is shown in parentheses and is 
calculated as the percentage difference between the baseline estimate and the simulated estimate. 
NRS = Nepalese rupees. PHCC = primary health care centre. 
In the first set of simulations, the effect of a 50 percent reduction in the price of care is modelled, 
one type of health facility at a time. As Table 5.13 shows, the reduction in price at a regional 
No policymaker, for example, is contemplating increasing the price of maternity care. 
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hospital increases utilisation by over 100 percent. This rise in demand is compensated by a fall in 
use of the district hospital and deliveries at home. Reducing the price of care in the district 
hospital by 50 percent increases the probability of delivery there by 27 percent. The increase is 
made possible through a decrease in the use of regional hospitals and primary health centres. 
Reducing the price of care at a primary health centre by half increases demand by 27 percent, or 
4.1 percentage points. A reduction by half in the price of all health facilities increases utilisation 
most in regional hospitals and leads to a 7.6 percent fall in home deliveries. 
In the next row of Table 5. l 3, care in all health facilities is provided free of charge and the 
opportunity cost is compensated for with, say a conditional cash transfer. This is a policy option 
that has been very much on the table in recent years in Nepal. Removing all charges lead to at 
least a seven-fold increase in the probability of women delivering at a regional hospital. The 
reduction in the cost of care is proportionately much greater in regional hospitals, explaining why 
the increase in utilisation is most pronounced for that option. Such a policy decision can be 
expected to lead to a 29 percent fall in home deliveries and an increase in the rate of institutional 
delivery care to almost 40 percent. 
Another set of policy simulations assesses the influence of quality on health seeking at childbirth, 
as measured by the probability of being seen to by a skilled attendant (Table 5.14). Given the 
already high probability of a skilled birth attendant being available at each provider and the little 
room for improvement, it is not surprising that increasing the quality of care with this measure 
results in little change in the demand for delivery care. This serves mainly to highlight the 
inadequacy of this measure of quality of care and offer few insights into whether the quality of 
care in a broader sense affects health seeking behaviour. 
128 ý Page 
Table 5.14 Simulated effects of a change in the quality of care on place of delivery 
Regional District 
Hospital Hospital 
PHCC Home 
Sample proportion 4.2% 5.2% 3.2% 87.4% 
Probability of SBA in regional hospital set to 1 4.4% 5.1% 3.2% 87.3% 
Relative change (5.1%) -(1.8%) -(0.4%) -(0.1%) 
Probability of SBA in district hospital set to 1 4.1% 5.3% 3.2% 87.4% 
Relative change -(1.0%) (2.0%) -(0.4%) -(0.1%) 
Probability of SBA in PHCC set to 1 4.1% 5.1% 3.7% 87.1% 
Relative change -(1.2%) -(1.9%) (15.5%) -(0.4%) 
Probability of SBA in all facilities set to 1 4.3% 5.1% 3.7% 87.0% 
Relative change (2.8%) -(1.7%) (14.6%) -(0.6%) 
Note: All simulations are based on the parameter estimates computed for the flexible behavioural 
model using a multinomial logit specification. The relative change is shown in parentheses and is 
calculated as the percentage difference between the baseline estimate and the simulated estimate. 
NRS = Nepalese rupees. PHCC = primary health care centre. 
Characteristics of the patient 
The characteristics of women are typically not amenable to change by policymakers, at least in the 
short to medium term. In other words, they do not represent a set of policy instruments available 
to the government. Modelling the effects of changes in certain individual or household attributes 
does, however, demonstrate how sensitive utilisation is to these factors and can indirectly inform 
policy. Table 5.15 shows the simulation results for changes in background characteristics of the 
woman and her household. 
If the education of all women is set at least to primary level, the probability of using a regional 
hospital increases by almost 50 percent, the probability of care at the district hospital increases by 
21 percent, the probability of care at a primary health centre increases by 47 percent and the 
probability of a home delivery is reduced by 5.3 percent. If women have at least a secondary 
education, these changes become even more marked. 
Raising the wealth of households by 50 percent increases the probability of care in all three types 
of health facility. The greatest increase is seen at the regional hospital (83 percent), followed by 
primary health centres (16 percent) and then regional hospitals (6 percent). The proportion of 
deliveries at home would fall by 5 percent. Utilisation is not very sensitive to whether women are 
marginalised in terms of caste. When the indicator is set to zero for all women, the model 
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predicts a modest increase in the use of delivery care at regional hospitals and the district hospital. 
A household's caste has almost no influence on health seeking at primary health centres. 
Table 5.15 Simulated effects of a change in individual characteristics on place of delivery 
Regional District PHCC Home 
Hospital Hospital 
Sample proportion 4.2% 5.2% 3.2% 87.4% 
Education at least primary completed 6.3% 6.3% 4.7% 82.7% 
Relative change (48.8%) (21.2%) (46.5%) -(5.3%) 
Education at least secondary completed 10.0% 7.8% 7.0% 75.2% 
Relative change (137.0%) (49.9%) (117.3%) -(13.9%) 
Wealth increased 50% 7.7% 5.5% 3.7% 83.0% 
Relative change (82.7%) (5.6%) (16.3%) -(4.9%) 
Wealth increased 100% 12.6% 5.0% 3.9% 78.5% 
Relative change (199.3%) -(4.9%) (20.9%) -(10.1%) 
Marginalised set to 0 4.4% 5.9% 3.3% 86.4% 
Relative change (4.2%) (14.1%) (2.5%) -(1.1%) 
Marginalised set to 1 4.1% 4.8% 3.2% 88.0% 
Relative change -(3.9%) -(8.6%) -(0.6%) (0.7%) 
Note: All simulations are based on the parameter estimates computed for the flexible behavioural 
model using a multinomial logit specification. The relative change is shown in parentheses and is 
calculated as the percentage difference between the baseline estimate and the simulated estimate. 
Completed primary education is grade 6 or above. Completed secondary education is grade 10 or 
above. PHCC = primary health care centre. 
The simulation exercises suggest self-reported health problems have an enormous influence on a 
family's decision of where to give birth (Table 5.16). Of the various problems, obstructed labour 
stands out as the most important. A scenario in which the dummy variable for obstructed labour is 
set to one lowers the expected probability of a home delivery by 51 percent, with the majority of 
the increase in institutional deliveries being taken up by regional hospitals. If the dummy variable 
for severe bleeding is set to one, the probability of a home delivery falls by almost 31 percent. 
Convulsions appear to influence decision making to a lesser degree but still substantially. 
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Table 5.16 Simulated effects of a change in self-reported obstetric complications on place of delivery 
Regional District 
Hospital Hospital 
PHCC Home 
Sample proportion 4.2% 5.2% 3.2% 87.4% 
Bleeding set to 0 3.9% 5.5% 3.1% 87.5% 
Relative change -(7.1%) (6.2%) -(4.0%) (0.1%) 
Bleeding set to 1 31.9% 1.3% 6.2% 60.6% 
Relative change (655.0%) -(74.8%) (93.3%) -(30.7%) 
Convulsions set to 0 4.0% 5.4% 3.2% 87.4% 
Relative change -(4.3%) (2.9%) -(1.1%) (0.1%) 
Convulsions set to 1 19.2% 2.2% 4.5% 74.1% 
Relative change (354.9%) -(57.7%) (39.4%) -(15.2%) 
Obstructed labour set to 0 3.1% 5.1% 3.1% 88.7% 
Relative change -(25.6%) -(1.7%) -(4.4%) (1.5%) 
Obstructed labour set to 1 44.0% 7.5% 5.7% 42.8% 
Relative change (940.6%) (44.6%) (76.2%) -(51.0%) 
Severe fever set to 0 5.3% 5.0% 3.2% 86.5% 
Relative change (25.4%) -(3.1%) -(2.0%) -(1.0%) 
Severe fever set to 1 0.3% 15.9% 1.9% 81.9% 
Relative change -(92.6%) (205.4%) -(41.7%) -(6.2%) 
Note: Note: All simulations are based on the parameter estimates computed for the flexible 
behavioural model using a multinomial logit specification. The relative change is shown in parentheses 
and is calculated as the percentage difference between the baseline estimate and the simulated 
estimate. NRS = Nepalese rupees. PHCC = primary health care centre. 
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5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1 Interpretation of findings 
Utilisation estimates indicate that 87 percent of women in rural Makwanpur deliver their baby at 
home. This compares with a national estimate of 86.5 percent in the rural population 
(Government of Nepal 2007). Household OOP expenditures associated with giving birth in a 
health facility are large and represent a substantial proportion of annual household consumption. 
The OOP budget share is 4 percent and 19 percent for a normal delivery and a caesarean section 
respectively. Clearly, the costs of a caesarean section place an enormous financial burden on the 
household budget. This sample was made up of women who did manage to seek care and it can 
only be assumed that the financial burden would be even greater for the remaining women, were 
they to give birth in a health facility. 
A hasty interpretation of this first set of findings, and one made in much of the literature, is that 
the low utilisation of maternity services can be attributed to the high financial cost of giving birth 
in a health facility. The results from the demand model provide some support for this argument. 
Price is found to be a significant determinant of health seeking behaviour and has a reasonably 
large effect on utilisation. The price elasticity estimates are, if anything, slightly higher than those 
reported in the rest of the literature (Gertler and Hammer 1997). As the simulations showed, the 
provision of free maternity care at health facilities would raise the proportion of women 
delivering in a health facility to almost 40 percent. 
Variation in the price elasticities across wealth indicates that price tends to have the largest effect 
on utilisation of regional and district hospital maternity services for households in the middle 
wealth quintiles (quintiles three and four). Price elasticity estimates for these health providers, 
however, do not vary much across the poorest four-fifths of the sample and any government 
intervention to subsidise maternity services can be expected to have the greatest impact on these 
families. 
Other factors appear to be influential in the decision-making process. The effect of self-reported 
problems on the utilisation of maternity services is positive, a result found in many other studies. 
However, what is so striking is the magnitude of the effect. Women who report having 
experienced serious maternal complications are considerably more likely to deliver in a health 
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facility. A couple of quotes from women during the qualitative component in the second phase of 
the evaluation reflect the sentiments of many who were interviewed and throw some light on the 
issue of obstetric needs and health seeking choices (Powell-Jackson, Ncupane et al. 2008): 
"I had difficulties during childbirth, otherwise why would I go to the hospital? When I 
thought I was going to die I asked my family to take me there. There are so many people 
in hospital, I am scared of them. It's not the money why I don't want to go to hospital. " 
"I don't want to deliver my baby in the hospital because women suffer there and my 
family is not confident of the hospital's service... that is the reason I don't want to go 
there. During the delivery the labour pain is there but I still prefer to deliver at home. 
Only if there is an emergency do I choose to go to hospital. " 
Interpretation of this finding is not straight forward. As suggested by the quotes, it may be that 
perceptions of the quality of care are such that women only go to a health facility as a last resort, 
in the case of a dire emergency. In the absence of a problem, they prefer the default option of 
delivering at home, but when faced with a severe complication they must seek care and have no 
alternative but to go to a health facility. 
Alternatively, the finding may be indicative of an information failure. The value of institutional 
delivery care as a preventive intervention may not be well recognised, ensuring the option is 
given little consideration when there is no obstetric need. After all, the health benefits from 
curative care are more tangible and certain than those associated with the prevention of a future 
health problem. In support of this interpretation is the fact that, when asked why they did not 
deliver in a health facility, 73 percent of Nepalese woman in a national survey felt it was not 
necessary (Government of Nepal 2007). A further 17 percent of women said it was not 
customary, suggesting cultural factors may also be influential. 
Quality of care was found to be positively associated with utilisation of maternity services. The 
narrowness of the quality of care measure, however, explains why the magnitude of the effect was 
so small. Wealth and education also had a positive effect on utilisation, consistent with 
expectations and other findings from the literature. This implies that maternity care is a normal 
good. Educated women may put a greater value on health improvements, are more cognisant of 
the risks of childbirth or have more autonomy in making decisions within the household. 
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5.5.2 Limitations 
Some of the limitations of the analysis are statistical, while others are more substantive. On the 
statistical side, a number of limitations pertain to the model specification. First, as already noted 
in the methods section, the IIA assumption required in the multinomial logit model may be overly 
restrictive. The multinomial probit model is more flexible and does not rest on the assumption of 
IIA. The Hausman test suggests that the IIA assumption holds. In any case, the results are fairly 
robust to different assumptions regarding the distribution of the error terms. The functional form 
of the model appears to be much more important for the results. The flexible behavioural model, 
proposed by Dow (1995), yields estimates of price elasticity that are much greater than those 
derived from the more restrictive models. 
More substantively, the model includes no empirical measures of many factors that are likely to 
affect health seeking behaviour at childbirth. The qualitative study conducted as part of the 
evaluation of the SDIP found factors such as trust in health providers, fear of hospitals, women's 
empowerment, cultural taboos, social pressure and embarrassment are important in influencing 
health seeking choices (Powell-Jackson, Neupane et al. 2008). These concepts are difficult to 
define let alone quantify for the purposes of statistical analysis and, for this reason, are more 
amenable to qualitative research methods. Omission of these potentially important determinants 
may bias parameter estimates. 
The analysis is based on a theoretical model that hugely simplifies health seeking behaviour. This 
manifests itself in several ways. The dependent variable is the place of childbirth, when in fact 
care seeking patterns can be much more complex. Women may seek care at multiple health 
providers, including traditional providers, who are likely to exert their own influence on the 
subsequent referral pattern. The circumstances that surround any particular childbirth often 
influence health seeking decisions, yet they are highly unpredictable and rarely measured. For 
instance, the same qualitative study quoted above found that the availability of physically helpful 
persons at the time of childbirth was critical in getting the women to a health facility (Powell- 
Jackson, Neupane et al. 2008). 
A set of limitations concern some of the measures of the independent variables. First, the quality 
of care measure, as already noted, is inadequate. The probability of there being a skilled birth 
attendant in each alternative reflects only the availability of staff. The model not only fails to 
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capture other structural measures of quality of care, it includes nothing on the process and 
interpersonal aspects of care (Donabedian 1988). While information on many of these aspects of 
quality of care was available from the Health Provider Survey, the focus on just one district meant 
that there was insufficient variation in quality of care across observations to perform the 
econometric analysis. 
A second concern relates to the measures of maternal health. From the perspective of 
understanding health seeking choices, self-reported measures of obstetric problems are relevant 
since perceptions drive decisions. However, from a public health perspective it is important to 
know whether individuals seek health care when they are ill. Given the unreliability of self- 
reported measures of illness (Sen 2002), objective measures are required to know whether 
women deliver in a hospital when they have a genuine obstetric need. Moreover, if self-reported 
measures are correlated with wealth, they will be endogenous. 
The analysis suffers from a lack of exogenous variation in prices, a problem frequently 
encountered in this literature (Gertler and Hammer 1997). Given the small geographical coverage 
of the study, variation in prices is likely to be correlated with characteristics of the household, 
such as distance to the health facility and socioeconomic status, leaving open the possibility that 
the effect of price is confounded by factors unobserved to the researcher. In addition, imputed 
prices may not be a good proxy for ex-ante prices. Given the unpredictability of health care needs 
at childbirth, actual prices may not coincide with perceptions of the price at each type of 
provider. Conceivably, uncertainty over the price is itself a determinant of health care choices. 
Greater certainty over the price of a home delivery may lead some families to shy away from the 
financial uncertainty of delivering in a health facility. 
With a view to understanding more about the likely impact of the SDIP, there is a question over 
the generalisability of these findings, given that the study was limited to rural areas of one district 
in Nepal. On the supply-side, there may not be much heterogeneity in the provision of services in 
the public sector, at least outside of the capital city, Kathmandu. In addition, the exclusion of 
private health facilities in the analysis may not matter since the public sector dominates the 
provision of maternal health care in most of the country. On the demand side, particularly in 
terms of the characteristics of individuals, there are large variations across the country suggesting 
generalisation beyond the sample may be unreliable. For instance, in the mountain region of 
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Nepal, physical access to health facilities is much more difficult and it is not obvious that price 
would have the same effect in the two settings. Certainly, the findings have relevance for 
Makwanpur district and perhaps rural settings in other hill districts. Generalisations beyond that, 
however, should be made with caution. 
5.5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter finds that the price of health seeking at childbirth has a reasonably large and 
statistically significant effect on the utilisation of maternity services. Women from the middle 
wealth households (quintiles three and four) tend to be more sensitive to changes in the price. 
Based on the findings of the simulation exercises, the demand-side incentives of the SDIP are 
expected to have a modest impact on health seeking behaviour at childbirth, at least in rural 
settings where the provision of services and the characteristics of the population are similar to the 
study setting. Demand-side incentives are likely to have the greatest effect on health seeking 
behaviour among households in the poorest four-fifths of the population. Other factors, in 
particular self-reported obstetric problems prior to childbirth, appear to exert a much greater 
influence than price on health seeking choices. 
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Chapter 6. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAFE DELIVERY 
INCENTIVE PROGRAMME 
6.1 Introduction 
The popularity of demand-side incentive programmes has grown in recent years and, while there 
is a wealth of evidence regarding the impact of these programmes, little has been documented 
about their implementation. This may be because there were few problems during 
implementation or the interest of policymakers was on outcomes. As countries in South Asia 
adopt similar policies, there are understandable concerns about government capacity to 
implement these programmes at scale, making it all the more important to study not just the 
impact but also the process. 
Investigating implementation is an important part of assessing a programme's performance, for 
without reasonable uptake in the target population there can be little expectation of an impact on 
outcomes. Process indicators, in other words, are important in informing our expectations of the 
programme's impact, but also in providing answers to some of the questions around feasibility 
and policy design. In-depth analysis of the process indicators can be useful in several ways. First, it 
can shed light on which groups have been reached by the programme and thus whether the 
programme can be expected to impact on such groups. Second, it is important in understanding 
the constraints to implementation in order to develop ways in which uptake of the programme 
can be improved. 
This chapter is concerned with a number of key indicators of implementation processes that 
emerge from the theoretical model of the programme's causal pathway. The empirical analysis is 
based on data from the Survey of Women. The rich dataset provides an opportunity to assess, for 
example, the determinants of programme uptake that may not be possible if relying on 
administrative data from a monitoring database. A particular focus of the analysis is on 
socioeconomic factors that may have influenced participation in the Safe Delivery Incentive 
Programme (SDIP). Certainly, the rhetoric of national policymakers suggests that the programme 
137 Pagc 
was intended to reach the poor or marginalised sections of society and it is pertinent to analyse to 
what extent this is indeed true. 
The quantitative analysis of processes in this chapter seeks to understand who has been reached by 
the SDIP and is thus largely descriptive. Qualitative data regarding implementation of the 
programme were also collected during the first phase of the evaluation. The qualitative study 
highlights a number of problems that are likely to have limited uptake of the programme. 
Combining both the quantitative and qualitative results allows for a more causal interpretation of 
what factors helped or hindered implementation. This is done in the discussion section of the 
chapter. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 is about the methods, providing a description of 
the framework behind the analysis, the process indicators, and the analytical methods used. 
Section 6.3 provides a description of the data. Section 6.4 presents the results and section 6.5 
gives a discussion of the interpretation of the results and the limitations of the study. 
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6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Elements of the process evaluation 
A process evaluation aims to generate understanding of what is happening during the 
implementation of the programme and why (Sanders and Haines 2006). It comprises a number of 
elements (Saunders, Evans et al. 2005). First, it describes the programme, including its purpose, 
the design, the underlying theory and the expected impacts as the basis for a critical assessment of 
the programme as it was conceived. Second, it describes in more detail what the complete and 
acceptable delivery of the intervention would entail (Bartholomew, Parcel et al. 1998). Third, it 
assesses fidelity, that is, the extent to which the programme was implemented as planned. Fourth, 
it assesses the uptake or reach of the programme. Finally, it seeks to understand how contextual 
factors influence implementation. 
This chapter focuses on the fourth and fifth elements. The description of the SDIP in chapter 4 
sought to address the other elements of the process evaluation. The discussion at the end of this 
chapter brings together all these elements and, in addition, draws on evidence from the qualitative 
study in the first phase of the evaluation (Powell-Jackson, Morrison et al. 2009). 
6.2.2 Intermediate steps 
The conceptual model of how the SDIP is expected to change health seeking behaviour and 
ultimately improve maternal health was presented in chapter 3. It showed the intermediate steps 
involved in reaching programme outcomes: the SDIP is promoted; households with pregnant 
women hear about the financial incentives offered by the SDIP; households perceive the offer of 
the demand-side incentives as credible; women give birth in a health facility; and receive the 
demand-side incentives. Any shortcomings at an earlier stage of the chain will result in failure in 
later achievements and will dampen the impact of the programme on health seeking behaviour. 
Thus, an analysis of processes provides the basis for interpreting results regarding the impact of 
the programme. For example, a lack of programme impact despite the successful completion of 
intermediate processes may suggest that the theoretical mechanism - the demand-side incentives 
- rather than implementation is at fault. 
A number of these stages warrant further elaboration to conceptualise more clearly the process by 
which individuals participate in the SDIP. As a public programme, the actions of government 
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officials and health providers are likely to be influential in determining who finds out about the 
SDIP and who receives the demand-side incentives. In other words, characterisation of 
participation must go beyond the individual decision making process of whether to participate, 
particularly given that exposure to information about the SDIP is, from the woman's perspective, 
a passive process. 
The process in which individuals find out about the SDIP and its benefits is informed by the 
various sources of information. These include mass media (radio, television, newspaper, 
billboards); information materials (leaflets, posters); health workers (facility-based staff, 
community health volunteers); community forums (women's groups, health facility management 
committees) and word of mouth (friends, neighbours, colleagues etc). With the exception of 
word of mouth, these represent channels of communication through which the government and 
its partners can disseminate information about the SDIP. 
In contrast, access to information concerning the programme at each source is determined by 
predisposing factors at the individual level. An illiterate woman, for example, is unlikely to learn 
about the programme from a newspaper but may have good access to the female community 
health volunteer. Together these two sets of factors interact to determine who finds out about the 
programme, with important implications for equity. Broadly, inequality is expected to be greatest 
where the cost required to access the information is greatest for the individual. For instance, the 
cost of obtaining information from a facility-based health worker is reasonably high and will mean 
information is accessed in this way by richer households who are more likely to use health 
services. 
Similarly, there are potentially two sets of factors that determine whether women receive the 
demand-side incentives. These include the administrative competence of the government and 
predisposing factors of the individual. Specifically, access to the financial benefits can be expected 
to be influenced by the official eligibility criteria, discrimination by health workers, the cost of 
returning to the health facility to collect the money {if required), and the woman's ability both to 
complete the administration process and advocate for her right to the cash. 
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6.2.3 Process indicators 
The various intermediate steps are assessed through the analysis of a number of corresponding 
process indicators. Together, these indicators provide a measure of success in the implementation 
of the programme and can indicate where problems may have arisen along the programmatic 
pathway. Data required for the process indicators should ideally be available on a regular basis at 
a disaggregated level in order that problems in the implementation of the programme can be 
identified and responded to quickly by programme managers. Administrative data of this sort is 
typically collected through a monitoring system that is set up at the time of the programme's 
launch. Problems in the SDIP's monitoring system meant that an important objective of the 
Survey of Women was to collect information on the process indicators. While costly, the 
availability of household level data provided an opportunity to delve deeper into some of the 
determinants of programme uptake than administrative data might allow. Table 6.1 summarises 
the key measures of process. 
Table 6.1 Summary of key process indicators 
Process Indicator 
1. Promotion of the SDIP Of women who knew about the SDIP, % of deliveries by source of 
information 
(Activities to disseminate information about the SDIP by the central 
government, district government and government partners) a 
_. _...... . 2. Knowledge of the SDIP % of deliveries in which the woman knew about the SDIP prior to 
. _.... .. . .. 
childbirth 
................. .................... . . _. _ .... 3. Credibility of the demand- % of deliveries in which the woman had heard about the SDIP prior to 
side incentives childbirth and knew of someone who received the conditional cash 
transfer 
4. Administration of payment % of deliveries in a government health facility in which the woman 
system received the conditional cash transfer 
% of deliveries in a government health facility in which the woman was 
given maternal care free of charge b 
Note: Data to measure the process indicators come from the Survey of Women. The unit of analysis (ie. 
the denominator) is a delivery. a Although not an indicator, data from the qualitative study in the first 
stage of the evaluation provide useful information on activities to promote the programme. 
b This 
indicator corresponds to the 25 least developed districts (2 districts in the Survey of Women) in which 
delivery care is given free of charge in addition to the conditional cash transfer. 
How people heard about the SDIP provides an indication of the extent to which different channels 
of communication were used. This indicator is complemented by information about the activities 
undertaken by the government and its partners to promote the programme. 
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Knowledge of the SDIP prior to childbirth is the most appropriate indicator to assess the extent to 
which the programme has reached the target population. The time dimension to the indicator is 
critical because the programme can only influence the health seeking behaviour of women who 
had knowledge of the financial benefits prior to delivery. The indicator captures the knowledge of 
the woman and the household decision-maker to reflect the fact that only 20 percent of married 
women in Nepal make decisions regarding their own health care (Government of Nepal 2007). In 
the survey interview, the question about knowledge was addressed to both the woman and the 
mother-in-law (or in her absence, the husband). If either person had knowledge of the SDIP, a 
positive reply was recorded by the interviewer. 47 In the next chapter, these individuals will make 
up the treatment group with which to assess the impact of the programme. For simplicity, the 
expression "the woman's knowledge of the SDIP" is maintained throughout the chapter, but this 
should be interpreted as the family's knowledge of the SDIP. 
The expectation of receiving the demand-side incentives is proxied using the proportion of 
women who both knew about the programme and had heard of someone else receiving the 
conditional cash transfer. The underlying premise is that an individual's expectation of receiving 
the demand-side incentives is heavily influenced by the experience others have had with 
administration of the payment of cash. 
Finally, administration of the demand-side incentives is measured using two indicators, as shown 
in Table 6. l. No data were available to assess administration of the provider incentive, since the 
household respondents would not have known whether the health worker attending their delivery 
ever received the incentive. 
6.2.4 Empirical analysis 
The analysis is framed around the intermediate steps required for the programme to impact on 
health seeking behaviour. Bivariate analysis is used to explore associations between the process 
indicators and key characteristics, with mean values and frequencies reported for each indicator 
by subgroup categories. For instance, knowledge of the SDIP is reported by each wealth quintile. 
The analysis is performed one variable at a time and the p-value is provided for the test of the 
hypothesis that the means of the subgroups are similar to each other. 
" However, there were few instances in which knowledge of the SDIP differed between the two respondents. 
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Since bivariate analysis is unable to control for the influence of other variables, a multivariate 
setup is used to explore in more depth the determinants of knowledge about the SDIP, credibility 
and receipt of the conditional cash transfer. In all three instances, the dependent variable reflects a 
binary choice and is therefore modelled using a probit regression estimated by maximum 
likelihood methods. The probit model predicts the probability of a positive outcome for given 
values of the explanatory variables. Owing to the difficulty of interpreting the coefficients of the 
probit models, the marginal effects at the sample means of each dependent variable are presented 
instead. The marginal effect quantifies the change in the probability of being exposed to 
information about the SDIP or receiving the conditional cash transfer arising from a one unit 
change in the explanatory variable and is calculated at the mean value of the independent 
variables. The marginal effect of dummy variables is for a discrete change from 0 to 1. All the 
models are subject to a number of diagnostic checks that are performed to identify specification 
problems. 
To reiterate, the multivariate analysis is descriptive in nature, seeking to understand inequalities 
in uptake of the programme at each step in the implementation process. it only when these results 
are combined with the qualitative findings that a more causal interpretation of what factors 
facilitated or hindered implementation is taken. 
Modelling access to information about SDIP 
The unit of analysis is a delivery. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the woman had 
knowledge of the SDIP prior to childbirth and 0 otherwise. The probability of knowing about the 
SDIP is a function of individual and household predisposing factors (age of woman, household 
wealth, education of woman, occupation of woman, ethnicity of woman, urban household), 
access to health services (time to the nearest health facility, previous delivery during the SDIP), 
access to media (frequency of radio use, frequency of newspaper readership), village level factors 
(availability of women's groups, level of activity of female community health volunteer) and 
district-level fixed effects. The model thus has the form: 
Yivk = ß1Xi1 + ß2Xi2 + ß3Xv + Yk + Eivk 
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where Yivk is the SDIP knowledge variable for each delivery, Xis is the vector of predisposing 
factors of individual i, Xi2 is the vector of access to media variables, X, is vector of village-level 
factors, Yk are the district-level and year fixed-effects and Eivk is a random disturbance term. 
Since access to the radio and newspapers are directly controlled for, the predisposing factors 
reflect access to information from the remaining contact points. Note that the coefficients on the 
media, access to health services and village-level variables will only be significant if information 
about the SDIP is actually available from these contact points. Therefore, implicitly they measure 
access to available information. The district dummy variables soak up unexplained district-level 
variation. They capture, inter alia, promotion of the programme by the district health office. Year 
dummy variables, measuring the length of time since the start of the SDIP, reflect the 
dissemination of information over time. 
A number of model specifications are considered. In the first instance, model I includes a full set 
of regressors with wealth specified in terms of wealth asset quintile dummy variables. In model 2, 
wealth enters the regression as the logarithm of the asset score variable. Finally, insignificant 
variables are excluded to give the restricted model 3. This is the preferred model as it fits the data 
well, is the most parsimonious and remains consistent with the behavioural model. 
Modelling credibility of the demand-side incentives 
The unit of analysis is a delivery. The analysis performed on the subsample of deliveries in which 
the woman had heard about the SDIP during pregnancy. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 
if the woman knew of at least one other person who had received the cash incentive and 0 
otherwise. The probability of knowing an incentive recipient is a function of individual and 
household predisposing factors (age of woman, household wealth, education of woman, 
occupation of woman, ethnicity of woman, urban household), access to health services (time to 
the nearest health facility, previous delivery during the SDIP), village level factors (availability of 
women's groups, level of activity of female community health volunteer) and district-level fixed 
effects. The model thus has the form: 
Yivk = ß1Xi1 + ß2Xv + Yk + Eivk 
1441 Pabc 
where Yivk is the SDIP knowledge variable for each delivery, Xii is the vector of predisposing 
factors of individual i, X, is vector of village-level factors, Yk are the district-level and year fixed- 
effects and Fwk is a random disturbance term. The district dummy variables soak up unexplained 
district-level variation. They capture, inter alia, effective disbursement of the financial incentives 
to women. Year dummy variables, measuring the length of time since the start of the SDIP, 
reflect the dissemination of information about recipients of the cash incentive over time. 
Modelling receipt of the conditional cash transfer 
The model setup is similar with the dependent variable specified as receipt of the conditional cash 
transfer. The subsample comprises only deliveries at a government health facility and the unit of 
analysis is a delivery. The dependent variable takes a value of l if the woman received the 
conditional cash transfer at any time after her delivery and 0 otherwise. The probability of 
receiving the cash is a function of individual predisposing factors (woman has less than two living 
children during pregnancy - one of official eligibility criteria, household wealth, education of the 
woman, ethnicity of the woman, accessibility to the nearest health facility, knowledge of the SDIP 
prior to childbirth), place of delivery, and district-level fixed effect. The model takes the form: 
Yijk = ß1Xi +ß2Xj + Yk +Eijk 
where Yijk is receipt of the cash after each delivery, Xi is the vector of predisposing factors, Xj is 
the place of delivery reflecting administration of the cash payment system, yk are the district- 
level and year fixed-effects and Eijk is a random disturbance term. 
Education is a measure of the woman's ability to complete the administrative process and to 
advocate for the cash. Ethnicity reflects the possibility of discrimination by health workers. 
Accessibility to the nearest health facility is a measure of the cost associated with having to return 
to the facility to collect the cash if it is not available at the time of childbirth. The type of 
government facility and district-level fixed-effects reflect the administrative competence of the 
respective government institutions. Two dummy variables for the year of implementation reflect 
variation in the administration of the conditional cash transfer over time. They are likely to reflect 
a number of major procedural changes pertaining to the disbursement of SDIP funds agreed 
145 1 Pagr 
between the government and the donor. Two models are estimated (model 6 and model 7); the 
former specifies wealth in terms of quintile dummy variables and the latter as its logarithm. 
Inequality in knowledge indicator 
While variations in each indicator by wealth quintile provide a crude means of identifying 
socioeconomic inequality, this issue is explored further using concentration curves in the analysis 
of programme uptake. Concentration curves provide a more complete picture than bivariate 
analysis by mapping knowledge of the SDIP over the entire distribution of the household living 
standard. A concentration curve shows the share of knowledge of the SDIP accounted for by 
cumulative proportions of individuals in the population ranked by the poorest first (Wagstaff, van 
Doorslaer et al. 1991; Kakwani, Wagstaff et al. 1997). The wealth index is used as the measure of 
living standard to rank individuals. The line of equality, shown by a 45-degree line, implies that 
the women, whatever their living standard, are equally as likely to have heard about the SDIP. 
A concentration curve that lies below (above) the 45 degree line implies that the knowledge 
indicator takes lower (higher) values among poorer individuals. Moreover, the further a 
concentration curve is below (above) the line of equality the more concentrated knowledge of the 
SDIP is among wealthier (poorer) individuals. A concentration curve that lies above the 45 degree 
line at all points along the line it is said to dominate. A more formal test that takes account of 
sampling variability in the survey data is able to conclude whether dominance is statistically 
significant. It requires the computation of standard errors at various points along the 
concentration curve. 48 
An extension of the concentration curve is the concentration index, which quantifies the degree of 
socioeconomic-related inequality in the knowledge variable and therefore allows comparisons 
between the different sources of information. The concentration index is twice the area between 
the concentration curve and the line of equality, such that a positive (negative) value indicates that 
the curve lies below (above) the line of equality and there is inequality in the knowledge indicator 
in favour of richer (poorer) households. The concentration index is defined as: 
`s This analysis uses the multiple comparison approach (Dardanoni and Forcina 1999) 
based on the decision rule that 
the null hypothesis of nondominance is rejected if there is at least one significant 
difference between the curve and the 
4S degree line in one direction and no significant difference in the other direction. Following O'Donnell (2008), 
differences are tested at 19 evenly spaced points from 0.05 to 0.95 along the x-axis. 
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wherey is the knowledge variable, µ is the mean, n is the number of observations and Ri is 
fractional rank in the socioeconomic distribution of individual i. 49 When the variable of interest is 
measured on a ratio scale with zero or positive values, the concentration index is bounded 
between -1 and 1. In this chapter, however, the knowledge variable is binary, which means the 
bounds depend on the mean. Wagstaff (2005) shows that, in large samples, the lower bound is 
given by /. l -1 and the upper bound by 1-U. When making comparisons in inequality between 
the different sources of information, the concentration index is normalised to give the 
concentration index as a proportion of the bound. The standard error of the concentration index 
is robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form and is corrected for within-cluster correlation. 50 
Regression diagnostics 
A number of econometric problems can arise during multivariate analysis. Some of these are the 
result of the survey design, while others relate to violations of the basic assumptions of probit 
regression analysis. Most commonly, they include: data clustering, specification errors, 
heteroskedasticity, outliers, and multicollinearity. 
The two-stage, stratified, cluster survey sampled women from primary sampling units using 
systematic sampling with probability proportional to size. The clustering of observations within 
enumeration areas implies that observations are not independent for there is likely to be more 
homogeneity within clusters than across the whole population. The svy command in Stata is 
used to correct for within-cluster correlation and to apply district weights due to variations in the 
district populations. 
49 Implicit in the concentration index is a set of value judgements about inequality aversion. In the standard 
computation of the concentration index (as defined above), the inequality aversion parameter is set at 2. This implies 
that the poorest individual's share of the knowledge indicator is weighted by a value close to 2, decreasing 
incrementally until it reaches almost zero for the wealthiest individual. 
5' It would be informative to decompose the causes of inequality in knowledge of the SDIP but to do so require a non- 
binary outcome variable, suitable for OLS regression. 
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Omitted variables or an incorrect functional form can lead to specification errors. These can be 
detected using a link test that includes the square of predicted values as an explanatory variable in 
the regression and tests for its statistical significance. None of the models come close to failing the 
link test, suggesting there are no specification errors. In the analysis of programme coverage, the 
coefficient on the square of the predicted values was approximately 0.9 in each model (p=0.35) 
and, in the analysis of access to the conditional cash transfer, 0.74 (p=0.46). 
The problem of multicollinearity between two or more variables was evaluated in terms of the 
degree of tolerance, a measure of how much collinearity a regression can tolerate. It is calculated 
as I minus the RZ from a regression of the other variables on the variable of interest. Hence, a 
tolerance value close to zero indicates the variable is not orthogonal to the other variables. In all 
models, the diagnostic test suggested there was no problem with multicollinearity. 
Outliers that could potentially influence the regression results can be identified by plotting the 
deviance residuals against the predicted probabilities. Since the intention of a probit regression is 
to minimise the sum of deviance residuals, observations with a high value are cause for concern. 
The plots revealed no obvious outliers in any of the models. Moreover, the exclusion of the five 
observations with the highest deviance residual had no impact on the regression results, suggesting 
none of these observations were influential. 
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the error terms do not have a constant variance and causes 
inconsistent estimators and an inappropriate covariance matrix (Greene 2008). A likelihood ratio 
test of the similarity between a full model with heteroskedasticity and a homoskedastic model 
provides the diagnostic test and can be obtained using the hetprob command in Stata. There 
was no evidence of hetroskedasticity in any of the models. 
Finally, the goodness-of-fit of each model is assessed using the Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-squared 
test. It ranks observations by their predicted probability, groups them into deciles and computes 
the chi-squared from the observed and predicted frequencies. The null hypothesis states that 
model fits the data better than the intercept-only model. The Hosmer-Lemesher chi-square 
statistics presented in the results section are unable to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting the 
models fit the data reasonably well. 
148 Pag' 
6.3 Data 
6.3.1 Data sources 
Data come from the Survey of Women, administered in six district of Nepal (see chapter 3 for 
more details). The sample is limited to those deliveries taking place after the SDIP had been 
officially launched in July 2005. It includes complete data on 5,483 deliveries. Analysis of receipt 
of the conditional cash transfer is based on a subsample of 730 deliveries in which the woman 
delivered in a government health facility. Information on the activities of the government and its 
partners to promote the SDIP come from the qualitative study in the first phase of the evaluation. 
6.3.2 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Table 6.2 reports the summary statistics for the independent variables used in the analysis of the 
determinants of knowledge of the SDIP and credibility of the SIDIP. The mean age of women in 
the sample is 26 years. The ownership of assets is used as the basis for measuring a household's 
wealth asset score. With no information on household consumption, it provides the most 
appropriate measure of household living standard. The wealth asset score is derived by principal 
components analysis to give an index that is increasing in household wealth (Filmer and Pritchett 
1998). The method has been described in more detail in chapter S. In order to test for non- 
linearity, a polynomial function of wealth is included in the analysis, but to do so requires that all 
values are positive. For this reason, the wealth index is re- scaled to give values between I and 100 
that then transformed into its logarithm. The logarithm of wealth has a mean value of 3.27. Using 
the same variable, observations can be categorised into quintile groups to generate wealth asset 
quintile dummy variables. 
Completed years of education are used to establish the following education categories: no 
education (0 grades completed); some primary (1 -4 grade); primary or some secondary (5- 9 
grade); and secondary or higher (10 or higher grade). Almost 50 percent of women have no 
education, while only IS percent of women have completed secondary education. Almost 60 
percent of women work in agriculture. Individual castes or ethnicities are grouped into categories 
based on those established by experts in this field in Nepal (Bennett, Dahal et al. 2008). Over 30 
percent of women belong to the Brahmin / Chhetri group, castes considered as socioeconomically 
advantaged in Nepal. Janajati, Dalit and Muslim are considered more disadvantaged caste groups 
and collectively account for 36 percent of all women. 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis of knowledge of the SDIP prior to 
childbirth 
Variable Definition Mean 
Stcl 
Deviation 
Age Age of woman 25.75 5.55 
Log of wealth Logarithm of re-scaled wealth asset score 3.27 0.66 
No education I if woman has no education 0.46 0.50 
Primary education 1 if woman has some primary education 0.13 0.33 
Secondary education 1 if woman has primary or some secondary education 0.26 0.44 
Higher education 1 if woman has secondary or higher education 0.15 0.36 
No work I if woman does not work 0.21 0.41 
Agriculture work 1 if woman works in agriculture 0.58 0.49 
Salaried work 1 if woman is salaried or government worker 0.02 0.13 
Small business 1 if woman has small business 0.07 0.25 
Waged worker 1 if woman is a waged worker 0.12 0.33 
Other work 1 if woman has other work 0.00 0.05 
Brahmin & Chhetri I if woman is Brahim / Chhetri 0.33 0.47 
Terai & Madeshi 1 if woman is Terai & Madeshi Other Castes 0.09 0.28 
Dalit 1 if woman is Dalit 0.09 0.28 
Newar 1 if woman is Newar 0.03 0.17 
Janajati I if woman is Janajati 0.23 0.42 
Muslim 1 if woman is Muslim 0.04 0.19 
Other Castes 1 if woman is Other Castes 0.20 0.40 
Newspaper daily 1 if woman reads newspaper daily 0.03 0.17 
Newspaper weekly 1 if woman reads newspaper weekly 0.09 0.29 
Newspaper < weekly 1 if woman reads newspaper less than weekly 0.20 0.40 
No read newspaper 1 if woman does not read newspaper 0.68 0.47 
Radio daily 1 if woman listens to radio daily 0.40 0.49 
Radio weekly I if woman listens to radio weekly 0.18 0.39 
Radio < weekly 1 if woman listens to radio less than weekly 0.17 0.38 
No listen to radio 1 if woman does not listen to radio 0.24 0.43 
Walk to facility < 1hr 1 if household can walk to health facility < 1hr 0.22 0.41 
Walk to facility 1hr <4 hr 1 if household can walk to health facility 1hr <4 hr 0.57 0.50 
Walk to facility 4hr <1 day 1 if household can walk to health facility 4hr <1 day 0.15 0.36 
Walk to facility >1 day 1 if household can walk to health facility >I day 0.06 0.24 
Urban 1 if household is urban 0.15 0.36 
Previous delivery in SDIP 1 if woman had a previous delivery during SDIP 0.06 0.24 
Active FCHV Index of female community health volunteer activity 0.08 0.10 
Women's groups 1 if village has active women's groups 0.26 0.44 
Morang I if district is Morang 0.44 0.50 
Sankhuwasabha 1 if district is Sankhuwasabha 0.11 0.31 
Myagdi 1 if district is Myagc1i 0.07 0.26 
Rupandehi 1 if district is Rupandehi 0.07 0.25 
Jurnia 1 if district is Jumla 0.23 0.42 
Achharn 1 if district is Achham 0.08 0.27 
SDIP year 1 1 if 1A year of SDIP in which delivery took place 0.35 0.48 
SDIP year 2 1 if 2 nd year of SDIP in which delivery took place 0.43 0.49 
SDIP year 3 1 if 3 rd year of SDIP in which delivery took place 0.22 0.42 
Note: Sample includes 5,483 deliveries, all of which took place after the start of the SDIP (July 2005). Sample 
weights are applied. FCHV = female community health volunteer 
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In the survey, women were asked about their exposure to various forms of media. Only 30 
percent of women ever read a newspaper, but access to the radio is much greater with 7S percent 
of women listening at least occasionally (and 40 percent listening daily). The time it takes to walk 
to the nearest health facility is categorised into four groups. Just over 20 percent of women live 
with one hour's walk of a health facility, while the majority (57 percent) live between one and 
four hours from a facility. The majority of the sample is rural, with only 15 percent of households 
located in areas labelled urban in the most recent national census. Less than 10 percent of women 
had a previous delivery during the period in which the SDIP was operating. 
The determinants include two village level variables. The level of activity of the female 
community health volunteer is an index that ranges between possible values of 0 to 1. The 
indicator provides a measure of how active the female community health volunteer in each village 
is in disseminating information about the SDIP to the community. It is calculated as the 
proportion of women in a village who found out about the SDIP through the female community 
health volunteer. Each observation takes the mean value of the village. The mean value indicates 
that almost 10 percent of women in each village found out about the SDIP through the female 
community health volunteer. The women's group variable is binary and indicates whether the 
village in which the woman lives has women's group meetings. Almost 30 percent of women live 
in villages with women's groups operating. The district and regional dummy variable mean 
estimates show that the sample across these geographical dimensions is reasonably evenly spread. 
The regional dummy variables represent not only different topography but also variations in the 
package of financial benefits provided under the SDIP. The time dummy variables indicate the 
year in which the delivery took place. 
Table 6.3 reports the summary statistics for the independent variables used to explore factors 
associated with receipt of the conditional cash transfer. The sample is limited to those deliveries 
taking place in a government hospital after the start of the SDIP and many of the independent 
variables are the same as those used in the analysis of knowledge of the programme. Over 80 
percent of women had less than two living children at the time of pregnancy making them 
automatically eligible to receive the conditional cash transfer. The vast majority delivered in a 
government hospital. 
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Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis of receipt of the conditional cash 
transfer 
Std 
Variable Definition Mean Deviation 
Parity<2 1 if woman had <2 living children at pregnancy 0.86 0.35 
Log of wealth Logarithm of re-scaled wealth asset score 3.73 0.51 
No education I if woman has no education 0.20 0.40 
Primary education 1 if woman has some primary education 0.09 0.28 
Secondary education 1 if woman has primary / some secondary education 0.33 0.47 
Higher education 1 if woman has secondary or higher education 0.38 0.49 
Brahim / Chhetri I if woman is Brahim / Chhetri 0.44 0.50 
Terai & Madeshi I if woman is Terai & Madeshi Other Castes 0.05 0.23 
Dalit 1 if woman is Dalit 0.04 0.20 
Newar 1 if woman is Newar 0.04 0.21 
Janajati 1 if woman is Janajati 0.22 0.42 
Muslim 1 if woman is Muslim 0.02 0.13 
Other Castes 1 if woman is Other Castes 0.18 0.38 
Walk to facility < 1hr 1 if household can walk to health facility < 1hr 0.38 0.49 
Walk to facility 1hr <4 hr 1 if household can walk to health facility 1hr <4 hr 0.49 0.50 
Walk to facility 4hr <I day 1 if household can walk to health facility 4hr <1 day 0.12 0.32 
Walk to facility >I day 1 if household can walk to health facility >1 day 0.01 0.09 
Delivery in govt hospital 1 if woman delivered in a govt hospital 0.80 0.40 
Delivery in govt PHCC 1 if woman delivered in a govt PHCC 0.17 0.37 
Delivery in health post 1 if woman delivered in a govt health post 0.03 0.17 
Morang I if district is Morang 0.67 0.47 
Sankhuwasabha 1 if district is Sankhuwasabha 0.06 0.24 
Myagdi I if district is Myagdi 0.05 0.21 
Rupandehi I if district is Rupandehi 0.02 0.15 
Jumla 1 if district is Jumla 0.19 0.39 
Achham 1 if district is Achham 0.004 0.06 
SDIP year 1 1 if 1" year of SDIP in which delivery took place 0.30 0.46 
SDIP year 2 1 if 2 nd year of SDIP in which delivery took place 0.44 0.50 
SDIP year 3 1 if 3 rd year of SDIP in which delivery took place 0.26 0.44 
Note: Sample includes 730 deliveries, all of which took place after the start of the SDIP (July 2005) in a 
government health facility. Sample weights are applied. PHCC = primary health care centre. 
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6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Promotion of the SDIP 
Table 6.4 provides a summary of activities undertaken by the government and non-state actors to 
promote the SDIP during the study period. The central level did very little to promote the SDIP. 
It sent out guidelines to district health offices and regional hospitals but with the primary purpose 
of guiding implementation, not promoting the programme. The central level was reluctant to 
initiate a national information campaign and devoted no resources to either this or a broader 
communication strategy over the study period. 
At the district level, there were more examples of the government making efforts to publicise the 
programme but these were done in an ad hoc manner and were not part of any concerted 
strategy. The typical means of communication was via word of mouth through the health workers 
and community health volunteers. The activities of non-state partners were similarly sporadic and 
limited to those areas where the organisations were operating. 
Table 6.4 Activities undertaken by the government and its partners to promote the SDIP 
Central level actions District level government District level non-state actors 
  Programme guidelines given to   Programme guidelines given to   Community forums - women's 
district health offices and government health providers groups, safe motherhood 
regional hospitals   Health staff and community emergency fund committee 
" Information kit given to district health volunteers encouraged to   Printing of information posters 
officials involved in publicise via word of mouth " Health staff encouraged by 
implementation   FM radio - eg. broadcast of list of NGOs to promote SDIP during 
recipients antenatal care visits 
  Special events - eg. an 
awareness camp on the SDIP 
Note: Data come from the qualitative study in the first phase of the evaluation, which was conducted in 10 
districts of Nepal (including the six districts sampled in the Survey of Women). NGO = non-governmental 
organisation. 
The most common means by which women first found out about the SDIP was through friends 
and family, accounting for 45 percent of the total (Table 6.5). Female community health 
volunteers and professional health workers were the source of information for approximately 20 
percent of women respectively. Media (television, radio and newspaper) accounted for just 6. S 
percent of the total. Women's groups were the source of information for 5.9 percent of women. 
The fact that the mass media accounted for such a small proportion of those informed is consistent 
with there being no concerted information campaign by the government. 
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Table 6.5 Percentage distribution of deliveries by source of information, according to district 
Morang Sankhuwasabha Myagdi Rupandehi Jumla Achham Total 
Word of mouth 
Friends / relatives (%) 54.9 49.3 41.2 55.0 30.8 43.3 50.2 
FCHV (%) 15.0 23.8 15.3 14.7 37.4 18.2 18.0 
Health worker (%) 22.7 18.5 20.8 20.7 13.1 25.4 20.7 
Women's group (%) 2.5 1.0 11.3 4.2 8.6 7.8 4.3 
TBA (%) 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 2.0 0.7 0.6 
Mass media 
Radio (%) 3.0 6.5 
Newspaper (%) 0.7 0.0 
Television (%) 0.5 0.0 
7.8 3.0 8.2 2.6 4.7 
0.7 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.6 
1.3 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.6 
Other sources (%) 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.4 
Don't know (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.03 
Total(%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of obs 401 491 451 333 452 307 2435 
Note: The denominator is the number of deliveries in which the woman knew about the SDIP at the time of 
the survey. Sample weights are applied in estimation of the total. FCHV = female community health volunteer. 
TBA = traditional birth attendant. 
The importance of each source of information varied between districts (Table 6.5). Relatively 
large differences between districts are apparent in the case of female community health 
volunteers, women's groups and radio - all channels which could be used by district officials to 
disseminate information. The variation may suggest some districts were more successful or 
willing than others in making use of these channels. 
6.4.2 Knowledge of the SDIP 
Table 6.6 provides estimates of the mean knowledge of the SDIP prior to childbirth, according to 
various background characteristics. Only 24 percent of women had knowledge of the SDIP when 
pregnant. In other words, three-quarters of women did not know about the SDIP when they and 
their families made the decision of where to give birth. The level of knowledge within the broader 
target population of women of childbearing age may have been lower since the survey 
respondents are more likely to have come into contact with the health system where they may 
have found out about the SDIP. 
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Table 6.6 Percentage of deliveries in which the woman had knowledge of the SDIP prior to childbirth, 
according to background characteristics 
Background characteristic % p-value N 
District 
Morang 22.2 < 0.001 964 
Sankhuwasabha 39.6 893 
Myagdi 30.6 795 
Rupandehi 17.9 911 
Jumla 33.6 961 
Achham 20.0 959 
Wealth 
Poorest 16.2 < 0.001 1,108 
Poorer 26.9 1,096 
Middle 23.5 1,077 
Richer 21.4 1,100 
Richest 28.3 1,102 
Education 
No education 15.7 < 0.001 3049 
Primary education 25.5 675 
Secondary education 28.2 1184 
Higher education 42.3 575 
Caste 
Brahmin / Chhetri 33.4 < 0.001 2,364 
Madheshi 21.8 410 
Dalit 21.8 742 
Newar 40.6 129 
Janajati 20.9 1,074 
Muslim 4.3 127 
Other castes 
.................. 
16.8 631 
Accessibility to health facility 
Walk , 1hr 31.3 < 0.001 918 
Walk 1hr <4 hr 25.0 3185 
Walk 4hr <I day 17.7 900 
Walk >1 day 
I,. -,., ... ....... --I-... 1. .1..... ....... 
8.9 480 
. ..... 
Type of dwelling 
Urban 28.9 0.2704 517 
Rural 
I ....... ...... .................... .................... . .......... ... 
23.4 
. .......... .... ..... ...... - 
4966 
. ........ 
Year of implementation 
15'year of the SDIP 18.4 < 0.002 2037 
2 nd year of the SDIP 24.3 2327 
3 rd year of the SDIP 33.5 1116 
Total 24.3 5,483 
Note: Using an adjusted Wald test, the p-value is provided for the test of the hypothesis 
that the means of the subgroups are similar to each other. Sample weights are applied 
and standard errors are adjusted for clustering and stratification. 
Women in the district of Rupandehi were least likely to know of the SDIP during pregnancy, 
while those in Sankhuwasabha were most likely to have heard of the programme. Knowledge 
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varied by household wealth, with women in the poorest quintile less likely to have heard of the 
SDIP that those in the wealthier quintiles. The higher the level of education, the higher the 
probability that the women were to have heard of the SDIP. Women of castes regarded as the 
most advantaged (Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar) were most likely to have been exposed to 
information about the SDIP. A clear pattern is observed by access, with households living closer 
to a health facility more likely to have heard of the programme. Similarly, urban households have 
a higher chance of knowing about the SDIP than rural households, although the difference was not 
significant. Finally, over each year of implementation, there has been a steady improvement in 
exposure to information about the programme. 
Table 6.7 provides a variety of measures to assess socioeconomic inequality in terms of who found 
out about the SDIP during pregnancy. The cumulative shares by wealth quintile indicate 
inequality in favour of wealthier households. The poorest 4-0 percent of households, for example, 
accounted for 37 percent of knowledge, significantly less than its population share. Inequality in 
the knowledge of the SDIP across the different sources of information is most easily quantified 
using the concentration index. 
Table 6.7 Inequality in knowledge of the SDIP prior to childbirth, by source of information 
Cumulative share of knowledge 
of SDIP during pregnancy 
All 
sources 
N 
Friend or 
relative 
M 
FCHV 
M 
Health 
worker 
M 
Radio 
N 
Women's 
group 
M 
Poorest 20% 17.7** 14.1** 22.2 12.7 20.9 22ý8 
(standard error) (0.93) (0.93) (1.95) (1.46) (4.04) (4.16) 
Poorest 40% 37.1** 30.4 ** 42.0 31.4** 51.5** 49.5 
(1.19) (1.21) (2.33) (2.02) (4.95) (4.97) 
Poorest 60% 54.7** 47.5** 63.5 47.6** 70.0** 64.0 
(1.19) (1,29) (2.27) (2.15) (4.53) (4.76) 
Poorest 80% 72.9 67.2** 82.4 69.5** 76.7 83.4 
(1.04) (1.16) (1.79) (2.00) (4.16) (3.69) 
Test of dominance against 45° line --+- 
Concentration index 0.082** 0.181** -0.056 0.165** -0.060 -0.096 
(standard error) (0.026) (0.026) (0.054) (0.037) (0.073) (0.098) 
Normalised concentration index 0.109 0.231 -0.061 0.182 -0.062 -0.098 
Note: ** denotes shares are significantly difference from population share at the 5 percent level. 45* line that 
dominates (lies above) the concentration curve is indicated by a negative sign. 45* line that is dominated (lies 
below) by the concentration curve is indicated by a positive sign. Blank cell indicates no dominance. Sample 
weights are applied and standard errors are adjusted for clustering. FCHV = female community health volunteer. 
For some sources of information - female community health volunteers, radio and women's 
groups - there is no statistically significant inequality. Women's groups are associated with the 
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least inequality in knowledge of the SDIP. In contrast, where women heard about the SDIP 
through friends or relatives and health workers, the results suggest there was inequality in favour 
of wealthier households. Estimates of the normalised concentration index reveal no substantive 
differences from the unadjusted estimates because the means of each indicator are so low. 
Visual inspection of the concentration curves in Figure 6.1 largely confirms the previous findings. 
However, the corresponding tests of dominance shown in Table 6.7 arc not entirely consistent 
with the concentration index estimates. The concentration index in the case of female community 
health volunteers, for example, is not statistically different from zero while the test of dominance 
suggests that the concentration curve lies above the line of equality. The reason for this result lies 
in the particular decision rule used in the test of dominance, illustrating why it is important to 
refer to findings from all the various ways of assessing inequality. Overall the findings are largely 
consistent with expectations. Those information sources that are the most costly to access appear 
to be associated with the greatest inequality. 
Figure 6.1 Concentration curves for knowledge of the SDIP prior to childbirth, by source of information 
1 
a 0.9 
0 
p 0.8 
N 
ho 
° 0.7 ar ü 
3ý 
oc 
Y 0.6 
o Cl 
vm0.5 
Lj 
y 0.4 
5 0.3 
E 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Cumulative share of deliveries (poorest first) 
Table 6.8 summarises the results from three probit models with knowledge of the SDIP prior to 
childbirth as the dependent variable. It gives the marginal effect, standard error and p-value 
for 
the coefficient of each independent variable. All the models fit the data reasonably well, as 
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indicated by the low Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square test statistic, and regardless of how it is 
specified, wealth has a significant positive influence on knowledge of the SDIP. In the preferred 
specification, model 3, the restrictions result in a set of explanatory variables that are almost all 
significant predictors of variation in knowledge of the SDIP. 
Younger and more educated women are more likely to have knowledge of the SDIP during 
pregnancy. Women from wealthier households have a higher chance of being exposed to 
information about the SDIP, while women belonging to janajati or Muslim castes are less likely 
than the reference group (Brahmin / Chhetri) to have knowledge of the programme. Exposure to 
newspapers and the radio appears to be positively associated with knowledge of the SDIP. 
Women living closer to a health facility are more likely to have heard of the programme, as are 
women living in villages with active female community health volunteers. If a woman gave birth 
to a previous baby during the SDIP, she is more likely to know of the programme. Women from 
the districts of Sankhuwasabha, Myagdi, Rupandehi and Achham have a higher chance than 
Morang of knowing about the SDIP while they were pregnant. Lastly, as the programme has 
matured, exposure to information on the programme has increased, as indicated by the effect of 
the time dummy variables. 
Table 6.8 Marginal effects from probit model of knowledge of SDIP prior to childbirth 
Variable dy/dx 
Model 1 
Std 
Error p value dy/dx 
Model 2 
Std 
Error p value dy/dx 
Model 3 
Stcl 
Error p value 
Age of woman -0.003 0.001 0.065 -0.003 0.001 O. Oso -0.003 
0.001 0.066 
Wealth quintile I Reference category Reference category Reference category 
Wealth quintile 2 0.079 0.031 0.006 0.079 0.031 0.006 
Wealth quintile 3 0.083 0.034 0.009 0.083 0.035 0.011 
Wealth quintile 4 0.125 0.04S 0.003 0.123 0.045 0.004 
Wealth quintile 5 0.160 0.046 0.000 0.15S 0.049 0.001 
Log of wealth - - 0.078 0.023 0.001 - - 
No education Reference category Reference category Reference category 
Primary education 0.073 0.028 0.006 0.073 0.028 0.006 0.074 0.029 
0.006 
Secondary education 0.071 0.033 0.027 0.069 0.033 0.034 0.070 0.032 
0.023 
Higher education 0.174 0.043 0,000 0.159 0.042 0.000 0.176 0.043 
0.000 
No work Reference category Reference category Reference category 
Agriculture work 0.028 0.021 0.201 0.031 0.021 0.149 - 
Salaried work 0.040 0.053 0.429 0.044 0.053 0.371 
Small business 0.012 0.038 0.760 0.009 0.038 0.800 
Waged worker 0.027 0.042 0.507 0.032 0.042 0.429 
Other work -0.008 0.116 0.947 -0.002 0.120 0.989 
Brahmin & Chhetri Reference category Reference category Reference category 
Terai & Madesh! -0.009 0.027 0.745 -0.005 0.027 
0.866 -0.011 0.026 0.675 
Dalit -0.041 0.024 0.108 -0.039 0.025 0.128 -0.043 
0.023 0.080 
Newar -0.012 0.039 0.759 -0.012 0.040 0.775 -0.014 
0.039 0.720 
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Table continued... 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable dy/dx 
Std 
Error p value dy/dx 
Stcl 
Error p value dyIdx 
Stcl 
Error p value 
Janajati -0.064 0.022 0.004 -0.061 0.022 0.007 -0.067 0.021 0.003 
Muslim -0.148 0.025 O. ODO -0.144 0.026 0.000 -0.151 0.024 0.000 
Other Castes -0.027 0.027 0.318 -0.022 0.027 0.437 -0.027 0.027 0.319 
Newspaper daily Reference category Reference category Reference category 
Newspaper weekly -0.096 0.033 0.013 -0.089 0.034 0.022 -0.099 0.033 0.010 
Newspaper < weekly -0.094 0.038 0.025 -0.082 0.038 0.051 -0.097 0.037 0.018 
No read newspaper -0.119 0.057 0.027 -0.103 0.056 0.055 -0.122 0.055 0.018 
Radio daily Reference category Reference category Reference category 
Radio weekly -0.063 0.017 0.000 -0.062 0.017 0.001 -0.064 0.017 0.000 
Radio < weekly -0.077 0.016 0.000 -0.076 0,016 0.000 -0.077 0.016 0.000 
No listen to radio -0.057 0.023 0.018 -0.057 0.023 0.018 -0.058 0.023 0.016 
Walk to facility < 1hr Reference category Reference category Reference category 
Walk to facility 1hr <4 hr -0.057 0.032 0.061 -0.057 0.032 0.064 -0.059 0.027 0.022 
Walk to tacility Or <1 day -0.115 0.028 
Walk to facility >I day -0.151 0.024 
Urban 0.025 0.038 
Previous delivery in SDIP 0.054 0.026 
Active FCHV 0.790 0.081 
Women's groups 0.028 0.020 
Morang Reference category 
Sankhuwasabha 0.289 0.046 
Myagdi 0.231 0.047 
Rupandehl 0.194 0.057 
Jumia 0.043 0.030 
Achharn 0.215 0.061 
SDIP year 1 Reference category 
SIDIP year 2 0.062 0.019 
SDIP year 3 0.173 0.022 
N obs 5483 
Pseudo R2 0.1583 
Log likelihood -2558 
LR X2 1031.3 
Prob > X2 0.000 
Hosmer-Lemeshow X2 11.500 
Prob > -X2 0.1750 
0.000 -0.115 0.028 0.000 -0.117 0.024 0.000 
0.000 -0.151 0.024 0.000 -0.152 0.022 0.000 
0.502 0.017 0.037 0.650 - - - 
0.029 0.055 0.026 0.024 0.055 0.027 0.029 
0.000 0.797 0.081 0.000 0.775 0.08 0.000 
0.161 0.028 0.020 0.156 0.028 0.020 0.149 
Reference category Reference category 
0.000 0.302 0.045 0.000 0.289 0.050 0.000 
0.000 0.238 0.046 0.000 0.226 0.048 0.000 
0.000 0.203 0.055 0.000 0.197 0.060 0.000 
0.144 0.036 0.030 0.219 0.043 0.029 0.131 
0.000 0.217 0.061 0.000 0.216 0.063 0.000 
Reference category Reference category 
0.001 0.062 0.019 0.001 0.062 0.019 0.001 
0.000 0.173 0.022 0.000 0.173 0.023 0.000 
5483 5483 
0.1583 0.1576 
-2558 -2560 
1022.0 941.0 
0.000 0.000 
9.840 11.74 
0.2767 0.1631 
Note: Sample weights are applied and standard errors are adjusted for clustering. FCHV = female community health volunteer. 
In terms of magnitude, some of the district variables appear to havc the greatest impact on the 
probability of women being exposed to information about the SDIP (Table 6.8). Women living in 
Sankhuwasabha, for example, are over 30 percentage points more likely to be exposed to 
information about the SDIP than those in Morang at the sample mean of the independent 
variables. The effect on exposure to information on the SDIP is also large for higher cducated 
women, wealthier families, households with poor access to the nearest health facility, women 
belonging to the Muslim caste group and women who gave birth in the third year of programme 
implementation. With respect to the continuous variables, the level of activity of the female 
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community health volunteer has a large effect on knowledge of the programme. A 10 percentagc 
point increase in the index measuring the level of activity of the village's female community health 
volunteer (index ranges from 0 to 1) increases the probability of being aware of the SDIP by 7.8 
percentage points. 
6.4.3 Credibility of the demand-side incentives 
Table 6.9 reports estimates for the proxy indicator for credibility of the demand-side incentives - 
deliveries in which the woman knew of someone else who received the conditional cash transfer. 
Only II percent of the overall sample was reached by the programmc in this sense. There were 
significant variations by level of education, caste group, accessibility to the nearest health facility 
and the year of the programme's implementation. The pattern of variation in estimates across 
subgroups was similar to those found in Table 6.6 for the indicator of knowledge of the 
programme. In the subsample of deliveries in which the women had knowledge of the SIDIP prior 
to childbirth, the woman knew of someone who had received the conditional cash transfer in 47 
percent of cases. There were significant variations in this indicator by district, wealth quintile, 
caste group, and accessibility to the nearest health facility. 
Table 6.10 shows the results of multivariate analysis. There are some qualitative differences in the 
results according to whether wealth is specified as quintile groups or as a continuous variable. 
Knowing someone else who received the cash transfer (conditional on knowing about the SDIP) is 
consistently positively associated with wealth, waged labour, an active FCHV, and two of the 
districts (Sankhuwasabha, Achham). The dependent variable is consistently negatively associated 
with some caste groups (Newar, Muslim), and distance from the nearest health facility when 
more than one day's walk. 
Whether knowledge of others who have received the conditional cash transfer is a good proxy for 
expectations of receiving the money is an important question. It must lead to a positive, however 
small, expectation of receiving the incentive. But an individual's expectations may be formed 
through various processes, of which only one is the experience of others in accessing the cash. An 
individual who finds out about the SDIP from a trusted and reliable source may be inclined to 
believe the promise of cash is credible. Similarly, health workers may have given the impression 
the demand-side incentives were being paid on time, purely because they have an incentive to 
encourage more women into health facilities. 
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Table 6.9 Percentage of deliveries in which the woman had knowledge of the SDIP prior to childbirth 
and knew of someone else who received the conditional cash transfer, according to background 
characteristics 
Full sample 
Sub sample of women with 
Variable 
knowledge of SOIP 
% p-value N% p-value N 
District 
Morang 10.2 0.1373 964 45.8 0.0249 214 
Sankhuwasabha 19.9 893 50.3 354 
Myagdi 12.7 795 41.6 243 
Rupandehi 9.0 911 50.3 163 
Jumla 11.0 961 32.8 323 
Achham 12.2 959 60.9 192 
Wealth 
Poorest 7.7 0.1806 1,108 47.8 0.0015 179 
Poorer 9.7 1,096 36.1 300 
Middle 9.8 1,077 41.6 340 
Richer 12.1 1,100 56.3 337 
Richest 13.0 1,102 45.8 333 
Education 
No education 7.5 < 0.001 3,049 47.6 0.9096 603 
Primary education 11.5 675 45.1 201 
Secondary education 12.7 1,184 45.1 404 
Higher education 20.4 575 48.2 281 
Caste 
Brahmin / Chhetri / Newar 15.9 < 0.001 2,493 46.8 0.031 843 
Madheshi 10.0 410 45.7 94 
Dalit 10.5 742 48.1 176 
Janajati 9.0 1,074 43.1 258 
Muslim 0.5 127 11.4 7 
Access to health facility 
Walk< 1hr 15.2 < 0.001 918 48.3 0.0056 359 
Walk 1hr <4 hr 12.1 3,185 48.4 913 
Walk Or <I day 6.7 900 37.7 171 
Walk >I day 2.3 480 25.5 46 
Type of dwelling 
Urban 16.0 0.1401 517 55.4 0.0686 179 
Rural 10.5 4,966 44.7 1,310 
Year of implementation 
1 st year of the SDIP 8.0 < 0.001 2,037 43.2 0.3029 462 
2 nd year of the SDIP 11.4 2,327 47.0 644 
3d year of the SDIP 16.5 1,116 49.4 383 
Total 11.3 5,483 46.7 1,489 
Note: Using an adjusted Wald test, the p-value is provided for the test of the hypothesis that the means of the 
subgroups are similar to each other. Sample weights are applied and standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering. 
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Table 6.10 Marginal effects from probit model of credibility of the conditional cash transfer 
Variable dy/dx. 
Model 4 
Stcl Error -value dy/dx. 
Model 5 
Stcl Error p value- 
Age of woman -0.003 0.004 0.506 -0.004 0.004 0.308 
Wealth quintile 1 Reference category Reference category 
Wealth quintile 2 -0.063 0.059 0.296 - - 
Wealth quintile 3 0.021 0.065 0.749 
Wealth quintile 4 0.185 0.070 0.010 
Wealth quintile 5 0.086 0.089 0.337 - - - 
Log of wealth - - - 0.122 0.060 0.043 
No education Reference category Reference category 
Primary education -0.053 0.063 0.402 -0.062 0.063 0.328 
Secondary education -0.071 0.059 0.226 -0.089 0.059 0.135 
Higher education -0.061 0.060 0.313 -0.120 0.060 0.051 
No work Reference category Reference category 
Agriculture work 0.009 0.067 0.891 0.030 0.066 0.648 
Salaried work 0.126 0.112 0.269 0.141 0.105 0.190 
Small business 0.049 0.073 0.500 O. G49 0.075 0.509 
Waged workers 0.150 0.072 0.041 0.183 0.070 0.011 
Other work 0.350 0.180 0.142 0.353 0.170 0.119 
Brahim / Chhetri Reference category Reference category 
Terai & Madeshi -0.060 0.093 0.528 -0.036 0.095 0.708 
Dalit 0.020 0.069 0.767 0.016 0.070 0.816 
Newar -0.185 0.071 0.017 -0.182 0.075 0.024 
Janajati -0.066 0.048 0.173 -0.058 0.048 0.230 
Muslim -0.390 0.086 0.022 -0.377 0.089 0.019 
Other Castes -0.016 0.077 0.834 0.010 0.077 0.899 
Walk to facility < 1hr Reference category Reference category 
Walk to facility 1hr <4 hr 0.004 0.045 0.933 0.010 0.046 0.832 
Walk to facility 4hr <I day -0.117 0.070 0.109 -0.105 0.073 0.162 
Walk to facility >1 day -0.210 0.082 0.025 -0.213 0.081 0.021 
Urban 0.104 0.061 0.090 0.088 0.062 0.153 
Previous delivery in SDIP -0.069 0.050 0.172 -0.058 0.050 0.250 
Active FCHV 0.474 0.214 0.026 0.518 0.216 0.016 
Women's groups 0.058 0.045 0.194 0.058 0.043 0.179 
Morang Reference category Reference category 
Sankhuwasabha 0.118 0.064 0.068 0.146 0.066 0.029 
Myagdi 0.012 0.082 0.879 0.053 0.077 0.489 
Rupandehi -0.137 0.086 0.124 -0.133 0.089 0.148 
Jumla 0.086 0.072 0.236 0.068 0.072 0.340 
Achharn 0.224 0.087 0.015 0.255 0.085 0.006 
SDIP year 1 Reference category Reference category 
SDIP year 2 0.059 0.042 0.161 0.050 0.042 0.22§ 
SDIP year 3 0.078 
........................... 
0.047 0.100 
. .... 
0.085 
..... ...... ........ 
0.046 0.066 
N obs 1489 1489 
Pseudo R2 0.0616 0.0542 
Log likelihood -965.4 -973.1 
LR X2 103.35 78.42 
Prob > X' 0.000 0.000 
Hosmer-Lemeshow X' 7.21 6.76 
Prob > X2 0.5139 0.563 
Note: Sample weights are applied and standard errors are adjusted for clustering. FCHV = female community 
health volunteer. 
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6.4.4 Receipt of the demand-side incentives 
The Survey of Women obtained information on the conditional cash transfer to find out whether 
the woman received it when discharged from the health facility, at a later date, as a deduction 
from the bill (ie. a price subsidy equivalent to the amount of cash), or not at all. Table 6.11 
provides estimates for these indicators for various subgroups, using the number of women who 
delivered in a government health facility as the denominator, hereafter referred to as eligible 
S1 women. 
The proportion of eligible women receiving the cash when discharged from the health facility was 
20 percent. This indicator corresponds to the stated policy of giving the cash to the woman 
immediately after delivery. A further 10 percent of women received the cash from the health 
facility at a later date, and 7 percent of eligible women had the full cash amount deducted from 
their bill. This leaves over 60 percent of eligible women who did not receive the cash or an 
equivalent deduction in their bill. A large proportion of eligible women were clearly either never 
paid or paid late indicating that there have been problems in the administration of the conditional 
cash transfer. 
There were significant variations in the proportion of eligible women who received the cash at the 
facility by district and year of implementation. Variation across districts ranged from 15 percent 
of eligible women receiving the cash on time in Sankhuwasabha to 51 percent in jumla. 
Administration of the cash has improved substantially each year since implementation started. 
Over time, a greater proportion of eligible women received the cash and, in the third year, 35 
percent of these cases were paid at discharge from the facility. 
s' Estimates indicate that at least 90 percent of women who delivered in a government health facility were eligible to 
receive the cash, but it may be higher. 85 percent of women who delivered in a government health facility had less 
than two living children during pregnancy making them eligible to receive the cash. Of the remaining 124 women (I S 
percent), 29 were eligible on the basis of having reported a caesarean section or assisted delivery (indicative of an 
obstetric complication). It is not known if any of theremaining women had an obstetric complication.. 
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Table 6.11 Percentage of deliveries at a government health facility in which the woman received the 
conditional cash transfer, according to background characteristics 
Woman received the conditional cash transfer: 
Immediately As a 
after At a later deduction 
Background childbirth date from the bill 
characteristics (%) p-value N p-value N p-value N 
District 
Morang 18.2 0.0124 7.1 < 0.001 0.3 < 0.001 297 
Sankhuwasabha 14.8 38.9 1.9 108 
Myagdi 30.7 27.7 1.0 101 
Rupandehl 20.9 3.3 33.3 153 
Jumla 50.8 16.4 0.0 61 
Achham 30.0 20.0 0.0 10 
Type of health facility 
Hospital 20.5 0.8504 6.8 0.0731 7.8 < 0.001 604 
Primary health centre 16.3 20.3 2.8 98 
Health post 21.9 23.2 0.0 27 
Accessibility 
Walk < 1hr 24.6 0.2555 11.4 < 0.001 4.3 0.5621 278 
Walk 1hr <4 hr 16.3 9.6 7.8 369 
Walk Or <1 day 19.5 4.2 9.6 76 
Walk >1 day 12.6 0.0 16.8 7 
Ethnicity 
Brahmin, Chhetri 17.6 0.4515 10.6 0.0488 8.0 0.0006 473 
Madheshi 25.6 6.2 11.6 38 
Dalit 21.1 21.2 0.0 52 
Janajati 15.9 6.6 8.6 155 
Muslim 25.3 
...... .... . ..... . 
2.6 0.0 12 
Education 
No education 9.8 0.514 1.2 0.2291 0.0 0.0205 154 
Primary education 14.8 7.1 2.1 70 
Secondary education 11.9 9.4 0.0 247 
Higher education 6.3 7.2 0.0 259 
Year of implementation 
SDIP 1st Year 9.2 < 0.001 8.2 0.6272 4.9 0.3268 240 
SDIP 2nd Year 18.1 11.1 6.6 313 
SDIP 3rd Year 34.9 8.7 8.9 177 
Total 19.8 9.6 6.7 730 
Note: Using an adjusted Wald test, the p-value is provided for the test of the hypothesis that the means of the 
subgroups are similar to each other. Sample weights are applied and standard errors are adjusted for clustering. 
There were significant variations in the proportion of eligible women receiving the conditional 
cash transfer late across a number of subgroups. Of note, women living nearer to the health 
facility were more likely to receive the cash, albeit late, than those living further away, perhaps 
1641 Page 
because they were able to make more frequent visits to the health facility to demand the money - 
The practice of deducting the cash amount from the woman's bill was presumably a means to pass 
on the financial benefit of the conditional cash transfer in the abscnce of any cash. It was much 
more common in Rupandehi than other districts and the data suggest it avoided paying women 
late. This practice was also more common in hospitals than lower level health facilities. 
Table AI in Appendix AI shows the average number of days that women were paid late when 
they received the conditional cash transfer. Estimates varied significantly across all subgroups. It 
ranged from a mean of just I day in Rupandehi to 18S days in Sankuwasabha. Delays appeared to 
be most lengthy in primary health care centres and shortest in hospitals. Women living more than 
4 hours away from the nearest health facility experienced barely any delay, reflecting the fact that 
they never returned to the health facility to pick up the cash. The number of days has fallen 
dramatically each year since the start of the SDIP. Although interpretation of this finding should 
be cautious, S2 administration of the cash does appear to have improved over time. Amongst 
women who received the cash late (ie. excluding those women who received the cash on the day 
of discharge), the average delay was 149 days (data not shown), illustrating the difficulty in 
getting cash to women once they have left the health facility after childbirth. 
In two of the study districts, women who were eligible to receive the conditional cash transfer 
could also be exempted from paying for the delivery care. Of the 187 deliveries that took place in 
a government health facility in these districts, 18 (9.6 percent) women did not pay for the 
services, suggesting implementation of this aspect of the policy has been poor (result not shown). 
Table 6.12 presents the results of the probit model used to explore the factors that influence 
whether eligible women receive the conditional cash transfer. Since model 6 does not fit the data 
well, as indicated by the high Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square test statistic, model 7 is the 
preferred model. A number of variables are found to affect the probability of an eligible woman 
receiving the cash. 
S2 These estimates refer to delays amongst women who were given the cash. The survey was conducted in the third 
year of implementation and insufficient time had elapsed to assess fully delays in that year. 
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Table 6.12 Marginal effects from probit model of receipt of conditional cash transfer 
Variable dy/dx. 
Model 6 
Std Error p value dy/dx. 
Model 7 
Stcl Error p value 
Living children <2 0.314 0.031 0.000 0.315 0.031 0.000 
Wealth quintile 1 Reference ca tegory Reference category 
Wealth quintile 2 -0.216 0.029 0.001 - - 
Wealth quintile 3 -0.112 0.084 0.262 
Wealth quintile 4 -0.138 0.094 0.210 
Wealth quintile 5 -0.120 0.128 0.342 - - - 
Log of wealth - - - 0.044 0.052 0.391 
No education Reference ca tegory Reference category 
Primary education 0.051 0.079 0.499 0.065 0.079 0.382 
Secondary education -0.097 0.060 0.121 -0.084 0.063 0.200 
Higher education -0.175 0.065 0.008 -0.166 0.071 0.027 
Brahim / Chhetri Reference category Reference category 
Terai & Madeshi 0.006 0.093 0.949 0.015 0.096 0.877 
Dalit -0.073 0.079 0.417 -0.071 0.077 0.414 
Newar -0.030 0.068 0.669 -0.019 0.070 0.797 
Janajati -0.110 0.040 0.021 -0.108 0.040 0.024 
Muslim -0.067 0.104 0.564 -0.055 0.108 0.639 
Other Castes 0.088 0.070 0.179 0.105 0.071 0.116 
Walk to facility< 1hr Reference category Reference category 
Walk to facility 1hr <4 hr -0.127 0.053 0.013 -0.125 0.054 0.015 
Walk to facility 4hr <1 day -0.106 0.058 0.096 -0.112 0.059 0.092 
Walk to facility >1 day -0.211 0.032 0.003 -0.210 0.033 0.004 
Delivery in govt hospital Reference category Reference category 
Delivery in govt PHCC 0.194 0.106 0.049 0.192 0.106 0.052 
Delivery in health post 0.235 0.168 0.121 0.255 0.162 0.082 
Morang Reference category Reference category 
Sankhuwasabha 0.477 0.088 0.000 0.461 0.097 0.000 
Myagdi 0.618 0.065 0.000 0.612 0.071 0.000 
Rupandehl 0.639 0.082 0.000 0.603 0.094 0.000 
Jumla 0.044 0.073 O. S35 0.041 0.073 0.567 
Achham 0.403 0.155 0.009 0.427 0.141 0.003 
SDIP year 1 Reference category Reference category 
SDIP year 2 0.180 0.058 0.002 0.181 0.057 0.002 
SDIP year 3 0.404 0.062 0.000 0.404 0.061 0.000 
N obs 730 730 
Pseudo R2 0.2503 0.2593 
Log likelihood -331.5 -358.2 
LR X' 224.6 223.6 
Prob > X2 0.0000 0.0000 
Hosmer-Lemeshow X2 14.540 13.380 
Prob >, y, ' 0.0687 0.0995 
Note: Sample weights are applied and standard errors are adjusted for clustering. PHCC = primary health care 
centre. 
As expected, the official requirement to have less than two living children to receive the cash is 
highly significant. There is evidence that eligible women with secondary education were less likely 
to receive the cash compared with those with no education. Accessibility to the nearest health 
facility was found to be significant, suggesting that the cost associated with returning to the health 
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facility deters families from receiving the cash. The results suggest that primary health ccntres 
performed better in the administration of the cash than government hospitals. The coefficients on 
the district dummy variables show that eligible women in Sankhuwasabha, Myagdi, Rupandehi 
and Achham had a higher chance of receiving the cash than women in Morang. Finally, the year of 
implementation is highly significant, implying that changes made to financial management 
procedures between the donor and the government improved the chances of eligible women 
receiving the cash. 
Dummy variables relating to the woman's parity, district and year of implementation have a 
substantial effect on the probability of an eligible woman receiving the conditional cash transfer, at 
the mean of all other variables. Women living in Myagdi and Rupandehi, for example, are over 60 
percentage points more likely to receive the cash than those in Morang. The chances that women 
who delivered in the SDIP's third year of implementation received the cash are 40 percentage 
points higher than those delivering in the first year. Eligible women with higher education are 17 
percentage points less likely to receive the cash than women with no education. Eligible women 
living more than an hour from the nearest health facility are between II and 21 percentage points 
less likely to receive the cash than those living closer. The probability of receiving the cash 
increases by 19 percentage points for women delivering in a primary health centre compared with 
a hospital. 
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6.5 Discussion 
The purpose of the chapter was to assess implementation of the SDIP, as a starting point to then 
explore in subsequent chapters the impact of the programme on health seeking behaviour. The 
analysis was based on a framework in which the logic underlying the programme was separated 
out into a number of key steps which are required if the programme is to have an impact. The 
framework recognises explicitly the need to promote the programme and administer the demand - 
side incentives successfully if individuals are to benefit. 
6.5.1 Interpretation of findings 
The findings suggest that knowledge of the SDIP is low, primarily because the central government 
did little to publicise the SDIP or facilitate similar activities at the district level. Less than a 
quarter of women had heard of the programme prior to childbirth, implying that three-quarters of 
the target population were not reached by the programme. The channels of communication least 
costly to access were associated with reaching poorer households more effectively than others. 
They include the radio, women's groups and female community health volunteers. 
Other findings suggest problems in the administration of the demand-side incentives. Only one 
fifth of the women who were meant to receive the conditional cash transfer at the health facility 
on discharge actually did so. The proportion of eligible women receiving free delivery care was 
even lower at 10 percent. Either health providers have been withholding these benefits or they 
did not have the cash available in the health facility to make payments. 
The health seeking behaviour of those unaware of the demand-side incentives will not have been 
influenced by the SDIP. It also seems likely that the programme failed to reach a further 14 
percent of the target population on the basis that they had low expectations of receiving the 
demand-side incentives. Together these fiIndings dampen any expectation that the SDIP had a 
sizeable impact on utilisation of maternity services at the population level. 
The bivariate and multivariate analyses show that those who knew about the SDIP tended to be 
wealthier, more educated, and from more advantaged castes. The implementation process has 
unintentionally favoured households that are, according to various measures, socioeconomically 
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better-off. This is to be expected given that there was no communication strategy to target the 
poorest and most marginalised sections of the population. 
The district-level fixed-effects are significant in both the model of knowledge of the SDIP and 
receipt of the conditional cash transfer, suggesting unobserved factors probably linked to the 
action of the district health office are important. Similarly, time is significant in both models. In 
terms of knowledge of the SDIP, it is likely to reflect the natural process of dissemination of 
information. However, in the model of the conditional cash transfer, it almost certainly reflects a 
number of key improvements in financial procedures agreed between the donor and the central 
government. 
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6.5.2 Reasons for poor uptake of the programme 
The qualitative study in the first phase of the evaluation, involving key informant interviews and 
focus group discussions with policyrnakers at the central level and government health officials and 
health personnel at the district level, can shed more light on some of the reasons for the poor 
uptake of the SDIP. Unless stated otherwise, the following discussion draws on the findings from 
this qualitative study (Powell-Jackson, Morrison et a]. 2009). 
There was little evidence that any serious attempt had been made to inform the public about the 
SDIP and this is reflected in the low proportion of families that were exposed to information 
about the programme, particularly from mass media sources. The hesitancy of the central 
government in this regard was linked to a number of factors. First, central level policyrnakers had 
concerns that the programme might raise demand too quickly and overwhelm health services. An 
incremental process in which demand rises slowly may have been seen as a more desirable 
strategy. 
Second, government officials were wary of raising public expectations owing to problems in the 
disbursement of funds to pay beneficiaries, which illustrates how one component of the 
programme can unduly influence another component. It seems entirely understandable that 
government officials did not want to publicise a programme that was not yet functioning 
smoothly. Indeed, these concerns proved to be valid with health staff reporting confrontations and 
" More specifically, this included a relaxation of reporting requirements by the government to the donor to permit 
the disbursement-of each tranche of 
. 
fun-ding. 
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angry exchanges with women demanding their cash. It took, in fact, over three years after the 
launch of the SDIP for programme managers at the central level to develop a communication plan 
and this was only after the donor had made a new funding commitment to allay fears that the 
programme might run out of money in a couple of years time. At the district level, managers 
complained that communication activities were hampered by having no budget or time allowance 
allocated. Moreover, they felt it difficult to disseminate information about a programme they 
themselves did not fully understand. 
Poor administration of the demand-side incentives was closely linked to bureaucratic delays in the 
disbursement of funds further up the system. While bottlenecks were evident at every stage in the 
process, delays in the disbursement of funds were most acute between the donor and central 
government. Funds arrived at the Treasury approximately 8 months and 5 months late in the first 
and second fiscal year respectively. It seems that the financial management problem was 
complicated by the involvement of a donor, which can act outside the control of central 
government and is able to impose its own conditions on disbursement. There was anecdotal 
evidence of financial irregularities at lower levels, but due to the nature of the problem, this was 
impossible to quantify. 
Beyond these problems at the central level, a number of factors explain why women did not 
receive the conditional cash transfer when they should have done. The finding that women with 
secondary education were less likely to receive the cash is perhaps surprising but is consistent with 
the qualitative evidence. Women in the community explained that the most educated were often 
embarrassed to take the cash, believing others were more deserving of the money. The positive 
relationship between accessibility to the nearest health facility and the probability of receiving the 
cash may reflect the cost of returning to pick up the money at a later date. This finding was 
consistent with the responses of health workers who acknowledged the difficulty of getting the 
cash to those living far away from the health facility. Women with knowledge of the SDIP were 
more likely to receive the cash, because they were in a position to advocate and put pressure on 
the health workers. The analysis finds some evidence that specific ethnic groups were 
discriminated against in the payment of the cash. In contrast, however, health workers and 
women in interview made no mention of discrimination against any particular groups, suggesting 
the process may have been quite subtle. 
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Given the context in which they were working, the actions of district level actors may be seen as 
coping strategies to overcome (or avoid) the problems imposed on them from above. Indeed, the 
significant coefficients on many of the district dummy variables allude to the varying success of 
these coping strategies and management practices. Those who attempted to deal with challenges 
were often driven by pressure to meet local needs. Inaction, however, was equally common and it 
is important to understand the motivations that influenced the two sets of actors. 
The most important coping strategy, given the bureaucratic delays at the central level, may have 
been the decision by some district health offices and hospital managers to direct funds from other 
budget lines for the purposes of the SDIP. This practice allowed payment of beneficiaries earlier 
than would otherwise have been possible. But it also may have had (unknown) implications for 
other health programmes or health services. Where managers refrained from using funds from 
other sources, respondents noted government rules prohibiting such practices and concerns over 
the unpredictability of donor funding. It is also possible that this strict adherence to government 
regulations may have represented a reaction - particularly among those who had taken the time to 
develop careful plans for bow to allocate the SDIP budget between health facilities - against the 
continued pressure from the central government to use funds from other budget headings. 
The fear of having to deal with angry families demanding their money appeared to be a motivating 
factor behind a number of practices to manage the problem of unpredictable funding to health 
facilities. Health workers tried to appease mothers by providing money out of their own pocket, 
deducting an amount equivalent to the conditional cash transfer from the hospital bill or sharing 
what money they had among all those waiting. Another motivating factor may have been the 
widespread support for paying mothers, which resonated with the view that mothers tend to put 
funds to better use than men. In contrast, some simply sidestepped the problem altogether, 
putting the programme on hold so that no women could claim the cash. 
Central to this question of why some district implementers took actions to deal with problems 
and others did not may be the widespread knowledge that the SDIP was donor-funded. One of 
the reasons donors provide funds directly to the recipient government's treasury is to promote 
national ownership of policy. Paradoxically, however, there a ppeared to be little ownership of the 
policy at the district level. The SDIP was perceived by many as a vertical "programme", whose 
activities were regarded as additional to the routine of government. Respondents maintained that 
171 1 Page 
monitoring, supervision and communication of the programme could not be carried out using 
available resources and the fact that there was no budget provision or explicit time allocation for 
these tasks reinforced the idea that they should be done by external monitors from the central 
level or non -governmental organisations. 
The findings are broadly suggestive of a lack of preparedness in the implementation of the SDIP. 
Political expediency to ensure the policy was adopted quickly (Ensor, Clapham et a]. 2009) may 
have been the root cause of a lack of financial planning and piloting of procedures or systems. 
Respondents in the qualitative study frequently spoke about the inadequacy of funds and 
acknowledged that the means to verify the eligibility of women and monitor the programme had 
not been developed. Moreover, efforts by the central level to retain substantial control of the 
implementation process - by using an earmarked budget, providing prescriptive (yet unclear) 
guidance on the policy, and offering few opportunities for feedback - may have exacerbated 
problems and contributed further to the programme's low uptake. 
6.5.3 Limitations 
There were a number of statistical limitations in the analysis of the implementation processes. 
First, there may have been recall bias in responses given about the knowledge of the SDIP prior to 
childbirth, given that the recall period in some instances was almost three years. Over-reporting 
seems to be more likely than under-reporting (families report they knew about the SDIP prior to 
childbirth when in fact they found out about it subsequently), causing an upwards bias in 
estimates. 
Second, women may not have known whether an equivalent amount to the conditional cash 
subsidy was taken off their hospital bill in the absence of cash to pay beneficiaries. In this instance, 
it is more likely women under-report the reduction in the bill, making administration of the 
demand-side incentives appear worse than it was. Third, the model of receipt of the conditional 
cash transfer used a relatively small sample of eligible women, which meant it may have lacked 
statistical power. 
More substantively, the models pointed towards a set of factors at the district level that are 
unobserved and therefore not well understood. These are critical in explaining how some districts 
managed to cope with the problems imposed by the central government and achieve a reasonable 
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uptake of the SDIP. The qualitative data point towards a few important actions such as 
transferring funds from other budget lines to use to pay beneficiaries and ad hoc district 
promotion of the SDIP. However, there may be other important factors. 
Similarly, at the individual level there may be factors not included in the models, which influence 
uptake of the programme. For instance, a family's access to social networks, or social capital, may 
be an important determinant of bearing about the SDIP. Other unobserved factors might include 
the mobility of family members, attendance at community groups or political activism. 
6.5.4 Conclusion 
Although there are indications of improvement over time, the findings imply that implementation 
of the SDIP has been weak. The majority of the target population was not reached by the SDIP, 
dampening expectations of a large impact on health seeking behaviour. Failures at the central level 
provide the most convincing explanation for why uptake of the programme was low and why the 
implementation process unintentionally favoured households of higher socioeconomic status. 
District and community level variables, however, are also important and serve to show that some 
areas were able to cope with the central level problems better than others. Information from the 
qualitative study throws light on some of these more complex issues. The focus now turns to the 
impact of the programme. The next two chapters explore the effect of the SDIP on health seeking 
behaviour at childbirth. 
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Chapter 7. IMPACT OF THE DEMAND-SIDE INCENTIVES 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter assesses the impact of the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme's (SDIP) demand-side 
incentives on health seeking behaviour at childbirth in six districts of Nepal. The SDIP has 
attracted considerable interest from policyrnakers both in Nepal and internationally. More 
generally, various forms of results-based aid are growing in popularity among international aid 
agencies (Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems 2009). 
In Asia, evidence on the impact of demand-side incentives to improve health seeking behaviour is 
scarce. Available evidence comes mostly from countries in Latin America, where conditional cash 
transfer programmes, at least on a national scale, were first pioneered (Glassman, Todd et a]. 
2009). The most influential of these was the Mexican Oportunidades programme, introduced in 
1997 to target poor households with cash transfers provided the children regularly attended 
school and made preventive health care visits (Gertler 2004). Many of the conditional cash 
transfer programmes were evaluated using randomised methods, providing a strong body of 
evidence that they can be an effective means to increase utilisation and, in some cases but certainly 
not all, improve health (Lagarde, Haines et al. 2007; Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2008). 
The generalisability of these findings to countries such as Nepal is questionable, particularly when 
one considers the strength of the health system (WHO 2000) and the capacity of government 
(Kaufman, Kraay et al. 2009). Demand-side incentive programmes require health services to be 
in place and of an adequate quality. Moreover, they can be hugely complex, placing a considerable 
administrative burden on the government and particularly the public financial management 
system. 
Expectations regarding the impact of the SDIP are informed by the results of the previous 
chapter, which showed low levels of programme uptake. The programme has clearly faced a 
whole host of implementation challenges, including funding problems and a reluctance on the part 
of government to promote it. This can only have dampened the potential impact of the SDIP over 
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the entire target population. Expectations are also informed by the results of the demand model in 
chapter 5, where there was evidence that the price of care had a statistically significant and 
reasonably large impact on utilisation of maternity services. However, the fact that those findings 
applied to only one district cautions against making too broad a generalisation. It is worth 
recognising that there is also the potential for the SDIP to have unintended consequences and a 
positive impact on utilisation should not be taken for granted. Qualitative evidence, for example, 
has found that community trust in health workers has suffered as a result of the SDIP (Powell- 
Jackson, Morrison et al. 2009). 
The analysis in this chapter is based on the Survey of Women. Impacts are identified using 
propensity score matching methods. They correct for some of the selection bias inherent in single 
difference comparisons of mean outcomes by constructing and then weighting an appropriate 
comparison group for assessing the counterfactual. An important focus of the analysis is on 
studying the heterogeneity in impacts and whether expectations (credibility) of receiving the 
conditional cash transfer matter. The former is in response to the priorities of policymakers in 
Nepal, who stressed the need to understand to what extent the poorest families have been 
affected by the programme. Beyond looking at the impact of the programme on health seeking 
behaviour, the chapter also assesses socioeconomic inequality in access to the conditional cash 
transfer through benefit incidence analysis. 
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7.2 Empirical strategy 
7.2.1 Links with conceptual framework 
Defining treatment 
Implicit in the archetypal evaluation problem with a binary treatment is a clear definition of the 
treatment status of each individual in the population of interest. Only then can a group of treated 
individuals and untreated individuals be established to estimate the effect of a programme. 
Treated units are those who participated in the programme and are thus able to benefit from it. A 
unit may refer to an individual or a cluster of individuals, the latter often defined by a 
geographical area. 
The most common ways of defining treatment using enrolment status, eligibility status or 
geographical area are effectively ruled out in this study owing to the nature of the programme. 
Women were not required to enrol in the programme, as they are in, say, a health insurance 
programme, providing no means to identify non -participants. The programme was rolled out 
nationwide right from the outset, which rules out the possibility of using geographical placement 
to construct the comparison group. And finally, a comparison group of women ineligible to 
receive the conditional cash transfer (ie. women with more than two living children) is not valid 
because there is no way of knowing prior to childbirth whether they will have an obstetric 
complication - an event that would make them eligible to receive the money. 
Instead, the study design is informed by the model of the programme's causal pathway. The 
participation process, as characterised in the conceptual framework, points towards knowledge 
about the SDIP prior to childbirth as a necessary condition for the programme to affect health 
seeking behaviour. It is this indicator which is used to define treatment. As previously argued, a 
family's decision of where to seek care may be influenced by its ex-ante expectation of the price 
of care. It thus follows that the SDIP's demand-side incentives will only influence the health 
seeking behaviour of those families who have knowledge of the programme's benefits before 
childbirth. The further condition that the offer of money is interpreted as credible is later used as 
the basis to construct an alternative treatment group, for the purposes of assessing the robustness 
of the basic results. 
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This definition of treatment implies that only the impact of the conditional cash transfer and free 
delivery care - and not the health provider incentive - can be assessed. The impact estimates, 
therefore, do not reflect the possible supply-side influence of the provider incentive on utilisation, 
although changes to the supply-side may have modified the impact of the demand-side incentive. 
The narrowing of scope has the advantage of ensuring consistency in the assessment of the effect 
of the demand side incentives against predictions of the economic model in chapter 3. 
In summary, the basic analysis defines programme participants as those who knew about the SDIP 
14 
prior to childbirth. The control group comprises women who had never heard of the SDIP prior 
to childbirth. Further analysis is conducted to assess whether the credibility of the SDIP matters 
for health seeking. The treatment group is subdivided into two groups: 1) the "credible 
treatment" group contains women who knew about the SDIP and expected to receive the 
demand-side incentives, and 2) the "pseudo control" group contains women who knew about the 
SDIP but did not expect to receive the demand-side incentive. 55 
Test of hypotheses 
The most basic prediction of the model is that the demand-side incentives of the SDIP increase 
utilisation of maternity services in government health facilities. Since the SDIP was limited to the 
public sector, women can be expected to switch from the home-based alternative and non-state 
health facilities (includes private for-profit and non -governmental not-for-profit) to government 
health facilities. To test this hypothesis, place of delivery will be compared between individuals 
reached by the SDIP and comparable individuals in the control group. 
Differences in impacts are predicted by wealth and the size of the package of financial incentives 
relative to the cost of health seeking. Specifically, the SDIP can be expected to encourage greater 
use of government matemity services when women are poorer and located in regions where the 
financial benefits offered by the programme a're greater relative to the total cost of care. These 
predictions are tested by analysing the subgroup impacts on utilisation according to these relevant 
characteristics. 
" The terms "the treated", "the participants" or "women reached by the SDIP" arc used interchangeably to rcfcr to 
this group of women. 
" Needless to say, women who did not know about the SDIP prior to childbirth have a zero expectation of receiving 
the demand-side incentive. 
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Finally, the conceptual framework suggests that knowledge of the price change is necessary but 
not sufficient for behaviour change. There must also be a perception that the price change is 
credible. Thus, it is expected that the greater the expected probability of receiving the benefits of 
the programme, the greater the impact of the programme on utilisation. This is investigated by 
comparing the impact estimates from two analyses. In the first, the treatment effect is estimated 
by analysing the data from the credible treatment group (those who had heard of the SDIP and 
expected to receive demand-side incentives) and the control group. In the second, data from the 
pseudo control group (those who had heard of the SDIP but did not expect to receive demand- 
side incentives) and the control group are analysed as if the former were the treatment group. It is 
hypothesised that the average treatment effect on the treated will be positive in the first analysis 
and zero in the second analysis. 
7.2.2 Measuring treatment 
The method of eliciting the woman's knowledge of the programme was assessed rigorously in 
pre-testing and refined accordingly. Respondents were first given a brief description of the SDIP 
and the demand side incentives offered by the programme. They were asked whether they had 
ever heard of such a government programme and how they originally found out about it. A filter 
was then applied and only women currently aware of the SDIP were asked to think back to when 
they were pregnant and whether they knew about the SDIP at that time. 
With this unusual indicator of treatment used in the study, there are perhaps concerns over its 
validity. As explained in chapter 6, the interview was carefully conducted to ensure the 
knowledge of the women and the household decision-maker was captured to reflect the fact that 
few married women in Nepal make decisions regarding their own health care. " There were 
further concerns that the SDIP might be confused with other health programmes and the use of ex 
post information on knowledge of the programme prior to childbirth might be susceptible to 
recall bias. 
Thorough pre-testing of the survey tool and discussions with respondents after each interview 
provided reassurance that the validity of the measure was not compromised by these two 
'6 Again to reiterate, the expression "the woman's knowledge of the SDIP" is maintained throughout the chapter, but 
this should be interpreted as the family's knowledl! e of the SDIP. 
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concerns. Women found the SDIP's offer of cash a highly distinctive feature. This meant that 
there was no risk of respondents confusing the SDIP with other health programmes since no other 
government programme offers cash to women. Furthermore, childbirth is a memorable event for 
women (whether the outcome is positive or negative) and the simplicity of the questions meant 
respondents were able to relate the timing of when they found out about the SDIP to the date of 
giving birth. With treatment measured in this way, the survey tool aimed to collect information 
on factors that would be expected to influence jointly exposure to information about the SDIP 
and health seeking behaviour at childbirth. 
To assess credibility, the expectation of receiving the conditional cash transfer is proxied by 
whether the woman knew of anyone who had received it, the rationale being that a person's 
perception of the administration of the programme is more sensitive to the experiences of others 
in the community than the official policy line given by the government. S7 
7.2.3 Propensity score matching 
General approach 
The idea of propensity score matching (PSM) is to select a comparison group of non -participants 
that is as similar as possible to the treatment group in its observed characteristics. Individuals in 
the comparison group are selected on the basis of their propensity score, given by P(Z) 
Pr(D = 11 Z) and (0 <P (Z) < 1), where Z is a set of control variables unaffected by 
programme participation (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). " Appropriate matching variables are 
those that jointly affect treatment status and the outcome. 
Two assumptions are required for the identification of the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). First, the conditional independence assumption, often referred to as selection on 
observables or unconfoundedness, states that outcomes are independent of participation given the 
observables (ie. YO, Y, -L 
DI Z). It can be shown that the conditional independence assumption 
S7 Clearly, this indicator is a crude measure of expectations given that it is binary and fails to capture the full range of 
values that would be associated with a probability. Nevertheless, it seems entirely reasonable that the expectations of 
receiving the cash incentive will be higher amongst those who knew of someone who had received the money than 
those who had never heard of anyone. 
S8 The propensity score is one of a number of possibilities available to overcome the problem of high dimensionality 
when using a large number of Z variables. 
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continues to hold conditional on P(Z), such that outcomes are independent of participation given 
the propensity score (ie. YO, Yj IDI P(Z)). Second, the common support assumption ensures 
that there are treated and non-treated individuals with the same characteristics (ic. P= 
(D =1 JZ) < 1). If there are regions where this assumption fails to hold, the estimated 
treatment effect must be redefined to apply only to those treated individuals falling within the 
common support. Where impacts differ across treated individuals, restricting the sample to 
individuals within the common support may change the parameter being estimated, making it 
impossible to recover the average treatment effect on the treated. 
When these conditions hold, the average treatment effect on the treated is identified non- 
parametrically by the mean conditional difference in the outcome over the common support, 
suitably weighted by the distribution of Z in the treatment group. In terms of the various sources 
of bias, PSM eliminates both the bias associated with non-overlapping support of the observables 
and that arising from differences in the distribution of the observables between the two groups, 
although it does not necessarily provide the most efficient means to do so. As a (semi) non- 
parametric approach, PSM does not encounter the problem of mis- specification and uses only 
comparable individuals, avoiding any need to impose additional assumptions to extrapolate 
outside the common support. 
However, it fails to address the problem of bias due to unobservabIcs, and herein lies the main 
difference between PSM and a social experiment. While randomisation ensures that the treated 
and non-treated groups are identical in the distribution of their observed and unobserved 
characteristics (ie. YO, Y, 1D holds), PSM can only achieve this for the observabics and must 
assume conditional independence to overcome the problem of endogeneity. As a consequence, 
PSM is only as good as the data available to the researcher. If joint determinants of participation 
and the outcome are not captured by the available dataset, PSM will not be able to replicate 
estimates obtained from a social experiment. Thus, the argument in support of PSM in any 
particular study must be made with reference to the richness of the available data and founded in 
an understanding of the factors determining programme participation (Blundell, Dearden et al. 
2005). s9 
S9 Both a conceptual framework to provide a theoretical underpinning and knowledge from other sources, such as 
qualitative field work, can help in improving. pri. or understanding of the determinants of participation. 
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Applying propensity score matching 
The propensity score gives the probability that an individual participates in the programme given 
the set of observed characteristics that jointly influence treatment status and outcomes. The 
propensity score is estimated by means of a probit model. While estimation by this method is 
parametric, it has been found to perform well against non-parametric alternatives (Zhao 2004). 
Computation of the propensity score is a first step to correct for selection bias on observables. 
The propensity score is then used as the basis to define the common support and form the 
comparison group. 
The average impact estimator can be estimated by performing matching on the conditional 
expectation of the outcome in the non-treated group and averaging it over the distribution of Z in 
the treated group. Matching is non-parametric and aims to pair a group of comparable non- 
treated individuals to each treated individual. The general form of the average treatment effect on 
the treated is given by: 
1 
ATT = N1 
i (Yi -I Wi j yj 
iE{Di=1} jEC°(Z1) 
where N, is the number receiving the programme, CO(Zi) is the set of neighbours of treated i in 
the non-treated group, and Wij is the weight on non-treated individual j in forming a comparison 
with treated i. There are a number of ways to construct the matched outcome that vary around 
how the set of neighbours, CO(Zi), is defined and how the weights, Wij, are chosen. Three 
matching estimators are used and then evaluated. With caliper matching, each treated observation 
is matched to the 10 neighbours nearest in terms of their propensity score (Cochran and Rubin 
1973). A caliper of 0.01 sets the maximum distance within which the untreated observations must 
fall in order to be matched. In kernel matching, the outcome of a treated individual is matched to 
the weighted outcomes of all untreated units, where the weight is in proportion to the closeness 
between the propensity score of the treated and untreated individuals (Heckman, lchimura et al. 
1997; Heckman, Ichimura et al. 1998; Heckman, Ichimura et al. 1998; Blundell, Dearden et al. 
2005). The weight is given by: 
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K (Pý - Pi) 
wij 
lh 
C PS ) EjE{v=o} Kh Pj J 
where K is the epanechnikov kernel and h is set at a bandwidth of 0.03. Finally, mahalanobis- 
metric matching combines the matching variables into a distance measure and then matches based 
on the resulting scalar. The propensity score is included in the set of matching variables. 
How the common support is defined depends on the matching estimator. In caliper and kernel 
matching, treated individuals whose propensity score is greater than the largest of the propensity 
scores of the untreated individuals remain unmatched. Moreover, caliper matching ignores 
treated observations which cannot be matched because no neighbour falls within the caliper 
distance and kernel matching's imposition of the common support depends on the choice of 
bandwidth and, to some degree, the choice of kernel. 
The percent of treated observations lost due to common support and various tests of matching 
quality provide the basis with which to evaluate the matching procedures. Smith and Todd (2005) 
suggest testing for differences in the covariates between the treated and the non-treated group. 
For each variable, the standardised percentage bias - the difference of the sample means in the 
treated and non-treated groups as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances in each group (Rosenbaum and Rubin 198S) - is calculated before and after matching. A 
two-sample t-test can then be used to check if there are significant differences between the means 
before and after matching. In addition, a likehhood-ratio test of joint significance of covariates 
before and after matching can provide tests of matching quality. 
PSM introduces variability through estimation of the propensity score and the matching 
procedure. The common practice is to derive standard errors through bootstrapping. However, 
the statistical properties of matching estimators are not well understood and it is unclear if 
bootstrapping is valid in the context of nearest-neighbour matching (Abadie and Imbens 2008). In 
the case of kernel-based matching, Heckman et al. (1998) have derived analytical asymptotic 
results. The Stata psmatch2 module was used to perform the PSM analysis in this study 
(Leuven and Sianesi 2003). The standard errors of the impact estimates are those reported by 
psmatch2. The complementary routine, pstest was used for test of imbalance in the 
observables. 
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7.2.4 Robustness checks 
A number of checks are used to assess the robustness of the basic results. First, the impact 
estimates that emerge when using the three different matching estimators are compared. Second, 
a number of checks are used to assess the plausibility of the conditional independence assumption 
in light of the fact that the propensity score matching estimates may be upward biased if there are 
confounders that arc unobserved. 
If the impact estimates from the propensity score matching are subject to omitted variable bias, 
this bias can be expected to work in the same direction for government and NGO maternity 
services, given that the two types of provider are close substitutes. Thus, estimates of impact that 
are upward biased arc likely to hide any evidence of crowding-out of the non-state sector. 
The theoretical expectation is that the SDIP will have little or no impact on women who knew 
about the SDIP but did not expect to receive the conditional cash transfer. However, the pseudo 
control group and the original control group contain women with very different characteristics 
(and different biases). Any omitted variable bias should be apparent through a difference in the 
mean utilisation of maternity services between the two groups (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). In 
this sense, a finding of no treatment effect in the analysis of the pseudo control group, coupled 
with a large treatment effect in the analysis of the credible treatment group provides evidence in 
support of the assumption of conditional independence. 
Finally, instrumental variable estimation is used to control for unobservables. if omitted variable 
bias plagues the propensity score estimates and the instrument used is valid, there should be a 
large difference between the impact estimates from the two methods. A promising candidate with 
which to instrument knowledge of the SDIP during pregnancy is the frequency with which 
women in the sample listen to the radio. Data from the Survey of Women and qualitative 
interviews (as reported in chapter 6) confirm that some households found out about the SDIP 
from the radio and indeed it was used by some district headquarters to promote the programme. 
It was not used, however, to promote institutional delivery care more generally. " Thus, the main 
pathway through which the radio influences a woman's place of delivery is through its promotion 
' The evaluation of the SDIP used research teams drawn from each of the study districts. These individuals had a deep 
knowledge of the local area and were able to confirm that FM radio was used only to promote the SDIP. 
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of the SDIP. The two-stage least squares estimate of impact should be interpreted as a local 
average treatment effect, given that the assumption of homogeneous treatment effects is 
particularly unrealistic in this instance. The treatment effect, in other words, applies only to the 
sample of women who found out about the SDIP through the radio. One possible problem of 
using the frequency of radio listenership as an instrument is the fact that there is likely to be 
multicollinearity in the first stage. Radio listenership is correlated with some of the 
socioeconomic variables, particularly education. While multicollincarity does not bias the 
treatment effect, it is likely to result in a large loss of efficiency, large standard errors and an 
imprecise coefficient (Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
7.2.5 Heterogeneous impacts 
Until recently, much of the applied evaluation literature has focused on the mean impact, 
assuming a common effect across all individuals (ie. fli --: fl for all i). This parameter leaves 
unanswered a range of questions regarding the impact of the programme across individuals and 
groups (Djebbari and Smith 2008). " Insight into these questions can inform the targeting of the 
programme in order to achieve the greatest impact. In the evaluation of the SDIP, there was 
considerable interest from policyrnakers, particularly the international donor funding the 
programme, as to the impact on the poorest and most marginalised sections of society. 
Heterogeneity is most commonly introduced into the analysis by estimating mean treatment 
effects for subgroups of the population in which differences are predicted by the model to arise - 
ie. wealth and level of financial reward. This is otherwise known as systematic impact 
heterogeneity, as distinct from idiosyncratic (unobserved) variation in the treatment effects that 
remains are removing subgroup variation (Djebbari and Smith 2008). 6' An OLS regression of the 
outcome on the subgroup dummy variables and interactions between the same dummy variables 
and the treatment variable is used to estimate mean'treatment effects among subgroups. The 
regression is weighted by the kernel weight provided by ps ma tch2 (Wagstaff, Undelow et al. 
2009). 
6' As noted by Heckman et al. (1997), focus on the mean impact can only be justified if: i) increases in total output 
increases welfare; and ii) undesirable distributional aspects of programmes are either unimportant or offset by some 
transfer of outcomes between participants or settled by some external distribution mechanism. In any case, health 
outcomes are not transferrable and there are thus good reasons to look at heterogeneity in impacts. 
" Getting a handle on idiosyncratic variation in treatment effects is complex even with experimental data since only 
marginal distributions and not the joint distribution of outcomes in the treated and untreated states are given 
(Djebbari and Smith 2008). 
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A next step is then to examine the importance of subgroup impacts jointly and explore which 
factors drive the variation in ATT estimates. Heterogeneity in impacts across wealth quintiles, for 
example, may be due to a correlation between a household's wealth and the design of the policy 
operating in their region, when it is in fact the latter which is the determinant of the impact. 
Interactions between the treatment indicator and covariates suffice to estimate the systematic 
variation in mean impacts across subgroups. A probit regression includes all the covariates as well 
as the interactions and, as above, is weighted by the kernel weight provided by psmatch2. 
Where a variable is separated into dummy variables, a test of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the interaction terms are equal to zero is performed. Two models are estimated. 
The first model includes the full set of covariates and interactions between the treatment 
indicators and covariates. In the second model, the region dummy variables are replaced by a 
variable that corresponds to the size of the subsidy (conditional cash transfer and free delivery 
care) relative to the cost of delivery care in each district. 
7.2.6 Benefit incidence analysis 
Benefit incidence analysis explores who benefits from a public health subsidy (Brennan 1976; Van 
de Walle and Nead 1995). The SDIP's conditional cash transfer is a public subsidy, making it 
suitable for this type of analysis. The analysis describes the distribution of the public subsidy across 
beneficiaries ranked in terms of their socioeconomic status, although this can easily be extended 
to examine the distribution of spending by ethnicity, geography and so on. 
This analysis essentially requires information on who received the conditional cash transfer and 
the living standards of each individual to establish the distribution of the cash subsidy in relation to 
socioeconomic status. The household wealth asset score provides the living standards measure 
with which to rank households. The. distribution of the conditional cash transfer can then be 
shown as cumulative shares received by successive wealth quintiles or, more completely, as a 
concentration curve. The final step is to evaluate the distribution of cash subsidy against some 
stated target distribution. If evaluated against the line of equality (ie. the 45 degree line), a 
judgement can be made as to whether the subsidy is pro-poor or pro-rich. A concentration curve 
of the cash subsidy that dominates the line of equality is said to represent absolute progressivity 
(Castro-Leal, Dayton et al. 2000). Similarly, the concentration index quantifies the extent of 
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absolute progressivity. The methods used to compute quintile shares, dominance test and the 
concentration index have been described in chapter 6. 
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7.3 Data 
7.3.1 Data source 
The data used in the analysis come from the Survey of Women, conducted in six districts of 
Nepal. A detailed description of the survey is given in chapter 3. The unit of analysis is a delivery 
and, given the three year recall period, it is possible for a woman to have had more than one 
delivery. Multiple births (eg. twins) are counted as a single observation. The same household can 
also be represented by more than one woman, as all women in the household who had recently 
given birth were interviewed. The recall period extended five months earlier than the start of the 
SDIP. The dataset contains complete data on 5,903 deliveries, of which 420 took place before the 
start of the SDIP. 
7.3.2 Descriptive statistics" 
Outcomes 
The impact of the SDIP is assessed on a set of utilisation outcomes that refer to the place of 
delivery, the type of attendant present at the delivery and the type of procedure, if carried out 
during the delivery. The outcomes are binary to reflect the occurrence of a single event and, 
therefore, each outcome measure is a probability. 
Table 7.1 reports the summary statistics of the outcomes for the treatment and control group. 
Utilisation of professional delivery care services in the control group is low. Deliveries in a health 
facility account for 16 percent of all deliveries. Maternity care is dominated by the public sector. 
just over 10 percent of deliveries in the control group take place in a government health facility, 
while non-governmental (not-for-profit) and private (for-profit) health facilities account for 3 
percent and 2 percent of all deliveries respectively. Within the public sector, the majority of 
deliveries take place in hospitals (9 percent of total deliveries), while 2 percent of women give 
birth in government primary health care centres or health posts (result not shown). 
Almost a fifth of women in the control group give birth with a doctor, nurse or midwife in 
attendance. This indicator corresponds with the standard international World Health 
" The explanatory variables used in this analysis are not defined here since variable definitions for the same dataset 
were described in chapter 6. 
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Organisation definition of a skilled birth attendant . 
6' The proportion of women in the control 
group who deliver with any professional health worker is 23 percent. This indicator excludes 
female community health volunteers, trained birth attendants and traditional birth attendants, 
who do not work in a health facility but instead in the community. The rate of caesarean section in 
the study area is low. Only 3 percent of women had surgery at childbirth, while 5 percent of 
women had either surgery or an assisted delivery. An assisted delivery involves the use of forceps 
or a ventouse that are attached to the baby's head. 
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics on utilisation outcomes, by treatment group 
Treated Control 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Place of delivery 
Health facility 
Government health facility 
NGO hospital 
Private health facility 
Type of ottendant 
Doctor, nurse or midwife (SBA) 
Any professional health worker 
Procedure ot delivery 
Caesarean section 
Caesarean section or assisted 
Observations 
0.263 0.440 0.155 0.362 
0.210 0.407 0.106 0.307 
0.024 0.154 0.031 0.175 
0.029 0.168 0.018 0.134 
0.293 0.455 0.182 0.386 
0.351 0.478 0.225 0.418 
0.047 0.212 0.025 0.155 
0.099 0.299 0.048 0.214 
1489 4416 
Note: NGO = non-governmental organisation (not-for-profit). SBA = skilled birth attendant. SD= standard 
deviation. 
While the survey was not designed to be representative of the entire country, the control group 
estimates correspond closely with national estimates. The most recent Nepal Demographic and 
Health Survey (2007) estimated that 18 percent of live births took place in a health facility and 19 
percent of live births were with a skilled birth attendant. Estimates from the control group of 
women in the Survey of Women fall within the confidence intervals of these national estimates. 
Clearly, there are large differences in the outcomes between the control group and the treated 
group. Women in the treated group gain greater access to professional care at childbirth. For 
" There is a suspicion that skilled birth attendance is overestimated in Nepal since women who give birth with a male 
health workcr often refer to the attendant as a doctor in the local language. There is unlikely to be any reason, 
however, why reporting should differ between treated and untreated individuals. 
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instance, 26 percent of deliveries in this group are in a health facility and 30 percent with skilled 
birth attendance. 
Independent variables 
The literature offers little guidance as to the variables to include in the probit model used to 
derive the propensity score of participation in the programme (Ravallion 2008). The results of the 
previous chapter examining the determinants of exposure to information about the programme 
can provide guidance on the choice of variables in the propensity score model. However, the 
strategy of estimating a parsimonious model is not followed, since simulations have shown that 
including even poor predictors of outcomes can reduce bias in estimating causal effects when 
using PSM (Rubin and Thomas 2000). 
Table 7.2 reports the summary statistics for the covariates used in the estimation of the propensity 
score. The covariates included are those variables that are expected to jointly influence the 
outcome(s) and treatment, which is why these variables do not correspond exactly with the list of 
determinants explored in chapter 6. The variables measuring exposure to the radio or newspaper 
from the previous analysis are excluded here on the basis that they are not likely to be direct 
determinants of health care seeking behaviour. Instead, it is presumed that they influence health 
seeking behaviour via their effect on knowledge of the SDI P, akin to an instrumental variable. 65 
The time variable measures the fiscal year in which the delivery took place with possible values 
ranging from 1 to 4, and 2 representing the first year of the SDIP. It captures unobservables 
whose variation over time influence both programme participation and outcomes. 
Based on these covariates, the two subsamples appear to be different. The control group is older, 
less wealthy, less educated, more likely to be from marginalised castes, and lives further from its 
nearest health facility than the other two groups. These and other differences are analysed in more 
detail in the results section. 
" There is some evidence to support this argument. 'Me various forms of media are not significant in their influence 
on utilisation when a probit model is run with the full set of independent variables. Moreover, there is little use of the 
media in Nepal to encourage institutional deliveries other than through the promotion of the SDIP. 
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Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics on covariates, by treatment group 
Variable 
Treated 
Mean SD 
Control 
Mean SO 
Age-of woman 25.379 5.285 26.622 5.990 
Log of wealth 0.441 3.333 2.911 0.676 
No education (reference) 
Primary education 0.135 0.342 0.119 0.323 
Secondary education 0.271 0.445 0.195 0.396 
Higher education 0.189 0.391 0.080 0.272 
No work (reference) 
Agriculture work 0.684 0.465 0.701 0.458 
Salaried work 0.030 0.169 0.012 0.109 
Small business 0.066 0.248 0.046 0.209 
Waged work 0.063 0.243 0.084 0.278 
Other work 0.003 0.058 0.002 0.045 
Brahmin & Chhetri (reference) 
Terai & Madeshi 0.063 0.243 0.079 0.270 
Dalit 0.118 0.323 0.141 0.348 
Newar 0.043 0.203 0.016 0.125 
Janajati 0.173 0.379 0.204 0.403 
Muslim 0.005 0.068 0.028 0.165 
Other Castes 0.075 0.263 0.129 0.335 
Walk to facility < 1hr (reference) 
Walk to facility 1hr <4 hr 0.613 0.487 0.572 0.495 
Walk to facility 4hr <1 day 0.115 0.319 0.184 0.388 
Walk to facility >I day 0.031 0.173 0.106 0.307 
Urban dwelling 0.120 0.32S 0.084 0.277 
Previous delivery during SDIP 0.091 0.287 0.060 0.238 
Active FCHV 0.147 0.128 0.076 0.098 
Women's groups 0.337 0.473 0.274 0.446 
Morang (reference) 
Sankhuwasabha 0.238 0.426 0.140 0.347 
Myagdi 0.163 0.370 0.142 0.350 
Rupandehi 0.109 0.312 0.160 0.367 
Jumla 0.217 0.412 0.185 0.389 
Achham 0.129 0.335 0.189 0.391 
Time 1.947 0.752 1.617 0.872 
Observations 1489 4416 
Note: FCHV = female community health volunteer. SID= standard deviation. 
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7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Benefit incidence of the conditional cash transfer 
The concentration curves in Figure 7.1 show the inequality in the receipt ofthe conditional cash 
transfer and the utilisation of government matcrnity services. The concentration curves of both 
indicators lie below the line of inequality indicating that richer households have disproportionately 
benefited. The fact that the concentration curve for utilisation falls below that for the cash transfer 
is suggestive of greater inequality in service utilisation in favour of wealthier households. This 
finding is pcrhaps encouraging when compared with the prior expectation of thcre being no 
difference in the equalities of the two indicators given that receipt of the cash is conditional on 
using government maternity services. 
Figure 7.1 Concentration curves for receipt of the cash and use of maternity services 
1 
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Cumulative share of deliveries (poorest first) 
Table 7.3 provides quantitative estimates of various measures of inequality in the receipt of the 
conditional cash transfer and the utilisation of government maternity services in the entire sample. 
The cumulative percentage of all cash incentives accounted for by each wealth quintilc shows that 
poorer groups received less than their population share. The poorest two-fifths of households, for 
example, received only 6.5 percent ofthe conditional cash transfers. A similar pattern of 
inequality is shown for utilisation of government maternity services. The poorest two-fifths of 
households accounted for just 6.9 percent of deliveries in government health facilities. All 
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estimates arc significantly different from the respective population share at the S percent 
threshold, 
Table 7.3 Inequality in the receipt of the cash and use of maternity services 
Cumulative shares 
Receipt of conditional cash 
transfer (%) 
Utilisation of government 
maternity services (%) 
Poorest 20% 2.63 2.66** 
(standard error) (0.892) (0.477) 
Poorest 40% 19.98* * 15.34** 
(2.207) (1.033) 
Poorest 60% 41.1S** 31.17** 
(2.664) (1.261) 
Poorest 80% 69.19** 56.84** 
(2.460) (1.261) 
Test of dominance against 45 line 
Test of dominance against other curve + 
Concentration index 0.295** 0.395** 
(standard error) (0.035) (0.022) 
Note: ** denotes shares are significantly diff ere nce from population share at the 5 percent level. Calculations 
are based on the sample of deliveries that took place after the start of the SDIP. Standard errors are corrected 
for within cluster correlation. 45* line that dominates (lies above) the concentration curve is indicated by a 
negative sign. 45* line that is dominated (lies below) by the concentration curve is indicated by a positive sign. 
Blank cell indicates no dominance. 
The tests of dominance of the concentration curves against the 45 degree line confirm the finding 
of the visual inspection. Both concentration curves are dominated by (lie below) the 45 degree 
line, again indicating inequality in the two indicators, and the concentration curve for receipt of 
the conditional cash transfer dominates (lies above) that for the utilisation of government 
maternity services. The concentration index quantifies the extent of inequality and confirms that 
there is huge inequality in both indicators in favour of wealthier households. In summary, the 
findings suggest that the conditional cash transfer and utilisation of government maternity services 
arc both strongly regressive. 
7.4.2 Estimation of the propensity score and balancing tests 
The results of the probit model used to derive the propensity score of being reached by the SDIP 
are shown in Table A2 in Appendix Al. No behavioural interpretation is offered here, since the 
model in this instance is used purely as a statistical tool to give the propensity score required for 
matching. The analysis in chapter 6 is more comprehensive and rigorous in providing a 
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behavioural explanation for why women did not hear about the programme or receive the 
conditional cash transfer. 
The pseudo R' of the probit model is 0.177 and the coefficients indicate that a handful of 
covariates are important predicators of treatment status. The logarithm of wealth is modelled 
flexibly with the inclusion of a quartic function. The coefficient on each term is significant 
suggesting wealth exerts a non-linear influence on treatment status. 
The purpose of the matching exercise is to balance the covariates such that the bias on observabIcs 
is reduced as much as possible. The quality of the matching of the covariates can be assessed 
through various balancing tests, informing which matching method to use in the estimation of 
impacts. Table A3 in Appendix AI provides, for each covariate, the t-statistic for the test of the 
equality of means in the treated and untreated groups, before and after matching. In addition, the 
table reports the standardised bias before and after matching, along with the percentage reduction 
in bias. 
Before matcl-ýng, the t-statistic for the equality of means is significant at the five percent level in 
the case of 28 out of the 32 covariates. There are, in other words, substantial differences between 
the two sub-samples in terms of the observables, as remarked upon earlier. Kerriel and caliper 
neigbbour matching balance the two groups remarkably well - the t-statistic for every covariate is 
insignificant at the conventional five percent level and the standardised biases are greatly 
reduced. " The mahalanobis matching does not perfonn as well with significant differences 
remaining in four of the covariates. 
Overall measures of imbalance in the covariates before and after matching are reportcd in Table 
7.4. The pseudo R' from the probit model estimated on the trimmed sample using the weights 
generated from all three inatching exercises is appreciably lower than the value from the model 
on the original unweighted sample. However, again kernel matching and nearest neighbour 
matching perform better, reducing the pseudo R' value from 0.177 to 0.002 respectively. 
Moreover, the hypothesis of the joint insignificance of all the regressors before and after matching 
cannot be rejected in the case of these two matching methods, as indicated by the p-valucs of the 
" While the t-statistic reflects sample size as much as anything else, it remains useful when comparing between 
different matching estimators. 
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likelihood -ratio test. Before matching, the average standardised bias is 17.2 percent. All three 
matching methods reduce the bias dramatically, although some more than others. Kernel 
matching reduces the average bias the most to 1.7 percent, while caliper matching reduces the 
average bias to 1.9 percent. Mahalanobis matching performs less well, reducing the average bias 
to 3.5 percent. Note, however, that some bias, albeit small, does remain after matching 
whichever method is used. 
Table 7.4 Covariate balancing indicators before and after matching 
Mean Mean Lost to 
Probit Probit bias bias common 
Impact N, No pseudo R2 pseudo R2 P>X, N N support 
parameter Before Before Before After After Before After After 
Kernel matching 
ATT 1,489 4,416 
ATNT 4,416 1,489 
Malahanobis matching 
ATT 1,489 4,416 
Nearest neighbour matching 
ATT 1,489 4,416 
0.177 0.002 1.000 17.18 1.74 0.13 
0.177 0.004 0.041 17.18 1.76 2.85 
0.177 0.021 0.000 17.18 3.46 0.00 
0.177 0.002 1.000 17.18 1.88 0.81 
Note: The pseudo R2 is from the probit estimation of the conditional treatment probability and gives a measure of 
how well the regressors explain variation treatment. The p value of the likelihood ratio test after matching tests 
the hypothesis that the regressors are jointly significant. The mean bias is the mean absolute stanclardised bias, as 
defined in section 7.2.3. Lost to common support gives the percentage of treated observations that fall outside the 
boundaries. 
'Me percentage of observations lost to the common support restrictions is negligible indicating 
that none of the matching methods appear to pose a problem in this regard. The kerncl, 
malahanobis and caliper matching procedures lose two (0.13%), zero and twelve (0.8 1 %) treated 
observations respectively. 
Figure 7.2 shows the histogram of the propensity scores before matching for those in the 
treatment group and those in the control group. Despite a distribution that is skewed to right in 
the case of the untreated deliveries, the region of common support is substantial. 
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Figure 7.2 Histogram of propensity scores for the treated group and the control group 
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Graphs by psmatch2: Treatment assignment 
The common support and balancing test results suggest that bias associated with differences in the 
observabIcs between the treated and untreated groups can be almost completely eliminated 
without the need to discard a large number of observations from the sample due to a lack of 
common support. Since the region of common support includes almost the entire sample, the 
estimated treatment effect barely has to be redefined, essentially allowing the ATT to be 
recovered. The common support findings may seem innocuous but they arc in fact important, 
indicating that the parameter of interest - the ATT in the sample population - can be identified by 
the estimation strategy. 67 While there is little to choose between the kernel and the nearest 
neighbour matching procedures, the former is preferred on the basis that it loses the least 
observations to common support while achieving a substantial reduction in bias. The next section 
reports estimates of programme impact using the kernel matching estimator. 
67 With a large loss of observations due to common support the estimated treatment cfl'cct is analogous to the concept 
of the local average treatment effect in instrumental variable estimation. The estimated treatment effect loses some 
policy relevance because it is not clear for whom the treatment effect has been calculated. 
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Untreated (never heard of SDIP) 
Treated (heard of SDIP) 
7.4.3 Impact of the SDIP 
Basic results 
Table 7.5 shows estimates of the ATT for each utilisation outcome with the corresponding t- 
statistic, the relative percentage change and the 95 percent confidence interval around the relative 
change. Also reported is the mean in the treated and the untreated group before and after 
matching, as well as the mean difference between the two groups before matching. 
The estimates before matching (see columns S and 6) suggest there is a substantial difference in 
utilisation outcomes between the treated and the untreated groups. However, since there is 
(observed) selection bias the mean difference in the outcome does not approximate the true 
impact of the programme. The magnitude of these estimates is reduced substantially after 
matching. The matched estimates (see columns 7,8,9 and 10) indicate that the SDIP, for those it 
reached, had a significant impact on the probability of women delivering in a health facility. 
Institutional deliveries for those treated increased by 4.0 percentage points (relative change 18%; 
Cl: 5% ,31 %) as a result of the SDIP, 
Among those reached by the SDIP, impact estimates show that the programme increased both 
deliveries with a skilled birth attendant and deliveries with any professional health worker by 4.2 
percentage points (relative change 17%; Cl: 4% , 29%) and 5.2 percentage points (relative 
change 17%; CI: 6% , 28%) respectively. The programme also had a positive impact of 1.2 
percentage points (relative change 36%; CL -3% , 74%) on the caesarean section rate, and a 
positive impact of 1.9 percentage points (relative change 24%; Cl: 0% , 48%) on caesarean 
sections and assisted deliveries combined. 
The findings are fairly robust to the matdiing procedure used (see Table A4 in Appendix A 1). 
There is consistency in the statistical significance and magnitude of impact estimates across the 
different outcomes. Programme impact tends to be greatest with the kernel matching. 
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Another impact parameter of interest is the average treatment effect on the non-treated. Table 7.6 
provides estimates of this parameter in addition to the same ATT estimates shown previously. Since 
matching allows (observably) heterogeneous impacts, the various parameters are not constrained to 
be equal. The absolute ATNT estimates are smaller than the ATT estimates for most outcomes except 
the emergency procedures, although it is worth noting that none of the differences are significant at 
conventional levels. The ATNT estimate corresponding to utilisation of health facilities suggests that 
if the non-treated women had in fact been reached by the SIDIP, they would have enjoyed a 1.6 
percentage point increase in utilisation as a result of the programme. In contrast, however, the SDIP 
has increased utilisation of government maternity by 4.0 percentage points among the small 
proportion of the total sample who are in the treatment group. 
Table 7.6 Impact of the SIDIP's demand-side incentives on health seeking behaviour (ATNT) 
ATT t-Stat ATNT t-Stat 
Place of delivery 
Health facility 0.040*** 2.70 0.016 0.83 
Type of attendant 
Doctor, nurse or midwife (SBA) 0.042*** 2.72 0.022 1.09 
Any professional health worker 0.052*** 3.17 0.024 1.15 
Emergency procedure 
Caesarean section 0.012* 1.83 0.013 1.45 
Caesarean section or assisted 0.019** 2.02 0.021 1.62 
Note: Sample includes 5,098 deliveries. *** denotes impact parameters are significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 
10%. Kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.03 is used to compute impact estimates. A treated observation whose 
propensity score is greater than the largest of the propensity scores of the non-treated is dropped. Standard errors 
are those provided by psmatch2.95 percent confidence intervals are around the relative percentage impact. ATT 
average treatment effect on the treated. ATNT = average treatment effect on the non-treated. SBA = skilled birth 
attendance. NGO = non-governmental organisation. 
The differences between the ATT and the ATNT estimates are suggestive of some heterogeneity in 
impacts. It is worth noting that there may be reasons to expect ATNT estimates to be biased 
(Blundell, Dearden et al. 2005). Identification of the ATNT requires the more restrictive assumption 
of no selection on unobserved returns. If this assumption does not hold and individuals with higher 
returns are more likely to be in the treatment group, the ATNT will be biased upwards. Moreover, 
the matching procedure to balance the covariates for the non-treated group may not have performed 
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as well as it did for the treated individuals. The quality of the matching can easily be checked in the 
same way as before (see Table 7.4). In fact, the covariates remain quite unbalanced as shown by the 
rejection of the hypothesis that the covariates are the same after matching. 
Impact by type of provider 
Table 7.7 present impact results for various types of health facility. The impact of 4.3 percentage 
points (relative change 26%; CI: 10% , 42%) in the government sector is offset 
by a negative impact 
of 1.1 percentage points (relative change -3 1 %; CI: -6S% , 2%) on utilisation of NGO 
hospitals. The 
evidence suggests that the SDIP encouraged women to switch from NGO hospitals to government 
health facilities, which is not surprising given its focus on the public sector and the fact NGO hospitals 
are the closest substitute. Nonetheless, there remained a significant positive impact on utilisation of 
health facility care overall. In absolute terms, the SDIP had a larger impact on utilisation of 
government hospitals than health centres (results not shown). 
This finding provides weak evidence in support of the robustness of the basic results and, more 
specifically, the conditional independence assumption. If omitted variable bias were driving the 
positive impact on government maternity services, it is unlikely that there would be evidence of 
crowding-out of the NGO sector, which is probably subject to the same bias. It should be noted that 
the impact on NGO hospitals is only significant at the 10 percent level when using caliper matching, 
suggesting that the importance of this result should not be moderated. 
Credibility of the SDIP's promise of cash 
In this analysis the treatment group is defined differently to address the question of whether it is 
sufficient to have heard of the SDIP for the programme to influence health seeking behaviour. Two 
analyses are conducted. The first applies PSM to the new treatment group and the control group. The 
second applies PSM to the pseudo control group and the original control group. Statistical evidence of 
a large positive impact in the first analysis and a zero impact in the second analysis would support the 
hypothesis that credibility of the promise of the demand-side incentives is also necessary for the SDIP 
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to affect behaviour. Table 7.8 reports the findings . In column 1, the ATT estimates suggest that the 
SDIP had a large and significant impact on women who knew about the SDIP and had heard of 
someone receiving the conditional cash transfer. These women increased utilisation of government 
maternity services by 9.6 percentage points (relative change 53%; Cl: 31% , 74%) 
because of the 
SDIP. 
In column 2, the results suggest that knowing about the SDIP while having little expectation of 
receiving the cash incentive has no effect on utilisation of maternity services. Knowledge on its own 
does not appear sufficient to change behaviour. The impact estimates on the key outcomes are highly 
insignificant - ie. skilled birth attendance and deliveries in a health facility. A woman in the pseudo 
control group is 0.3 percentage points (relative change -2%; Cl: -21% , 17%) 
less likely to deliver in 
a government health facility as a result of the SDIP and 0.2 percentage points (relative change -0.9%; 
Cl: - 15% , 13%) 
less likely to deliver with skilled birth attendance. These results are in sharp contrast 
to those estimated using the data from the new treatment group and the control group, which showed 
a large impact of the SDIP on utilisation of government maternity services and skilled attendance at 
delivery. Note that the 95 percent confidence intervals of the treatment effects from the two sets of 
results do not overlap for these outcomes. 
The results from this analysis can be interpreted as providing evidence in support of the robustness of 
the basic findings. The finding of no treatment effect and the fact that the pseudo control group and 
the original control group are very different from each other (and therefore likely to have different 
biases) suggest that the conditional independence assumption is plausible. Suppose that conditional 
independence did not hold, the ATT estimates from the analysis of the pseudo control group would 
be biased upwards, for the control group is the more genuine control group. Alternatively, if 
credibility did not matter or the measure of the expected probability of receiving the conditional cash 
transfer was invalid, the ATT estimates would show a positive impact on utilisation. Either way, it is 
difficult to conceive how either or both could lead to a result of no statistical difference in the 
outcomes between the pseudo control and the control group. 
" In terms of the balancing of the covariates, it suffices to note that the kernel matching estimator performs well in both 
matching exercises. 
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Instrumental variable estimates 
When using propensity score matching, there are always concerns over endogeneity. The robustness 
of the basic results can be further assessed by instrumenting knowledge of the SUP prior to childbirth 
using the frequency of radio listenership. Table 7.9 reports the impact estimate on utilisation of 
institutional delivery care and utilisation of government maternity services using three methods: 
ordinary least squares (columns 1 and 2), propensity score matching (columns 3 and 4) and 
instrumental variable estimation (columns S and 6). 
Columns 5 and 6 confirm that the instruments are correlated with knowledge of the SDIP prior to 
childbirth (F-statistic is 8.76). The Sargan test of over - identification passes in both instances. The 
impact estimates using two-stage least squares are, if anything, greater in absolute size than those 
obtained using propensity score matching and ordinary least squares. These results suggest the 
propensity score matching estimates may not be subject to upward bias owing to omitted variables. 
The two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of the SDIP are not, however, close to being 
statistically significant. The loss of efficiency and subsequently large standard errors are probably the 
result of two problems. First, there is multicollinearity between the instruments and several of the 
covariates, particularly education. Second, the fact that the dependent variable is binary increases the 
risk that the analysis lacks statistical power (Type 11 error). 
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Heterogeneity in impacts 
Table 7.10 provides estimates of the ATT on the two key outcomes - delivery at a health facility 
and skilled birth attendance - for various subgroups suggested as relevant by economic theory: 
wealth quintile; and region (which corresponds to the SDIP's three different packages of 
incentives). In addition, the table gives subgroup estimates by geographical accessibility to health 
services and according to whether the household is categorised as a marginalised caste or ethnic 
group. 
First, the impact of the SDIP on institutional delivery care is explored. The results by wealth 
quintile show a consistent gradient in impact estimates, with the poorer households benefiting 
most in terms of the relative impact of the programme. The poorest two-fifths of households in 
the treated group saw aS1 percent rise in utilisation as a result of the SDIP. In absolute terms, the 
impact was largest in the middle wealth quintile with an ATT of 6.3 percentage points. The t- 
statistics of the ATT estimates indicate that the impacts were significant in the middle quintile at 
the 5 percent level and in the poorest two quintiles at the 10 percent level, but not in the richest 
two-fifths of households. There is sufficient power to detect only large impacts. 
The impact of the SDIP was larger among the marginalised households, both in relative and 
absolute terms. It appears households living close to a health facility were highly incentivised to 
use institutional delivery care. The relative impact is also large for those living more than four 
hours walk away, but the result is not significant. There appear to be enormous differences in 
impact by region. The SDIP increased utilisation by 9 percentage points in the mountain districts, 
equivalent to a 85 percent rise. In contrast, the programme appeared to have no impact in the hill 
districts and only a small positive impact in the terai districts. 
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Table 7.10 Impact of the SDIP's demand-side incentives on health seeking behaviour by subgroup 
ATT 
A. Institutional delivery 
Wealth quintile 
Poorest 40% 0.026* 
Middle 20% 0.063*** 
Richest 40% 0.032 
Caste / ethnicity 
Not marginalised 0.037** 
Marginalised 0.043*** 
Access to health facility 
Near (<1 hour) 0.077** 
Medium (1 hr >4 hr) 0.025 
Far (>4 hour) 0.028 
Region 
Terai 0.029 
Hill -0.020 
Mountain 0.087*** 
B. Skilled birth attendance 
Wealth quintile 
Poorest 40% 0.022* 
Middle 20% 0.073** 
Richest 40% 0.019 
Castelethnkity 
Not marginalised 0.042** 
Marginalised 0.042*** 
Access to health facility 
t-Stat % change 95% Cl 
1.79 50.8 (-5.8; 107.5) 
2.94 45.2 (14.4 75.9) 
0.78 6.9 (-10.8 24.5) 
2.45 15.2 (2.8 27.6) 
3.83 24.1 (11.5 36.6) 
2.03 20.4 (2.1 41.1) 
1.34 13.1 (-3.1 32.1) 
0.92 23.2 (-36.1 41.1) 
0.91 5.3 (-6.1 17.1) 
-0.84 -14.6 (-49.1 20.1) 
-8ý5. 
I-, 
- 
(44.1 127.1) 
1.81 65.1 (-5.8; 107.5) 
2.33 70.6 (14.4 75.9) 
0.85 4.5 (-10.8 24.5) 
2.34 15.2 (2.2 28.2) 
3.56 19.9 (8.7 31.0) 
Near (<I hour) 0.083** 2.17 21.4 (2.1 41.1) 
Medium (1 hr >4 hr) 0.032* 1.67 14.7 (-3.1 32.1) 
Far (>4 hour) 0.004 0.14 2.6 (-36.1 41.1) 
Region 
Terai 0.024 0.77 4.3 (-6.1; 17.1) 
Hill 0.002 0.07 0.9 (49.1; 20.1) 
Mountain 0.078*** 3.85 80.3 (44.1 ; 127.1) 
Note: Sample includes 5,903 deliveries. *** denotes impact parameters are significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 
10%. Impact estimates are computed using an OLS regression of the outcome on dummy variables of 
treatment, the subgroups and treatment-subgroup interactions weighted by the kernel weight provided by 
psmatch2 The regression-based standard error is somewhat smallerthan that provided by psmatch2, so 
the t-statistics for the subgroup estimates reported in this table may be somewhat higher than warranted. 95 
percent confidence intervals are around the relative percentage impact. ATT = average treatment effect on the 
treated. Cl = confidence interval. 
In terms of the impact on skilled birth attendance, there are again noticeable differences across 
wealth groups. The middle group seemed to be most incentivised by the SDIP, although the 
poorest wealth quintile also saw a relatively large impact on skilled birth attendance. The 
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programme appears to have had a negligible impact on the richest quintile. As before, 
marginalised households benefited slightly more in terms of improved health seeking behaviour. 
The effect of the SDIP on skilled birth attendance was substantially greater among those living 
within one hour of their nearest health facility. Finally, the SDIP had the greatest effect on treated 
individuals living in the mountain districts, with an ATT of 8 percentage points. The effect of the 
SDIP was negligible in both the MI and terai region and far off conventional levels of statistical 
significance. 
The next step is to examine the factors that influence the impact of the SDIP in a multivariatc 
framework. Table 7.11 shows the probit results with institutional dclivery care as the dependent 
variable for two specifications, as described in section 7.2. S. The final rows give the p-valucs for 
the F-tests of four null hypotheses of interest: i) all the coefficients of all the interaction terms are 
equal to zero; ii) the coefficients of the region -treatment interaction terms are equal to zero; iii) 
the coefficients of the accessibility- treatment interaction terms are equal to zero; iv) the 
coefficients of the caste-treatment interaction terms are equal to zero. 
The null hypothesis of zero coefficients on all of the interaction terms is firmly rejected in both 
models, indicating that there is variation in impacts across the observables. in both models, the 
cocfficient on wealth is negative, suggesting the impact of the SDIP is greater among poorer 
families. However, the coefficient is not significant, implying that the evidence is very weak. The 
statistical significance of wealth is not altered by including wealth quintile dummy variables. The 
null hypothesis for the caste dummy variables is also rejected at the 10 percent level in both 
models. Caste appears to influence the impact of the SDIP, even when controlling for all other 
covariates. It is worth noting that the null hypothesis of zero coefficients on interaction terms of 
the accessibility dummy variables cannot be rejected. 
The null hypothesis of zero coefficients on the interaction terms of the regional dummy variables 
is rejected in the first model. A closer look at the coefficients suggests a larger impact for 
households in mountain districts than those in terai districts and hill districts. In the second 
model, the size of cash subsidy relative to the cost of care in a district is positively associated with 
utilisation of institutional delivery care. These finding are consistent with the notion that health 
care seeking will change most in areas where the financial package offered by the SDIP is most 
attractive. Finally, the year of implementation has a positive, although statistically insignificant, 
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effect on the impact of the programme on utilisation of institutional delivery care. The variable 
may be picking up, inter alia, improvements in the disbursement of SDIP funds through the 
government's financial system. 
Table 7.11 Determinants of variation in the impact of the SDIP's demand-side incentives 
Model 1 Model 2 
Variable dy/dx 
Stcl 
Error z-Stat dy/dx 
Stcl 
Error z-Stat 
Treatment 0.242 0.190 1.27 0.082 0.170 0.48 
Treatment x Age of woman 0.004 0.003 1.21 0.003 0.003 1.10 
Treatment x Log of wealth -0.057 0.040 -1.42 -0.031 0.034 -0.91 
Treatment x Primary education -0.003 0.048 -0.06 -0.001 0.048 -0.02 
Treatment x Secondary education -0.053 0.034 -1.43 -0.05S 0.033 -1.50 
Treatment x Higher education -0.061 0.040 -1.35 -0.068 0.038 -1.57 
Treatment x Woman works agriculture -0.088** 0.037 -2.23 -0.087** 0.037 -2.21 
Treatment x Woman is salaried worker 0.049 0.100 0.53 0.020 0.090 0.23 
Treatment x Woman has small business -0.090* 0.038 -1.77 -0.088* 0.038 -1.7S 
Treatment x Woman is a waged worker -0.013 0.069 -0.18 0.004 0.072 0.05 
Treatment x Woman has other work -0.162** 0.009 -2.09 -0.162** 0.009 -2.13 
Treatment x Terai & Madeshi 0.161* 0.098 1.93 0.182** 0.094 2.27 
Treatment x Dalit 0.071 0.066 1.19 0.074 0.067 1.22 
Treatment x Newar 0.260*** 0.120 2.57 0.250** 0.119 2.49 
Treatment x Janajati -0.016 0.040 -0.39 -0.008 0.040 -0.21 
Treatment x Muslim 0.098 0.183 0.60 0.072 0.154 0.52 
Treatment x Other Castes 0.051 0.064 0.87 0.084 0.066 1.42 
Treatment x Time to facility 1>4 hr -0.043 0.036 -1.17 -0.051 0.035 -1.37 
Treatment x Time to facility 4> 24 hr 0.026 0.061 0.45 0.043 0.063 0.72 
Treatment x Time to facility >I day -0.037 0.081 -0.42 -0.043 0.077 -0.51 
Treatment x Urban -0.034 0.044 -0.71 -0.032 0.044 -0.68 
Treatment x Previous delivery SDIP 0.005 0.070 0.07 0.007 0.071 0.10 
Treatment x Active FCHV -0.044 0.141 -0.31 -0.052 0.141 -0.37 
Treatment x Active women's groups -0.005 0.031 -0.17 -0.017 0.030 -0.56 
Treatment x Hill -0.068 0.039 -I. S6 
Treatment x Mountain O. OS6 0.057 1.03 
Treatment x Ratio of CCT to cost 0.314** 0.129 2.41 
Treatment x Time 
-- . ........... -..... ........ 
0.006 0.020 
............ . --. - . .. 
0.32 
... ........ ....... 
0.008 0.019 0.43 
R2 0.3476 0.3391 
F-statistic for null that all interactions =0 S4.52 54.65 
p-value 0.0009 0.0005 
F-statistic for null that regional interactions =0 7.7S - 
p-value 0.0207 - 
F-statistic for null that accessibility interactions =0 3.21 5.31 
p-value 0.3607 0.1501 
F-statistic for null that caste interactions =0 12.23 13.17 
p-value 0.0571 0.0404 
N 5902 5902 
Note: Sample includes 5,903 deliveries. *** denotes impact parameters are significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 
10%. Results are based on a probit model, which is weighted by the kernel weight provided by psmatch2. The 
table gives the marginal effects calculated at the average of the covarlates. Each model includes all the covariates 
that were interacted with the treatment indicator, but the effects of these variables are not reported. FCHV= 
female community health volunteer. 
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7.5 Discussion 
7.5.1 Interpretation of findings 
This chapter finds that the SDIP had a positive impact on the utilisation of maternity services. 
Women in the treated group were 4.3 percentage points (26 percent) more likely to deliver in a 
public health facility, 4.2 percentage points (17 percent) more likely to deliver with a skilled birth 
attendant and 1.2 percentage points (36 percent) more likely to have a caesarean section. There 
was some evidence that the SDIP encouraged some women to switch from using a non-state 
hospital to delivering in a government health facility. The SDIP, in other words, may led to some 
crowding out of the non -governmental sector, which is hard to justify from a policy perspective 
unless there is evidence to suggest quality of care is higher in the public sector. Still, it remained 
the case that the SDIP led to more women delivering in a health facility. These findings are 
consistent with the predictions from standard consumer theory. 
Interpretation of the findings is not straightforward and requires some caution in light of how the 
study was designed. "' The treatment group was defined in such a way that the measure of 
programme impact essentially filters out issues related to implementation. This is useful in 
separating the question of whether the incentive mechanism underpinning the programme 
worked from questions about administrative failings. 
The impact of the SDIP over the entire sample, therefore, is a fraction of the estimates given by 
the ATT. With just over one-quarter of the sample reached by the programme, the ATT estimate 
implies that the increase in skilled birth attendance as a result of the SDIP was 1.2 percentage 
points across the entire sample. Similarly, the rise in the utilisation of institutional deliveries 
attributable to the SDIP is 1.1 percentage points and, in the case of the caesarean section rate, 
0.3 
percentage points. There is a large gap between the population-wide impacts achieved so 
far and 
the potential impact of the SDIP, even after taking into account that the estimated ilripact 
for 
those who were not treated (ATNT) may be lower than that felt by the treated group (ATT). 
These figures provide a stark illustration of how weak implementation has limited the programme 
impact and suggest a missed opportunity. 
69 Particular care should be taken in the interpretation of results 
for subgroups. It is perfectly possible, and indeed 
likely, that the SDIP had a large impact on utilisation of a subgroup (je. high AIT estimate), yet failed to reach many 
in that subgroup (ie. low uptake). This is given greater consideration in chapter 
9. 
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The impact on utilisation at the population level is too low for maternity services to have been 
overwhelmed as a result and there has been no evidence from the qualitative studies in the 
evaluation to suggest otherwise. Nonetheless, concerns over the capacity of health services to deal 
with an influx of deliveries were at the heart of the decision by the central government not to 
promote the programme in the public arena. The magnitude of the impact estimates also suggest 
there can be little expectation of a sizeable improvement in maternal health, particularly when 
one accepts that increased utilisation does not automatically translate into improved health, for 
example see Ansah et al. (2009). 
The findings from the analysis of the pseudo control group are interpreted as providing evidence 
of a link between the administration of the demand-side incentives and the impact of the 
programme. Knowledge of the SDIP appears to be insufficient to influence health seeking 
behaviour, suggesting that credibility of the promise of the demand-side incentives is indeed 
necessary. This is consistent with the theoretical model of how the programme is expected to 
cause change. 
The analysis of the heterogeneity of impacts indicates that the programme had a substantial impact 
in the mountain districts, yet a negligible impact in the other two regions. This is a cause for 
concern and potentially has important policy implications. There are a number of possible reasons 
for the variation in the impact of the SDIP across regions, of which the most likely relates to the 
difference in the package of financial incentives offered across the regions. As noted in chapter 4, 
the demand-side incentives represent 47 percent of the total household cost of delivery care in the 
mountain districts, but just 14 percent in the tarai districts and 16 percent in the hill districts. 
Thus, there may be a question mark over whether the financial incentive provided in the hill 
(1,000 NRS) and tarai (500 NRS) districts is sufficient to change health seeking behaviour. 
It remains possible that the variation in impacts is also linked to differences in baseline utilisation, 
supply-side factors and implementation across regions. Future analysis may seek to include data 
on health providers to try and understand whether the impact of the programme at the district 
level is associated with the availability and cluality of care. In one of the hill districts, the reason 
for a lack of impact may be because the policy guidelines were misinterpreted and women giving 
birth at home were also given the conditional cash transfer. In the mountain districts, demand for 
maternal health care may have been more responsive to price because the baseline proportion of 
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women giving birth in a health facility was lower, ensuring there was more room for 
improvement. 
There was little evidence in the multivariate analysis to support the hypothesis that demand-side 
incentives have a greater effect on poorer households. There appeared to be significant variation 
between caste groups. This subgroup analysis was defined ex-post and theory can offer little 
explanation as to why one might expect variation after controlling for other factors. Further 
research in this area is recommended. 
7.5.2 Internal validity 
The internal validity of the study comes down to the plausibility of the conditional independence 
assumption. Theory leads to a number of robustness checks, the results of which suggest 
conditional independence can be defended. The SDIP increased utilisation of public health 
facilities, and crowded out the non -governmental sector. Credibility of the promise of the 
financial incentives is found to be necessary to influence health seeking behaviour. And finally, the 
point estimates of the treatment effect are no smaller in absolute size when instrumenting for 
knowledge of the SDIP using radio listenership. 
Internal validity is strengthened by the richness and quality of the data. Unlike many studies using 
PSM, data were collected primarily for the purpose of the evaluating the SDIP. In particular, it is 
recommended to use the same questionnaire on both participants and controls, take all individuals 
from the same context (eg. geographical area or local labour market), and collect information on 
all factors that might jointly influence programme participation and the outcome, as informed by 
the theory (Heckman, Ichimura et al. 1998; Diaz and Handa 2006). The approach of the study 
was guided by these principles. In addition, the covariates included time, which soaks up the 
influence of some of the unobservables. 
7.5.3 Limitations 
Notwithstanding the arguments above, the conditional independence assumption is in the end 
untestable, and it is not possible to estimate robustly the extent to which there is bias 
due to 
selection on unobservables. If the evaluation had had more control over the implementation 
process, it may have sought to use alternative study designs that can in theory control for 
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unobservables. For example, difference -in -difference impact estimators have been popular in the 
literature recently. This approach looks for differences in changes between treated and untreated 
individuals before and after the programme's implementation and is able to sweep out correlation 
with fixed individual unobservables that confound identification of the programme's effect on 
outcomes. 
However, it can be argued that in the context of this study, selection bias may be less of a 
problem. Much of the econometrics of programme evaluation has been concerned with training 
programmes in which the eligible individual chooses whether to participate. The selection process 
in this study is quite different; the individual does not actively select or enrol into the programme, 
but rather is a passive recipient of the 'treatment'. As Ravallion (2009) has argued, greater 
consideration of the government's role is called for in the theoretical characterisation of the 
selection problem and attempts were made to do just that in chapter 6.70 
it seems reasonable to assume that selection bias on unobservables is more of a problem in 
programmes which require a decision on the part of the beneficiary to participate, since the 
decision may be influenced by, rather than simply correlated with, the unobservables. As a final 
point it is worth remarking that the bias from the observables remaining after the matching 
procedure was minimal and the quality of matching achieved in the analysis compares very 
favourably with other studies, for example see Wagstaff et al. (2009) and Blundell et al. (2005). 
Discussion of three issues allows further consideration of the limitations of the analysis in this 
chapter. First, the sample was not designed to be representative of the entire country, which has 
implications for the external validity of the findings, as discussed in chapter 9. Another problem is 
concerned with the sample size, which meant the analysis of the heterogeneity in the impacts 
lacked statistical power where subgroups contained few observations. 
71 
A second limitation relates to the focus of the analysis on utilisation outcomes as the main measure 
of performance. In contrast with many simple health technologies, the link between utilisation of 
maternity services and improved health depends on a complex set of factors concerning the 
70 The sources of information individuals found out about the SDIP provide a useful starting point in characterising the 
selection problem. 
"A further methodological point is that the impact estimates are not weighted to account for oversampling. 
The 
literature is not clear on how to incorporatc. weights when performing propensity score matching. 
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quality of care. Individuals demand health, not health care per se. Thus, judging the success of the 
SDIP on the extent to which it influenced health seeking behaviour at childbirth is fraught with 
problems. The standard measure of utilisation, skilled birth attendance, is a crude measure of 
access to quality maternity services. Not only does it fail to capture very well the skills of the 
attendant, it says nothing about many other equally important aspects of quality that impact on 
health. Nor can the caesarean section rate be relied on as an indicator of access to emergency care, 
since there is no way of knowing from the data whether there was a medical need for the 
intervention. 
The third limitation concerns the possibility that there were recall errors in responses to questions 
about knowledge of the SDIP, particularly in light of a recall period of up to three years. 
However, the most likely recall error would be for women to state that knew about the SDIP 
prior to childbirth when in fact they had found subsequently. This would create a downward bias 
on impact estimates since these women were not exposed to knowledge about the incentives and 
are thus less likely to have delivered in a health facility. 
Finally, as mentioned in the previous chapter, knowledge of someone who has received the 
conditional cash transfer may not be a valid measure of credibility of the programme. A number 
of factors are likely to influence the chances an individual attaches to receiving the demand-side 
incentives, including perceptions of the public health system, perceptions of the government 
more generally, and the trustworthiness of the source of the information about the SDIP. 
7.5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the impact of the SDIP's demand-side incentives on health seeking 
behaviour at childbirth in six districts of Nepal. It finds that the financial incentives were 
reasonably effective in encouraging women to deliver with professional care. The impacts appear 
to be greatest in the region offering the most attractive package of financial incentives relative to 
the cost of care. Owing to the low proportion of the sample who were reached by the SDIP, these 
treatment effects translate into small population-wide impacts, illustrating how weak 
implementation has constrained its success. The universal nature of the conditional cash transfer 
means its recipients are disproportionately from richer households, who are more likely to use 
maternity services. 
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Chapter 8. IMPACT OF THE SAFE DELIVERY INCENTIVE 
PROGRAMME IN THE DISTRICT OF MAKWANPUR 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide further evidence on the impact of the Safe Delivery Incentive 
Programme (SDIP). It focuses on rural areas of Makwanpur district, the same study setting as the 
analysis in chapter 5, which found that price has a significant but small effect on utilisation of 
government health services at childbirth. Demand for maternity care was shown to be inelastic 
and, in simulation exercises, a subsidy on the price care equivalent to the value of the cash 
incentive appeared to have only a negligible impact on utilisation. 
The analysis builds on previous chapters in a number of ways. First, it offers an alternative method 
to evaluate the impact of the SDIP. This is useful for assessing the robustness of results to different 
non- experimental evaluation techniques. Second, it assesses the impact of the SDIP not only on 
utilisation of maternity services, but also on health status, as measured by neonatal deaths. Third, 
it evaluates the impact of the entire package of incentives offered by the SDIP and not just the 
demand-side incentives. Fourth, by analysing performance of the programme in the same study 
setting as the analysis of demand for maternity care in chapter S, it allows for a direct comparison 
between the two sets of findings. 
The policy evaluation method used in this analysis is quite different from the previous chapter, 
which estimated impacts through propensity score matching. A longitudinal analysis is used to 
study trends in outcomes over a five-year period, two years of which the SDIP was running. Time 
is modelled flexibly and impacts are identified as either a shift or a slope change in the outcome 
after adjusting for socioeconomic factors and community-level fixed effects. Data conne from the 
Community Surveillance System in Makwanpur and are supplemented with primary data about 
the activities and services of health providers and non-governmcntal organisations (N GO) 
working in health in the district. 
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Given the non -experimental nature of the design, an important part of the empirical strategy is to 
assess the validity of the findings. A variety of mcthods are used, including estimation of the 
regression model with a non-equivalent dependent variable and an assessment of contextual 
factors that may act as potential confounders. It is intended that this approach strengthens the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the study. 
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8.2 Methods 
8.2.1 Identification of impacts 
Time is commonly used in the evaluation hierature to establish a comparison group with which to 
assess a programme's impact. The most basic longitudinal approach estimates impact by measuring 
the mean change in outcome before and after the programme commences. It is rarely able to 
permit reasonable causal inferences, as the key assumption of no change in the absence of the 
programme is rarely plausible in practice. Unless the influence of non-programme factors can be 
ruled out with confidence, the conclusions from such a design can be weak. With more time 
periods before and after the intervention it is possible to test for a structural change at a specific 
point in time around the start of the programm e, thereby providing more plausible causal 
inferences. In this way the approach can attempt to separate genuine intervention effects from 
other long-term trends in the data (Glass 1997). 
The logic of the identification strategy is simple. If there is a shift in level or change in direction of 
the dependent variable at the time of the intervention, then this change is interpreted as the causal 
effect of the intervention. Conceivably, the effect of an intervention could take on a number of 
different forms, ranging from a simple shift to more complex ones that might reflect, for 
example, an accelerated change in direction or a change in variability (Glass 1997). In the context 
of the SDIP, the conditional cash transfer and the provider payment in principle should have an 
instantaneous impact on health seeking behaviour but if implementation has been slow, the effects 
may be incremental. The critical factors are exposure to information about the SDIP and 
administration of the cash payment, and the findings in chapter 6 suggested that both these 
elements of the programme have improved over time even when controlling for other factors. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to search for two types of effects: an immediate effect identified by a 
shift in the outcome at the time the programme began; and a longer-term or incremental effect 
identified by a change in the slope of the outcome. Identification of the long-term impact of the 
SDIP as a change in slope of the outcome could be threatened by confounding factors that operate 
at any point over a longer period of time, making the task of ruling out such factors much more 
difficult. Findings regarding the long-term effect of the SDIP are, in other words, more likely to 
be spurious. 
216 1P ao c b 
As is already clear, treatment is defined by time. Treated observations are deliveries that took 
place after the launch of the SDIP. The comparison group then consists of all deliveries taking 
place prior to start of the programme. Implementation of the SDIP in Makwanpur district is 
known from interviews with district programme managers, corroborated using financial data on 
programme disbursements, to have started in September 2005, two months after the official 
launch at the beginning of the fiscal year. The impact parameter provided by this approach is the 
average treatment effect on the treated. 
The definition of treatment raises of a number of issues. First, since all deliveries in the sample 
after a certain point in time make up the treatment group, the average treatment effect on the 
treated provides an estimate of the impact of the SDIP on the entire population under 
surveillance. Moreover, it captures the effect of the entire package of incentives - ic. the supply- 
side and demand-side incentives - provided by the SDIP. This contrasts with the way treatment is 
defined in chapter 7, in which the treatment effect applies only to the fraction of the entire sample 
that had heard of the SDIP. Since the treated populations are not the same, the two irnpact 
parameters are not directly comparable. A second, closely related point is concerned with the fact 
that the treated group, as defined in this chapter, may include deliveries by women who had not 
heard of the SDIP or did not perceive the programme as credible. The impact parameter 
therefore reflects programme implementation as well as the effect of the financial incentives. To 
some extent, this issue is addressed by stratifying the analysis into two geographical areas in which 
exposure to information about the SDIP was known to differ considerably (see below). 
8.2.2 Empirical model 
The unit of analysis is a delivery. In the first instance, outcomes are plotted against time (in 
months) to see if there is any evidence of a discontinuity in the observations around the month the 
SDIP began. The graphs also plot the three-month moving average to show with more clarity the 
underlying pattern by smoothing the data. While crude, the graphs provide a visual means of 
assessing the impact of the programme on the set of outcomes. 
The second step involves estimation of a model that links the level of the outcome at a point in 
time to the start of the programme, contemporaneous values of a series of demographic controls, 
time and community level fixed-effects. The specification takes the form: 
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yit = yDt + o)Dt -T+ PXit + vT + aj + Eit 
where yit is the outcome variable for individual i measured at time t, Dt is the treatment dummy 
at time t, Xit is a vector of individual and household characteristics measured at time t, T is time 
measured in months (with T=1 being the month of the first observation), aj are community- 
level fixed effects and Eit is a random error. The immediate impact of the programme, given by 
the size of the coefficient y, is modeled as a shift in the level of the outcome. A value of Y equal to 
0 indicates that the SDIP has had no immediate impact on the outcome of interest. The longer- 
term impact of the programme is modelled as a change in the slope of the outcome and is given by 
the size of the coefficient W. While it would be possible to incorporate more flexible forms of the 
programme effect, the task of ruling out confounding factors becomes increasingly difficult. The 
above model thus represents a balance in this regard. 
The model includes a full set of community dummy variables to control for influences at the 
village level such as the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGO). Also included is a 
vector of individual and household characteristics to capture other secular trends in the outcome: 
the woman's age, religion, ethnicity, educational attainment, the occupation of the household 
head, the size of the household, the materials used to make the house, and the number of months 
the household had sufficient food in the previous year. The time variable(s) captures the secular 
trend in the outcome over time. How the relationship between the outcome and time is specified 
may affect the results. Therefore, results are shown for two different specifications to assess the 
robustness of the results: a flexible model in which time is specified as a fourth degree polynomial 
function and a more restricted model where time is a quadratic function. Given the former 
model's flexibility, it is the preferred specification on a priori grounds. 
In rural areas of Makwanpur district, women's groups have been active in half of the villages since 
the year 2001. These women's groups were used to inform the community about the SDIP when 
it was launched, making exposure to information about the programme substantially higher in 
these areas. In this sense, the women's groups are expected to modify the impact of the SDIP by 
influencing implementation. It is therefore important to stratify the analysis according to whether 
or not there were women's groups functioning in the village. Although there are no data on 
household knowledge of the SDIP in the district, it can only be assumed that awareness in villages 
with no women's groups was low, similar to that found in the other districts sampled in the 
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Survey of Women. 
8.2.3 Outcomes 
The impact of the SDIP is assessed in relation to a set of outcomes that include a measure of health 
and various indicators of utilisation of delivery care services. These outcomes are single events and 
therefore defined as probabilities. The primary outcome in the analysis is utilisation of maternity 
services, which includes the place of delivery (government facility or private facility), the type of 
birth attendant (a skilled birth attendant or any health worker) and whether the woman undergoes 
a surgical delivery (caesarean section). A skilled birth attendant is a doctor, nurse or midwife, and 
any health worker refers to these cadres as well as all other health workers in a health facility, but 
not community health workers such as trained birth attendants (TBA). 
To reiterate the predictions of the economic model, the SDIP is expected to have a positive 
impact on utilisation of government maternity services and skilled birth attendance. The 
conditional cash transfer to the woman functions as a price subsidy reducing the cost of care and 
thereby raising demand, the extent to which depends on the household's price elasticity. The 
provider payment, on the other hand, should increase the availability of health workers to attend 
deliveries by providing additional motivation to work. Expectation of an impact on the caesarean 
section rate is low given that no health facility in the district was able to conduct caesarean 
sections at the time the SDIP began. 
It would have been preferable to use maternal mortality as the main health outcome, to be 
consistent with the goal of the programme. However, given the rarity of a maternal death, the 
study has insufficient statistical power to detect even a large effect despite the large sample size. 
Instead, it uses neonatal mortality, which is considered a secondary outcome given that the 
analysis may still lack power to detect a change in this outcome. Neonatal mortality is of interest, 
given that about 25 to 45 percent of neonatal deaths occur around the first day of life and can, 
therefore, be prevented through direct medical intervention at the time of childbirth (Lawn, 
Cousens et al. 2005). It should not be considered a proxy for maternal mortality. A prerequisite 
for there to be an effect of the SUP on mortality is an increase in utilisation of maternity services 
and adequate quality of care. Put another way, a finding that showed an impact on neonatal 
mortality without any impact on utilisation of maternity services would, given our behavioural 
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model, be difficult to rationalise. The final outcome in the analysis is the number of antenatal care 
visits, whose inclusion is explained below. 
With the exception of antenatal care visits, all outcomes are binary. The appropriate model is thus 
a probit. In presenting the results, the change in probability associated with a given change in the 
treatment variable is reported rather than the estimated coefficient since the former is more easily 
interpreted. The number of antenatal care visits is an example of a count dependent variable and a 
model that assumes a Poisson process is appropriate. In all cases, there is strong evidence of 
overdispersion as shown by the size of the dispersion parameter (alpha) and the likelihood ratio 
test, which rejects the Poisson specification of equi-dispersion decisively (see notes of regression 
result tables). For this reason, a negative binomial specification, which maintains the Poisson 
process but allows for overdispersion, is used (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). 
8.2.4 Assessing validity 
The internal validity of non -experimental studies is always open to question. This study's 
identification strategy relies on there being no other change at the time of the programme's 
introduction that could account for a discontinuity or slope change in the relationship between the 
outcome and time. Changes in non-programme factors such as health infrastructure, staffing 
levels, government policy and the activities of NGOs working in maternal health are a particular 
concern. An important part of the empirical strategy is to rule out alternative explanations for 
observed trends, thereby complementing the longitudinal analysis. 
Validity of the findings is assessed using two different approaches. The first aims to estimate the 
causal effect of the SDIP on an outcome known to be unaffected by it, but closely related to the 
other outcomes under investigation (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). Lagged outcomes are often 
attractive candidates when using matching methods. In this study, use of antenatal care is 
appropriate since it is precedes childbirth along the continuum of care, but is not targeted by the 
SDIP. Thus, potential confounding factors are likely to cause a shift or slope change in the 
utilisation of antenatal care. The'absence of any discontinuity in the trend of antenatal. care seeking 
at the time of the SDIP suggests that there is no confounding. Clearly, this approach fails to rule 
out factors that affect utihsation of maternity services independently of antenatal care. Changes to 
the availability of emergency obstetric care, for instance, are unlikely to induce any change in the 
utilisation of antenatal care services. 
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The second approach is descriptive and uses information regarding contextual factors to assess 
internal validity. Contextual factors can act both as confounders and effect modifiers and in the 
analysis it is important to differentiate between the two, since the former have more relevance for 
internal validity and the latter for external validity (Victora, Schellenberg et al. 2005). Effect 
modifiers are factors that arc on the causal path of an intervention, influencing its impact. Primary 
data collection centred around four categories of interest: health policy; political and governance 
factors; health service-related factors; and the presence of relevant projects or programmes. 
The analysis includes a description of each contextual factor and an assessment of its threat to 
internal validity. The latter is framed around a number of criteria that each contextual factor must 
meet if it is to affect internal validity. Each factor should be consistent with the effect identified 
from the regression analysis in terms of: i) the timing of the introduction of the SDIP; ii) the 
direction of the effect; iii) the magnitude of the effect; and iv) the type of effect. The assessment 
of each factor against these criteria is based on qualitative data concerning contextual factors, 
available evidence from other studies or theory. For instance, the expected magnitude of the 
effect of an NGO project is likely to depend on the coverage of its activities (how many villages 
does it cover? ), the type of intervention (does it seek to influence the demand or supply of 
maternity services? ) and its budget (does the project have sufficient resources to cause the size of 
change implied by the regression results? ). 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, there are two measurement issues to consider. One of 
these concerns the introduction of a new questionnaire around the start of the SDIP as part of 
improvements made to the Community Surveillance System. In the revised questionnaire, 
questions pertaining to the place of delivery were re-worded and given a different coding system. 
Inconsistent measurement of outcomes could he behind any structural change in the time trend. 
Since the measurement of skilled birth attendance remained completely unaltered, the impact 
estimate on this outcome can be compared against that on institutional delivery care to assess 
whether the change in questionnaire confounded estimates. These two outcomes are close proxies 
for each other and any influence of measurement might be revealed by differences between the 
two impact estimates. As the results will show, impact estimates of the SDIP on institutional 
deliveries and skilled birth attendance are highly consistent, both in magnitude and direction, 
suggesting the introduction of a new questionnaire posed no problem. 
221 1Pa ge 
A second measurement concern is variation over time in the coverage of the surveillance system. 
There were large differences in the monthly number of deliveries captured by the surveillance 
system. These variations cannot be explained by seasonal variations alone and were, in fact, the 
consequence of political instability in specific parts of the district and fluctuations in project 
funding levels. The concern is that any change in the outcome of interest may be due to bias 
linked to systematic changes in the sample over time. An inspection of monthly data on the 
proportion of women with primary education reveals no obvious structural break in the time 
series (result not shown). This provides some reassurance that the sample remained 
representative of the population during the period when the surveillance system was unable to 
capture all deliveries in the study area. The empirical strategy involving the estimation of a model 
with antenatal care as the dependent variable should also identify this problem. 
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8.3 Data 
8.3.1 Data sources 
The longitudinal analysis uses data from the Community Surveillance 
. 
System in rural areas of 
Makwanpur, collected between 2002 and 2007. Each observation in the datasct is a delivery. 
Because the data contain some deliveries from the same woman, the analysis adjusts for clustering 
at the level of the woman, although doing so makes no difference whatsoever to the results. Still 
births are included, as are maternal deaths. Multiple births are counted as one delivery and if only 
one of the babies dies within 28 days it is defined as a neonatal death. With the start of the SDIP in 
the district in September 200S, the dataset covers 22 months of programme implementation and 
49 months prior to the start of the programme. The dataset contains complete data on 14,799 
deliveries. 
In July 200S, the surveillance area was expanded to cover new villages. To ensure consistency, 
observations from these additional villages are not included in the analysis. Similarly, owing to the 
introduction of a modified questionnaire in July 2005, the analysis includes only those explanatory 
variables available throughout the entire seven-year period that the surveillance system has been 
active. 
Two methods were used to collect contextual information. The first involved key informant 
interviews using a semi-structured topic guide (see Appendix A5). The purpose of these 
interviews was to gather respondents' views of what factors other than the SDIP have influenced 
health care seeking at childbirth in the previous three years. These interviews were conducted by 
a Nepalese researcher trained in qualitative methods, transcribed and then translated into English. 
The second method involved the collection of data through record review and was guided by a 
structured questionnaire (see Appendix AS). Two questionnaires were developed, one for NGOs 
and one for respondents working in government. Information was sought on the type of activities 
carried out by the organisation or health provider, their timing, the services provided, the 
coverage of the activities or services, and the budget for activities or services. Information was 
provided both by the respondents themselves and through the review of project documents and 
administrative data. 
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The sample for the two data collection tools was the same. Initially, two senior health staff 
working at the district hospital, one member of the district hospital management committee and 
staff at two NGOs were interviewed. At the end of each interview, respondents were asked to 
identify other organisations working in maternal health in the district. Three other organisations 
were identified as being relevant, but it was only possible to interview one of these organisations. 
In total, six key informant interviews and record reviews were carried out. 
8.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 8.1 gives the summary statistics on the outcomes and explanatory variables for the periods 
before and after the start of the SDIP in the district. There has been a noticeable improvement in 
the outcomes of interest. Neonatal mortality has fallen from 29 deaths per 1,000 live births to 23 
deaths per 1,000 live births between the two periods. Utilisation of maternal health services has 
increased. For instance, the proportion of deliveries at home has fallen by almost 8 percentage 
points, while the number of antenatal care visits has almost doubled. 
Women give birth at a younger age and, in general, socioeconomic indicators show an 
improvement between the two periods. Women are more cducatcd, there is greater sufficiency in 
food, and there is an increase in proportion of households with higher quality building materials. 
Household heads working as wage labourers appear to have shifted in agriculture. There is little 
change in the composition of the population either in terms of religion or caste. A greater 
proportion of deliveries are in villages with women's groups in the first period than in the second 
period. 
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Table 8.1 Descriptive statistics for the periods before and after the start of the SDIP 
Variable 
Outcomes 
Neonatal mortality 
Delivery at home 
Delivery at government facility 
Delivery at private facility 
Delivery with skilled birth attendant 
Delivery with any health worker 
Delivery by caesarean section 
Number of ANC visits 
Characteristics of woman and household 
Age of woman at birth of child 
Education grade 
Household members 
Months of sufficient food in previous year 
Hindu 
Buddhist 
Muslim 
Christian 
Other religion 
Brahmin / Chhetri 
Newar 
Janajati 
Other caste 
Cement house 
Brick / mud house 
Stone / mud house 
Planks house 
Brushwood house 
Thatch house 
Other type of house 
Agricultural work 
Salaried / government work 
Small business 
Wage labourer 
Other work 
HH in women's group intervention area 
N obs 
Pre-SDIP Post-SDIP 
Std Std 
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation 
0.029 0.168 0.023 
0.944 0.229 0.866 
0.043 0.203 0.112 
0.003 0.051 0.010 
0.046 0.209 0.113 
0.065 0.247 0.174 
0.004 0.060 0.010 
1.274 1.746 2.146 
27.733 6.562 25.645 
1.084 2.394 2.014 
6.914 3.067 7.199 
9.238 2.704 9.653 
0.333 0.471 0.323 
0.655 0.475 0.654 
0.000 0.016 0.000 
0.010 0.098 0.015 
0.001 0.037 0.008 
OAS7 0.363 0.156 
0.022 0.147 0.019 
0.778 0.416 0.777 
0.004 0.061 0.007 
0.023 0.150 0.04S 
0.020 0.142 0.032 
0.626 0.484 0.589 
0.309 0.462 0.253 
0.009 0.093 0.009 
0.005 0.070 0.005 
0.006 0.076 0.047 
0.910 0.286 0.927 
0.019 0.137 0.014 
0.014 0.119 0.017 
0.056 0.230 0.040 
0.000 0.000 0.002 
0.499 0.500 0.461 
8199 6600 
0.150 
0.340 
0.316 
0.101 
0.317 
0.379 
0.099 
2.063 
6.420 
3.157 
3.203 
2.806 
0.468 
0.476 
0.021 
0.122 
0.088 
0.363 
0.137 
0.417 
0.081 
0.207 
0.176 
0.492 
0.435 
0.096 
0.073 
0.211 
0.260 
0.118 
0.127 
0.196 
0.048 
0.498 
Note: Data come from 24 village development committees covered by the Community Surveillance System. HH 
household. 
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8.4 Results 
8.4.1 Graphical inspection 
Figure 8.1 to Figure 8.7 plot the outcomes over time, showing the three-month moving average 
and a vertical line to indicate the point at which implementation of the SDIP began. Visual 
inspection of the time series data provides a useful starting point to identify impacts. 
A clear discontinuity in the time series at the month of the programme's introduction can be seen 
in the case of a delivery in government health facility, a dclivcry with a skilled birth attendant and 
a delivery with any health worker. The shifts are in the expected direction: an increase in the 
chances of a delivery at a government health facility, with a skilled birth attendant and with any 
health worker. In contrast, there is no sizeable shift in the probability of a neonatal death, the 
cacsarean section rate or the number of antenatal care visits at around the time of the 
programme's introduction, but rather a consistent trend over the entire period. The plot of 
deliveries at a private health facility shows a small positive shift, but it is not clear that this occurs 
at the time the SDIP started. 
Figure 8.1 Probability of a neonatal death over time 
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Figure 8.2 Probability of a delivery in a government health facility over time 
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Figure 8.3 Probability of a delivery in a private health facility over time 
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Figure 8.4 Probability of a delivery with a skilled birth attendant over time 
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Figure 8.5 Probability of a delivery with any health worker over time 
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Figure 8.6 Probability of a caesarean section over time 
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Figure 8.7 Number of antenatal care visits per delivery over time 
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8.4.2 Longitudinal analysis 
To reiterate, immediate impacts are identified as a change in the level, while longer-term impacts 
are indcntified as a change in the slope of the outcome at the time the SDIP began implementation 
in Makwanpur district. The marginal effect corresponding to the change in slope is interpreted as 
the monthly percentage point change in utilisation due to the SDIP. Table 8.2 presents the impact 
estimates based on the full sample, which includes all the villages in the surveillance area. Impact 
estimates are also stratified between the villages in which women's groups were running at the 
time the SDIP began and the villages in which no womenýs groups were operating at that time. 
These are shown in Table 8.3 and Table 8.4 respectively. 
Table 8.2 Effect of the SDI P on the probability of a neonatal death and use of maternal health services 
(all villages, quartic time function) 
All villages (Model 1) 
Effect Effect 
(change in level) (change in slope) Pseudo RN 
Outcome dy/dx z-Stat dy/dx z-Stat 
Neonatal mortality -0.001 -0.08 0.001 0.39 0.019 14,717 
Delivery at government facility 0.026*** 2.75 0.0005 0.28 0.244 14,737 
Delivery at private facility 0.001 1.27 -0.0004 -1.51 0.340 9,347 
Delivery with SBA 0.022* * 2.34 -0.0004 -0.20 0.245 14,737 
Delivery with a health worker 0.044*** 3.56 -O. OOs** -2.02 0.247 14,799 
Delivery by caesarean section -0.001 -0.68 -0.0005 -1.20 0.187 12,832 
Number of antenatal care visits 0.035 0.52 0.006 0.41 0.101 14,799 
Note: Each row is a different model. ' denotes coefficients are significant at 1%, **at 5%, and* at 10%. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the level of the woman. Regression models include 24 community fixed effects, dummies capturing 
ethnicity, religion, occupation of household head, and materials used to make house, as well variables for age of the woman at 
childbirth, educational attainment and number of months in the previous year for which household had enough food. The time 
function is a polynomial of degree four. Marginal effects for these variables are not reported. For those outcomes where the 
dependent variable is a probability of utilisation, a probit model is used, while estimates of Impact on the number of ANC visits 
are derived from a negative binomial model. A likelihood ratio test of equi-dispersion (alpha=O) between the negative binomial 
and the poisson specification rejects the latter decisively (chibar2=1535.4, p<0.001). Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. observations in which the regression model predicts failure perfectly must be dropped, explaining why N 
varies in each model. SBA = skilled birth attendant. 
In Table 8.2, the parameter estimates largely confirm the results of the visual inspection of the 
graphs. In terms of immediate effects, the SDIP had a significant impact on deliveries in 
government facilities, deliveries with a skilled birth attendant, and deliveries with a health 
worker. Specifically, the SDIP increased the probability of a woman delivering in a government 
health facility by 2.6 percentage points (relative to a predicted mean of 9.1 percent in the month 
prior to the start of implementation), with a skilled birth attendant by 2.2 percentage points 
(relative to a predicted mean of 9.6 percent in the month prior to the start of implementation) 
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and with any health worker by 4.4 percentage points (relative to a predicted mean of 15.9 
percent in the month prior to the start of implementation). In terms of a change in the slope of 
the outcome, the SDIP led to a decrease in deliveries with any health worker, equivalent to a fall 
of O. S percentage points per month. Notably, there is no evidence that the SDIP had any impact 
(either immediate or long-term) on neonatal mortality, utilisation of private health facilities or the 
cacsarean section rate. 
When the results are stratified between the villages that were receiving the women's group 
intervention at the time the SDIP began and those that were not, substantial differences in the 
impacts arc revealed (Table 8.3 and Table 8.4). In the villages with women's groups, the 
immediate effect of the SDIP was to increase skilled birth attendance by S. 2 percentage points 
(relative to a predicted mean of 11.4 percent in the month prior to the start of implementation) 
and raise the chances of a delivery in a government health facility by 6.2 percentage points 
(relative to a predicted mean of 11.1 percent in the month prior to the start of implementation). 
The programme's immediate impact of 8.5 percentage points on deliveries with any health 
worker was offset by a negative impact of I percentage point per month in the rate of change of 
the outcome. The results also indicate a negative long-term impact on deliveries at private 
facilities, equivalent to 0.03 percentage points every month. However, the magnitude of the 
impact is so small that it is does not have any major bearing on utilisation of maternity services in 
general. In these villages, the programme appears to have had no effect of either type on neonatal 
mortality or the caesarean section rate. 
In the villages without women's groups, the SDIP had no significant impact on almost all the 
outcomes (Table 8.4), suggesting the significant results from the full sample are driven by the 
villages with women's groups. The only exception is the caesarean section rate. The results imply 
that the SDIP had a negative long-term impact on the caesarean section rate, but the magnitude of 
the effect is small, equivalent to 0.36 percentage points per year. 
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Table 8.3 Effect of the SDIP on the probability of a neonatal death and use of maternal health services 
(villages with women's groups, quartic time function) 
Villages with women's group (Model 2) 
Effect Effect 
(change in level) (change in slope) 
Pseudo 
N 
R2 
Outcome dy/dx Z-Stat dy/cIx z-Stat 
Neonatal mortality -0.003 -0.24 0.001 0.71 0.021 7,081 
Delivery at government facility 0.062*** 3.22 -0.002 -0.45 0.226 7,095 
Delivery at private facility 0.000 0.33 -0.0003*** -2.67 0.418 3,950 
Delivery with SBA 0.0520** 2.72 -0.003 -0.92 0.223 7,095 
Delivery with a health worker 0.085* ** 3. S6 -0.0100* -2.15 0.220 7,095 
Delivery by caesarean section -0.003 -1.01 -0.001 -1.07 0.184 6,434 
Number of antenatal care visits 0.129 1.17 -0.002 -0.07 0.096 7,128 
Note: Each row is a different model. *** denotes coeff icients are significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and 0 at 10%. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the level of the woman. Regression models include 12 community fixed effects, dummies capturing 
ethnicity, religion, occupation of household head, and materials used to make house, as well variables for age of the woman at 
childbirth, educational attainment and number of months in the previous year for which household had enough food. The time 
function is a polynomial of degree four. Marginal effects for these variables are not reported. For those outcomes where the 
dependent variable is a probability of utilisation, a probit model is used, while estimates of impact on the number of ANC visits 
are derived from a negative binomial model. A likelihood ratio test of equi-dispersion (alpha=O) between the negative binomial 
and the poisson specification rejects the latter decisively (chibar'=398.1, p<0.001). Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Observations in which the regression model predicts failure perfectly must be dropped, explaining why N 
varies in each model. SBA = skilled birth attendant. 
Table 8.4 Effect of the SIDIP on the probability of a neonatal death and use of maternal health services 
(villages without women's groups, quartic time function) 
Villages without women's group (Model 3) 
Effect Effect 
(change in level) (change in slope) 
Pseudo 
2N R 
Outcome dy/dx Z-Stat dy/dx Z-Stat 
Neonatal mortality 0.002 0.13 -0.001 -0.26 0.025 7,610 
Delivery at government facility 0.003 0.43 0.001 0.34 0.235 7,614 
Delivery at private facility 0.0003 0.71 -0.0001 -0.76 0.199 4,821 
Delivery with SBA 0.005 0.52 0.000 0.11 0.253 7,533 
Delivery with a health worker 0.016 1.40 -0.003 -1.13 0.240 7,670 
Delivery by caesarean section 0.0004 O. S2 -0.0003** -1.99 0.229 5,937 
Number of antenatal care visits 0.004 0.05 0.002 0.09 0.091 7,671 
Note: Each row is a different model. *** denotes coefficients are significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and 0 at 10%. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the level of the woman. Regression models include 12 community fixed effects, dummies capturing 
ethnicity, religion, occupation of household head, and materials used to make house, as well variables for age of the woman at 
childbirth, educational attainment and number of months in the previous year for which household had enough food. The time 
function is a polynomial of degree four. Marginal effects for these variables are not reported. For those outcomes where the 
dependent variable is a probability of utilisation, a probit model Is used, while estimates of impact on the number of ANC visits 
are derived from a negative binomial model. A likelihood ratio test of equi-dispersion (alpha=O) between the negative binomial 
and the poisson specification rejects the latter decisively (chibar2=1244.8, p<0.001). Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Observations in which the regression model predicts failure perfectly must be dropped, explaining why N 
varies in each model. SBA = skilled birth attendant 
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The final table assesses the robustness of the results to a different specification of the time 
function. Table 8. S provides impact estimates using the more restricted specification where time 
is modelled as a quadratic function. In many instances, there is agreement between these impact 
estimates and those generated previously in the more flexible model. The two sets of 
specifications remain consistent in their finding of no impact on either neonatal mortality or the 
caesarean section rate. The findings regarding the impact of the SDI P in villages with worne n's 
groups are also consistent. However, differences emerge in the statistical significance of the 
results for villages with no women's groups. Contrary to the previous results, the marginal effects 
under the more restricted specification suggest the SDIP had a significant, albeit small, immediate 
positive impact on utilisation of government maternity services, skilled birth attendance and 
attendance by any health worker, as well as a negative longer-term impact on attendance by any 
health worker. 
8.4.3 Assessment of internal validity 
Non-equivalent outcome 
In the last row of Table 8.2, Table 8.3 and Table 8.4, estimates show that there was no 
discontinuity or slope change in the number of antenatal care visits at the time of the SDIP's 
introduction, strengthening the plausibility of the impact estimates identified on the other 
outcomes. This finding suggests non-programme factors that might affect health seeking along the 
entire continuum of care are unlikely to confound the impact estimates. Moreover, it implies that 
changes in the coverage of the surveillance system over time were not a source of confounding, 
since it would bias impact estimates on utilisation of both antenatal care and intrapartum care in 
the same direction. 
233 1Pae 
n C4 00 Ln oo 4 ! vý -! 
-a !ý6 
cL 
cu 
ba c x m 00 0 
= :z0 98 9 L" 8 3. 96 1? 5 
0 
to co IT C4 
C4 0 r4 
bo C4 xa Cý az rý 00 = 9 14 ci 
C:, 
LA in r, rn cn 11 r! r! 
0 9 CL 
0 
Ur 
.0 Cx 
Ul : LM 
m :z8 
§§ § 
ch 
§ 
CS 6 qýi Cý 
m co 0 r, 00 co 
@ ý;; a m- C-4 m 1ý 
a 00 
.0 
ci 0 CD 
cn 
9 9T 9 'It 
CL 
cu m 
x to 
- m Ul 9 m 
cn 
19! 't 
r, 40 r4 
9 
Klo * Co "0 Co r4 00 cý -ol CD 0 0 
Ln 
06 
.0 
im 
E2 
co 
2 a a 
-0 2uZ l* 
: t- 
. 2! ,w 
'00 
.9 j2 'Z 
00 
0>ý ýO Z' -Z E -0 M 00 ZE 
"0 . 
E E 
ZE 002%e 
0 Le c>- 3: 0 
> -Z ý-r, 0 'U 0 '2 0mZ 
ID -m ý-M 
E *2 2 f', ý Z0wm-5! 
mc, r-E-l«13 
to m-Z, u0 
. rr- -w1. 
IL - 
,v0E am 2 jýý z=C 
av m0 
I «a k- .6 10 
md da# 0 
-CU 0 Z -0 0m 
0E 
-, i = CL =. O . 12 -2f 
2 
c 
E 
fr- m 
.m -1,2, C -, Z 
an 
.u, ýeZ 
E 
---- .2 
'ý m *E w0, -00 
. bo 'ZE 
mä m Ci 
Ew > 
0 %t 
53r, - Ch 3: 
41 G. 0- .0cm0'. »E 
, :E j3 0 -u :E 't -u 
«s f ei t11:, -. -Z 
«ýlag, 
E du 0 (L, CL 
c 
D' 
wE EA 
an 
u> 
QI --, 
e 
m aal , -i (IJ 
UJ Ze r- la CL 
Ew' 'm ' 
EeE 11 5 
"o C, - 
Contextual factors as confounders 
The longitudinal analysis shows that there was a positive shift in utilisation of government health 
facilities and attendance by a skilled health worker in villages with women's groups at the time the 
SDIP began implementation. The threats to internal validity are assessed in relation to this finding. In 
other words, could factors other than the SDIP explain these changes in utilisation of maternity 
services? 
Interviews with key informants identified a range of factors that could potentially confound impact 
estimates. An obvious political factor mentioned by respondents was the end of civil conflict. In terms 
of service-related factors, those identified included changes made to the delivery of maternity services 
at the district hospital, a new sub-health post and two new small private hospitals. Finally, a number 
of project managed by NGOs were identified as being potentially relevant. These include the 
activities of PLAN international, Mother and Infant Research Activities, Family Planning Association 
of Nepal, Marie Stopes and the Centre for Community Development Nepal. Respondents made no 
mention of any health policy changes that might be relevant. 
Table 8.6 provides a description of each factor, the geographical coverage, and the budget (where 
relevant). Table 8.7 summarises the threat to internal validity of each factor, basing this assessment 
largely on the information given in the previous table. 
The civil conflict in Nepal started in 1996 and took the form of a Maoist-led violent insurgency. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the provision of and access to health services were disrupted 
during this time. The latter was particularly hampered due to frequent vehicle strikes caused by the 
political instability. In 2006, however, the King was forced to relinquish power in the face of 
widespread popular protests (International Crisis Group 2006). This lay the foundation for a ceasefire 
between the Maoists and the new government and a serious peace process. While the direction and 
magnitude of the effect of the conflict's end on maternal health care seeking are probably consistent 
with the structural break in the trend of skilled birth attendance, the inconsistent timing suggests this 
factor is not a credible threat to internal validity. 
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Makwanpur's district hospital was upgraded in mid-2006 to provide caesarean section and blood 
transfusion services, although these were not made available on a 24-hour basis. These changes are 
expected to have led to an immediate shift in utilisation of government maternity services. 
However, the timing of the change was not consistent with the start of the SDIP, making it an 
unlikely source of confounding. Other changes to government services included the opening of a 
new sub-health post. This factor poses no threat to internal validity since its timing does not 
coincide with the start of the SDIP and the magnitude of its effect was probably far too small to 
explain the regression results. 
Two new private hospitals have opened in Makwanpur district in recent years. The first of these, 
Devi private hospital, is expected to have increased skilled birth attendance, and its anticipated 
effect is consistent with the timing and magnitude of the discontinuity in the time trend. Given 
that this factor concerns the private sector, it could only have improved skilled birth attendance 
through an increase in the utilisation of private maternity services. The regression results, 
however, provide no evidence of any positive shift in private hospital deliveries at the time the 
SDIP started, suggesting this factor was not responsible for the shift in skilled birth attendance. " 
The second hospital, Samudyak private hospital, provides no delivery care services and opened a 
couple of years after the start of the SDIP, ruling out the possibility that it could have confounded 
impact estimates. 
Of the five NGOs working in reproductive health in the district, the potential influence of two of 
these can be immediately ruled out on the basis that they were not involved in any activities 
directly related to care seeking at childbirth, The assessment of the three remaining NGOs that 
could plausibly have increased utilisation of maternity services suggests none were likely to have 
affected internal validity of the study. PLAN international started well before the SDIP and few of 
its activities focused on maternal health. MIRA's women's group intervention, although shown to 
influence health care seeking (Manandhar, Osrin et al. 2004), is not consistent with the start of 
the SDIP, nor is its effect likely to have been instantaneous given the time it takes to complete the 
women's group action cycle. Finally, the activities of Family Planning Association of Nepal started 
a long time before the SDIP and the annual budget appears too small for any impact on health care 
seeking at childbirth. 
72 If anything, the regression results suggest that there was negative long-term 
. 
effect on private hospital deliveries. 
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8. S Discussion 
8.5.1 Interpretation of findings 
The findings show that utilisation of government maternity services has risen noticeably in rural 
areas of Makwanpur. Various pieces of evidence suggest that part of this increase is attributable to 
the SDIP. Inspection of trends over time show a clear shift in the level of sUled birth attendance 
and utilisation of government health facilities precisely around the time the SDIP began 
implementation. Confirmation of the discontinuity in these outcomes is provided by the 
regression results. They indicate the programme raised skilled birth attendance by 2.2 percentage 
points and utilisation of government maternity services by 2.6 percentage points, a magnitude 
which is consistent with the impact findings from the previous chapter. 
With the same study setting, the findings from this analysis can be directly compared to those that 
emerged from the demand model in chapter S. A calculation based on the above impact estimate 
and the household cost of seeking care at childbirth gives a price elasticity of - 1.3 - that is, for 
every 100 percent fall in the price of care, there is a 130 percent increase in utilisation of 
government maternity services. This estimate compares with a price elasticity of -2.3 for the 
regional hospital and - 1.3 for the district hospital generated by the model in chapter S. The 
estimates of price elasticity are of same order of magnitude, thereby adding to the credibility of 
the overall findings. If anything, one might expect the evaluation impact estimate to be higher 
than the model estimates owing to an interaction effect between the supply-side and demand-side 
incentive. 
The programme failed to have any significant impact on the caesarcan rate, presumably because 
the district hospital was not upgraded to provide surgery until nine months after the start of the 
SDIP in the district. The results also showed no impact on neonatal mortality. The analysis was 
not powered to detect the small change in neonatal mortality that one might expect, given the 
size of the impact of the SDIP on service utilisation. In any event, inadequate quality of care may 
have constrained improvements in health outcomes that would be expected from the increased 
utilisation. 
A closer examination of the data provides some understanding of what influenced the impact of 
the SDIP. In the stratified analysis, it becomes clear that the positive impact on utilisation over the 
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entire sample is driven largely by the villages with women's groups. In these villages, the impact 
of the SDIP on utihsation of maternity services and skilled birth attendance was substantial. The 
findings suggest that the women's groups, by providing a channel to communicate the policy to 
the community, acted as a mediating factor between implementation and the impact of the SDIP. 
Moreover, the women's groups may have been particularly effective in this regard because of the 
trust that has developed between the group facilitators and the community, ensuring the message 
had credibility despite poor administration of the cash incentive. The impact estimates suggest 
then that the price elasticity is probably double the - 1.3 calculated above. 
There are a number of reasons behind why the women's groups are likely to be the most plausible 
explanation for the difference between the two sets of villages. First, the findings are consistent 
both with what is known about implementation of the programme in the district and the 
conceptual framework in chapter 3. Second, the fact that the women's group intervention was 
randomised across villages narrows the possibility that other factors were responsible for 
differences in impact between the two groups. 73 
The results have implications for the health provider incentive, a component of the SDIP yet to be 
addressed in this thesis. Given that there is no obvious reason why the women's groups would 
have modified the effect of the health provider incentive, the little or no impact in villages 
without women's groups provides some evidence that the supply-side incentive had at most a 
small effect on utilisation in this district. Unfortunately, with no information on processes it is 
difficult to understand the reasons for why this might be case. 
There are reasons to believe that the impact estimates in this study area were greater than the 
country as a whole. Geographical access to health facilities in the district is relatively good, 
whereas in many other districts in Nepal, poor access represents more than simply a high 
transport cost - it is a physical barrier to getting to the health facility. Moreover, our sample 
included only rural households who are typically poorer than urban households. Economic theory 
would predict that poorer households are likely to be more incentivised by the conditional cash 
transfer. 
This is certainly true in terms of characteristics that are fixed over time. Conecivably, factors themselves influenced 
by the women's groups prior to the SDIP may have mediated the impact. 
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8.5.2 Limitations 
An important part of the empirical strategy was to assess the threats to internal validity. It focused 
on confounding arising from problems in the completeness of data or contextual factors. The 
evidence in its entirety points to no external factor that could explain the discontinuity in the 
utilisation outcomes, thereby strengthening the plausibility of the findings. Most of all, it is 
difficult to see how any potential confounding factor could explain the differences between the 
stratified results. There are, however, a number of limitations that should be noted, even if they 
do not invalidate the findings. 
First, the robustness of the results to different specifications of the time function is mixed. While 
the preferred specification is the quartic time function, differences between the two specifications 
in the statistical significance of results suggest the functional form of the regression model is not 
unimportant. The level of significance is a moot point and what should be emphasised is that the 
SDIP had a greater impact on utilisation of government maternity services in those villages with 
women's groups. Whether the SDIP had any impact in villages with no women's groups is more 
uncertain. 
Second, while the use of additional qualitative information improves the validity of the findings, 
this is no substitute for more credible policy evaluation methods. For instance, if there had been 
genuine control areas in which individuals could not participate in the programme, difference-in- 
difference methods could have been used. The findings suggest that the villages with no women's 
groups are almost control areas; however, there is no quantitative data on knowledge of the SDIP 
to be sufficiently confident to justify a difference- in -difference approach in this instance. 
Third, it was a challenge getting information on the coverage and impact of NGO activities, an 
7' 
indication perhaps that these organisations rarely conduct rigorous evaluations of their projects . 
While this posed no major problem in this study given that most potential confounders could be 
disregarded on timing alone, it does serve to highlight a limitation of using data on contextual 
factors to assess internal validity if the evaluation covers, say, many districts. As the number of 
potential confounders rises it becomes increasingly difficult to rule them out, particularly if little 
is known about the magnitude of their effect on outcomes. 
"' The sole exception is MIRA, the organisation which is responsible for implementing the women's group 
intervention. They kept detailed documentation of their activities and have rigorously evaluated their intervention. 
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Fourth, the model implicitly assumed a certain functional form of the intervention effect -a shift 
and/or a change in the slope of outcome. While this seemed realistic, other types of effect are 
possible, such as an accelerated or decaying change in direction. 
Fifth, the external validity of the findings is questionable given that the women's groups - 
identified as an important effect modifier - are not widespread in Nepal. The results may simply 
indicate the importance of effectively communicating the SDIP to the public. On the other hand, 
the interaction between the women's groups and the SDIP may be much more complex. For 
instance, as already mentioned, there is the issue of trust, which is specific to the women's 
groups. In addition, the women's groups may have broken down many of the non-financial 
barriers to health care, allowing the SDIP's cash incentive to trigger a greater behaviour change 
than would otherwise happen. 
Sixth, there are unexpected findings which, unless spurious, are difficult to rationalise. For 
instance, the regression results suggest that the SDIP led to a (change in slope) reduction in the 
proportion of deliveries with a health worker. Perceptions of a gradual weakening in the 
implementation of the supply-side incentive over time or a confounding factor may explain this 
finding. 75 
8.5.3 Conclusion 
As in the previous chapter, the results from the analysis of the impact of the SDIP in Makwanpur 
district demonstrate the potential for the SDIP to influence health seeking behaviour were it not 
for weak implementation. The analysis in this chapter was able to separate implementation from 
the underlying mechanism of the SDIP and show the latter to work. The women's group appeared 
to be an important effect modifier, by providing an effective means through which to 
communicate the policy. 
" As mentioned previously, an incremental effect identified by a change in the slope is probably more susceptible to 
confounding that the shift in the outcome. 
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Chapter 9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis explored the impact of demand-side incentives on health seeking at childbirth, in the 
context of Nepal's Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP). This final chapter discusses the 
Pindings in reference to the broader literature on demand-side incentives and health seeking 
behaviour, and seeks to draw conclusions. More specifically, it brings together the findings from 
each of the four empirical analyses to discuss how they link together and to provide a coherent 
overview of the thesis results. It outlines the broad limitations, which provide the basis to discuss 
the key policy implications of the findings. These concern demand-side incentive programmes in 
low-income countries and maternal health care more broadly. The chapter concludes by 
exploring priorities for future research. 
Before discussing the findings, it is important to be mindful of a number of design changes that 
have been made to the SDIP after the end of the fieldwork for this research. In July 2008, the 
SDIP was expanded to cover the non-state sector. It meant that women receiving delivery care in 
participating hospitals - mostly private medical colleges and some non-profit mission hospitals - 
could claim the conditional cash transfer as long as they were on the general ward, not paying for 
a private room. In early 2009, the SDIP underwent two further major changes. The revised policy 
stated that the incentives to health workers for attending deliveries would no longer be paid. 
Moreover, it specified that both public and non-state providers are to provide free delivery care. 
To compensate for loss of reVehue, the government reimburses health facilities for the cost of 
care. 76 Part of this reimbursement is set aside for quality of care improvements, including a 
provision to give a small financial benefit to health workers in light of the discontinuation of the 
provider incentive. 
While it is recognised that these policy changes have already taken place, the discussion around 
policy implications can only draw on the research evidence. There is clearly a challenge in 
conducting an evaluation of a policy which is constantly evolving. The research remains relevant 
in informing discussion of whether the policy changes that have been made are likely to have much 
impact. 
In light of these changes, the government has renamed the SDIP, the "Ama Surakchhya Karyakram" programme. 
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9.1 Main findings 
9.1.1 Objective 1: Exploring the demand for maternity care 
The utility model of provider choice showed that price has a negative effect on utilisation of health 
services. Price operates through both an income effect and a substitution effect. Moreover, it is 
predicted to have a greater effect on poorer households. Inferences about the relative importance 
of the determinants of demand for health care at childbirth were made using discrete choice 
models and full information maximum likelihood estimation techniques. Prices were measured 
comprehensively, including the financial costs of health seeking as well as the opportunity cost of 
time. 
Using data from the district of Makwanpur, descriptive statistics showcd that the vast majority of 
women give birth at home. The cost of care at a health facility places a considerable burden on the 
household budget and the budget share is greater the poorer is the houschold. Caesarean sections, 
in particular, appear to cause severe financial distress, as shown by the high incidence of 
catastrophic expenditure. 
The discrete choice models showed that price is indeed a significant determinant of provider 
choice at childbirth. Price elasticity estimates indicate that demand for maternity care is elastic for 
regional hospitals, and close to unity for the district hospital and primary health care centre 
alternatives. The estimates of price elasticity, however, are highly sensitive to the choice of 
behavioural model. In the case of regional and district hospitals, price elasticities arc highest for 
the middle wealth quintiles (quintile three and four) and lowest at each end of wealth distribution. 
In the simulation exercises, reducing the price of care at health facilities has a reasonably large 
effect on utilisation of maternity services (Figure 9.1). If maternity care were to be free, almost 
40 percent of women would deliver in health facility. In contrast, ensuring all health facilities have 
at least a doctor, nurse or midwife to attend deliveries has almost no effect on the proportion of 
women delivering at home because this is already almost always the case. 
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Figure 9.1 Simulated effects of changes to keV policV variables on institutional deliverV care 
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Figure 9.2 Simulated effect of changes to predisposing factors on institutional delivery care 
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Baseline Price reduced by 50% Free maternity care Skilled birth 
in facilities attendance 
Baseline Wealth At least primary At least Obstructed Severe bleeding 
increased 50% education secondary labour 
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Other factors are significant determinants of health seeking, including household wealth and 
education of the woman. Simulations of changes in these and other variables are shown in Figure 
9.2. Sclf-rcported complications prior to or during labour were the most important 
determinants. The reason for this may be linked to perceptions of the quality of care, such that 
women only seek care in a dire emergency. Or perhaps, there is an information failure such that 
families may not recognise the need for maternity care when there is no problem during 
childbirth, seeing it primarily as a curative intervention. 
Price elasticity estimates are reasonably consistent with other studies that have used similar 
methods in the general health care literature (Gertler and Hammer 1997). They arc, however, 
substantially higher than previous studies on maternal health seeking, which found little or no 
effect of price on utilisation (Heller 1982; Akin, Guilkey et al. 1985; Schwartz, Akin et al. 1988; 
Li 1996; Hotchkiss 1998). The difference is most likely due to the use of a more flexible model in 
this study. Numerous studies have found that morbidity, or at least self-reported morbidity, is 
positively associated with health seeking at childbirth, in line with the findings from this study 
(van den Heuvc], de Mey et al. 1999; Amooti-Kaguna and Nuwaha 2000; Afsana and Rashid 
2001; Paul and Rumsey 2002; Glei, Goldman et al. 2003; Matthews, Ramakrishna et al. 2005; 
Islam, Chowdhury et al. 2006). 
In summary, the findings suggest that price is an important determinant of health care seeking at 
childbirth. Households arc thus likely to be reasonably sensitive to a price subsidy equivalent to 
the conditional cash transfer of the SDIP. Other important barriers exist, relating to women's 
preferences to deliver at home in the absence of any sign of obstetric complications. 
9.1.2 Objective 2: Assessing implementation of the SDIP 
The second objective of the thesis was to explore implementation of the SDIP. The theoretical 
model of the programme's causal pathway pointed towards a number of intermediate processes 
that are key to the implementation of the SDIP. Indicators related to these processes were 
analysed and findings from a qualitative study were brought into the discussion to explain in more 
depth why uptake of the programme was low. 
Information on the process indicators is telling. Only a quarter of women had heard of the SDIP 
prior to childbirth and only a fifth of women who delivered in a public health facility received the 
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conditional cash transfer that they were entitled to immediately after childbirth. If women who 
received a deduction from their health facility bill equivalent to the conditional cash transfer are 
also included, the proportion increases to 36 percent. It is thereforc not surprising that only one- 
tenth of women prior to childbirth knew of the SDIP and expccted to rcceivc the conditional cash 
transfer. 
Table 9.1 surnmarises the evidence on the factors that influenced knowledge of the SDIP prior to 
childbirth and receipt of the conditional cash transfer. It incorporates evidence from the 
qualitative study in the first phase of the evaluation. Constraints at the central level provide the 
most plausible reason for why few families heard about the SDIP and why administration of the 
demand-side incentives was weak. There was no attempt by programme managers at the central 
level to promote the SDIP, owing to two concerns. First, it was feared that public health services 
might not be able to meet the increase in demand. Second, there were well-known problems in 
the disbursement of funds to pay beneficiaries and it was felt irresponsible to raise public 
expectations. 
The late disbursement of funds from the donor was the primary reason behind the failure of health 
providers to pay women. Long delays in the disbursement of funds from the donor to the central 
government meant health providers could rarely honour the promise to pay beneficiaries on 
discharge from the health facility. With the donor funding. 90 percent of the national programme 
budget, the government was in no position to fill the gap caused by these delays. The 
unpredictability of donor funding has been well documented (Bulir and Hamann 2001 ). The 
problem is accentuated if the funding is for a demand-side incentive progarnme, whose success 
ultimately depends on being able to pay beneficiaries on time. This explains why Gilson and 
McIntyre (2005) caution against the use of donor funds to finance the removal of user fees. 
Closely related is the strength of the public financial management system. Delays in the 
disbursement of funds were observed at every level throughout the system (Powell-Jackson, 
Neupane et al. 2008). 
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Table 9.1 Factors influencing the uptake of the SDIP 
Factor 
Direction of Evidence 
influence (QUANT = quantitative; QUAL = qualitative) 
1. Knowledge of SDIP and receipt of the conditional cash transfer 
Lack of preparation and planning Negative Planning was limited due to political expediency for quick 
adoption of policy (QUAL) 
............... District level factors Positive Districts borrowing funds from other budget lines to pay 
beneficiaries (QUAL). Districts used FM radio and other 
strategies to promote the SDIP (QUAL). Variation in 
sources of information about SDIP by district (QUANT). 
Access to health services Positive Proximity to health providers is associated with 
....... . ......... . .... . 
knowledge. and receipt of cash (QUANT) 
Year of exposure to SDIP Positive Year of implementation is associated with knowledge and 
receipt of cash (QUANT) 
2. Knowledge of SDIP 
............ ....... ........ . .. Lack of central level promotion of the Negative Failure to promote the programme led to low awareness 
SIDIP of SIDIP in target population (QUAL) 
Communication channels at the Positive Variation in impacts by women's group area, indicative of 
community level (women's groups, variation in knowledge of the SDIP (QUANT). ' FCHV is 
female community health associated with knowledge (QUANT) 
volunteers) 
.......... . ...... 
Age Negative Age is associated with knowledge (QUANT) 
Socioeconomic status (wealth, Positive Wealth, education level and marginalised ethnicities are 
education, ethnicity) associated with knowledge (QUANT) 
.... ... ............ .-..... ....... Access to media Positive Access to media is associated with knowledge (QUANT) 
3. Receipt of the conditional cash transfer 
................... ... ..... .............. -- ............. Donor funding of SDIP Negative 
I ............. I .. I.., .............. ....... I-....... .................... .... .-.............. - .......... ..... ..... Weak financial management system Negative 
... ...... ....... - ---- Delivery in a hospital Negative 
Delays in disbursement by the donor (QUANT). Donor 
support led to a lack of ownership at the district level and 
perceptions of SDIP as a vertical programme (QUAL) 
I ............. ..... .............. . ....... ........................ Delays in disbursement of funds throughout the system 
from central level to the health providers (QUANT & 
QUAL). Misuse of funds (QUAL) 
Hospital delivery associated with receipt of cash (QUANT) 
Note: ' Although chapter 7 suggests no effect of women's groups on knowledge of the SDIP, this is likely to be 
because women's groups were rarely used to promote SDIp. 
b Evidence is weak (p<0.1) 
Underpinning the disbursement delays and failure to promote the SDIP was a general lack of 
preparation and planning prior to the launch of the programme. This has been noted as an 
important constraint in other studies. For instance, the experience of financial reforms in South 
Africa and Zambia suggest political pressure to rush through policy changes meant there was 
limited time to plan effectively (Gilson, Doherty et al. 2003). While policymakers have an 
incentive to come up with new policy initiatives that will attract the interest of donors, they may 
be less concerned with the practical issues of implementation (Witter and Adjei 2007). 
Despite the central level constraints, it is clear that some districts were able to pcrform 
considerably better than others in the implementation of the programme. Implementers at this 
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level appear to have considerable influence in how the policy takes shape on the ground (Lipsky 
1983). The qualitative data shed light on some of these unobserved district level factors. Some 
districts took it upon themselves to communicate the policy. On the financial side, the decision by 
some district and hospital managers to direct funds from other budget lines for the purposes of the 
SDIP was critical. This practice allowed payment of beneficiaries earlier than would otherwise 
have been possible. The reasons why districts did or did not take actions to cope with the 
challenges seem to be linked to local pressures, perceptions of the programme as a donor-funded 
vertical programme, and understanding of the policy. 
A range of factors at the community, household and individual - lev el were associated with uptake 
of the programme (including access to women's groups, actions of the female community health 
volunteer, age, wealth, education, ethnicity, access to media, and proximity to health services). 
The direction of influence of these factors was as expected, but probably context- specific. That is, 
if the government had used (different) strategies to communicate the SDIP or had stronger 
administrative structures in place, the direction of influence of some of these factors may have 
changed. For instance, in the conditional cash transfer programmes in Brazil and Ecuador, income 
and education were shown to be negatively associated with participation because the government 
was able to communicate the policy effectively to the poorest households (Fiszbein, Schady et al. 
2008). The context in Nepal of a relatively free media and a strong tradition of community based 
organisations that act largely independent of government should also be considered. 
Finally, the length of time the SDIP had been operating was found to be an important determinant 
of both the receipt of the conditional cash transfer and knowledge of the SDIP prior to childbirth. 
In the case of administration of the conditional cash transfer, it is likely to reflect major changes 
made in disbursement arrangements between the bilateral donor and the central government, 
which goes back to the point about the predictability of donor funding. More generally, however, 
it indicates that it took time for the programme to bed down and it seems reasonable to expect 
the same in different contexts. 
There is little in the literature about the implementation of demand-side incentive programmes 
beyond a description of programme design. As such, it is not clear if there have been 
implementation challenges in other countries and, if so, what are the lessons. In the study of the 
experience of financing reform in South Africa and Zambia, Gilson et al. (2003) note a number of 
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factors that constrained implementation, many of which ring true in this research. They include 
political pressure for a quick policy change; a failure to provide information about the new policy 
to key implementers; and a failure to build implementation capacity such as monitoring systems. 
A review of conditional cash transfer programmes provides an indication of their complexity 
(Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2008). The monitoring systems are intricate, using cutting-edge 
technology to collect information on as many as 400 process indicators. Moreover, the designs are 
complex. For example, Brazil's Bolsa Familia required at least 60 regulatory documents to guide 
implementation (Lindert, Linder et al. 2007), while Chile's Solidario has over 53 minimum 
conditions of participation (Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2008). In terms of community awareness of the 
programmes, there appears to be little evidence but, as Gilson and McIntyre emphasisc, 
communication is one of the key strategies to implement health financing reforms (Gilson and 
McIntyre 200S). 
Weak financial management and administrative capacity, in particular, scems to be a common 
theme emerging from the recent literature on financing policies in low-income countries. For 
instance, the removal of fees for delivery care in Ghana was characterised by considerable 
unpredictability in funding and in India there have been long delays in paying beneficiaries of the 
national demand-side incentive programme (Witter and Adjei 2007; Devadasan, Elias et al. 
2008). The Government of Mexico's contracting of the national telecoms company to manage 
payments in the Oportunidades programme perhaps illustrates the importance of having an 
administrative infrastructure already in place (Eichler and Levine 2009). 
In summary, the findings showed that implementation of the SDIP has been weak, although there 
are indications it has improved over time. The majority of the target population were not reached 
by the SIDIP, dampening expectations of a large impact on health seeking behaviour. The analysis 
shed light on a range of factors that influenced individual participation in the programme, thereby 
helping to characterise the selection process. 
9.1.3 Objective 3: Analysing the impact of the SDIP 
The conceptual model provided insights into the hypothesised effect of the SDIP on health seeking 
behaviour. These predictions provided the basis for the two separate analyses of the programme's 
impact that corresponded to different geographical areas in Nepal. The choice of control group 
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with which to identify the impact of the SDIP was guided by the theoretical model of the 
programme's causal pathway. Table 9.2 summarises the evidence from the empirical analyses of 
the impact of the SDIP. 
In the first analysis, primary data were used from a survey of six districts in Nepal. Impact 
estimates were derived using propensity score matching methods. Among women who knew 
about the SDIP prior to childbirth, the programme had a positive impact on the utilisation of 
maternity services. There was some weak evidence that the SDIP crowded out the non- 
governmental sector, as shown by the negative impact on deliveries in INGO health facilities. 
Table 9.2 Summary of evidence on the impact of the SDIP 
Main finding Evidence (ATT estimates) 
a. Propensity score matching analysis in six districts (treated = heard of the SUP prior to childbirth) 
SDIP increased utilisation of a +4.0 percentage points on institutional delivery care (p value<0.001) 
maternity services . +4.3 percentage points on skilled birth attendance (p value<0.001) 
N +1.2 percentage points on caesarean section rate (p value=0.067) 
.... ...... SDIP crowded out the non- -1.1 percentage points on NGO delivery care (p value=0.063) 
governmental sector 
.., . 1. .ý-1 .1. I. -I. - ...... .... ....... .... . ........ - .......... .......... ...... ..... SIDIP impacts varied by region Tarai districts: +2.9 percentage points on institutional delivery care (p 
value=0.363) 
Hill districts: -2.0 percentage points on institutional delivery care (p 
value=0.401) 
Mountain districts: +8.7 percentage points on institutional delivery care 
(p value<0.001) 
SIDIP impacts varied by wealth for 0 Poorest 40%: 2.6 percentage points on institutional delivery care (p 
institutional delivery care value=0.073) 
" Middle 20%: 6.3 percentage points on institutional delivery care (p 
value<0.001) - 
" Richest 40%: 3.2 percentage points on institutional delivery care (p 
value=0.435) 
b. Longitudinal analysis in Makwanpur district (treated = area in which policy was communicated) 
.......... . .... . ...... . ............. ...... ... . ........ I................. ...... ....... . .... SDIP increased utilisation of 0 +6.2 percentage points on government delivery care (p value<0.001) 
maternity services 0 +5.2 percentage points on skilled birth attendance (p value<0.007) 
SDIP did not increase the caesarean -0.3 percentage points on caesarean section rate (p value=0.312) 
section rate 
-- .1- -1-1-- -1. ........ ....... . ...... -. - ............. ......... ............. ........ ....... ...... . ... SDIP did not reduce neonatal -0.3 percentage points on neonatal mortality (p value=0.810) 
mortality 
Note: ATT = average treatment effect on the treated. CCT = conditional cash transfer. NGO = non-governmental 
organisation. 
The greatest impact of the programme was in the mountain region, where the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) was substantial. The impact on institutional delivery care in the tarai 
and the hill districts was not significant. It should be noted, however, that the subgroup analysis 
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only had enough power to detect a large impact. There was weak evidence of variation in the 
impact of the SDIP on institutional delivery care by wealth. The largest ATT estimate is found in 
the middle wealth group, but in relative terms the poorest two-fifths of households were most 
responsive to the demand-side incentives. 
The second analysis provides evidence of the SDIP's impact in the district of Makwanpur and 
allows a direct comparison with results from the demand model in chapter S. The longitudinal 
analysis showed that in areas where the programme was communicated widely through women's 
groups, the SDIP increased utilisation of maternity services. There was, however, no impact on 
the caesarean section rate because it was not for another nine months after the start of the SDIP 
that the district hospital was upgraded to provide emergency surgery. There was no evidence of 
an impact of the programme on neonatal mortality, although the analysis was not powered to 
detect the small change in neonatal mortality that one might expect, in light of the size of the 
impact of the SDIP on service utilisation. 
The magnitude of the impact estimates in this analysis is consistent with that computed by the 
demand model in chapter S. Individuals appear similarly sensitive to prices in both the evaluation 
of the SDIP and in the modelling exercise. In principle, the evaluation impact estimates reflect the 
combined effect of the conditional cash transfer and the provider incentive and thus may not be 
directly comparable, but indications are that the supply-side incentive had a minimal effect. 
The results from the two analyses of impact show that the demand-side incentives, as the 
mechanism through which the programme works, are effective in raising utilisatiOn of maternity 
services. In this sense, the core insight emerging from each analysis is consistent. However, the 
fmding of no impact in the hill districts in chapter 7 was unexpected. In one of the two districts, 
women were mistakenly given the incentive even when they delivered at home - in effect, a 
measurement error in the treatment variable, which would dampen the estimated effect. In the 
other h ill district, the terrain is particularly challenging, which may have meant the cash incentive 
represented a small fraction of the overall cost of seeking care. 
A direct comparison of the two sets of ATT estimates is complicated by the fact that the treatment 
group is defined differently in the two analyses. In particular, the treatment group for the 
propensity score matching was defined in such a way that the measure of prograrnme impact 
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essentially filters out issues related to implementation. Over the entire sample, the increases in 
utilisation attributable to the SDIP are a fraction of the estimates given by the ATT. With just 
over one-quarter of the sample reached by the programme, the ATT estimate implies that the 
increase in skilled birth attendance as a result of the SDIP was 1.2 pcrcentage points across the 
entire sample (see section 9.3.4). 
This compares with an impact of 2.2 percentage points on skilled birth attendance across the 
entire sample in Makwanpur district. There arc various reasons why estimates might differ, 
relating to differences in the financial package of incentives on offer and differences in 
implementation. It is reassuring, however, that the impact estimates are of the same order of 
magnitude. In view of the government target of 60 percent for skilled birth attendance in 201 S, 
the impact indicated by the estimates from the two analyses are modest at best. 
With little evidence from other countries on the effect of demand-side incentives on utilisation of 
maternity services it is difficult to put these findings into perspective. Indeed, this illustrates the 
important contribution of this research to the literature. A number of studies have noted that 
when user fees for maternal health services have been abolished, utilisation has increased, but 
without a credible identification strategy, one would be ill-advised to attribute all of the change to 
the reform (Wilkinson, Gouws et al. 2001; Deininger and Mpuga 2004; Nabyonga, Desmet et al. 
2005; Penfold, Harrison et al. 2007). 
Similarly, comparisons of impact estimates with those from evaluations of conditional cash 
transfer programmes are difficult, although for other reasons. These programmes focus on quite 
different health interventions and provide an incentive on top of fully subsidised health care. To 
get a sense of the magnitude, estimates of programme impact on health centre visits by children 
range from a6 percentage point increase in Nicaragua to a 33 percentage point increase in 
Columbia (Attanasio, Battistin E et al. 2005; Macours, Schady et al. 2008). It suffices to note that 
evaluations of these programmes provide compelling evidence that conditional cash transfers have 
the potential to increase utilisation of health services. 
Whether the positive impact on service utilisation improves health depends on the quality of care. 
The Survey of Health Providers conducted during the first phase of the evaluation provides 
evidence on a comprehensive range of both structural and process- orientated measures (Powell- 
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Jackson, Neupane et al. 2008). The quality of maternity services was found to be poor. Most 
telling is the fact that no primary health care centre and only 13 percent of district hospitals could 
provide basic emergency obstetric care. Neither of these two types of health facility could provide 
surgical procedures. 
Various empirical methods were used in an effort to assess the robustness of the findings in light 
of the non -experimental study design. Table 9.3 summarises the findings from these empirical 
assessments. In its entirety, the evidence suggests that the findings from both analyses are 
credible. 
Table 9.3 Summary of evidence on the robustness of the impact findings 
Main finding Evidence 
a. Propensity score matching analysis in six districts 
SDIP has no impact on women with 6 -0.3 percentage points on government delivery care (p value=0.834) 
low expectation of receiving CCT a +0.6 percentage points on skilled birth attendance (p value=0.741) 
Absolute estimates of impact from a +4.6 percentage points on government delivery care (p value=0.764) 
IV estimation are greater a +8.7 percentage points on institutional delivery care (p value=0.582) 
Impact estimates are fairly robust to a Kernel matching: +4.0 percentage points on institutional delivery care (p 
different matching estimators value<0.001) 
0 Malahanobis matching; + 3.9 percentage points on institutional delivery 
care (p value=0.039) 
6 Nearest neighbour matching: + 4.6 percentage points on institutional 
delivery care (p value<0.001) 
b. Longitudinal analysis in Makwanpur district 
I.. I I -... ý-1.1111.1.1 ......... . .......................... . ............ ........ ...... ..... . ................... SIDIP had no impact in areas in . +0.3 percentage points on government delivery care (p value=0.672) 
which the policy was poorly . +0.5 percentage points on skilled birth attendance (p vafue=0.603) 
communicated 
.......... ... .......... SDIP had no impact on antenatal .... . ....... . ......... . .......... 8 +0.04 antenatal care visits (p value=0.603) in entire sample 
care (non-equivalent outcome) 0 +0.13 antenatal care visits (p value=0.242) in sample with women's 
groups 
Contextual factors as confounders Political factors, health-service related factors, and the activities of 
are ruled out NGOs ruled out as confounders on basis of either timing, direction of 
...... .... . ..... _Rpss-i+ble 
bias, or size of possible bias 
Robustness of results to different Quartic time function: +5.2 percentage points on skilled birth 
specifications of the time function attendance (p value<0.007)in sample with women's groups 
was mixed Quadratic time function: +4.4 percentage points on skilled birth 
attendance (p value<0.004)ln sample with women's groups 
Quartic time function: +1.6 percentage points on skilled birth 
attendance (p value<0.162)in sample with no women's groups 
Quadratic time function: +1.8 percentage points on skilled birth 
attendance (p value<0.026)in sample with no women's groups 
Note: CCT = conditional cash transfer. NGO = non-governmental organisation. 
Equally compelling is the fact that the findings are consistent with standard economic theory and 
the model of the programme's causal Pathway. As predicted, reducing the price through a cash 
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subsidy has a positive and modest impact on utilisation of government maternity services and leads 
to substitution away from the home and non-state providers. Moreover, the effect of the demand- 
side incentives on behaviour is modified by the size of financial package relative to price, 
consistent with the theoretical predictions. in terms of the programme's causal pathway, the 
findings confirm that knowledge of the SDIP is necessary but not sufficient for the programme to 
change health seeking behaviour. There must also be an expectation that the conditional cash 
transfer will be paid. 
9.1.4 Linking implementation with impacts 
The story of the SDIP has two parts. On the one hand, the programme reached only a small 
proportion of the target population in its first three years and implementation has unintentionally 
favoured some subgroups more than others. On the other hand, the demand-side incentives have 
been shown to be effective in changing health seeking behaviour at childbirth. The behaviour of 
some subgroups was more affected by the financial incentives than others. Thus, it helpful to 
make the distinction between the impact of the demand-side incentives (the mechanism through 
which the programme works) and the impact of the programme (a combination of 
implementation and the effect of the demand-side incentives). 
Figure 9.3 summarises the findings from chapters 6 and 7 according to the stages laid out in the 
theoretical model of the programme's causal pathway. The entire sample of women is regarded as 
being eligible to receive the demand-side incentives. The first column shows the proportion of the 
target population who knew about the SDIP prior to childbirth. The second column shows the 
shows the proportion of the target population who knew about the SDIP and expected to receive 
the demand-side incentives (as proxied by knowledge of someone else who had received the cash 
incentive). The third column indicates the proportion of the total who were reached by the 
programme and delivered with skilled birth attendance. In this group there are women who 
would have delivered with skilled birth attendance in the absence of the SDIP, and there are 
women whose health seeking behaviour changed as a result of the incentive. The last column 
shows the latter group of women as a proportion of the target population, calculated on the basis 
of the ATT given by the propensity score matching. It gives the increase in skilled birth 
attendance over the entire sample that can be attributed to the SDIP. 
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Presentation of the findings in this way is useful for identifying where the major bottlenecks exist 
along the programme's causal pathway. Clearly, the major constraint is in the communication of 
the programme, given that threc-quarters of women were excluded from the programme on the 
basis of knowledge alone (Figure 9.3). However, there are also important bottlenecks at each 
subsequent stage. Only II percent of target households were reached by the programme; of 
these, half delivered with skilled birth attendance (S percent of the target population). In the end, 
1.3 percent of deliveries were with a skilled birth attendant as a result of the programme. The 
majority of women who were reached by the SDIP and delivered with skilled birth attendance 
would have done so in the absence of the programme. Raising the level of incentives such that 
more women are encouraged to deliver in a health facility would have a limited impact if no 
action was taken to improve knowledge of the SDIP and administration of the demand-side 
incentives. 
Figure 9.3 Uptake and impact of the SDIP in six districts of Nepal 
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Figure 9.4 links the process and impact findings in the same way but this time disaggregated by 
wealth quintile. There is a consistent positive gradient in the proportion of women reached by the 
SDIP (column 2). Only 13 percent of women in the richest quintile participated in the 
programme, but this is almost double that of the poorest quintile. In the poorest four-fifths of the 
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(1) Pregnant woman (2) ... and expected to (3) ... and delivered with 
(4) ... because of the SDIP 
heard about the SDIP receive cash SBA (impact) 
population, less than 5 percent of women were reached by the programme and delivered with 
skilled birth attendance. The last column is revealing. It shows that almost none of the women in 
the richest quintile who delivered with skilled birth attendance were incentivised to do by the 
SDIP. Moreover, despite a large effect of the incentives on behavioural change in the poorest two- 
fifths of the population, the impacts were negligible because few women had been reached by the 
programme. Thus, when the combination of implementation and the effect of the incentives are 
factored in, the middle wealth quintile benefits the most from the SDIP. 
Figure 9.4 Uptake and impact of the SDIP in six districts of Nepal by wealth quintile 
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Figure 9.5 shows that uptake was lowest in the tarai districts and highest in the mountain districts. 
The tarai districts have the highest proportion of women who were both reached by the SDIP and 
delivered with skilled birth attendance (column 3). However, since the incentives did not have a 
substantial effect on behaviour, a low proportion of women in this group delivered with skilled 
birth attendance as a result of the SDIP. The picture is very different in the mountain districts, 
where the majority of women who were reached by the programme and delivered with skilled 
birth attendance, did so because of the demand-sidc incentives. In the hill districts, the impact of 
the programme on skilled birth attendance is almost zero. 
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Figure 9.5 Uptake and impact of the SDIP in six districts of Nepal by ecological region 
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9.2 Limitations 
9.2.1 Reflections on the conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework in chapter 3 presented a theoretical model of the programme's causal 
pathway, showing explicitly the process through which the SDIP changes health seeking behaviour 
at childbirth. A woman's health seeking decision can only by influenced by the SDIP if she has 
knowledge of the programme and she has a positive expectation of receiving the financial benefits 
offered by the programme. In a simple model of utility maximisation, the demand-side incentives 
operate through the price mechanism to influence the choice of health provider among a discrete 
set of alternatives. The model provides a set of predictions that are then empirically tested. 
The conceptual framework was essential in identifying a control group with which to assess the 
impact of the SDIP. This was all the more important given that the programme was implemented 
nationwide with little opportunity to establish more conventional comparison units. It also 
allowed a clear separation between implementation processes and the price mechanism. This was 
useful in identifying where along the SDIP's causal pathway the main obstacles to programme 
impacts lay. 
The conceptual framework, nonetheless, has its limitations. The first is its representation of the 
causal chain as a linear series of well-defined stages, when in reality the process is likely to be 
mucli more complex and involve multiple interactions (Mills, Gilson et al. 2008; Ravallion 2009). 
This simple representation of the process can be useful for the reasons outlined above, but can 
also be misleading. The findings provide frequent examples of this complexity, throwing light on 
factors that could lead to the development of a new set of hypotheses to be tested. For instance, 
government promotion of the programme and administration of the payment system were 
conceived as essentially unconnected steps when in fact the former was heavily influenced by 
failures in the latter. It suggests that implementation processes are highly interdependent. 
A second limitation is the static nature of the model. Processes and even the intervention itself 
may deviate from stated policy or evolve over time. Local adaptation ensured the programme was 
often not implemented as planned (see chapter 4). Variation in the intervention means that the 
theoretical model of the programme's causal pathway, which is based on the design stated in the 
policy, may lose its relevance. A clear example comes from one of the districts, in which the SDIP 
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was altered to pay cash to women who give birth at home. In this instance, an assessment of the 
impact of the intervention on health seeking misses the point; rather the research might seek to 
uncover why the intervention was changed by district officials so radically, reasons that might be 
linked to equity concerns or a simple misunderstanding. Analytically, adaptation of the 
intervention is equivalent to measurement error and makes it more difficult to reject the null 
hypothesis of no programme impact. 
A third limitation refers to the lack of engagement with the theory on implementation. This also 
reflects a limitation in the scope of the thesis (see section 9.3.2), given that implementation could 
have been its sole focus. By setting out the main steps in the programme's causal pathway, the 
model lends itself to an assessment of implementation processes that is broadly descriptive 
(Sanders and Haines 2006). What is missingis a deeper understanding of the fundamental causes 
of the weak implementation. While the research findings may be interesting on one level, they are 
of limited use if they are unable to guide future implementation of other policies in Nepal or 
similar programmes in other countries. This argues for a strong theoretical framework to develop 
and test hypotheses, which can throw light on a set of factors that can be generalised. 
The literature review highlighted health policy analysis and theories of implementation to guide 
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empirical work in this area (Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008). Alternatively, a framework for 
analysing capacity may have been used to understand the various dimension of capacity that 
influenced implementation (Mills, Bennett et al. 2001). Some of the capacity constraints were 
clearly internal to the implementing institutions, while others were external, perhaps linked to 
the broader public sector institutional context. 
Finally, the utility model of provider choice may not be appropriate for analysing the 
consequences of the demand-side incentives for welfare. In so much as women may be under- 
consuming maternity services, an analytical framework that incorporates inconsistent time 
preferences, intra-household conflict and misguided beliefs may predict more accurately the 
welfare consequences of the demand-side incentives. But, as Kremer (2009) notes, there is not 
even an agreed conceptual framework for assessing welfare in such circumstances. 
These are discussed in more detail in the literature review chapter. 
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9.2.2 Scope of the thesis 
The scope of the thesis limits to some extent the conclusions that can be drawn from the findings. 
No rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis was conducted to judge whether the SDIP is good value for 
money. In a world of limited resources, information on costs is critical if policyrnakers are to 
adopt policies that will reap the greatest benefit for each dollar spent. It seems, however, 
economic evaluations of demand-side programmes are rare. The literature review identified a few 
studies, such as a cost-benefit analysis of a conditional cash transfer programme in Colombia 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometria et al. 2006). 
The thesis did not evaluate the effect of the supply-side incentive. There was a weak suggestion in 
chapter 8 that the health provider incentive in Makwanpur district had no effect, but this can 
hardly be regarded as conclusive evidence. The provider incentive has been contentious. I. ts 
inclusion in the policy was politically motivated and there have been widespread allegations of 
fraud (Ensor and Witter 2008). Policyrnakers in Nepal showed scant interest in wanting to study 
their effect, nor was there an opportunity to adopt a rigorous approach to evaluate this 
component of the SDIP. The lessons that can be learnt from this research are thus limited to the 
demand-side incentives. 
Finally, the evaluation was limited to studying the early period of programme implementation 
only. It is perhaps not surprising that the programme during this period faced difficulties. It was a 
national programme that was introduced rapidly without time set aside for piloting or detailed 
planning. The findings that emerge from an evaluation of the SDIP as a mature programme might 
be quite different, particularly with regards to the implementation process. For example, the 
administrative system might have adapted to the problems encountered early on. Conversely, the 
long delays in the disbursement of funds might have masked more deep rooted problems such as 
corruption that is known to be a major issue in Nepal. 
9.2.3 Critical appraisal of empirical methods 
identification of impacts 
The most common ways of defining treatment in impact evaluation use enrolment status, 
eligibility status or geographical controls. However, these conventional approaches were rided 
out in this study owing to the nature of the programme and its implementation (see chapter 7). 
262 1 11 a ,, e b 
Alternative approaches to identifying impacts and improving the plausibility of findings were 
followed. If, however, the evaluation had had more control over the implementation process, it 
may have sought to use alternative study designs that control for unobservables, or at least some 
of them. For example, difference -in-difference impact estimators have been popular in the recent 
literature. This approach looks for differences in changes between treated and untreated 
individuals before and after the programme's implementation and is able to sweep out correlation 
with fixed individual unobservables that confound identification of the programme's effect on 
outcomes. 
There are also a number of arguments that could have been made in favour of an experimental 
design with the district as the unit of randomisation. First, other countries have been successful in 
conducting cluster randomised controlled trials of similar interventions (Lagarde, Haines et al. 
2007). Second, the experiment would not have had to last long, since the behavioural response to 
the demand-side incentives is immediate, ensuring that control districts would be able to 
participate within a year or two if the programme was shown to be effective. This may have 
allayed concerns over equity. Third, if appropriately designed the experiment could have teased 
out the separate causal effects of the demand-side incentives and the health provider incentives, 
and ultimately saved resources, in light of the fact that the provider incentive is considered to have 
been a failure (Ensor and Witter 2008). 
Outcomes 
The evaluation was limited to an assessment of the SDIP on utilisation of maternity services. 
" 
Given that the goal of the programme is to improve maternal health, utilisation outcomes do not 
capture the most important measure of the SDIP's performance. However, it was not feasible to 
assess the impact of the SDIP on maternal mortality. In the absence of a complete vital registration 
system, the maternal mortality rate can be measured with a household survey using the sisterhood 
method. This is the case in Nepal (Government of Nepal 2007). However, the rarity of a 
maternal death means that survey estimates of maternal mortality typically have extremely wide 
confidence intervals. Even if the impact of the programme on maternal mortality were expected 
to be large, the sample size required to detect a statistical difference between the treated and 
" Although, neonatal mortality was assessed as a secondary outcome in the longitudinal analysis in Makwanpur 
district. 
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untreated groups is prohibitively high. As it turned out, the impact of the SDIP on utilisation was 
such that there is little expectation of any sizeable improvement in maternal mortality. 
The maternal mortality measurement problem is widely recogniscd (Attaran 2005; Graham, 
Ahmed et al. 2008). Yet, no widely accepted methodological advances seem to have been made. 
It is the case that national estimates for many of the less developed countries have to be modelled, 
rather than measured directly (Hill, Thomas et al. 2007). Moreover, only one study assessing the 
impact of policy on maternal mortality was identified during the literature review -a 30-year 
cohort study using data from community surveillance in Bangladesh (Chowdhury, Botlero et al. 
2007). Concerns might be assuaged if service utilisation indicators were adequate measures of the 
quantity of interest but they have numerous drawbacks, especially related to quality of care. 
Unfortunately, maternal health is a complex field and simple indicators, such as immunisation 
coverage, that translate more directly into health outcomes do not exist. The methodological 
challenge is to develop service utilisation indicators that incorporate critical elements of the 
quality of care. 
The evaluation also failed to assess the impact of the SDIP on the household cost of care. There is 
the possibility that health providers raised their prices after the start of the programme to absorb 
some of the subsidy of the conditional cash transfer as producer surplus. There was indeed some 
anecdotal evidence to support this hypothesis. In one hospital, patients were charged significantly 
more for a normal delivery if they received the conditional cash transfer (Powell -Jackson, 
Neupane et al. 2009). Relatedly, the evaluation did not assess the supply-side consequences of the 
free care policy in the mountain districts, although it appears these may have been negligible since 
free care was rarely provided in practice. 
Coherence between analyses and data 
The thesis involved four separate analyses. By using multiple datasets, which covered different 
districts in Nepal, the analysis in the thesis is somewhat fragmented, making it more difficult to 
link the findings into one coherent story. This reflects the opportunistic nature of the research and 
the reality of doing an impact evaluation when funders engage with researchers long after the 
policy has been launched. It would have been preferable if the geographical area of the demand 
model in chapter 5 corresponded to the same six districts as those sampled in the process 
evaluation (chapter 6) and the assessment of impacts (chapter 7). 
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In part, the problem is mitigated by the fact that the two analyses in the district of Makwanpur 
(chapter 5 and chapter 8) are grounded in standard economic theory. Notwithstanding the 
methodological limitations of both these analyses, they show whether a theoretical mechanism is 
at work. In this sense, their core insights rather than the precise estimates of the relevant 
parameters are relevant to the setting of the other analyses. 
In addition, stronger linkages between the qualitative data and quantitative data in the process 
evaluation may have led to a deeper understanding of the unobserved district level factors that 
seemed to be important determinants of programme uptake. The challenge is to incorporate 
variables into the statistical analysis when they emerge only through qualitative research methods. 
Understanding the heterogeneity in impacts 
The variation in the impact of the SDIP across regions is attributed to the size of the demand-side 
incentives and, to a lesser extent, the baseline service utilisation and supply-side constraints. 
However, the variation may also reflect other factors linked to implementation. For instance, the 
provision of the conditional cash transfer to women delivering at home in one of the hill districts 
has already been mentioned as a reason why there appeared to be no impact in this region. 
With a greater number of districts and more district-level information on local implementation of 
the SDIP and supply-side data on health providers, it may have been possible to shed more light 
on the district level factors that drive impacts. Wagstaff et al. (2009) provide an excellent 
example in which administrative data is incorporated into an impact evaluation to understand the 
causes of variation between administrative units. Unobserved factors. may also be important in 
determining the heterogeneity in impacts, but analysis of the extent to which this is the case 
requires data from a randomised experiment (Djebbari and Smith 2008). 
External validity 
The strength of the theory upon which the empirical analysis is based has important implications 
for any attempt to address the question of external validity. In this respect, the findings on the 
constraints to implementation are not easily generalised, as already mentioned. It should noted, 
however, that the challenge to understanding the influence of institutions and contextual factors 
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on implementation processes is enormous, and research in this area in developing countries is in 
its infancy. 
From an empirical perspective, the thesis had to rely on within-study variation to throw light on 
factors that might be important for the external validity of the findings. This has limited 
applicability if the aim is to generalise findings to other countries. One avenue worth exploring is 
a cross-country comparison of case studies of demand-side incentive programmes, where the 
focus in on implementation processes and capacity constraints. 
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9.3 Policy implications 
This section addresses the fourth objective of the thesis, which discusses the implications of the 
empirical findings. It focuses on the policy implications for maternal health carc as well as those 
more specific to demand-side incentive programmes in low-income countries. An important part 
of the discussion is the external validity of the findings. 
9.3.1 External validity 
Framework 
A number of frameworks have been suggested in the medical literature to assess the external 
validity of a study (Rothwell 2005; Dekkers, Elm et al. 2009). However, they place considerable 
emphasis on the eligibility of individuals to participate in randomised controlled trials and are 
mostly concerned with factors that affect impacts directly, rather than through delivery of the 
intervention. 
A more appropriate framework for assessing the generalisability of the findings in this thesis is 
provided by the Bonnell et al. (Bonell, Oakley et al. 2006). They posit two questions. " First, can 
the intervention be delivered elsewhere? This refers to whether the intervention is feasible, can 
reach adequate coverage and is acceptable to the target population. Second, does the intervention 
meet recipients' needs? In other words, recipients must have the capacity to benefit from the 
intervention. 
From the outset, it is important to state explicitly the target population and setting to which one 
would want to generalise the study findings. Policyrnakers in Nepal are interested in knowing 
whether the findings apply to the entire country. One of the strengths of the evaluation of the 
SDIP is the fact that the intervention was delivered under "routine" conditions. That is, the 
demand-side incentives were implemented as a large-scale programme, managed by the 
government, albeit with some outside technical support. This avoids a common problem of 
assessing whether the results from a small pilot project managed by a well-resourced organisation 
apply to a setting in which the intervention is delivered at scale by the government. One concern 
79 Victora et al. (200S) provide an alternative framework, which is similar in the sense that it emphasiscs both 
implementation (delivery of the intervention> and factors influencing impacts directly (typically characteristics of the 
population). 
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then is whether the study findings are representative of the country. 80 Policymakers may also be 
interested in knowing whether the findings have relevance for India and Bangladesh, countries 
which have adopted similar programmes. 
Assessment of generalisability 
Although the Survey of Women covered only six districts, there are some indications that it is 
representative of the population of the country. A comparison of a limited set of indicators 
relating to education, access to the media and ownership of households possessions in chapter 4 
showed that the sample in the Survey of Women is reasonably similar to the nationally 
representative sample used in Demographic and Health Survey in 2006. There are, however, 
reasons why some of the findings may not apply to the entire country. Uptake of the programme 
was shown to be driven partly by district level factors. With only six districts sampled in the 
Survey of Women, the sample is unlikely to be representative of the actions of all seventy-five 
districts in administering and promoting the programme. Another concern relates to the fact that 
the estimation of impacts using propensity score matching methods in chapter 8 was unable to 
accommodate sample weights. 
Acceptability 
Evidence on the acceptability of the SDIP emerged from the qualitative study in the first phase of 
the evaluation (Powell-Jackson, Morrison et al. 2009). Among respondents there was widespread 
support for paying mothers. It was felt both legitimate and helpful. It may also have resonated 
with the view that women tend to put money to better use than men. There was much 
less 
acceptance of the health provider incentive, even among those health workers who benefited. 
Moreover, the condition to give the cash only to women with two or fewer children was 
controversial, since poorer women tend to have more children and should not be excluded on 
grounds of equity. 
Feasibilitv 
The findings from the process evaluation on what factors led to the low programme uptake 
provide evidence regarding the feasibility of the SDIP. However, as noted earlier in the 
discussion, one's ability to generalise the findings to other settings, such as India and Bangladesh, 
" It should be noted that statistical generalisation, strictly speaking, requires some abstraction of a theory that is 
independent of time and place for scientific generalisation (Rothman, Greenland et al. 2008). 
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is limited by the absence of a strong theoretical framework underpinning the analysis of 
implementation. It makes it difficult to judge whether the constraints to implementation are 
specific to the context in Nepal or do indeed have generalisability to other countries. 
Nevertheless, a number of fundamental issues stand out. 
First, a well-developed communication strategy is imperative if the programme is to reach the 
target population. Second, a predictable source of funding is required. In this respect, donor 
funding, which is notoriously unpredictable, may lead to problems. And finally, the strength of 
the public financial management system is likely to be central to successful administration of the 
programme. This refers not only to the timely transfer of funds through the various levels of 
government, but also the system for making payments to women, which needs to be cfficient and 
robust to possible fraud. 
Coverage 
The findings show that the SDIP achieved low levels of uptake in the population. However, a 
limitation of the research was its focus on the first few years of implementation, and there were 
clear signs that uptake of the programme was improving over time, cvcn after controlling for 
other factors. Thus the process evaluation portrays a rather pessimistic view of implementation 
when in fact improvements in administration may have overcome some of the key constraints to 
implementation. But without further research, it is not possible to judge progress during the 
period since the time of the fieldwork. On the basis of the evidence alone, there are major 
challenges in achieving high levels of uptake for reasons outlined in the process evaluation. 
Target population needs 
The findings suggest that the demand-side incentives did influence health seeking behaviour. They 
provide evidence that the theoretical mechanism underpinning the SDIP is effective. Indeed, 
because the empirical analyses of the SDIP's impact were based on standard economic theory and 
a set of derived hypotheses, the results can be generalised to other settings. Moreover, there is an 
extensive body of evidence from evaluations of conditional cash transfer programmes and policy 
reforms to remove user fees showing that price has a negative effect on utilisation of health 
services. 
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Variation in the response of individuals to the demand-side incentives has implications for the 
generalisability of the findings. The geographical location was an important determinant of 
programme impact, although interpretation of this result is not straight forward. Moreover, there 
was weak evidence that income has a negative influence on the programme impacts. On the basis 
of these results and economic theory, it seems likely that the effect of demand-sidc incentives will 
he greater the larger the incentive relative to both the cost of care and income, Ethnicity was also 
found to be an important determinant of impacts but in the absence of any theoretical insight it is 
not clear how to generalise this finding beyond the study context. 
9.3.2 Implications for demand-side incentive programmes 
The findings in this thesis suggest that demand-side incentives are no magic bullet to the problem 
of low utilisation of professional care at childbirth in Nepal. Even in the districts where a 
substantial conditional cash transfer was offered in addition to the free delivery care, almost 70 
percent of women reached by the SDIP continued to deliver at home. At best, demand-side 
incentives should be considered one part of a multi-pronged strategy to reduce the barriers to 
maternity services. When feasibility of the SDIP is considered, demand-side incentives do not 
appear to be an attractive policy option, although improvements in implementation over time 
suggest some patience is needed on this front. 
WhAe no rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis was conducted, a crude calculation of the cost per 
additional visit can be made. Using programme expenditure data, it is estimated that over the first 
three years of the programme, it cost (converted to US dollars using an average of 70 Nepalese 
Rupees per dollar) approximately US$ I IS for each additional delivery in a health facility. " This 
should be considered a lower bound estimate since no administration costs, which are likely to be 
considerable, are included. Given that the demand-side incentives range from $8 in the tarai 
districts to around $40 in the mountain districts, this estimate gives some sense of the 
inefficiencies of providing universal financial incentives. 
" The cost is based on programme expenditure on the demand-side incentives over the pcriod 2005-2008. It does not 
include the cost of administration or the cost of technical assistance provided to the programme by the Support to 
Safe Motherhood Programme. The effect of the SDIP is calculated on the basis of the 1.1 percentage point increase in 
the number of institutional deliveries attributable to the demand-sidc incentives. 'Me total number of deliveries is 
calculated using population projections and estimates of the crude birth rate from the Census 2001 and the 
Demographicand Health Survey 20,96 
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The cost of paying for delivery care places a high financial burden on the household budget and 
this is likely to have implications for the SDIP's effect on welfare. Households that are motivated 
by the demand-side incentives to seek care at a health facility may face catastrophic health 
expenditures. The welfare implications of this are not at all obvious but it cannot be presumed 
that the health benefits of seeking care outweigh the detrimental economic consequences of 
paying for care. 
A range of potential design modifications and implementation strategies emerge from the 
findings. In light of the discussion on external validity in section 9.4.1, these are likely to have 
some relevance to other demand-side incentive programmes in low-income countries. First, there 
seems to be little justification for excluding the non-governmental health providers from the 
SDIP . 
82As expected, the programme led to some substitution away from non-gov-ernmental 
health providers and there is no evidence to suggest this would have any health benefit. On 
practical grounds, the inclusion of non-governmental health providers is more contentious. 
Monitoring would be a challenge given that the currently weak system would need to be 
expanded to include health facilities who are not accustomed to being monitored. On the other 
hand, it provides an opportunity to develop a system of accreditation and to incentivise the health 
facilities in the non-state sector to meet minimum standards of quality. 
Second, the results suggest behavioural responses to the conditional cash transfer were modest in 
the tarai and hill regions of Nepal and that greater subsidies might be required. The removal of 
user fees for delivery care in these regions is how the government has chosen to proceed but it 
requires careful planning to address the shortfall in resources which would ensue and to develop 
implementation strategies. Particular attention needs to be given to monitoring increases in or 
misrcporting of unnecessary care, such as caesarean sections, to ensure there are no incentives for 
over-medicalisation of obstetric care. After a long debate over user fees in developing countries, 
on one level there is greater appreciation of the risks involved and the actions to mitigate these 
risks (Gilson and McIntyre 20OS; James, Hanson et al. 2006; Save the Children Fund 2008). For 
politicians, however, it seems that free health care represents the answer to all the problems - 
and the risks are all too often overlooked (Brown 2009). 
" As already mentioned in chapter 4, the non-state sector in Nepal includes private- for- profit health providers and 
non-govcrnmental not-for-profit health providers. 
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Third, the policy in Nepal is unusual in the sense that it provides a universal conditional cash 
transfer, while similar programmes elsewhere tend to focus on the poor. The results suggest that 
there are large inefficiencies of providing a universal benefit. A large proportion of women would 
have delivered in a health facility even in the absence of the SDIP. Targeting may improve 
efficiency but this would entail additional administrative costs to identify poor recipients. The 
limited evidence available suggests that the costs of targeting can be as high as 12 percent of 
programme costs (Grosh, Del Ninno et al. 2008). Moreover, the experience of targeting in low- 
income countries is not encouraging, implying that policymakers may simply have to accept on 
practical grounds the inefficiency of providing a universal incentive. 
Fourth, there is a case for extending the demand-side incentives to cover the whole continuum of 
care from antenatal care through to postnatal care or even child health interventions. The SDIP 
could recognise the importance of a package of priority maternal, newborn and child health 
interventions and in this regard reflect the latest in international thinking (Bryce, Daelmans et al. 
2008). Monitoring whether the mother meets the conditions would become more complex, 
although it could provide the impetus to invest in a comprehensive administration system. 
Fifth, following the example of the conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America, the 
SDIP could attach an additional condition of attending health education sessions in an effort to 
address problems around information. " These may focus on the recognition of danger signs in 
childbirth and stress the importance of making specific preparations before delivery in case of a 
complication. Currently, almost 50 percent of women in Nepal make no preparation before 
delivery (Government of Nepal 2007). 
Sixth, although the public financial management system is unlikely to be reformed to meet the 
requirements of just one health programme, there are various ways in which the system for 
issuing payments to women could be made more efficient and robust. There is no reason why 
health providers should administer payment and indeed the blurring of responsibilities creates the 
potential for misuse of funds and ensures that dissatisfaction by patients over payment is directed 
at health workers. One option would be to use the banking system, at least in areas where this is 
possible, such as municipalities. 
'3 Perhaps the most feasible and appropriate means of providing information would be at antenatal care visits, which 
ties in with the previous point about extending the conditions of the demand-side incentive to cover the whole 
continuum of care. 
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Where this is not feasible, payment centres should be used. Private sector companies could be 
contracted to provide this service. For instance, mobile phone companies have a wide network of 
kiosks and the administrative systems to monitor transactions. In some developing countries now, 
credit - easily converted into cash - can be loaded on to mobile phones (The Economist 2009). 
Such a payment mechanism would reduce fiduciary risk and leakage, if carefully designed. There 
also needs to be a greater role for the community in monitoring the programme. Their 
engagement could be encouraged through the health management committees of health facilities, 
which typically include members of the public. 
Seventh, strategies to promote the SDIP need to focus on reaching poorer households, who are 
more likely to be incentivised to seek care by the programme. The use of radio, female 
community health volunteers and women's groups are likely to be the most effective means of 
reaching these households. In this regard, central level actors should engage closely with key 
implementers at lower level district health offices and provide resources to conduct 
communication activities of their own. 
9.3.3 Implications for maternal health care 
Financing of maternal health 
The findings provide some empirical support for recent moves by the government to remove 
health facility charges for delivery care. There was a substantial impact of the SDIP in the 
mountain districts in which this policy operated. This opens up a whole debate of how to finance 
maternal health and whether piecemeal reforms that are disease-specific are the appropriate 
response. 
One possibility of financing free maternal health is through a tax-based system. Projections of the 
cost of a policy that removes user charges for maternity services and maintains the conditional 
cash transfer has been put at US$ 14 million per year in Nepal (Ensor and Witter 2008). This 
represents approximately 12 percent of the Government of Nepal health budget. It seems unlikely 
that the government can afford to prioritise the policy to this extent and external donors would 
need to provide funds to finance the resource gap. 
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An alternative way to achieve free delivery care is through health insurance schemes. Social health 
insurance plays a major role in health financing in many of the more developed countries. Such 
schemes remain, however, underdeveloped in Nepal and does not seem to have been given 
serious consideration by policyrnakers. Social health insurance typically operates at the national 
level and requires compulsory enrolment by segments of the population. In low-income 
countries, social health insurance may not be appropriate when the majority of the population 
work in the informal sector and live in rural areas. Community-based insurance is another 
possibility. It is often small-scale, voluntary and targeted towards rural communities. To-date 
there is little compelling evidence that it can offer more than small-scale coverage and thus have a 
substantial impact of the financing of maternal health care (Borghi, Ensor et al. 2006). 
Other options include loan funds that seek to reduce the opportunity cost of time associated with 
seeking care at childbirth. A number of experiences have been documented, including a scheme in 
Nepal (Chiwuzie, Okojie et al. 1997; Fofana, Samai et al. 1997; Neupane 2003). They are not, 
however, seen as a viable large-scale solution to the problem of accessing health services. There 
are question marks over their sustainability, capacity to generate funds, and ability to ensure funds 
are used for the intended purpose (Borghi, Ensor et al. 2006). 
There is the broader question of whether piecemeal financing reforms can address the 
fundamental question of limited resources. With tax revenue at 10 percent of GDP (World Bank 
2009), the government is constrained in its ability to finance the public provision of health 
services. In addition, the majority of external funds are earmarked (RTI International 2007) and 
cannot be channelled into health financing reforms. Arguably, there needs to be greater flexibility 
in the use of donor funds, if governments are to be able to embark on ambitious reforms. There is 
also the issue of adopting financing reforms for specific diseases and with that the potential for 
adverse effects on the delivery of other health services. The focus on diseases is closely tied to the 
preference of donors on what to fund. Health financing reforms should be sector-wide, also giving 
careful consideration of the implications for non-state health providers. 
The findings in this thesis serve to demonstrate that demand-side incentives - while effective in 
raising service utilisation - have their limits. There are, in other words, other important barriers 
to accessing care, implying there is a need to address these factors directly. The most important 
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set of factors seem to be linked to the finding that (self-rcported) complications and the woman's 
level of education drive health seeking behaviour at childbirth. 
Information and knowledge 
The capacity to benefit from institutional delivery care when there is no obstetric complication is 
probably not obvious to many women and their families. This suggests a failure in information and 
interventions might seek to tackle the problem directly. Typically this can be done through the 
use of community level health workers or educators, who seek to inform families of the benefits 
of seeking maternity care in a participatory manner. 
A partial review of the evidence suggests such interventions have been associated with increases in 
utilisation (Ensor and Cooper 2004). Nepal has had experiences with women's groups and there 
is evidence that these have had a modest effect on raising service utilisation at childbirth 
(Manandhar, Osrin et al. 2004). An intervention that used information on the utilisation and 
quality of health services to strengthen local accountability in Uganda had a large impact on 
service utilisation (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009). 
Quality of care 
Various pieces of evidence point towards quality. of care as being a constraint to increased 
utilisation in Nepal. Women typically only access obstetric care when they are very ill. The 
Survey of Health Providers in the first phase of the evaluation also found enormous inadequacies 
in both the process of care and the structural inputs to provide quality maternal health care 
(Powell-Jackson, Neupane et al. 2008). A dual strategy should be adopted whereby concerns over 
the supply-side are addressed while continuing to raise demand for health services. 
The challenges to improving maternal health services are formidable, not least because the 
resources required to invest in the health system are likely to be well beyond those available 
domestically and, based on past performance, external donors are rarely inclined to make such 
investments, which are hard to measure and take years to yield results. Nonetheless, the case 
needs to be made that the majority of maternal deaths can only be prevented if women have 
access to life saving emergency obstetric care. 
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9.4 Conclusion 
9.4.1 Priorities for future research 
Continued evaluation of the SDIP 
In light of the policy change to provide free delivery care and the focus of this research on the 
early period of implementation, further evaluation of the SDIP is warranted. it could seek to 
examine trends in process indicators over time and explore the impact of the SDIP on a refined 
set of outcomes using alternative, arguably more credible, policy evaluation methods. It will also 
be important both to understand whether supply-side factors constrain the impact of the 
programme and to assess the cost. 
In future, an instrumental variable approach could be used to identify the impact of the SDIP. 
Exogenous variation in knowledge of the SDIP generated by the promotion of the programme in 
random villages (ic. those sampled in the previous household survey) could serve as a valid 
instrument. A follow-up survey would sample the same villages as previously and, in addition, a 
random selection of remaining villages in the same six districts. The study would estimate a local 
average treatment effect - that is, the treatment effect would apply to the subgroup of the 
population that found out about the SDIP through the information dissemination activites of the 
previous household survey. 
In terms of outcomes, data could be collected on neonatal mortality and measures of health 
seeking that are likely to be closely linked to health outcomes. One possibility is to use an index 
that incorporates a number of different components of health seeking at childbirth. They would 
have to be observable to the woman and might include: delays in seeking care; the type of health 
worker in attendance; and specific intrapartum care practices that are considered good practice. 
Alternatively, a composite indicator could be used, including specific interventions provided 
during intrapartum care (Murray 2007). 
Impact of different programme designs 
In terms of the design of demand-side incentive programmes, there are a number of areas in 
which future research could focus. There are a few studies that have reported diminishing 
marginal returns to the size of incentive, an issue that deserves more attention (Thornton 2008; 
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Filmer and Schady 2009). Closely linked is the observation that price elasticities seem to be very 
sensitive around a price of zero, such that small costs and small incentives generate large changcs 
in utilisation (Kremer and Holla 2009). This has huge implications for the efficiency of demand- 
side incentive programmes. A study could introduce random variation over a whole range of' 
prices and assess the effect on the utilisation of the maternity services. 
Demand-side incentive programmes assume health services are available. An interesting area for 
further research, particularly pertinent to low-income countries, could compare the impact of 
providing just demand-side incentives with the impact of both providing incentives and upgrading 
health services. An attempt at doing this was made in Honduras, but owing to implementation 
problems with the supply-side intervention, the study could report credible estimates only for the 
demand-side intervention (Morris, Flores et al. 2004). 
Implementation research 
Implementation research has been neglected in health and, as Sanders and Haines (2006) argue, 
partly explains why there remains a large gap between knowledge of what works and strategies to 
deliver health interventions. Functioning health systems are essential to the sustained delivery of 
interventions. This opens up a whole research agenda around health systems. 
More specifically, a comparison of demand-side incentive programmes in low-income countries 
within a common research framework might provide clues as to the most effective 
implementation strategies. Case studies would need to be carefully selected to ensure variation in 
contextual factors that are hypothesised to be important for programme uptake. The study would 
need to give as much weight to political and bureaucratic factors as it would to technical issues 
around the design of the programmes. In particular, it may seek to examine whether factors such 
as governance, accountability, leadership, administrative capacity and donor involvement, are 
important. Future research in Nepal could also study implementation more generally by 
exploring strategies to implement a range of different programmes, including the SDIP, in an 
effort to understand why some programmes reach the target population while others W. 
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9.4.2 Evaluation lessons 
Various issues arose during the research that are generic to all evaluations, but deserve mention 
nonetheless with specific reference to the SDIP. First, there was the unavoidable problem of 
conducting research that gets overtaken by the continued dcvelopment of the policy. While the 
evaluation of the SDIP itself led to some changes in the policy, the process has moved so rapidly 
that policy recommendations emerging from the research become outdated. Partly, this reflects 
the time it takes to do an impact evaluation, but is also probably an indication that the policy was 
poorly conceived in the first place, which meant there was a need to make changes soon after it 
started. Impact evaluations of large-scale interventions, whenever possible, should seek to provide 
timely results. 
Second, the independence of the evaluation, as is often stressed, is critical. While the evaluation 
of the SDIP itself was not influenced by the funder, the dissemination of findings was carcfUlly 
managed in light of some negative results. In this regard, sensitivities around the process evaluation 
were greatest since it touches on issues which are closely tied to the management practices of 
easily identifiable institutions or government departments. Since the dissemination of the research 
findings in Kathmandu, the Ministry of Health continue to present government data on service 
utilisation over time as evidence of a successful programme, despite the fact these data have been 
shown to be inaccurate and inconsistent with the evaluation results. This point highlights the need 
for communication of the evaluation results that is independent and effective. 
Third, an ex-post evaluation does not imply that the evaluation should commence after 
implementation of the policy has started (Ravallion 2008). Baseline data would have provided 
more options for a rigorous evaluation of the SDIP. Policy development processes can be very 
haphazard and, in this case, too rapid to involve the research team sufficiently early to obtain 
baseline data that were needed in the absence of reliable routine data. There seemed to be a lack 
of awareness of the need to involve researchers during the policy development phase. Access to 
third party funding for impact evaluations might help address this problem but, unless the 
evaluation is requested by the government, external evaluators are unUely to be welcome. 
9.4.3 Concluding remarks 
Low utilisation of health services is a familiar problem in low-income countries. Increasingly such 
countries are adopting demand-side incentives with the encouragement of international donors in 
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an effort to raise service utilisation. Yet, there is limited evidence on whether dcmand-side 
incentives are effective in increasing utilisation of health services in low-income countries, where 
health services can be costly to access and administrative capacity to implement individual 
targeted subsidies is low. 
In this respect, the thesis makes an important contribution to the literature. In the context of the 
SDIP in Nepal, it provides evidence on the impact of demand-side incentives and gives reasons for 
why uptake of the programme was low. From a methodological perspective, the thesis also points 
towards a feasible approach to evaluating health financing policies. Household knowledge 
provides a valid indicator of 'treatment' and potentially is simple to manipulate. This opens up the 
possibility of evaluating health financing policies, such as the removal of user fees that are 
notoriously difficult to assess rigorously with experimental or quasi- experimental policy 
evaluation methods (Lagarde and Palmer 2008). 
The demand-side incentives were shown to encourage women to give birth in health facilities. 
The incentive is likely to be more effective the greater it is relative to the cost of health seeking 
and the income of family. The decision of whether to target the demand-side incentives towards 
poorer sections of society is thus important. A universal benefit can end up subsidising health care 
for wealthier households who are more likely to give birth in a health facility irrespective of the 
demand-side incentives. On the other hand, targeting requires administrative capacity and can be 
very costly, even if it is likely to increase efficiency. 
Effective administration of the payment system and communication of the SIDIP to the public are 
essential if programme inputs are to lead to behavioural change. Uptake of the programme was 
found to be low, albeit improving over time. This can be attributed to insufficient planning, the 
unpredictability in donor funding, a weak public financial management system, and the absence of 
a communication strategy. 
The constraints to successful delivery of the SDIP suggest that the promise of financial incentives 
implied by the experience of conditional cash transfer programmes may not be realised in a low- 
income country setting. It is likely that a greater proportion of programme budgets will need to 
be channelled into administration (including relevant capacity building). More robust systems 
should be explored that rely on the banking system or even mobile phone companies to handle 
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cash. A communication strategy that ensures information reaches poorer, more marginalised 
households must be developed and effectively executed. 
Policy responses to the problem of low utilisation of maternity services must go beyond the use of 
financial incentives. Even free maternity care together with a conditional cash transfer is not 
sufficient to ensure a high proportion of women use services in Nepal. Policy must address two 
fundamental issues: the poor quality of maternal health services and the lack of information 
families have about the potential benefits of professional care at childbirth. 
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Table Al. Average number of days women were paid late 
Days late in receipt 
Variable ofcash p-value N 
District 
Morang 14.3 < 0.001 75 
Sankhuwasabha 184.9 58 
Myagdi 47.8 59 
Rupandehi 0.8 37 
Jumla 9.7 41 
Achham 7.0 5 
Type of health facility 
Hospital 22.6 0.1046 221 
Primary health centre 71.8 37 
Health post 67.7 16 
Accessibility to health facility 
Walk < 1hr 40.1 < 0.001 127 
Walk 1hr <4 hr 37.7 126 
Walk Or <1 day 5.0 20 
Walk >I day 0.0 2 
Ethnicity 
Brahmin, Chhetri, Newar 36.8 < 0.001 186 
Madheshi 47.1 14 
Dalit 46.7 26 
Janajati 49.1 46 
Muslim 2.8 3 
Education 
No education 35.4 0.9812 58 
Primary education 40.3 35 
Secondary education 36.0 9S 
Higher education 32.8 87 
Year of implementation 
SDIP Ist Year 94.1 < 0.001 69 
SDIP 2nd Year 38.3 120 
SDIP 3rd Year 8.1 86 
Total 35.5 275 
Note: Source of data is the Survey of Women. P-value is provided for the test of the 
hypothesis that the means within the subgroup are similar to each other. Standard errors 
corrected for within cluster correlation 
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Table A2. Probit model results for the estimation of the propensity score 
Variable Coefficient Stcl error z-Stat 
Constant 7.029 5.420 1.30 
Age of woman -0.007 0.004 -1.94 
Ln(wealth asset score) -14.183 7.565 -1.87 
Ln(wealth asset score )2 7.596 3.862 1.97 
Ln(wealth asset score)3 -1.698 0.855 -1.99 
Ln(wealth asset score )4 0.138 0.069 1.99 
Primary education 0.255 0.065 3.94 
Secondary education 0.294 0.061 4.78 
Higher education 0.529 0.083 6.40 
Woman works in agriculture 0.134 0.062 2.18 
Woman is salaried or government worker 0.265 0.145 1.82 
Woman has small business 0.016 0.099 0.16 
Woman is a waged worker 0.102 0.095 1.08 
Woman has other work -0.060 0.374 -0.16 
Terai & Madeshi Other Castes 0.042 0.083 0.51 
Dalit -0.054 0.064 -0.84 
Newar -0.020 0.124 -0.16 
Janajati -0.198 0.061 -3.25 
Muslim -0.639 0.206 -3.10 
Other Castes -0.142 0.081 -1.75 
Walk to facility 1hr <4 hr -0.158 0.057 -2.76 
Walk to facility 4hr <1 day -0.422 0.076 -5.52 
Walk to facility >1 day -0.670 0.105 -6.36 
Urban 0,125 0.078 1.59 
Woman had a previous delivery during SDIP 0.130 0.074 1.76 
Active female community health volunteer 2.829 0.192 14.74 
Active women's groups 0.161 0.043 3.74 
Sankhuwasabha 0.854 0.086 9.99 
Myagdi 0.600 0.083 7.25 
Rupandehi 0.546 0.098 5.57 
Jumla 0.020 0.074 0.27 
Achham 0.651 0.104 6.25 
Time 0.336 0.023 14.54 
N 5905 
Pseudo R2 0.1765 
Log likelihood -2745.6 
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Table A4. Impact estimates by matching procedure 
Variable 
Kernel 
ATT t-! 
Place of delivery 
Health facility 0.040* 
Government health facility 0.043*** 
NGO hospital -0.011* 
Private health facility 0.008 
Type of attendant 
Doctor, nurse or midwife (SBA) 0.042*** 
Any professional health worker 0.052*** 
Procedure at delivery 
Caesarean section 0.012* 
Caesarean section or assisted 0.019** 
Stat 
Mahalanobis 
ATT t-Stat 
Nearest neighbour 
ATT t-Stat 
2.70 0.039** 2.06 0.046* 3.04 
3.28 0.045** 2.65 0.048*** 3.52 
-1.86 -0.009 -1.17 -0.011* -1.73 
1.40 0.003 0.48 0.009 1.57 
2.72 0.042** 2.11 0.048*** 3.00 
3.17 0.045** 2.16 0.058*** 3.43 
1.83 0.018** 2.13 0.013* 1.83 
2.02 0.032*** 2.67 0.022** 2.25 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. NGO = non-governmental organisation. 
SBA = skilled birth attendant. 
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4q. 
1. Household ID No. 
VDC ul WARDF] 
Tole 
.................... 
Sector [] HH No. 
Interviewer ID. 
Interveiw Date 
day M month M year M 
Observed 11 Checked 11 
Name of MW .................................... 
Date of Birth : 
Respondent's Name 
................................ 
day 11: 1 month 111 year ETI 
MW ID M F1 El FM El 
a. Have you had ever attended the mothers'group meeting ?0 Yes 0 No 
b. If yes, how many times ?M Times 
(if no go to question no. c) 
c. Did you play perinatal picture card game in your tole ?0 Yes 0 No 
#f-gotoQ. -f, -no2) 
d. If yes, whom did you play with ?0 Facilitator 0 Mini Facilitator 0 Both 
Religion and EthniCity (if the woman had already been asked the SERMI, skip to 24)) 
2. What is your ethnic group / caste ? 
0 Tamang 0 Magar 0 Gurung 0 Newar 0 Praja 0 Majhi 0 Rai (Danuwar) 0 Bankariya 
0 Bahun 0 Chhetri 0 Thakuri 0 Sanyasi 0 Gharti 0 Kami 0 Sarki 0 Damai 
0 Others .................. 
3. What is your religion ? 
0 Hindu 0 Buddhist 0 Muslim 0 Christian 0 Other ................... 
Pf SERMI Questionnaire has already been asked In this household, go to question number 17 without asking quesion 
number 4 to 16) 
House and Household Possession 
4. Is this house your own ?0 Yes 0 No If no go to question no. 8 
5. What the house is made of ? 
0 Cement & Bricks 0 Mud & Bricks 0 Mud & Stone 0 Planks 0 Brushwood 
0 Thatch 0 Others ................ 
6. How manay people live in your house ? No/s. 
7. How many sleeping rooms are there in your house ? No/s. 
8. Which things do you have in your house ? 
a) Electricity 0 Yes 0 No b)Radio 0 Yes 0 No c)Television 0 Yes 0 No 
d) Bicycle 0 Yes 0 No e) Telephone 0 Yes 0 No 
9. What type of fuel does your household mainly use for cooking ? 
Electricity [3 LPG [I BIOGAS Kerosene [3 Coal [_3 Firewood/Straw 
Dung 0 Others ............ 
10. What is the principle source of drinking water ? 
[3 Piped drinking water in residence Well in residence Public piped tap 
Well with handpump in yard/plot Public well with handpump [] Traditional public well 
River, canal or surface water for drinking [] Other source of drinking water 
MIRA, Makwanpur 
Mother and Newborn Care Programme 
SERMI Question'xia: "itie. 
Page 311 
11. What is the principal type of toilet facility used by members of your household ? 
0 Flush toilet Use a pan as a latrine 0 Bush, field as latrine D Pit latrine 
[] Other type of latrine 
12. What is the major occupation of your household ? 
0 Aqriculture 0 Salaried or Government 0 Small Business 
13. Do you have your own land ?0 Yes 0 No 
14. if yes, how much wet land and how much dry upland ? 
Wet land Kaftha or Bigaha 
Dry upland Kattha or Bigaha 
Waged labour 
(if no go to question no. 15 ) 
or Ropani 
or Ropani 
2 
15. How many months of the year does the main occupation support enough food ?M Months 
(if there is enough for 12 months, go to question no. 17) 
16. What do you do to cope with the rest of months ? 
0 Agriculture 0 Salary or Govt. Work 0 Small business 0 Waged labour 0 Others 
............. 
Education 
17. What is the highest grade did you study ? Class 0 No 
18. Could you read this Sentence ? 
( ask to read the sentence ) 
0 Read Easily 0 Read Hardly 0 Can not read 
19. How old were you when you got married ?m Years 
20. Have you or your husband used any temproary contraceptive ever before ?0 Yes 0 No 
21. If yes, which one did you use ? 
(if no go to question no. 22) 
[] Depo [: 1 Norplant El Pills [D l. U. D [: ] Condom (D Others 
22. Have you ever had pregnancy before even if it ended early or the baby was a stillbirth ? 
0 Yes 0 No 
If no go to question no. 24) 
Past Pregnancies 
23. Married Woman( MW) full matemity history: - ( Now I am going to ask your pregnancies which include 
born alive, born dead or lost before birth. Please start with the first pregnancy you had ) 
a) Was there multiple pregnancy? 0 Yes 0 No 
0 Born Dead <7 months Mscarrage Date of Miscarrage 1-11 day[][] Month Year 
(nowplonext 
M. 
ftweis) 
Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth M dayEoMonih 
M Year 
(now go to next babyd tharo is) 
Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth 1111 dayE]]Month 
0] Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid (now go to rs"t baby if Owe is) 
[I Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth 
1: 0 day[JE] Month M Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... 
Sex 0 Boy 0 Girl 
Date of Death M day [I] Month Ell] Year (now ao to next baby if Owe is) 
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a) Was there multiple pregnancy ?0 Yes 0 No 
3 
0 Born Dead <7 months NEscarrage Date of Miscarrage M day M Month Year 
(now go to next 
My, 
there is) 
Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth M day M Month 1111 Year 
(now go to next baby if there is) 
Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth M dayM Month M Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 
0 Gid 
(now go to next baby if there is) 
0 Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth M day[]E] Month 11: 1 Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Date of Death day Month Year Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid 
M [I] 
(now go to next baby it there is) 
a) Was there multiple pregnancy ?0 Yes 0 No 
0 Born Dead <7 months Miscarrage Date of Miscarrage 1111 day 1111 Month E Year (now go to next baubys there is) 
Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth ED day ED Month ID Year (now go to next baby if thffe is) 
Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth ED dayM Month M Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid (ww go to next baby if thffo is) 
[I Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth M dayM Month Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Date of Death day 
1111 Month Year 
Sex 0 Boy 0 Girl 
(now go to next baby if them is) 
4a) Was there multiple pregnancy ?0 Yes 0 No 
0 Born Dead <7 months Miscarrage Date of Miscarrage 0: 1 dayM Month Year 
(now go to fox, 
T, 
there is) 
Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth 
ED day[][] Month 1111 Year 
(now go to mxt baby if there is) 
Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth Ell] dayE][] Month 1111 Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 0 Girl (row go to rext baby if there is) 
D Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth day[: 
[] Month Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... 
Sex 0 Boy 0 Girl 
Date of Death ED dayE][] Month Year (now go to next baby ifthare is) 
5a) Was there multiple pregnancy ?0 Yes 0 No 
0 Born Dead <7 months NEscarrage Date of MscaiTage ED day[I] Month I Year (ww go to nex, 
11w 
thff a is) 
0 Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth M dayM Month 
M Year 
(now go to next baby if thwe is) 
0 Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth ED day[]] Month [1: 1 Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 0 Girl (now go to next baby if thare is) 
0 Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth M day[]o Month Ell] Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Date of Death dayEE] Month Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid 
[D Ell] Year (now go to next baby if them is) 
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6a) Was there multiple pregnancy ?0 Yes 0 No 4 
0 Born Dead <7 months MiscajTage Date of Miscarrage M day 1111 Month Year 
(now go go nexL&Pyi there is) 
0 Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth 
00 day M Month Ell] Year (now go to next baby if Itiere is) 
0 Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth day 
IE Month M Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid (now go to next baby if Itwe is) 
0 Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth 
11-: 1 dayM Month 1111 Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... 
Sex 0 Boy 0 Girl 
Date of Death ED day ED Month ED Year ( now go to next baby if there is) 
7a) Was there multiple pregnancy ?0 Yes 0 No 
0 Born Dead <7 months NEscarrage Date of Miscarrage ID day 1111 Month Year 
(now go to next babpth" is) 
Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth E[] day 1111 Month M Year 
(now go to next baby if there is) 
Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth ED dayE][] Month FUYear 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid (now go to next baby it thov is) 
[] Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth ED day ID Month M Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... 
Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid 
Date of Death II] day IIE1 Month 1111 Year 
(now go fo next baby if there is) 
8a) Was there multiple pregnancy ?0 Yes 0 No 
0 Born Dead <7 months MscaiTage Date of Miscarrage 1111 day II] Month Year 
(r, ow go io nextL U, thwe is) 
Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth 
E]] day ID Month M Year 
(now go lo next baby if th" is) 
Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth ED dayEDMonth E]] Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid (now go to next baby if th" is) 
[] Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth [I] dayE][]Month 
M Year 
Name of Baby .................................................. Date of Death day Month 
00 Year 
Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid 
M OD 
I 
(now go Io next baby if thwe is) 
9a) Was there multiple pregnancy ?0 Yes 0 No 
0 Born Dead <7 months Miscarrage Date of Miscaffage ED day II] Month Year (WW go to neXIIdwe is) 
Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth 01 dayM Month 
a] Year 
(now go to next boby if Mom is) 
Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth IIE1 day[D Month ED Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 0 Girl (now go to mxt baby if them is) 
0 Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth EID day[]o Month ED Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Date of Death day Month Sex 0 Boy 0 Girl ED III a] Year (now go OD next baby if th" is) 
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10 
a) Was there multiple pregnancy ?0 Yes 0 No 
5 
0 Born Dead <7 months MiscaiTage Date of Miscarrage 11: 1 day 1: 0 Month 11: 1 Year 
(now go to next baby it there is) 
0 Born Dead >7 months Stillbirth Date of Stillbirth 110 day IIEI Month M Year ( now go to next baby if there is) 
Born aLive Still Alive Date of Birth IIEI day 1111 Month M Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid (now go to ýxt baby it there is) 
0 Born aLive Now Dead Date of Birth M dayM Month 
M Year 
Name of Baby ................................................... Date of Death day[]E] Month [][] Year Sex 0 Boy 0 Gid 
(now go to next baby ft there is) 
Antenatal Care 
24. Did you go for check-up during this pregnancy ?0 yes 0 No (if yes go to question no. 26 
25. Why did not you go ? 
........................................................................................................................ 
(Now go to question no. 33) 
26. Why did you go for ANC for the first time ? 
0 For a problem 0 Just for a check up 
27. Where did you go for the check-up ? 
[] Hetauda Hospital [I Hospital [3 P. H. C 0 Health Post [D Sub Health Post 
D Mobile Clinic [3 Family Planning [3 Private Clinic [] Medical Shop [] Others 
28, How may months pregnat were you when you went for first check-up ?M Months 
29. How many times did you go for a check-up ? FU Times 
30. During this pregnancy, were any of the following done at least once ? 
a) Were you weighted ?0 Yes 0 No 
b) Was your height measured ?0 Yes 0 No 
c) Was your blood pressure measured ? 
d) Did you give a urine sample ? 
0 Yes 0 No 
0 Yes 0 No 
e) Did you give a blood sample ?0 Yes 0 No 
0 Did a health worker get you to lie down and feel the position of the 0 Yes 0 No 
baby ? 
31. Were you told about signs of pregnancy complication ?0 Yes 0 No 0 Don't know 
(if no or do not know go to quesdon no. 33) 
32. Were you told where to go if you had these complication ?0 Yes 0 No 0 Don't know 
33. Did you have IT injection during this pregnancy ? OYes 0 No 0 Do not know 
34. During this pregnancy, were you given or did you buy any iron tablets or iron syrup ? (Show tablelsyrup) 
0 Given 0 Bought 0 Do not know 0 Didn't take 
(if didn't take to question no. 36) 
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35. During the whole pregnancy for how many days did you take the tables/syrup ?6 
FM days FU weeks FUrnonths 0 Do not know 
Promblems 
36. Did you have any problems during pregnancy or after delivery ?0 Yes 0 No 
(if no go to question no. 58 
37. What was the problem ? Serious Promblems Common Promblems 
(if there is no serfous: problems go for common problems) 
A. Serious Problems 
Any vaginal bleeding during pregnancy, before delivery 
Any vaginal bleeding after delivery, so much you thought you would die 
Fit/Convulsion : unconscious, jerking arms, legs (not just shivering or shaking) 
[3 Obstructed labour/ baby stuck 
[3 Placenta stuck you thought it would not come out 
(3 Fever, very sick 
[I Swollen Face 13 Other 
38) Did you take treatment for serious problems ?0 Yes 0 No 
if no, why not .................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
39. Who did you consult with at first ? 
0 Doctor 0 Staff Nurse 0 HA 
0 Medical shopkeeper 0 MCHW 0 FCHV 
0 Others 
40. Where did you go for treatment ? 
0 Health Institution 0 Medical shop 0 Shaman 
41. How did you get there ? 
Walked [I Carried Ambulence 
Stretcher (MIRA) 0 Stretcher (Other) Doko 
42. How long after you became ill did you get treatment ? 
..................................................... 
..................................................... 
.................................................... (if no go for Common Problems 
0 ANM 0 AHW 
0 TBA 0 Dhami 
Call Health worker at home 0 Other 
(if Health worker was called at home, go to 42 
[] Car / Tempo / Bus / Rickshaw 
M After houds or m After day/s 
43. Did you go to another place after the first place ?0 Yes 0 No (if no go for Common Problems) 
44. If yes, were you suggested (reffered ) to go there or you just decided yourself to go there ? 
0 Reffered 0 Just go 
45. Where did you go for treatment ? 
[I Health Institution [: 1 Medical shop [] Shaman [] Call Health worker at home [] Other 
46. How did you get there ? 
D Walked 0 Carried 0 Ambulance Car I Tempo / Bus / Rickshaw 
[I Stretcher (MIRA) [: 1 Stretcher (Other) [I Doko 
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B. Common minor Problems 7 
Headache, Constipation, Nausea, Backache, Weakness, Bloated stomach, Indigestion, Cramps, 
Itching, diarrohes, Stomach pain, Vaginal discharge, Burning udne 
Nightblindness 
Breathlessness doing regular household activities 
Other ................................................................................................................................................... 
47) Did you take treatment for common minor problems ?0 Yes 0 No 
if no, why not ............................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................................. (if woman had taken treatment for Serious problem but even she did not take treatment for common Problem, go to 56 
48. Who did you consult with at first ? 
0 Doctor 0 Staff Nurse 0 HA 0 ANM 0 AHW 
0 Medical shopkeeper 0 MCHW 0 FCHV 0 TBA 0 Dhami 
0 Others 
49. Where did you go ? 
0 Health Institution 0 Medical shop 0 Shaman 0 Call Health worker at home 0 Other 
50. How did you get there ? 
El Walked 0 Carried 0 Ambulence Car / Tempo / Bus / Rickshaw 
[I Stretcher (MIRA) [I Stretcher (Other) [: ] Doko 
51. How long after you became ill did you get treatment ?M After hour/s or 
M After day/s 
52. Did you go to another place after the first place ?0 Yes 0 No (if no go to 56) 
53. If yes, were you suggested (reffered ) to go there or you just decided yourself to go there ? 
0 Reffered 0 Just go 
54. Where did you go for treatment ? 
Health Institution [: 1 Medical shop [] Shaman Call Health worker at home [3 Other 
(if Health worker was called at home, go to 56) 
55. How did you get there ? 
El Walked 0 Carried 0 Ambulence Car/ Tempo/ Bus/ Rickshaw 
[I Stretcher (MIRA) 0 Stretcher (Other) [3 Doko 
56. How much did you paid in total for transportation and treatment ? Rs .......................................... 
57. How did you get money ? 
Wages Rs .......................................... 
Saving Rs .......................................... 
0 Sale of Land Rs .......................................... 
Sale of Livestock Rs .......................................... 
Borrowed money from relatives Rs .......................................... 
Borrowed money from Lender Rs .......................................... 
Borrowed money from MCH Fund (MIRA) Rs .......................................... 
Borrowed money from Other Fund Rs .......................................... 
Other Organization Rs .......................................... 
From Donation Rs .......................................... 
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58. Did you have long labour more than 24 hours ?0 Yes 0 No 8 
59. Did you have check-up after delivery ?0 Yes 0 No (if no go to question no. 62) 
60. If yes, when did you go ?M Aft er day/s 
61. Whom did you consult with ? 
0 Doctor 0 Staff Nurse 0 HA 0 ANM 0 AHW 
0 Medical shopkeeper 0 MCHW 0 FCHV 0 TBA 0 Dhami 
0 Others 
62. Have you been given vitamin A capsuls since the delivery ? 0 Yes 0 No 
if there is no living baby stop interview) 
Newborn Baby 
63. Name of Baby ................................................. Weight non 1-1 El Kg 
64. Date of Birth M Day M Month M Year 0 Son 0 Daughter 
65. How many complete months of pregnancy did the baby born ? IE Months 66. Is the baby twin ?0 Yes 0 No (if no go to question no. 68) 
67. Was the baby born first or second ?0 First 0 Second 
Newborn Care 
68. Where was the baby born ? 
0 At home 0 Hetauda Hospital 
0 SHP 0 Private clinic 
0 Shed 0 Others ................ 
69. How was the baby delivered ? 
0 Normally 
0 Other Hospital OPHC 0HP 
0 Medical Shop 0 Area around home 0 Field / Jungle 
Manually 0 Forceps 0 Operatively 
(if baby was defivered at hospital or phc and operadvely 
-- #- -- 0.31 70. Which part of baby came out first? 11w. VC/ 
0 Head 0 Buttock 0 Hands/Foot 0 Cord 
0 Don't know 
71. Was there a fire, stove or other form of heating in the delivery room ? 
0 Before baby was born 0 After baby was born 0 Before and after baby was born 
0 No 0 Don't know 
72. Who helped with the delivery ? 
E] Doctor [I Nurse ANM HA/AHW/CMA 
TBA MCHW VHW FCHV 
Mother in law Family Member Neighbours / Friends None (Alone) 
D Others ............... 
(ff she was alone, go to 74) 
73. Did the person who helped, have washed his/her hands ? 
0 Yes 0 No 0 Don't know 
74Doyouknowwhatisthis? (Show delivery kit) 
75. Did you use this ? 
76. If yes, which one did you use 
0 Yes 0 No (if no go to question no. 77) 
0 Yes 0 No (if no go to question no. 77) 
0 MCH Product 0 Mother's Group Product 
(iShow Safte DeNvery Kit) 
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77. What was the cord cut with ?9 
0 Boild Blade 0 Unboiled Blade 0 knife /scissors OSickle / woodknifý 0 Bamboo 
0 Don't know 0 Others ....................... 
78. Did you tie cord ? 
0 Yes 0 No 
79 What was put on the cord stump after it was cut ? 
0 Oil 0 Turmeric 0 Unwashed cloth I cotton 0 Washed cloth / cotton 0 Medicin /dettole 
0 Powder 0 Mud 0 Nothing Don't know 0 Other .............. 
80. How long after birth was the baby wrapped up ? 
ID After minutes or 
M After hour/s 
81. How long after birth was the baby bathed ? 
M After minutes or 
M After hourls Or 
M After day/s 
82. What was the first food given to the baby ? 
0 Mother's milk 0 Other mother's milk 0 Cow /buffalo milk 0 Furmola/ Lactozine 
0 Milk food 0 Ghee/Sugar/ Honey 0 Oil 0 Don't know 
0 Others ................ 
Breasffeeding 
83. Have you breastfeed your baby ?0 yes 0 No If no go to question no. 86 
84. How long after the birth did you first feed the baby ? 
M After minutes or After hour/s or 
M 
After day/s 
85. Did you throw first milk before you feed the baby first ?0 Yes 0 No 
86. Are you feeding the baby only mother's milk or are you giving some other things like : water, lacto- 
gen, coas/buffalo milk as well ? 
0 Mother's milk 0 Other things too 
87. Has your baby had the BCG immunization ?0 Yes 0 No 0 Don't know 
Illness in Infant 
88. Has the baby had caugh ?0 Yes 
89. How many days continuously did the caugh last ? F--] Day/s 
90. Has the baby had fast breathing for more than 6 hours ? 
91, Has the baby had chest recession ?0 Yes 
92. Has the baby had difficulty in feeding ?0 Yes 
93. Has the baby had diarrhoea more than 3 times a day ? 
94. For how many day did the diarrhoea last ? F-1 Day/s 
95. Did the baby vornitted repeatedly ?0 Yes 
96. Has the baby had a high fever ? 
97. How many days did the fever last ? 
Yes 
0 No (if no go to ques6on no. 90) 
0 Yes 0 No 
0 No 0 Donl know 
0 No 
Yes 0 No 
(if no go to quesdon no. 95) 
No 
No (if no go to question no. 98) 
F--] Day/s 
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98. Has the baby had infection in umbilical cord ?0 Yes 0 No 
99. Has the baby had jaundice ?0 Yes 0 No 
10 
100. Has the baby had any other illness that you are worried about ? 
0 Yes 0 No 
( if there is no any diness in this section , stop 
interview) 
if yes ............................................................................................................................... 
Treatment of the baby 
(if baby had fever, diarrhoea, jaundice, cord infection and caughing ask the following questions 
101. Did you seek treatment when the baby was sick ? 
0 Yes 0 No (if yes go to question no. 103) 
102. if not, why did not you go ? 
.......................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................... 103. Who did you consult with at first ?( stop interview) 
0 Doctor 0 Staff Nurse 0 HA 0 ANM 0 AHW 
0 Medical shopkeeper 0 MCHW 0 FCHV 0 TBA 0 
Dhami 
0 Others 
104. Where did you go for treatment ? 
0 Health Institution 0 Medical shop 0 Shaman 0 Call Health worker at home 0 Other 
105. How did you get there ?( 
If Health worker was cafled at home, go to 106) 
Walked D Carried D Ambulence [3 Car / Tempo / Bus / Rickshaw 
Stretcher (MIRA) 0 Stretcher (Other) El Doko 
106. Did they treat the baby ? 
107. What did they do ? 
0 Yes 0 No (if no go to questfon no. 109 ) 
108. How long was it from the start of the baby's illness to receive treatment 7 
M Alter hours or 0] After day or 
11-1 After week 
109. Did you then consult anyone else ? (: ) Yes 0 No (if No go to 117) 
110. Who did you consult with ? 
0 Doctor 0 Staff Nurse 0 HA 0 ANM 0 AHW 
0 Medical shopkeeper 0 MCHW 0 FCHV 0 TBA 0 
Dharni 
0 Others 
111 . Where 
did you go for treatment ? 
Health Institution [: ] Medical shop El Shaman Call Health worker at home 0 Other 
( If Health worker was caRed at home, go to 113) 
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112. How did you get there ?II 
0 Walked 0 Carried Ambulence Car/ Tempo/ Bus/ Rickshaw 
[: 1 Stretcher (MIRA) [I Stretcher (Other) [3 Doko 
113. Were you reffered or did you just decide to go ?0 Reffered 0 Just decided to go 
114. Did they treat the baby ?0 Yes 0 No (it no, go to 117) 
115. What did they do ? 
............................................................................................. ............. 
I .... I ................................................................................................. I. 
.................................... I ........................................................................... ............ 
116. How long was it from the start of the baby's illness to receive treatment ? 
MAfter hours or ID After day or 
M After week 
11 7. Did you or your family member give a treatment without consulting anyone else ? 
0 Yes 0 No 
118. How much did you paid in total for transportation and treatment ? Rs .......................................... 
119. How did you get money ? 
0 wages Rs .......................................... 
Saving Rs .......................................... 
Sale of Land Rs .......................................... 
Sale of Livestock Rs .......................................... 
Borrowed money from relatives Rs .......................................... 
Borrowed money from Lender Rs .......................................... 
El Borrowed money from MIRA MCH Fund Rs .......................................... 
0 Borrowed money from Other Fund Rs .......................................... 
Other Organization Rs .......................................... 
From Donation Rs .......................................... 
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APPENDix A3 
QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE 
COST OF DELIVERY CARE SURVEY 
IN MAKWANPUR SISTRICT 
322 Page 
EVALUATION OF SAFE DELIVERY INCENTIVE PROGRAMME 
POVERTY AND COST OF DELIVERY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
IDENTIFICATION AND INTERVIEW ELIGIBILITY 
NAME AND CODE OF VDC 
WARD NUMBER .......................................................................................................... 
SECTOR NUMBER .................................................................................................... 
HOUSEHOLD ID NUMBER 
............................................................................................. 
PREGNANCY ID 
NAME OF MARRIED WOMAN 
NAME OF RESPONDENT 
INTERVIEW ELIGIBILITY .............................................................................................. NO=2) [DID THE WOMAN DELIVER IN A GOVERNMENT HEALTH FACILITY? ] (YES=l , IF NO, DO NOT START QUESTIONNAIRE 
OTHER MEMBERS OF HOUSEHOLD PRESENT .................. .................. .................. MULTIPLE CHOICE (MOTHER=l, HOUSEHOLD HEAD=2, MOTH ER-1 N-LAW=3) 
INTERVIEWER VISITS 
2 3 
DATE ..................................... ..................................... ..................................... 
TIME STARTED ..................................... ..................................... ..................................... 
TIME FINISHED ..................................... ..................................... ..................................... 
INTERVIEWER'S NAME ..................................... ..................................... ..................................... 
RESULT* 
..................................... ..................................... ..................................... 
*RESULT CODES: 
I COMPLETED 
2 NO HOUSEHOLD MEMBER AT HOME OR NO ABLE PERSON AT HOME AT TIME OF VISIT 
3 ENTIRE HOUSEHOLD ABSENT FOR EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME 
4 POSTPONED 
5 REFUSED 
6 DWELLING VACANT OR ADDRESS NOT A DWELLING 
7 DWELLING DESTROYED 
8 DWELLING NOT FOUND 
9 OTHER 
(SPECIFY) 
INTERVIEWER SUPERVISOR ENTERED BY 
NAME NAME 
DATE DATE 
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SECTION 3 DELIVERY CARE EXPENSES AND THE MATERNITY INCENTIVE SCHEME 
I. Where did you deliver your most recent baby? 
HETAUDA HOSPITAL I OTHER HOSPITAL 2 
PHC 3 HP 4 
SHP 5 
2. What was the narne of the health facility you delivered your baby in? 
NAME: 
3. Which district is that health facility in? 
MAKWANPUR I OTHER (SPECIFY): 
_ 
4. Was this health facility the first place you sought care? PROBE TO SEE IF WOMAN WAS REFERRED. 
YES I NO, REFERRED 2 
5. Before seeking care at the health facility, did you see a dbaami jhankri or lama jhankri while you were in labOLIr? 
YES I NO 2 [ý7] 
6. How much did you pay the dhaami jhankri or lama jhankri? IF IN KIND, ESTIMATE VALUE OF GIFT. 
AMOUNT IN RUPEES: 
7. Approximately how much did you pay your delivery service provider(s) for your most recent delivery? (include registration fee, 
delivery fee, drugs, supplies, inpatient stay, lab tests etc). IF REFERRED, INCLUDE EXPENDITURE IN ALL HEALTI I 
FACILITIES VISITED. 
AMOUNT IN RUPEES: 
8. 9. 
Did your household spend anything on the following items when you delivered your baby How much did you spend on the 
in the health facility: following items at all the health facilities 
you visited: 
PUT A CHECK (V) IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX FOR EACH ITEM. IF THE 
ANSWER TO QX IS YES, ASK QX. IF PAYMENT WAS IN-KIND, 
ESTIMATE VALUE IN RUPEES 
ES NO CODE RUPEES 
AT THE HEALTH FACILITY 
Registration fee 702 
Delivery fee 703 
Fee for use of operating theatre 704 
Drugs and supplies bought inside facility 705 
Lab tests, x-rays and ultrasound 706 
Accommodation / inpatient stay 707 
OUTSIDE THE HEALTH FACILITY 
Drugs and supplies bought at an outside phannacy or shop 709 
Transport to health facility (include accompanying household 
members) 
710 
Transport home after discharge (include accompanying 
household members) 
711 
Accommodation / lodging of accompanying household members 712 
Food of accompanying household members 713 
OTHERITEMS I = 
Other (specify) 
.................................................. 
715 
Other (specify) 
.............. . ............. .............. ... 
716 
_ . TOTAL SPENDING (SUM EACH LINE ITEM) 717 
Page 333 
10. In addition to what you paid for services you received, is flicie any ýunount ýou ha\, e ýct to 
YES NO 2 [--+ 12] 
11. How much money is still outstanding? 
AMOUNT IN RUPEES: 
12. 13. 14. 
Where did you obtain the money to pay for your delivery care? Was it How much money carne from this Do you have to pay 
from: source: this money back? 
PUT A CHECK (V) IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX FOR EACH ITEM. IF PAYMENT WAS IN-KIND, PUT A CHECK 
IF THE ANSWER TO QX IS YES, ASK QX. ASK FOR VALUE IN RUPFES (-) IN THE 
RUPEES APPROPRIATE 
BOX FOR EACH 
ITEM. 
YES NO CODE RUPEES YES NO CODE 
Household members 801 901 
Neigbbours / friends 802 902 
Relatives 803 903 
Savings 804 904 
Money lender / bank 805 905 
NGO 806 906 
Wornen's group / community 807 907 
Landlord 808 909 
Sold possessions 809 909 
Other 
....... 810 910 
Other 
....... f 
911 
TOTAL (SUM 801-811) 812 
15. How much time did you spend away from h(wic to ic, ci\ c dcl i,, cl i c, including time at the health facility and the time it took to 
travel there and back?. 
HOURS DAYS WEEKS 
16. What would you normally have been doing during the time you were away receiving delivery care? CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY. 
HOUSEHOLD CHORES I AGRICULTURE 2 
SALARIED GOVERNMENT 3 SMALL BUSINESS 4 
WAGEDLABOUR 5 OTHER 6 
17. How much time have you taken away from work / household chores since you delivered your baby? 
DAYS WEEKS 
18. Have you lost any income as a result of being away from home or unable to work? If yes, how much? 
AMOUNT IN RUPEES: NO -2 
19. Did any person(s) take over your household chores / work while you were away or unable to work'? 
YES I NO 2 [--ý21] DON'T KNOW 3 [--ý2 11 
20. Have you paid the person(s) for this work? If yes, how much? IF IN-KIND, ESTIMATE VALUE IN RUPEES. PROBE TO SEE 
IF THEY EXCHANGED LABOUR. 
AMOUNT IN RUPEES: LABOUR EXCHANGE -2 NO -3 
Page 334 
21. 22. 23. 
Did any of the following household members accompany you to the Did forgo any Approximately how much income 
health facility or visit while you were in the health facility: income by coming did forgo? 
with you or visiting 
PUT A CHECK (V) IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX FOR EACH ITEM. you at the health 
IF THE ANSWER TO QX IS YES, ASK QX. facility? 
YES NO YES NO RUPEES 
Your husband 
Your mother 
Your mother-in-law 
Your children 
Other (specify) .............. . ...... 
Other (specify) .............. . ........... 24. At any time after you gave birth, have you received cash from the health facility as part of a new government scheme to help 
mothers? PROBE TO SEE IF WOMAN HAS CLAIMED FOR THE MONEY BUT NOT YET RECEIVED. 
YES I NO, CLAIMED 2 [--+END] NO, NOT CLAIMED 3 [-END] 
25. Was the money deducted from your bill at the health institution? IF DEDUCTED, PROBE: Was the money fully or partly 
deducted? 
FULLY DEDUCTED I [--ýEND] PARTLY DEDUCTED 2 NO 3 
26. How much money did you receive? 
AMOUNT IN RUPEES: 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
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APPENDix A4 
QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE 
SURVEY OF WOMEN 
336 Pagc 
Version: FINAL 
EVALUATION OF MATERNITY INCENTIVE SCHEME (MIS) 
HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW OF WOMEN WHO DELIVERED IN THE PAST THREE YEARS (SINCE START OF YEAR 2062) 
IDENTIFICATION AND INTERVIEW ELIGIBILITY 
NAME AND CODE OF DISTRICT 
NAME AND CODE OF VDC / MUNICIPALITY 
WARD NUMBER 
.......................................................................................................... 
CLUSTER NUMBER .................................................................................................... 
HOUSEHOLD ID NUMBER 
............................................................................................. 
CITY / TOWN / RURAL 
.................................................................................................. (CITY=1, TOWN=2, RURAL=3) 
NAME OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD 
NAME OF RESPONDENT 
INTERVIEW ELIGIBILITY 
.............................................................................................. ASK: Does any woman who gave birth after that start of 2062 AND more than two months ago live in 
this household? 
(YES=1, NO=2) 
IF NO, DO NOT START QUESTIONNAIRE AND VISIT NEXT HOUSEHOLD 
OTHER MEMBERS OF HOUSEHOLD PRESENT .................. .................. .................. MULTIPLE CHOICE (MOTHER=I, HOUSEHOLD HEAD=2, MOTH ER-1 N-LAW=3) 
INTERVIEWER VISITS 
11 2 3 
DATE 
..................................... ..................................... ..................................... 
TIME STARTED ..................................... ..................................... ..................................... 
TIME FINISHED 
..................................... ..................................... ..................................... 
INTERVIEWER'S NAME 
..................................... ..................................... ..................................... 
RESULT* 
....... I ............................. ..................................... ..................................... 
*RESULT CODES: TOTALPERSONS 
IN HOUSEHOLD 
1 COMPLETED 
2 NO HOUSEHOLD MEMBER AT HOME OR NO ABLE PERSON AT HOME AT TIME OF VISIT NUMBER OF 
3 ENTIRE HOUSEHOLD ABSENT FOR EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME ELIGIBLE WOMEN 
IN HOUSEHOLD 
4 POSTPONED 
5 REFUSED 
6 DWELLING VACANT OR ADDRESS NOT A DWELLING 
7 DWELLING DESTROYED 
8 DWELLING NOT FOUND 
9 OTHER 
(SPECIFY) 
INTERVIEWER SUPERVISOR ENTERED BY 
NAME NAME 
DATE DATE 
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APPENDIX AS 
Topic GUIDE AND STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE 
FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
IN MAKWANPUR DISTRICT 
358 1Pac 
Topic guide for in-depth interview 
Introduce yourself, the purpose of the interview, and the approximate amount of 
time it may take. 
1. In the past 3 years, there has been an increase in utilisation of institutional 
deliveries (deliveries taking place in health institutions) in Makwanpur. How do 
you explain this increase? Which of the factors you mention were most 
important and why? 
2. What changes have been made to the provision of delivery care services in the 
district and nearby districts over the past 3 years? Probe for both improvements 
in services and deteriorations in services, changes in health infrastructure (eg. 
new health facilities), health personnel, and availability of emergency and c- 
section services. 
3. When did these changes happen? Probe particularly around whether there 
were major changes at the beginning of year 2062 when the SDIP started. 
4. What NGOs have worked in maternal health in the district (including your own) 
in the past 3 years and how do think each of these organisations has affected 
utilisation of health facilities? 
5. How do you think the conflict (Maoist insurgency) has affected health in general 
and maternal health more specifically in the district over the past 3 years? 
Probe how the conflict situation has changed in recent years and whether this 
has influenced health in the district. 
6. Have you heard of the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme -a government 
programme that provides women cash if they deliver in health facility? What is 
your understanding of the programme in Makwanpur? To what extent do you 
think this programme has encouraged women to deliver in health institutions? 
7. Do you know of any other person(s) in the district who might be particularly 
knowledgeable about these issues we have just discussed? 
Many thanks for your time. I would now like to record some further information. 
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Abstract 
Background: Nepal's Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) was introduced nationwide in 
2005 with the intention of increasing utilisation of professional care at childbirth. It provided cash 
to women giving birth in a health facility and an incentive to the health provider for each delivery 
attended, either at home or in the facility. We explored early implementation of the programme 
at the district-level to understand the factors that have contributed to its low uptake. 
Methods: We conducted in ten study districts a series of key informant interviews and focus 
group discussions with staff from health facilities and the district health office and other 
stakeholders involved in implementation. Manual content analysis was used to categorise data 
under emerging themes. 
Results: Problems at the central level imposed severe constraints on the ability of district-level 
actors to implement the programme. These included bureaucratic delays in the disbursement of 
funds, difficulties in communicating the policy, both to implementers and the wider public and the 
complexity of the programme's design. However, some district implementers were able to cope 
with these problems, providing reasons for why uptake of the programme varied considerably 
between districts. Actions appeared to be influenced by the pressure to meet local needs, as well 
individual perceptions and acceptance of the programme. The experience also sheds light on some 
of the adverse effects of the programme on the wider health system. 
Conclusion: The success of conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America has led to a 
wave of enthusiasm for their adoption in other parts of the world. However, context matters and 
proponents of similar programmes in south Asia should give due attention to the challenges to 
implementation when capacity is weak and health services inadequate. 
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Background 
Programmes that provide monetary incentives condi- 
tional on households engaging in certain health seeking 
behaviours have been popular for the past decade, partic- 
ularly in Latin America. Such programmes have been 
implemented at scale, and typically target poor families 
and children 11,21. Conditional cash transfers can be an 
effective means to increase utilisation of preventive health 
services and, in some cases, improve health outcomes 
13,41. However, the literature also points to problems, 
including: the inefficiencies of paying some people to do 
what they would have done anyway 151; the high admin- 
istrative cost of programmes 16]; the potential for unin- 
tended effects 17]; and ethical concerns, such as those 
related to the promotion of permanent contraceptive 
methods 14]. 
Interest in using cash incentives to influence behaviour 
and promote the health of families has spread to south 
Asia. Progress in raising the low coverage of skilled birth 
attendance (ie. delivery attended by either a doctor, nurse 
or midwife) in the region has been slow 181 and it is 
against this backdrop of relative stagnation that Nepal, 
India and Bangladesh have adopted policies to provide 
financial incentives to women in an effort to encourage 
greater use of maternity services [9-11 ]. While these poli- 
cies are not intended to act as a social safety net - they are 
more orientated towards behavioural change - they still 
share many of the same characteristics as conditional cash 
transfer programmes. 
This paper reports the findings of a qualitative study 
describing implementation of Nepal's scheme to under- 
stand the factors that have hindered uptake of the pro- 
gramme. Nepal's Safe Delivery Incentives Programme 
(SDIP) (formerly known as the Maternity Incentives 
Scheme) was launched in 2005, with the aim of raising 
the coverage of skilled birth attendance. It marked a 
departure from past government policy that had tended to 
focus predominantly on service delivery without serious 
regard for demand side barriers. The establishment of the 
SDIP was a response to mounting evidence of the high 
cost faced by households trying to access care at childbirth 
http: //www. biomedcentral. com/1472-6963/g/97 
1121 and the low coverage of skilled birth attendance, 
most recently estimated at 19 percent 113 J. 
National implementation of the programme meant that 
there were few opportunities to pilot different implemen- 
tation approaches and develop mechanisms to verify the 
eligibility of women, pay beneficiaries, and monitor the 
programme, elements deemed essential for implementa- 
tion Ill. In countries like Nepal, with weak governance 
and limited capacity 1141, the need for such systems is per- 
haps all the more vital. Concerns were also raised about 
the complexity of the programme and how this might 
affect implementation. 
We aim to shed light on these issues and, more broadly, 
contribute to the small body of literature on health policy 
implementation in developing countries 115,16]. Our 
approach is broadly descriptive, seeking to identify what 
is happening in terms of the design, implementation, 
administration, and operation of the programme; 
whether it is expected; and the reasons behind why it is 
happening as it is 116,17 ]. We focused on the experiences 
of actors involved in the programme at the district level in 
order to give a bottom-up perspective of the implementa- 
tion process. A description of the design of the pro- 
gramme and its implementation at the central level 
establishes the context in which district level actors were 
operating. An important part of the story, namely the for- 
mulation of the policy, has been described elsewhere 118 ]. 
Safe Defivery Incentives Programme 
The SDIP sought to change the behaviour of both families 
and health workers though a package of financial incen- 
tives (table 1) that included: i) a conditional cash transfer 
to women; ii) an incentive to the health provider for each 
delivery attended; and iii) free health care, in addition to 
the conditional cash transfer, for those women from the 
25 least developed districts 1111. There have been a 
number of changes made to the design of the SDIP since 
our study. Here, we describe the benefits and eligibility 
criteria that were in place during the study period - ie. the 
first 18 months of the programme. 
Table 1: Financial incentives offered by the SDIP and the eligibility criteria 
Financial incentive Eligibility criteria 
1. Conditional cash transfer to women Woman delivered in a public health facility and had no more than two living children QE an 500 NRS ($7.8) in plains districts obstetric complication (as diagnosed by the health provider) 
1,000 NRS ($15.6) in hill districts 
1.500 NRS ($23.4) in mountain districts 
2. Provider incentive Doctor, nurse, midwife, health assistant, auxiliary health worker or maternal and child 
- 300 NRS ($4.7) for each delivery attended health worker attended a delivery at the woman's homegr in a public health facility 
3. Free delivery care to women and facility reimbursed Woman comes from one of the 25 least developed districts aud meets the eligibility 
- 1,000 NRS ($15.6) reimbursed to health facility criteria required for the conditional cash transfer 
Page 366 
Page 2 of 11 
(pop number not for citation purposes) 
BMC Health Services Research 2009,9: 97 
The SIDIP offered cash to women giving birth in a public 
health facility. Money was to be paid by the health pro- 
vider or accountant on discharge and the amount was set 
to reflect differences in accessibility to health facilities 
across the three main geographical regions of Nepal (table 
1). In contrast to many performance-based payment 
schemes, the government chose to provide a universal 
conditional cash transfer rather than one targeted towards 
the poorest. This decision was driven by the desire to gain 
political popularity, as well as concerns about equity 1181, 
The SDIP intended to alleviate some of the transport costs 
of accessing care. The conditional cash transfer repre- 
sented 30-50 percent of the mean transport cost incurred 
by a family seeking delivery care at a health facility [121. 
Two groups of women were eligible to receive the money: 
i) women with up to two living children; and ii) women 
with any number of specified obstetric complications, 
irrespective of parity. The rationale for the first of these eli- 
gibility criteria was to avoid a risk of the SDIP increasing 
fertility. Clearly, the use of cash rather than a voucher sys- 
tem meant that money had to be transferred from the dis- 
trict health office to the health facility and, once there, 
securely kept. In many health centres with no accountant 
or bank account, this implied the handling of large sums 
of cash by health workers. 
The SDIP also provided 300 NRS ($4.7) to health workers 
for each delivery attended. Surprisingly, perhaps, the pro- 
vider incentive was given for deliveries attended both at 
the health facility and at home. Policyrnakers were anx- 
ious that the SDIP should not neglect home deliveries 
altogether, as it was unrealistic to expect the majority of 
women, even over the medium term, to deliver in health 
facilities given the current low coverage rate. However, 
this decision gave rise to a possible tension with the con- 
ditional cash transfer, on the one hand, incentivising 
institutional deliveries and the provider incentive, on the 
other hand, encouraging health workers to attend home 
deliveries. The policy specified the cadres of health worker 
eligible to receive the incentive, but was intentionally 
vague on whether or how the incentive should be shared 
amongst health workers, leaving the decision to the health 
facility management committee. Initially, auxiliary health 
workers were not eligible for the provider incentive, but 
after one year of widespread protests, the policy was 
changed to include them. 
Free maternity care was available to women from the 25 
least developed districts as an additional benefit to the 
conditional cash transfer. The policy stipulated that health 
facilities were to be given 1,000 NRS ($15.7) for each 
delivery provided free of charge, as a reimbursement to 
recover costs. 
hftp: //www. biomedcentral. com/1472-6963/9/97 
Central level implementation 
The central government issued guidelines to each district 
health office, zonal hospital and regional hospital on the 
how the SDIP should be designed and implemented II 11. 
In some respects (eg. sharing of the provider incentive), 
the guidelines gave actors at the district level discretion 
over implementation. On other matters (eg. the eligibility 
criteria), they represented a set of regulations that were 
intended to be strictly applied. In the absence of training, 
the guidelines were the primary means by which the pol- 
icy was communicated to implementers at the district 
level. 
There were lengthy delays in the transfer of funds from the 
central level (including the donor) to the districts. On 
average, districts received funds earmarked for the SDIP 
283 days late in the first fiscal year, and 147 days late in 
the second fiscal year 1191. To initiate implementation of 
the SDIP as quickly as possible, the central level govern- 
ment encouraged districts to start paying beneficiaries 
using funds from other budget lines or borrow money 
from local partners. Wary of raising expectations amongst 
the public before ensuring funds were available to pay 
beneficiaries, the central level programme managers 
chose not to publicise the SDIP with a national media 
campaign. To be precise, the SDIP's launch was publicly 
announced; however, there was no national information 
campaign explaining the benefits of the programme and 
who could benefit 
Uptake of the programme 
Available data suggest uptake of the programme in its first 
two years was, broadly speaking, low. The most reliable 
data, from a household survey carried out in six districts, 
indicate that 29 percent of eligible women received the 
conditional cash transfer at the time of childbirth and 
only 27 percent of women had any knowledge of the pro- 
gramme while they were pregnant 1191. There were found 
to be wide variations between districts, suggesting imple- 
mentation has been more successful in some places than 
others. The proportion of eligible women receiving the 
cash ranged from 16 percent to 52 percent, while aware- 
ness during pregnancy varied from 22 percent to 40 per- 
cent. Over the same period, annual expenditure of the 
programme was $1.2 million with approximately 50 per- 
cent going to women recipients of the conditional cash 
transfer 1201. 
Methods 
Study setting 
Nepal is a geographically and ethnically diverse country 
that has suffered from political conflict and internal 
upheaval as the country moved from democracy to mon- 
archy and now to an interim phase of political uncertainty 
121). Himalayan mountains border Tibet to the north, 
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and India borders the flat plains to the south. Gross 
national income per capita is $340 1221 and while female 
literacy is improving, 45 percent of women remain illiter- 
ate 1131. Nepal has a maternal mortality rate of 281 per 
100,000 live births and a neonatal mortality rate of 33 per 
1,000 live births, and only 19 percent of women deliver 
with a skilled birth attendant [ 13 1. 
Study participants and data collection 
The study was conducted in 10 districts of Nepal. We pur- 
posively sampled two mountain districts, four hill dis- 
tricts, and four plains districts to ensure that the variation 
in the SDIP's package of benefits across the three topo- 
graphical regions was represented. In each district, we 
sampled five health institutions that were providing deliv- 
ery care (one hospital, two primary health centres and two 
health posts). Health facilities were purposively selected 
to include two that were near to the district health office 
and two that were further away. In addition, two regional 
hospitals were sampled from other districts since our 
study districts contained no hospitals providing this level 
of care. 
We aimed to conduct one key informant interview with 
the most senior level of health personnel available in each 
health facility, a key informant interview with the district 
health office and a focus group discussion in each district. 
Participants of each focus group discussion were a mix of 
health personnel, accountants, non-governmental organ- 
isation workers, and management committee members. 
In total, 55 key informant interviews and nine focus group 
discussions were completed (table 2). Trained Nepali 
researchers conducted discussions and kept log-books. 
TPJ and ST worked from the offices of Family Health Divi- 
sion in the Ministry of Health and Population, and made 
notes of their observations during this time. Verbal data 
were tape-recorded and transcribed. The study was 
approved by the ethics committee of the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and written consent 
was obtained from each respondent. 
Table 2: Number of key informant interviews completed and 
analysed (in parentheses) by place 
Plains Hill Mountain Total 
District health office 3(2) 3 (2) 1 (1) 7(5) 
Regional hospital 0(0) 2(2) 0(0) 2(0) 
Zonal/district hospital 6(3) 4(3) 1 (1) 11 (7) 
Primary health centre 8(6) 7(6) 3(2) 18(14) 
Health post 7(6) 6(5) 4(3) 17(14) 
Total 24(17) 22(18) 9(7) 55(42) 
Note: In addition, there were nine focus group discussions completed 
and analysed (four in plains, three in hill and two in mountain districts) 
http: //www. biomedcentral. com/1472-6963/9/97 
Analysis 
Researchers who had collected and transcribed the data 
conducted manual content analysis 1231 with two interna- 
tional researchers (TPI, JM). Initially, 10 transcripts from 
different types of respondents and different topographical 
areas were categorised under headings from the topic 
guides. Categories were refined based on themes emerging 
from the data, and thereafter, transcripts were analysed 
according to those themes. We analysed all the focus 
group discussion data and a random sample of respond- 
ents in every district, ensuring coverage of stakeholders 
and methods (table 2). After analysis of 51 transcripts we 
felt there was saturation and a further 9 transcripts were 
read to check for recurring themes. Data were tabulated to 
compare responses across types of respondent and topog- 
raphy. Analysis was conducted in Nepali, and quotations 
were translated into English for publiýation. The extent to 
which observation data corroborated data from tran- 
scripts was discussed during analysis, and an observation 
report was written, describing the implementation of the 
programme. 
Results 
Variations In implementation 
Information on examples of implementation were 
obtained from respondents in interviews and focus group 
discussions, allowing us to aggregate specific cases into 
categories of practices that could be mapped against the 
stated policy (table 3). 
There were numerous practices in the implementation of 
the conditional cash transfer to the women. There were 
variations in the interpretation of the eligibility criteria 
and the administration of the cash. The former included 
cases where health facilities simply ignored the eligibility 
criteria altogether, making the cash available to all women 
delivering in a public health facility. More serious devia- 
tions from policy were apparent when an entire district, 
for example, gave cash to women delivering at home. 
Such practices might be expected to have the opposite 
effect to the SDIP's intended objective of increasing skilled 
birth attendance. 
Administration of the cash varied in terms of- the amount 
of cash given; to whom the cash was given; and the time 
at which the cash was given. The practice of giving cash to 
husbands was a particular concern to some respondents 
who were worried that the money might be misspent. 
Most commonly, women were given no money at all or 
given it at a later date after being discharged from the 
health facility. 
There were many instances of health facilities following 
their own rules in the payment of the health provider 
incentive. Practices varied according to who was entitled 
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Table 3: Variations in implementation 
http: //www. biomedcentral. com/1 472-6963/9/97 
Policy Practice 
1. Conditional cash transfer to women 
Women who deliver in a public health facility - Cash given to women delivering at home 
hospital, primary health centre or health post - Cash given to women delivering in sub-health posts 
are entitled to a cash payment if they have no more Cash given to all women. and not limited to those with no more than two living children 
than two living children sy an obstetric complication. or an obstetric complication 
The cash is given at the time of discharge. - Reduced amount of cash given to women, because the health institution did not have 
If referred, the woman is to receive the sufficient funds 
cash from the referring institution. and equally divided the money among the eligible women 
- Cash amount deducted from the patient's bill in the absence of any cash to hand over to 
the woman 
Cash given on a first come first served basis or selectively due to insufficient funds 
Cash not given at time of discharge but at a later time 
Cash given to the relatives of women on proof of identity 
Cash given to women with abortion complications (not in the policy) 
Cash given to women by the referral hospital, rather than the referring institution 
- No cash given 
2. Health provider incentive 
Government health professionals - - Incentive to health workers given only for attendance at those deliveries in which the 
medical doctor, nurse, midwife, woman 
health assistant, auxiliary health worker has no more than two living children or an obstetric complication 
and maternal and child health worker Incentive divided up among all staff involved in delivery care 
- are entitled to an incentive for every Incentive given to a single health professional involved in the delivery 
delivery they attend either at home A share of the incentive taken by non health professionals - eg. the accountant 
or at a government health facility Incentive given to health professionals for attending institutional deliveries only, not home 
deliveries 
Incentive claimed by health professionals for attending deliveries in private clinics 
No incentive given to health professionals 
3. Free delivery care to women 
Women eligible for the cash incentive Free delivery provided to all women, and not limited to 
and resident in a low human development district those with no more than two living children or an obstetric complication 
are also entitled to free delivery care. Health institution not reimbursed for the free delivery 
The health institution is reimbursed 1,000 NRS 
for each case of free delivery care given 
to receive the incentive, between whom the incentive was 
shared, and the place of delivery for which health workers 
could claim the incentive. Different practices regarding 
the sharing of the incentive between health staff were 
expected given that the policy guidelines allowed health 
facility management committees discretion on this issue. 
Some health facilities, however, took practices a step fiir- 
ther, including non-health workers, such as the account- 
ant, in the share of the incentives. The free delivery care 
element of the policy was usually implemented as 
intended. Sometimes, respondents reported that the 
health facility had not been reimbursed for the deliveries 
provided free of charge. 
Factors affecting impiernentation 
Delays in disbursement, inadequate funds and their consequences 
Respondents at all levels of the health system expressed 
concern that women were not getting the incentive imme- 
diately after delivery. Often, money was not given to 
women in time because of delays in money reaching dis- 
tricts, inadequate funds or a combination of these factors. 
Delays occurred because of the late arrival of fund release 
letters from the central level, and the short-term absence 
of key district staff who were in the field or in training. In 
a few districts, health workers were also experiencing long 
delays before receiving their incentive, but more concern 
was expressed about the failure to pay women on time, 
particularly because the purpose of the cash was to meet 
immediate expenses of travel and subsistence. 
"As the incentive is given for transportation expenses 
it should be given on time. " (District hospital, Hill, 
Key informant interview) 
"In my opinion, the incentive should be given to the 
woman immediately after she delivers... if she does not 
get the money in her hand she may not be able to bor- 
row and then she will face problems. " (District hospi- 
tal, Hill, Key informant interview) 
"We sometimes feel that this scheme should be 
stopped. Either the money should arrive on time oth- 
erwise it does not have any meaning. " (District hospi- 
tal, Hill, Key informant interview) 
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A diverse group of respondents also reported that funds 
had been inadequate to pay beneficiaries. The amount 
budgeted did not match requirements, or the amount 
released was less than the amount stated in the budget. 
There was frustration that the central level did not consult 
with the district level in the development of plans, even 
when the district had taken the initiative to plan how to 
spend the budget. 
When money was not available to give to eligible women 
at the time of delivery, a number of issues arose. First, it 
was difficult to find or contact women in order to give 
them the money, particularly those in remote areas or 
those whose whereabouts were unknown. Outstanding 
debts accumulated and many women, at the time of this 
study, were yet to be paid: 
"Since we have no money during the time of delivery 
we have to ask [women] to come later to collect the 
incentive. It will be difficult to find them later on, and 
many do not contact us. You see the problem? " 
(Health post, Hill, Key informant interview) 
"Women come from 60 kilometres away for delivery. 
If they do not receive the money immediately after 
delivery, how many times can they come from so far, 
just for 500 rupees, and how many times can they 
call? " (District stakeholders, Plains, Focus group dis- 
cussion) 
Second, a failure to give the incentive created a perception 
that health institutions were withholding money, leading 
to friction and mistrust of health personnel: 
"We started working with a tentative plan but as the 
number of deliveries increased, women who delivered 
in the beginning got the incentive and others were left 
out. About 40 to 50 women did not get the incentive. 
Those who did not get [the money] started fighting 
with us. " (District stakeholders, Hill, Focus group dis- 
cussion) 
In one place, the programme was put on hold because 
there were inadequate funds, and staff were worried about 
the consequences of only giving cash to some women: 
"If we distribute the outstanding incentive of last year 
from February onwards we need about five hundred 
thousand rupees but we have received only one hun- 
dred thousand. If we distribute this amount we are 
sure to be beaten by women. ' (District stakeholders, 
Mountain, Focus group discussion) 
A number of ways to deal with the unpredictability of 
funds were described. These included: making payment 
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on a first come first served basis; providing money out of 
one's own pocket; giving a smaller amount of money to 
share the cash across a larger number of women; and bor- 
rowing from other sources. Some district health offices 
used hinds from other health programmes, whilst some 
health institutions borrowed from their own account. 
Some district officials, who were reluctant to borrow, wor- 
ried that donor hinds may not materialise, or felt it was 
risky to borrow without approval. 
"if we spend money from the regular budget head 
funded by foreign donors we are questioned. If we 
spend even after receiving an authorisation letter we 
are questioned: 'why did we spend without receiving 
the letter of releaseT Even those taking risks are 
trapped sometimes. " (District health office, Plains, 
Key informant interview) 
*1 am reluctant to use money from the hospital com- 
mittee fund because donor funds are highly unpredict- 
able and we do not know when they will come. " 
(District health office, Mountain, Key informant inter- 
view) 
Confusion about the policy 
Many respondents were unclear about aspects of the pol- 
icy. They reported that there had been inadequate dissem- 
ination of information to the districts. The confiision 
created variations in implementation and affected the 
ability of health workers to disseminate information in 
communities, potentially hampering the effectiveness of 
the programme. 
District officials and health workers were often confused 
about how to implement the programme, finding the offi- 
cial guidelines issued by central government unhelpful, 
confusing and lacking in detail. There were reports of late 
distribution of guidelines and insufficient copies, which 
restricted their ability to implement the policy: 
"The centre was so miserly to send only one guideline. 
How do they think that this is sufficient to run Ithe 
programme] in such a big district? * (District stake- 
holders, Plains, Focus group discussion) 
"Most importantly, the staff should be properly ori- 
ented before launching the programme. " (Health 
post, Mountain, Key informant interview) 
There was particular confusion about the eligibility of 
health workers to receive the incentive, and the process of 
reimbursement to health institutions for free delivery 
care. Respondents did not know the cadres of health 
worker and the place of delivery that ensured eligibility to 
receive the money. Data suggest that the conditional cash 
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transfer to women was more clearly understood, but there 
were still some issues of confusion that led to deviations 
from the stated policy. Sometimes cash was distributed to 
women at ineligible health facilities and women were not 
paid when they were referred: 
"I am not sure about getting the incentive when refer- 
ring the women to another facility after I attended her 
first. And I am also not sure from which facility the 
women will get the incentive... " (Primary health cen- 
tre, Plains, Key informant interviews) 
"We were all confused about how to distribute the 
incentive and we were not sure whom to give, land] 
how much to give" (District stakeholders, Mountain, 
Focus group discussion) 
Districts disseminated information to the community 
using various means, such as FM radio or through female 
community health volunteers. However, district stake- 
holders felt communication was hampered by a lack of 
guidance on how to promote the policy, and the absence 
of any budget allocation. Moreover, some respondents 
felt it difficult to disseminate information about a pro- 
gramme that they themselves did not fully understand. 
Disseminating information about the programme was 
particularly challenging in sparsely populated areas where 
households were scattered. Respondents felt that poorer 
women who tended to live in more remote areas were dis- 
advantaged because they were less likely to know about 
the programme. Women in more remote areas who had 
not received the cash at delivery were also disadvantaged 
as they were less likely to find out that the budget had 
been released: 
"Only advantaged women received the incentive as 
they are better informed and are able to visit the health 
facilities. The poor ones were not informed properly 
and did not receive the incentive. " (District stakehold- 
ers, Plains, Focus group discussion) 
"I am sure people in town know about the scheme but 
I am not sure about in the villages" (District stakehold- 
ers, Plains, Focus group discussion) 
Misuse and monitoring 
Respondents in several districts were concerned about 
misuse of SDIP funds. Different types of misuse were 
described, including: false claims by health workers for 
deliveries that never took place; claims by health workers 
for assisting deliveries in private clinics; claims for money 
by women with more than two children; and skimming of 
money by staff at the district level. Occasionally reports of 
false claims were followed up, but the lack of a budget 
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provision hindered verification of parity or if a birth actu- 
ally took place. 
" [Health workers] are claiming incentives for deliver- 
ies that they have attended in the local market place, 
and registering them as institutional deliveries. And 
there is no mechanism to check. " (District stakehold- 
ers, Plains, Focus group discussion) 
"You know, sometimes the district level people keep 
up to fifty percent of the incentive. I heard they make 
false claims too. ' (Health post, Hill, Key informant 
interview) 
In some cases, it was not clear whether the lack of clarity 
in the guidelines caused the (unintentional) misuse of 
funds, or if they were wilfully misused. Either way, 
respondents felt that there were opportunities for misap- 
propriation of funds by virtue of the programme's design: 
"When cash comes, there are possibilities for misuse, 
this is the only problem. " (District health office, Hill, 
Key informant interview) 
In almost all districts, respondents were unclear about 
what was expected of them in terms of monitoring the 
programme. There was a lack of guidance on how to mon- 
itor and there was no separate budget or time allocation 
to carry out these activities. Many felt that monitoring the 
distribution of financial incentives was important, but 
guidance had been insufficient. 
"So far we have not monitored the programme and no 
one has raised any question about this. However, this 
now stands as a big issue. " (District hospital, Hill, Key 
informant interview) 
"A separate budget for supervision and monitoring of 
this scheme should be made available. The integrated 
budget for monitoring is just not enough. " (District 
stakeholders, Hill, Focus group discussion) 
No monitoring system had been established in any of the 
districts we sampled. Some respondents felt that they had 
not been given time to prepare recording and reporting 
tools, and hasty implementation had resulted in an ina- 
bility to plan or set up a monitoring system. Reporting 
appeared to be on an ad hoc basis, provided 'on demand' 
to representatives of non-governmental organisations and 
central level officials, or in meetings where the pro- 
gramme was discussed. In some places respondents felt 
that health workers were not expected to monitor the 
scheme, and this was the responsibility of those at the cen- 
tral level or non-government organisations. 
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Acceptance of the policy 
Most respondents welcomed the idea of giving cash to 
women delivering in a health facility and felt it was both 
legitimate and helpful. However, they had specific con- 
cerns with the eligibility criteria, questioning the logic of 
only giving the cash to women with two or fewer children. 
Respondents felt that this indirect discrimination, partic- 
ularly against poorer women, opposed the overall aim of 
the programme - to increase institutional deliveries and 
reduce mortality: 
"The poorest of the poor are excluded from the incen- 
tive because the poor are the ones who have more than 
two children. So there should not be any parity condi- 
tion" (District health office, Hill, Key informant inter- 
vievý) 
"Women having more babies are subject to higher 
risks and they are deprived of the incentive. " (District 
stakeholders, Plains, Focus group discussion) 
"if safe motherhood is women's right, then what 
about the rights of women having more than two chil- 
dren? " (District stakeholders, Plains, Focus group dis- 
cussion) 
Health workers sometimes found themselves in difficult 
situations, either being unable to provide the cash to 
poorer women with greater need because they had more 
than two children, or purposively ignoring the parity 
restriction: 
"Women with 4 or 5 babies must also have been paid 
the incentive, because I have paid the incentive to 
women with 3 babies" (District stakeholders, Plains, 
Focus group discussion) 
"It is difficult if rich people get money and poor peo- 
ple do not get money... for example, a rich woman 
came to the health institution for delivery and got the 
incentive. A poor woman found out about the incen- 
tive from that person but we could not give her the 
incentive because she had more than two 
babies ... (this) makes me feel uneasy. ' (Primary health 
centre, Hill, Key informant interview) 
Other respondents were concerned about the practicali- 
ties of reliably verifying the parity (and therefore eligibil- 
ity) of women and methods of verification were 
ineffective and sometimes restrictive: 
"How can a woman go to the Village Development 
Committee and get a certificate (of parity) before 
going to the health institution for delivery? Currently 
there is no local political representative, how can it be 
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practical? " (District hospital, Hill, Key informant 
interview) 
"The main barrier is to find out the number of babies, 
even a mother with 3 or 4 babies claims that they have 
just 2 babies, and we are not trained to find out the 
parity (of the woman). " (District hospital, Hill, Key 
informant interview) 
There was widespread discontent with the health provider 
incentive, even amongst those who benefit directly such 
midwives. It strained relations between health staff, par- 
ticularly when some felt the distribution of money was 
unjust or higher qualified staff were ineligible to receive 
the incentive: 
"Distribution of incentives to health workers creates 
tensions especially in cases of home delivery. Often 
the home delivery is attended by one health worker 
but others who do not attend also the want the money 
to be equally distributed" (District stakeholders, 
Plains, Focus group discussion) 
"The guidelines are discriminatory by giving money to 
maternal and child health workers and not auxiliary 
health workers who are in charge. This issue is highly 
controversial in my district. " (Health post, Plains, Key 
infon-nant interview) 
In one large hospital, managers wanted to avoid any con- 
flict between staff and therefore no incentive was pro- 
vided to health workers. Instead, the money was used to 
make up the deficit in payments to women. 
Respondents felt that effective implementation of the pro- 
gramme required improvements in the availability and 
quality of services. This typically manifested itself in a call 
for greater investment in drugs, equipment and training of 
skilled birth attendants: 
'It does not help just to distribute money to women. 
The skills of all health workers should be improved by 
providing proper training. ' (District stakeholders, 
Plains, Focus group discussion) 
Many respondents suggested that funds should be used to 
provide free delivery care, instead of allocation to the 
SIDP, and some felt that the programme should be needs 
based, targeting poorer women: 
"It is not necessary to provide incentives to all women. 
it should only be provided to poor women, otherwise 
it is not worthwhile and it is a loss of money. On the 
contrary, rich women should be charged ... because 
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they can afford it. " (Regional hospital, Hill, Key 
informant interivew) 
"It would be even better if the amount of incentive 
could be given to the hospital to make the delivery 
service completely free. " (District hospital, Hill, Key 
informant interview) 
Discussion 
The paper has described the experiences of district level 
actors in implementing the SDIP and illustrates a number 
of challenges they faced. In the discussion, we expand on 
the most important issues raised by respondents with ref- 
erence to the wider literature on the implementation of 
health policy in developing countries. 
The study had a number of limitations. First, while it was 
always our intention to follow a descriptive approach to 
studying implementation 1161, methods grounded in 
health policy analysis theory may have been able to pro- 
vide deeper insights by stating a set of hypotheses to test 
empirically [241. There are analytical frameworks, for 
example, that integrate "politics, process and power into 
the study of health policies" 115 1. Second, we focused on 
early implementation only, motivated by the need to pro- 
vide timely findings in the evaluation of an ongoing pro- 
gramme. We recognise this provides an incomplete 
picture, a snapshot of implementation over what is, at a 
minimum, a five-year programme. Third, all data collec- 
tion was completed before the analysis of data was under- 
taken. A more iterative process of data collection and 
analysis would have improved the topic guides and expe- 
rience of the interviewers. 
Despite these limitations, the study was able to provide a 
detailed account of the SDIP's early implementation. We 
should not perhaps be surprised that early implementa- 
tion faced several difficulties. It was a national pro- 
gramme which was introduced rapidly without time set 
aside for piloting or detailed planning at district level. The 
large variation in practices suggests district managers and 
health workers were able to exercise considerable discre- 
tion in the implementation of the programme and it is 
largely their actions that have determined how the policy 
took shape on the ground. At the same time, a number of 
factors at the central level imposed considerable con- 
straints on the ability of actors in each of the districts to 
implement-the SDIP--Bureaucratic delays ia the disburse- 
ment of ftinds, difficulties in communicating the policy, 
both to implementers and the wider public and the design 
of the programme were cited by respondents as impor- 
tant. It is these factors that provide the most convincing 
explanation of why uptake of the programme was low. 
Poor financial management, in particular, has been a 
common theme emerging from the recent literature on 
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implementation of maternal health financing policies in 
low-income countries 19,25,261. 
Political expediency to ensure the policy was adopted 
quickly 1181 may have meant there was inadequate prep- 
aration in the planning of resources and development of 
certain mechanisms. Respondents frequently spoke about 
the inadequacy of funds and acknowledged that the 
means to verify the eligibility of women and monitor the 
programme were lacking. Moreover, efforts by the central 
level to retain substantial control of the implementation 
process - by using an earmarked budget, providing pre- 
scriptive (yet unclear) guidance on the policy, and offer- 
ing few opportunities for feedback - may have 
exacerbated problems and contributed further to the pro- 
gramme's low uptake. 
In this context, the actions of district level actors may be 
seen as coping strategies to overcome (or avoid) the prob- 
lems imposed on them from above and, in turn, they may 
explain the reasons for the variation in uptake of the pro- 
gramme between districts. Those who attempted to deal 
with challenges were often driven by pressure to meet 
local needs. Inaction, however, was equally common and 
it is important to understand the motivations that influ- 
enced the two sets of actors. 
The most important coping strategy, given the bureau- 
cratic delays at the central level, may have been the deci- 
sion by some district managers to direct funds from other 
budget lines for the purposes of the SDIP. This practice 
presumably allowed implementation earlier than would 
otherwise have been possible, but its impact on the 
financing of other district health programmes. is, from the 
data, unclear. Prior perceptions about the unpredictability 
of donor funding influenced the decision of some manag- 
ers to refrain from using other budget lines and delay 
implementation. it is also possible that this strict adher- 
ence to government regulations may have represented a 
reaction - particularly among those who had taken the 
time to develop careful plans for how to allocate the SDI P 
budget between health facilities - against the continued 
pressure from the central government to use funds from 
other budget headings. 
The fear of having to deal with angry families demanding 
their money appeared to be a motivating factor behind a 
number of practices to manage the problem of unpredict- 
able funding to health facilities. Health workers tried to 
appease mothers by providing money out of their own 
pocket, deducting an amount equivalent to the condi- 
tional cash transfer from the hospital bill or sharing what 
money they had among all those waiting. Another moti- 
vating factor may have been the wide support for paying 
mothers - also found elsewhere 11,91 - which resonated 
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with the view that mothers tend to put funds to better use 
than men. Some simply sidestepped the problem alto- 
gether, putting the programme on hold so that no women 
could claim the cash. 
With respect to raising awareness, some districts under- 
took local initiatives to communicate information about 
the programme using, for example, FM radio. It suggests 
that other districts could have done more to promote the 
programme, but with widespread confusion among 
implementers they themselves may have lacked the confi- 
dence to take the initiative themselves. 
It appears that the complexity of the programme - with 
the different eligibility criteria for different incentives - 
was itself a major barrier to implementation, exacerbated 
further by the confusing guidelines. There is no denying 
that such programmes are inherently complex; one only 
needs to looks at Brazil's conditional cash transfer pro- 
gramme, Bolsa Familia 1271. However, an alternative 
approach to implementation may have promoted more 
innovation and creativity at the district level with the 
emphasis on reaching policy objectives, rather than spec- 
ifying the policy in such detail, which probably made peo- 
ple uncertain whether or not they could adapt the rules 
when faced with problems. 
Central to this question of why some district implement- 
ers took actions to deal with problems and others did not 
may be the widespread knowledge that the SDIP was 
donor-filnded. Interestingly, one of the reasons donors 
provide funds directly to the recipient government's treas- 
ury is to promote national ownership of policy. In prac- 
tice, however, there appeared to be little ownership of the 
policy at the district level. The SDIP was perceived by 
many as a 'programme', whose activities were regarded as 
additional to the routine of government. Respondents 
maintained that monitoring, supervision and communi- 
cation of the programme could not be carried out using 
available resources and the fact that there was no budget 
provision or explicit time allocation for these tasks rein- 
forced the idea that they should be done by external mon- 
itors from the central level or NGOs. Other studies have 
found that such perceptions can be lead to inaction and a 
general reluctance to carry out tasks demanded of the cen- 
tral level 128-301. 
Several issues arose that may have had serious implica- 
tions for the wider public health system, highlighting the 
potential of the SDIP to have (unforeseen) adverse effects. 
The perception that health providers may have held 
money rather than paying women can only have eroded 
further the community's trust in the public health system, 
thereby reducing demand for all health services, not just 
delivery care. Equally serious, but from the perspective of 
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service provision, was the tension between staff caused by 
the provider incentive. Any conflict between staff is likely 
to have consequences for all health services provided by 
the health facility. In this regard, the central level could 
have devoted more time to explaining the rationale for the 
provider incentive (ie. why only some cadres were eligible 
for the incentive) in order to build legitimacy of this ele- 
ment of the SDIP. 
Conclusion 
Changes made to the SDIP since the study suggest devel- 
opment and implementation of the policy has been a 
dynamic process. In late 2007, the Government of Nepal 
made a number of changes, reflecting some of the most 
important concerns of respondents in this study. The eli- 
gibility criteria to receive the conditional cash transfer to 
women were removed, allowing all women to benefit and 
simplifying the programme enormously. The programme 
was expanded to inducle not-for-profit hospitals in order 
to address concerns about the availability of obstetric serv- 
ices. A national information campaign and district level 
training of staff were carried out to improve awareness 
and understanding of the programme. The orientation, in 
particular, provided a forum for district level staff to voice 
concerns and have greater exposure to information about 
the programme. Finally, procedures to manage and dis- 
burse funds at the central level were streamlined to reduce 
delays. These changes are welcome and they were most 
likely responsible for substantial increases in the uptake of 
the programme in its third year J 191. More recently, the 
government announced further changes, abolishing user 
fees for delivery care at all public health facilities while 
continuing to provide the SDI P's conditional cash transfer 
to women. Given the problems with early implementa- 
tion and the adjustments made by policyrnakers, it will be 
important to evaluate the impact and implementation of 
the SDIP over the first five years. 
The success of conditional cash transfer programmes in 
Latin America has led to a wave of enthusiasm for their 
adoption in other parts of the world. However, context 
matters and proponents of similar programmes in south 
Asia should give due attention to the challenges to imple- 
mentation when capacity is weak and health services inad- 
equate. There is a need for both careful planning in their 
roll out and closer engagement with district level actors, 
who exerdse considerable influence in the implementa- 
tion of policy. 
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Objective - Nepal's Sk, Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) was 
introduced nationwi '? ý005 with the ahn of encouraging greater use qf 
prqfýssional care (, &ý&Ldbirth. It provided cash to women giving birth in a 
public health. 14d . 
, 
Wy and an incentive to the health provider. 1br each 
allt: deliverv atten , either at home or in thefacility. We aimed to assess the ýmpaci qf4y)rogramme on neonatal mortality and health care seeking 
74 behaviow;, a childbirth in one district qf Nepal. 
Met 
cdý) 1ý 
Impacts were identified using an interrupted time series 
apprt, applied to household data. We estimated a model linking the 
level of each outcome at a point in time to the start qf the programme, 
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demographic controls, a vector qf'time variables and communitY-level 
fixed qf . 
fects. 
Findings - The recipients oj* the cash transfer in the programme's first 
two years were disproportionaiely wealthier households, r1fiecting 
existing inequality in the use of goi, ernment maternity services. In places 
with women's groups - where it! formation about the policy ivas>widely 
disseminated - the SDIP substantially increased skilled birth atTrance, 
butfijiled to impact on either neonatal mortality or the caes'l a section 
rate. In places with no women's groups, the SDIP had AZ`Ilimpact on 
utifisation outcomes or neonatal niorialitY. 
Implications for policy - The lack of any impact o onatal mortalit 'v 
rJAC, 
T suggests that greater increases in utilisation or heqX qualit. ); ol'care al 
needed to improve health outronies. The S ýc'hanged health care 
seeking behaviour only in those areas wit groups highlighting the 
importance oftyfective communication q( jAý? iolicy to the ivieler public. 
INTR! ýRCTION 
Under- utilisation of health c, i 
Qvices 
is a familiar problem in developing k 
countries. A combination >th supply- and demand-side barriers restrict 
n 14 
access to services, partiý arey for poorer households who are in greatest 
need of health ca (E Cooper, 2004; Travis et al., 2004). Overcoming 
these obstacles is es ly challenging in maternal health, in part because 
the provision of ae reluctance to use maternity services are inextricably 
linked to dee - issues such as the state of the health system and the 
place of wl o society. This may explain, perhaps, why professional care 
at childbiF44 i sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia has stagnated over the 
past de Koblinsky al., 2006). 
A bi)ý rt of the challenge, and one that is being increasingly recognised, 
Z ot 
is persua ing the relevant agents to undertake changes in behaviour that 
promote the health of individuals and families. Many countries, particu- 
larly in Latin America, have sought to raise demand for health services by 
providing monetary incentives to households on the condition that they 
engage in certain health care seeking practices (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). 
The most influential of these was the Mexican Progresa programme, 
introduced in 1997 to target poor households with cash transfers provided 
the children regularly attended school and made preventive health care visits 
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(Gertler., 2004). Other nationwide conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programmes - Red de Proleccion Socia in Nicaragua. Fanfilias ell Accion 
in Colombia, Bolsa Alimentacao in Brazil, Progrania de Asignacion in 
Honduras and Bono de Desarrollo Huniano in Ecuador - were similar in 
design to the Mexican programme, also targeting poor household with a 
focus on human capital formation (Attanasio, Carlos Gomez, Hqredia, & 
Vera-Hernandez, 2005; Maluccio & Flores, 2004; Morris, Flores & 
Medina, 22004a; Morris, Olinto, Flores. Nilson, & FigL 2004b; Paxon & Schady, 2007). Many of these programmes were Wuated using 
randomised methods, providing a strong body of evidenN, ýhi they can be 
an effective means to increase utilisation and, in some dake§4 improve health 
(Lagarde. Haines, & Palmer, 2007; Glassman. Todd, (&,, Gaardcr, 2007). C, Also popular are schemes that incentivise health<tW; to work harder by 
linking payments to some measure of effort. l2kr-Ofmance-based payment 
schemes have been implemented in Cambodj! Ofbeters & Griffiths, 2003), 
Rwanda (Meessen. Kasliala, & Musail. ýý607) and Haiti (Eichler, 
Auxila. & Pollock, 2001), modelled aro the basic idea of paying or 
'contracting' health providers to meetýr nce targets related to health 
outputs, punctuality or management d5pacity. The evidence regarding the 
success of provider-payment schenj ýý not only mixed but also, in the case 
of positive findings, questiom 
Me 
to weaknesses in study design 
(Eldridge & Palmer, 2009). 
In 2005, Nepal introduce((ý Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) 
0 Inc that combines the two typ o incentive. It provides a CCT to households with 
an incentive to health st r each delivery they attend. The SDIP grew out of 
concerns about the sl ogress in raising coverage of skilled birth attendance 
wo ty p 
og 
and the prohibitil$ high cost faced by households trying to access 
, 
ca S 
I 
tIv 
1 
professional q: ýf childbirth (Borghi, Ensor, Neupane, & Tiwari, 2006). 
-01 Latest figure 0 that over 80 percent of women in Nepal continue to deliver 7 
at ome an4 ly 19 percent deliver with a doctor or nurse in attendance 
(G ver e Nof Nepal, 2007). The* SDIP marked a departure from past 
govern policy that tended to focus on service provision only. Since the 
launch 
4Fhe 
SDIP, India and Bangladesh have followed suit with similar 
programmes of their own reflecting growing interest in south Asia (Devadasan, 
Elias, John, Grallachary, & Ralte, 2008; Government of the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh, 2007). While these programmes fit the CCT label less well than 
the Latin American programmes - they are not intended as a social safety net - 
they still seek to change health seeking behaviour with cash transfers. 
This chapter reports on a study that assessed the performance of the SDIP 
in Makwanpur, a district of Nepal where suitable data were available. 
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Specifically, it explored three related issues: tile financial burden of health 
care at childbirth, the benefit incidence of the CCT and the impact of the 
SDIP. The study was by no means comprehensive; it was limited to a 
quantitative evaluation of the SDIP in one part of the country. The larger 
evaluation, of which this study was a part, was broader in its scope 
capturing, for example, the experiences of a wide range of stakeholýers with 
-a-view-to identifying the main factors that have impeded and ! &itated 
implementation of the programme (Powell-Jackson, NelU Q; Tiwarii, 
Morrison, & Costello, 2008). Nevertheless, the study reportgere seeks 
to assess programme impact, the key component of evaluation. 
Moreover, the findings are likely to be applicable, in st; 
ýýeasure, 
to the 
rest of the country. There is little hard empirical eyk[ence on the health 
impact of CCT programmes in south A jkýmplementation is 
constrained by weak governance (Kaufiriann h, & Mastruzzi, 2008). 
The existing body of evidence is limited. 1 y to schemes in Latin 
'y , 
American countries, where government s Wos to verify eligibility, pay 
beneficiaries and monitor activities are maN06eveloped. 
The model used to estimate the ct of the SDIP looks for a 
discontinuity at the specific point in 'me the programme began in the 
district (Cook & Campbell, 1979) this point in time, we would expect 
observations after the program 
Ne 
different from those before it if the 
programme is to ha e had mpact. Our dataset from a community a-v 
surveillance system e. ds e 
tell 
to such an approach. It covers almost 
seven years of continuo ata collection and contains household data, 
which is not able to anipulated as easily as service data to make 
performance of a arnme appear better. The absence of any non- 
programme area Wstonstruct a cornparison group, however, is a major 
limitation. Witý -- and post-intervention data on both programme and 
non-progra R ites, it would have been possible to use difference-in- , itý difference. -ýE. ý Wagstaff, 2009b) or even triple difference methods to 
estimaterimpIcts (Moffitt, 1991; Wagstaff, 2009a). Instead, the approach is 
limited Uentifying instantaneous impacts and must assume no change in 
WC 
the secular trend of the outcome in the no-treatment state. It is capable of 
providing plausible evidence of an impact (Habicht, Victora, & Vaughan, 
1999; Victora, Habicht. & Bryce. 2004). 
We were also interested in the disruptive effects of out-of-pocket (OOP) 
spending for institutional delivery care on household consumption. Our 
intention was not to look at changes over time, but instead provide estimates 
at one point in time, after the SDIP started. We might expect payments for 
delivery care to be more disruptive than other types of health care, since they 
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are known to be particularly high in Nepal (Bor(Thi et al., 2006). On the 
other hand, childbirth differs from your typical health shock in that 
I 
the 
event is largely predictable, giving families time to prepare financially. 
In the next section, we describe the SDIP in Nepal and give a brief overview 
of implementation of the programme to-date. The subsequent sections outline 
the methods used to assess the performance of the programme and eport the 
results of the study. Finally, implications of the findings are discus . 
'W' 
SAFE DELIVERY INCENTIVE PRO ME 
The Nepalese health care system is dominated by thloRiblic sector, although 
the number of private and charitable ho 'M growing. Maternity 
services in Makwanpur, as in the rest of the cpqo are delivered through a 
,- 
ý_Y 
I 
network of health facilities based around A-: ýigtrict health system model, 
supported by regional and national hospi 
&, 
providing specialised care. 
Delivery care services are not free 4C)Wpoint of use-, in fact, household 
OOP expenditures can be substantia], Nrticularly in the case of emergency 
surgery. In Makwanpur, the mean to a household of a normal delivery 
was found to be 4,042 NRS ($ 1., compared with 22,780 NRS ($356.2) 
incurred by those With ac eski n section (Table 1). For both types of 
delivery, facility-based char 
ýend 
the additional costs of goods and services 
.a tj purchased outside of thol ii 
Ith 
facility together account for around two- 
thirds of the overall co Wyments made to the health provider are retained 
at facility level and ed under the control of the health management 
Table I usehold Costs of Institutional Delivery Care by Cost 
Category in Makwanpur (Rupees). 
Cost C Vaginal 95% Cl % Caesarean 95% Cl % 
(n = 271) Section (n = 29) 
Facility-based charges 1,492 (1,191-1,793) 36.9 7,913 (5,675--10,150) 34.7 
Additional charges 1.185 (1,040-1,330) 29.3 7,071 (4777-9,405) 31.1 
Transport costs 669 (565-773) 16.5 1.415 (845-1,985) 6.2 
Debt to service 697 (474-920) 17.2 6,362 (2,995-9.730) 27.9 
provider 
Total 4042 (3,522-4,562) 100 22,780 (17,045-28.516) 100 
Source: Cost of delivery and living standards survey. 
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committee (if in place). Clearly, delivery care can be an important source of 
revenue for health facilities. Outstanding debts to service providers remain a 
sizable share of the total cost suggesting households, particularly those with 
wornen requiring a caesarean section, struggle to find any means to pay their 
bills at the time the service is received. 2 The transport cost associated with a 
caesarean section is almost double that of a normal delivery, pr4; sumably 
because families need to travel further and more urgently to Ospitals 
sufficiently specialised to carry out surgery. 
With a view to alleviating some of financial cost of deWy care, the 
Government. of Nepal launched the SDIP nationwide in 204ý'W The SDIP's 
package of financial benefits included (i) a CCT to w who delivered 
their baby in a health facility and (ii) an incentive to hp" workers for each 
delivery attended either at home or in a heall<4-4ity (see Table 2), 
4 (Govet In this way, q. 1 0 -nment of Nepal, 2005). -hXq'Programme sought to increase utilisation of professional care at 4*, very by influencing the 
behaviour of both households and healSo, workers. The amount of 
cash offered to the woman varied across graphical regions to account 
for differences in the transport cost faulb ouseholds (Borghi et aL, 2006). 
The CCT, worth 1,000 NRS, is clearljýnot enough to cover the full cost of 
delivery care incurred by a househ& representing one quarter of the cost 
of a normal delivery or one tweW U the cost of a caesarean section. The 
intention of the SDIP was ý3ýale the cost, leaving the household still to 
pay for a substantial propdý. Ifqn of the costs of health care. 
The provider incentive%Qr attending a delivery at home was born out of a 
desire to improv car5ji ose women wising to deliver at home. Despite 
being well-intention! K, is ecision gave rise to a possible tension between 
the various inccntii - with the CCT, on the one hand, inccntivising women 
L 
Table 2e Benefits Offered by the SDIP and the Eligibility Criteria ý& 
Applied in Makwanpur. 
Financial Behelit Eligibility Criteria 
1. Conditional cash transfer to women 
0 1000 NRS (SI5.6) Woman delivered in a public health facility and had no more 
2. Provider incentive than two living children or an obstetric complication 
300 NRS ($4.7) per Doctor. nurse, midwife, health assistant, auxiliary health 
delivery worker or maternal and child health worker attended a 
delivery at home or in a public health facility 
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to the health facility, and the provider incentive, on the other hand, 
encouraging health providers to attend deliveries at home'5. The extent to 
which health workers can attend both deliveries at home and deliveries at 
the health facility depends on whether there is slack in the labour supply. If 
there is indeed a trade-off, how the incentive influences behaviour of the 
health worker will then depend in part on the income that would bc forgone 
(both the provider incentive and the user fee from the patient) b&Qt being 
present to attend a delivery in the health facility. AnotbK*teresting 
element to the design of the programme is the condition tANbie CCT is 
available only to those with two or fewer children (unless woman has an 
obstetric complication). The restriction was put in plact jl(ýýtt , ý- eflect concerns that the programme might inadvertently increase efertlity. In practice, 
however, health workers found it difficult to verify A(wWan's parity and the 
condition was later scrapped. N 
The programme was limited to public secl alth facilities in the first 
two years (our study period) but has subseq y expanded to includc both 
non-profit and private health facilities. ke many other demand-side 
programmes, the SDIP does not e target the poor, despite the 
rhetoric of national policyrr 0 times suggesting otherwise. 6 Nor 
does the programme use vouchers, 4ributing the CCT as cash. Numerous 
types of health worker can claim. 1461pHovider incentive, including those with 
no formal training in deliv 
)r4r rý r . 
Qedre, reflecting the compromise that was 
required to make the Ir me workable in a country where human 
resources in health are sqKce. 
There has been sub4efitial involvement of the central level in the 
implementation of tbtXogramme; the Ministry of Health is in charge of 
overall managerne "*f the programme and provides funds in instalments to 
each district an 
7s' 'ýýional 
hospital. Implementation has been governed by a 
set of guidet&, 
k-"ý- 
developed at the central level then issued to districts. to 
explain themaYagement of funds and the monitoring of activities, as well as 
the eli iii yNcriteria for beneficiaries. Despite these guidelines, implementa- 
tion und to vary substantially between districts owing, in part, to 
widesprea7a confusion amongst district officials and health workers. There 
were variations in the eligibility criteria applied to the CCT, the sharing of 
the provider payment among staff, the payment mechanisms used, the 
means of monitoring and so on. 
The programme has faced a number of challenges related to lengthy 
delays in the disbursement of funds and hesitation on the part of the central 
government to promote the programme. As a result, the level of coverage 
achieved by the programme in its first three years was low. A household 
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survey found that only 27 percent of households had ever heard of the 
programme and 29 percent of women who delivered in an eligible facility 
received the CCT at the time of delivery (Powell-Jackson et al.. 2008). With 
this level of awareness, a substantial proportion of the population were not 
reached by the SDIP. In MakwanpUT, there were no data on community 
awareness, but this is likely to have been substantially higher whcreýwomenls 
groups were operating since efforts were made to publicise the tý*amme 
widely through this existing channel. X 
" NN METHODS 
Eytimation of'rinancial Burjýý 
The purpose of this analysis is to show the 6 ial burden of paying for 
delivery care at a health facility, once the ad begun. 7 If the woman 
received the CCT, spending on delivery e is adjusted accordingly to 
include what is effectively a subsidy. it of analysis is the household, 
and financial burden is measured as the are of health spending for delivery 
care in household consumption. 8 &'. "ommon extension of this approach 
uses measures of catastrophic sW ing to estimate the effect of health 
X 
care payments on househol terial living standards (Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 2003; tu et aW 3). Health spending is regarded as cata- 
strophic if it exceeds a cep4in fraction of total household expenditure in any 
given time period. It js_ýýd on the premise that health spending is likely to 
displace consumpti other goods and services if it makes up a large 
proportion of tota 
esehold 
resources. 
Catastrophic VQ;; ýIents have been defined in two ways. The first measures 
catastrophic, y ents as the share of health spending in total household 
consumptiWt, 
tii'el 
the other estimates health spending relative to household 
consumo&ýNet of spending on basic essentials (i. e. non-food consumption). 
The seWmeasure reflects the view that non-discretionary expenditure may 
be a better indicator of a household's living standard or capacity to pay for 
health care (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et aL. 2003). The threshold 
above which health spending is classified as catastrophic is essentially 
arbitrary (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, & Lindelow, 2008). We use 
the most common thresholds of 10 percent in the case of the first measure of 
catastrophic payments and 40 percent in the second case. Results are 
stratified by type of delivery since spending on normal deliveries and 
caesarean sections is expected to diverge widely. 
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Identification of Impacts 
Time is commonly used in the evaluation literature to establish a 
comparison group with which to assess a programme's impact. The most 
basic approach estimates impact by measuring the mean change in outcome 
before and after the programme commences. It is rarely able te permit 
reasonable causal inferences, as there is no a priori reason mýh II ýthe key 
assumption of no change in the absence of the programme §ho'uld hold in 
practice. Unless the influence of non-programme factors c4nýVe ruled out 
with confidence, the conclusions from such a design can be- -ai. With more 
time periods, it is possible to test for an interruption 
ý ýapecific 
point in 
time around the start of the programme, thereby prq-#iding more plausible 
causal inferences. 
In the first instance, we plot outcomes agaq ime to see if there is 
any evidence of a discontinuity in the firric. IRP around the month the 
SDIP began. From interviews with district I ramme managers, we know 
that Makwanpur district was able to st 
ýtplementation 
of the SDIP 
in September 2005, two months aftelZjfficial launch. The graphs also 
plot the three-month moving averag& to show with more clarity the 
underlying pattern by smoothing t ata. While crude, the graphs provide 
a visual means of assessing th act of the programme on the set of 
outcomes. (. 1 
The second step involve e,. ation of a model that links the level of the sE9'n`1 
outcorne at a point in tintLto the start of the programme, contemporaneous 
values of a series of deiQaphic controls, time and community-level fixed 
effects. The specificýýIakes the form: 
, 
?j 
yi, = yD, + #Xit + AT + aj + Ei,, 
where yi, i&4, h utcome variable for individual i measured at time i, D, is the 
treatme t-u my at time t, Xj, is a vector of individual and household 
characý. 
SQics 
measured at time t, T is time measured in months, aj are 
community-level fixed effects and ti, is a random error. The impact of the 
programme is given by the size of the coefficient y. A value of y equal to 0 
indicates that the SDIP has had no impact on the outcome of interest. We 
include a full set of community dummies to control for influences at the 
village level such as the activities of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). We also include a vector of individual and household character- 
istics to capture other secular trends in the outcome: the woman's age, 
religion, ethnicity, educational attainment, the occupation of the household 
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head, the size of the household, the materials used to make the house and 
the number of months the household had sufficient food in the previous 
year. The time variable(s) captures the secular trend in the outcome over 
time. How we specify this relationship between the outcome and time may 
affect the results. We, therefore, show results for two different specifications 
to assess the robustness of the results: a restricted model where, ýime is a 
quadratic function and a more flexible model in which time is spe"A dasa 
polynomial function of degree four. 
The impact of the SDIP is assessed in relation to a set of omes that 
include a measure of health and various indicators of utih 
tr 
of delivery 
care services (Table 3). These outcome indicatoft arc defined as 
probabilities. Our preference would have been to u maternal mortality 
as one of our main health outcomes, to be consiste, the main goal of 
the programme. However, given the rarity of a 
2, 
El 
death and the huge 
sample size required to detect even a large effjp assess the impact of the 
SDIP on neonatal mortality only. About 2 percent of neonatal deaths 
occur around the first day of life and can refore, be prevented through 
direct medical intervention at the tio childbirth (Lawn. Cousens, & 
Zupan, 2005). Neonatal Mortality iNboth of interest in itself and a 
reasonable proxy for maternal mQýPty. A prerequisite for there to be an 
effect of the SDIP on mortality, &an increase in utilisation of maternity 
services and adequate qual' W care. Put another way, a finding that 
showed an impact on neon t mortality without any impact on utilisation 
of maternity services w&, 4d, given our behavioural model, be difficult to 
rationalise. W,: N Utilisation 01.1tcoritetAefer to the place of delivery (home, government 
facility or private C; Ni'jlity) and the type of birth attendant (a skilled birth 
attendant or a ealth worker). We expect a positive impact of the 
programme Vup isation of government maternity services and skilled birth 
attendance,,,, TM CCT to the woman functions as a price subsidy reducing 
the costrof., Are and thereby raising demand, the extent to which depends 
on theWsehold's price elasticity. The provider payment, however, should 
increase tfie availability of health workers to attend deliveries by providing 
additional motivation to work. We also include the probability of a 
caesarean section, although our expectation of an impact on this outcome is 
perhaps lower given that the SDIP does not address many of the supply-side 
constraints that explain the low rate of caesarean sections in Nepal. T11c 
final outcome is the number of antenatal care visits, whose inclusion is 
explained later. With the exception of this outcome, all outcomes arc binary. 
Thus, an appropriate model is a probit. In presenting the results, we report 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of the Community Surveillance System 
Dataset. 
Pre-SDIP Post-SDIP 
Variable Mean Standard Error Mean Standard Error 
Otaconies ' 
Neonatal mortality 0.029 0.002 0.023 
ý02 
Delivery at home 0.946 0.003 0.870'XZ : OW 0. 
Delivery at government facility 0.042 0.002 . 0. * 0.004 Delivery at private facility 0.002 0.001 1 ft 
; f 
0.001 
Delivery with skilled birth attendant 0.044 0.002 ,9 0 0.004 
Delivery with any health worker 0.061 0.003 SýýI 70 0.004 
Delivery by caesarean section 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.001 
Nurnber of ANC visits 1.235 0.0 2.116 0.024 
Characteristics qj'ivoman and hmisehold 
Age of woman during birth of child 27.918 75 25.619 0.075 
Education grade 1.02 . 027 1.998 0.037 HH size 6.89 0.035 7.192 0.038 
Months of sufficient food in previous year . 0.031 9.637 0.033 Hindu 
. 36 0.005 0.321 0.006 Buddhist 
. 653 0.005 0.656 0.006 Muslim 
. 000 0.000 0.001 0.000 Christian 0 10 0.001 0.014 0.001 
Other religion 0.001 0.000 0.008 0 001 
Brahmin/Chhetri 0.156 0.004 0,156 . 0.004 
Newar 0.023 0.002 0.018 0.002 
Janajati 0.777 0.005 0.778 0.005 
Other caste 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.001 
Cement house 0.022 0.002 0.044 0.002 
Brick/mud house 0.020 0.002 0.031 0.002 
Stone/mud house I'*Q N 0.630 0.006 0.589 0.006 %. Planks house 
ý 
0.312 0.005 0.254 0.005 
Brushwood h t le 0. (K)9 0.001 0.009 0.001 
Thatch 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.001 ý 
q:: 
ý 
f 
ýe 
f Ouse r t q f Ot 0.003 0.001 0.046 0.002 
, Ij A gric i wc rk ra 0.910 0.003 0.927 0.003 
Salaried/gowrnment Work 0.019 0.002 0.015 0.001 
Small business 0.014 0.001 0.017 0.002 
Wage labourer 0.058 0.003 0.040 0.002 
Other work 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
HH in women's group intervention area 0.499 0.006 0.461 0.006 
N 7,613 7,186 
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the change in probability associated with a given change in the treatment 
variable rather than the estimated coefficient. 
The identification strategy relies on there being no other change at the 
time of the programme's introduction that could account for a discontinuity 
or shift in the relationship between the outcome and time. Changes in non- 
programme factors such as health infrastructure, staffing levels, goXernment 
policy and the activities of NGOs working in maternal heaýý are a 
particular concern. One way of testing the plausibility of this, 4Nption is 
to estimate the impact of the SDIP on the use of antenatal cape, an outcome 
unrelated to the SDIP but closely linked to maternal healtlviýbre broadly. If 
the explanation for a discontinuity in the use of deliveqy' 
,,, 
bare is a factor 
other than the SDIP, it is likely this same factor would-qlso affect antenatal 
care seeking. 
A further limitation is that the regression m dt -4s only able to identify 
impacts that surface instantaneously. Thus, q question is whether the 
SDIP would be expected to have an imme 'Meffect on the set outcomes. 
The CCT and the provider payment in iple should have an instanta- 
neous impact on utilisation and neo ortality, but if implementation 
has been slow, the effects may be inc ental or simply delayed. On the 
is demand side, the critical factor 4 eness of the CCT in households. In 
those villages where womenls g were running (i. e. approximately half 
of the sample), we are confi= t awareness was high from the outset due 
to the widespread promoti(iropl the SDIP through this channel, as stated 
d 
met 
earlier. For this reasopn, en presenting the results, we stratify according 
m 
to those villages that J those that did not have women*s groups at the 
time the SDIP was mcnted. 
Data 
This ch t 
'NUraws 
on data from a community surveillance system that has 
been r 
Vug5 
in rural areas of Makwanpur district, as part of a randomised 
control trial to assess the effectiveness of a participatory intervention with 
women's groups (Manandhar ct al., 2004). In the surveillance area, every 
woman was interviewed one month postpartum about her health seeking 
behaviour at childbirth, the survival status of the newborn, her household's 
socioeconomic status and receipt of the CCT. The questionnaire recorded 
ownership of assets, with which an asset wealth index was constructed using 
principal components analysis (Filmer & Pritchett, 1998). Over the period 
2001-2007, complete data were collected on 14,799 deliveries in the 24 local 
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administrative areas or Village Development Committees (VDQ covered by 
the surveillance system. 9 This period includes five years before the SDIP 
started and almost two years of programme implementation. 
After the SDIP had begun, women who delivered in a health facility were 
asked additional questions on general household consumption and the cost 
of delivery care. The recall period remained one month, e cept for 
expenditures on durable items. Over a six-month period, every _ sehold (300 in total) in the surveillance area with a woman who dgl red in a 
.R health facility was interviewed. The additional module ca red general 
household expenditure, following closely the Nepal kkihg Standards 
Measurement Survey (Government of Nepal, 2004), AS Vwll as household 
expenditures on delivery care and outstanding de The approach to 
ineasuring household living standards was ro 
;; hensive, 
capturing 
information on not just household expenditure u'Also the value of home 
q production and those goods or services E4d in kind. This allows 
computation of household consumption xy for permanent income 
(Deaton & Grosh, 2000). The cost of deliv overed facility-based charges 
(registration; delivery fee, operating e; bed charge; drugs; medical 
supplies; diagnostic tests; food, gifts o health staff and spending on 
traditional practitioner if sought dý% labour), additional charges (lodging 
and food of accompanying farpi: ýAfid drugs, medical supplies and food 
bought outside) and transpor! ýýArges (Borghi et al.. 2006). 10 Outstanding 
payments to health provid ýPere also included. A summary of these data 
was presented in the preKus section. 
Table 3 reports desSýýe statistics of the outcome and socioeconomic 
variables for the fivX10i period before and the two-year period after the 
start of the SDIP. TWP atal mortality fell from 29 deaths per 1,000 live births 
in the first periQ&N 23 deaths per 1,000 in the second period. Utilisation of 
maternity se4&*ý_and skilled birth attendance were both low in the first 
period buthWe risen markedly over time. The proportion of women 
deliverirlf aýN government health facility, for example, increased from 4.2 
percen&oýfO. 8 percent between the two periods, and skilled birth attendance 
rose from 4.4 percent to 10.9 percent. Also, women in the second period were 
far more likely to deliver in the presence of a health worker. There was an 
increase in the caesarean section rate from 0.3 percent to I percent and an 
increase in the mean number of antenatal care visits from 1.2 to 2. L 
In the X1, we include a number of characteristics of the woman and her 
household. There have been notable changes in some of these characteristics 
over time. While women are more likely to give birth at a younger age and 
household size has increased, there has been little change in the religion or 
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caste of farnilies. The education level of women is low, although it has 
increased over time. Similarly, food sufficiency and the type of house have 
both improved. Almost 50 percent of the sample was resident in areas that 
received the women's group intervention. 
RESULTS 
Financial Burden of Delivery Care 
We estimate the OOP health care budget share a. -ý44n indicator of the 
financial burden associated with giving birth in. aA 
" 
a0h facility. Table 4 
indicates that OOP payments for normal deli ex k'ýre accounted for 3.6 
percent of total annual household consumptio ile those for a caesarean 
section accounted for a much higher 19.3 t, even with the SDIP in 
place. Clearly, spending on a caesareaý se places an enormous strain on 
the household budget. The concentrad ices of OOP budget shares for 
both types of delivery are negative indi ing that better-off families spend a 
smaller fraction of total householdoources on delivery care. The quintile 
Table 4. Out-of-Pocket ing on Institutional Delivery Care as a 
Percenta Household Consumption. 
11P Vaginal Delivery Caesarean Section a- 
OOP delivery care spend 
. 
ý, A % ot'lotal household consumption 
Mean (%) 
Quintile mean 
3.6 19.3 
Poorest (200Y, 5.1 22.9 
Poorer (200/0) 
IV. id 10 
5.6 
2.7 
18.9 
22.1 
Riche 0' ) t N-0.1 RichesIN-11FTO/0) 
2.5 
1.9 
16.3 
16.2 
Concentration index -0.23 -0.058 Incidence of catastrophic spending (> 10%) 7.4 72.4 
OOP delivery care spending as % qt* household non-food consumption 
Mean (%) 9.9 35.9 
Concentration index -0.21 -0.075 Incidence of catastrophic spending (>40%) 2.6 41.4 
Source: Cost of delivery and living standards survey. 
Notes: Vaginal deliveries (N = 271), caesarean section (N = 29) 
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means also show a similar pattern, although the gradient is less steep in the 
case of caesarean sections. Given that our sample covered only households 
seeking delivery care, it is perhaps to be expected that the OOP budget share 
decreased with household resources. If we had included those who did not 
seek any care - that is, women who delivered at home - it is likely we would 
have found that wealthier households spend proportionately more h. Ith 
care. consistent with other studies (van Doorslaer et al., 2( The 
proportion of households that incur catastrophic spending q 
Using a 10 percent threshold, the incidence of catastrophic s ng was 7.4 
c percent for normal delivery care and 72.4 percent for ca - 11 sections. 
The mean OOP budget share of non-food ex so ure offers an 
alternative measure of the disruptive effect of 00 ayments on living 
standards. The mean share rises considerably to ercent for normal 
'0) 
deliveries and 35.9 percent for caesarean sectionkplQuing the large fraction 
of household resources devoted to food (b 53tcessitics) in our sample. 
Again, the concentration indiceý are n' Nve suggesting that richer 
r 
cs 
households spent a smaller fraction of ýr discreiionary resources on 
delivery care. The incidence of catasj ,c: D 
'T 
ýc spending, as defined by a 40 
percent threshold, was 2.6 percent in t case of normal delivery care and 
41.4 percent for caesarean sections, 
While we are unable to cor? r4e§Kn how the SDIP has affected the 
financial burden of deljvery_g! ýZýhealth spending, and particularly that on 
surgery, appears to be iY disruptive to the living standards of 
households, despite the *p! 
Snodal 
assistance offered by the SDIP. 
1 
Uptake and 
6evfit 
Incidence of the Conditional Cash Tran#ýr 
el%ý 
Women wh the conditions of the SDIP should receive the CCT on the 
day of disc4r from the health facility. During our study period, only two- 
fifths of , Ae women received the CCT after childbirth. There are likely to 
be 
PC 
ther than the official conditions laid down in the policy that 
influence the chances of a woman receiving the CCT. We explored this 
possibility using a probit model, the results of which are reported in Table 5. 
In accordance with the official eligibility criteria, if a woman had two or 
fewer children or delivered in a public health facility, she was more likely to 
receive the CCT. In addition, a number of other factors were statistically 
significant. The chances of receiving the CCT varied by type of public health 
facility, suggesting differences in uptake were related to where the woman 
delivered. Women who delivered in a primary health care centre were most 
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Table 5. Results of Probit of Determinants of Receiving the 
Conditional Cash Transfer. 
Variable Coefficient Z score 
Two or fewer living children 0.833 6.75 
Home delivery Refiýrence category 
District hospital delivery 2.362 19.88 
Other public hospital delivery 2.035 16.00 
Primary health centre delivery 2.575 20.42 
Health post delivery 1.679 4.00 
Private health facility delivery 0885 3.12 
Asset wealth 0.011 0.67 
Ethnically marginalised 0,132 1.56 
No education Reference & 
. 11 Primary education 0.391ýý 3.54 
Some secondary 3.98 
Secondary or higher education 4.06 
Woman attended women's group '124 1.07 
Agricultural work erenve categorv 
Salaried work -0.248 -1.49 Small business 0.004 - -0.03 
Waged labour 0.288 1.69 
Other occupation 0,381 0.72 
constant ý3.982 -23.35 
N observations 9.801 
Pseudo R2 0.524 
Source: Community survedlA'W. ystem 2005-2007. 
Notes: Data include ad JitiWillages that were included in the surveillance system from 2005 
onwards. Table 3 does pqNeport summary statistics for these villages. 
likely to rec&ffie cash while those using a health post were least likely. 
Tho dVered in a private health facility rather than at home were 
more lik ytt receive the CCT. This could be explained by women receiving 
l'IW ,r the cas er childbirth during a visit to a public health facility to manage 
postpartum complications. Women with at least some cducation had a 
higher chance of receiving the CCT. Given the administrative procedures, 
women with no education (i. e. illiterate women) may have found it difficult - 
and health staff unwilling to assist - to complete the required form to apply 
for the CCT. The explanatory variables in the model do not fully capture 
administrative problems in the management of funds and undoubtedly, as 
reported elsewhere, delays in the disbursement of funds higher up the system 
prevented women getting access to the CCT (Powell-Jackson ct aL, 2008). 
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With no explicit targeting built into the SDIP, we would expect the same 
factors that influence use of public health facilities at delivery also to affect the 
chances of a woman receiving the CCT. Indeed, if we omit the variables 
relating to place of delivery in the probit model mentioned earlier (results not 
shown), wealth becomes significant - that is, richer households are much more 
likely to receive the CCT because they have a higher chance of delivering in a 
public health facility. " Another way of showing this is with cond&ration 
curves. In Fig. 1, we see that receipt of the CCT is heavily conce d among 
richer households, reflecting the fact that users of govern; 
ý$ma 
tern it y 
12 services are also disproportionately wealthier. Inequalilýpri the benefit 
incidence of the CCT is simply illustrative of an existing%ýe uality in the use 
,A of delivery care services. The main purpose of the CCTekto raise demand for 
health services, but it is also a transfer of resourc ouseholds. In this 
m co 
0 
+1 
CL 
to 
Fig. 1. Concentration Curves for Use of Institutional Delivery and Receipt of 
Conditional Cash Transfer in the Entire Population of Delivering Women. Source: 
Community Surveillance System 2005-2007. 
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second regard. it may be considered inequitable, benefiting relatively wealthier 
groups within our sample of rural women, 
h-npacts 
Figs. 25 plot selected outcomes over time, showing the th 
. -month moving average and a vertical line to indicate the po, n which 
implementation of the SDIP began. Visual inspection of t! ý15", 
ý&e 
series 
I 'I 
data provides a useful starting point to identify impacts. , 
programme's An interruption in the time series at the month oft 
2 
introduction can be seen in the case of a delivery at homeNA a delivery with 
a skilled birth attendant. The shifts are in the expected 
, 
0'ýection: a reduction 
in the probability of a home delivery and an ine tip; Yn the chances of a 
delivery with a skilled birth attendant. In contr ere is no obvious shift 
in the probability of a neonatal death or th er of antenatal care visits 
at around the time of the programme's int tion, but rather a consistent 
trend over the entire period. 
Next, we turn to the regression an< 
awisis, 
starting with the most flexible 
specification of the relationship bAw en the outcomes and time. The 
.... ....... 
v 
0.95 
2- 0.90 
0.80 
2 0.75 
0. 
0.70 
Time (months) 
Fig. 2. Probability of a Delivery at Home Over Time: The Three-Month Moving 
Average and Start of the SDIP. 
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Fig. 3. Probability of a Delivery with aqilled Birth Attendant Over Time: The 
Three-Month Moving AVnVge and Start of the SDIP. 
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Fig. 4. Number of Antenatal Care Visits Over Time: The Thrcc-Month Moving 
Average and Start of the SDIP. 
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Fýq. 5. Probability of a Neonatal Deatqedr Tirne: The Three-Month Moving 
Average and §tWt of the SDIP. 
regressions based on the full s4, le (i. e. including all villages) confirm the 
,, 
R 
results of the visual inspe4ti . 
Table 6 illustrates that the SDIP had a 
iv 
significant impact on an n0er of outcomes. The SDIP reduced the proba- 
bility of a home delive 
ý4.21 
percentage points and increased the chances 
of a delivery in aC rnment health facility by 2.6 percentage points. 
Estimates also su tt a positive impact on skilled birth attendance (2.3 
e pý percentag it ri nd attendance by any health worker (4.4 percentage 
.1 
points). Týýn no evidence that the SDIP had any impact on neonatal 
mortality, ili tion of private health facilities and the caesarean section rate. 
Whert`wýq ratify the results between the villages that were receiving the 
womekYoup intervention at the time the SDIP began and those that were 
not, subsantial differences in the impacts are revealed (Table 6). In the 
villages without women's groups, the SDIP had no impact on any of the 
outcomes. In the villages with women's groups, however, the SDIP 
increased skilled birth attendance by 5.3 percentage points and raised the 
chances of a delivery in a government health facility by 6.3 percentage 
points. The results from the full sample are driven by the villages with 
women's groups. The possibility remains that some factor other than the 
SDIP was responsible for these impacts. In Table 7, estimates show that 
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Table 6. Effect of the SDIP on the Probability of a Neonatal Death and 
the Use of Health Care Services at Childbirth (Quartic Time Function). 
Outcome All Villages Villages with Villages without 
Women's Groups Women's Groups 
Effect 
dyjdx 
Pseudo R2 Effect 
dyidx 
Pseudo R2 Effect Pseudo R2 
dy 
. 
/dX : V)ý 
Neonatal mortality -0.0004 -0.05 0.019 -0.002 -0.20 0.020 0.00 1 0.025 
' Delivery at home -0.042 -3.49 0.212 -0.091 -3.82 -0.82 0.201 704ýft,, 0.189 
Deliverv at 0.026 2.78 0.244 0.063 3.25 0.225 dV. - 4 0.45 0.235 
government facility NV 
Delivery at private 0.002 1.17 0.337 0.000 0.41 0.40%-16%, 0.000 0.57 0.197 
facilitv 
Delivery with skilled 0.023 2.34 0.245 0.053 2.72 0.005 0.52 0.253 
birth attendance 
Delivery with a 0.044 3.46 0.247 0,088 0,219 0.016 1.29 0.240 
health worker 
Delivery by caesarean -0.001 -0.69 0.186 -;, g"r. oo 0.182 0.000 0.43 0.225 
section NV 
241 
Notes: Regressions include 24 communitI401 fixed 
a. U.: 
ffects, dummies capturing ethnicity, 
religion, occupation of household head, -rials 
d to make house, as well variables for 
age ofthe woman at childbirth, educatil n ainment and number of months in the previous 
year for which bousehold had en( 
ýKe 
time function is a polynomial of degree four. "PON, 
Table 7. Effect 11KI e SDIP on the Number of Antenatal Care Visits 
X. 
P. - (Quartic Time Function). 
Outcome All Villages Villages with Villages without 
Women's Groups Women's Groups 
, ý) N 
EtTect R2 EfTect R2 Effect R2 
Coeff. i-Stat. coeff. I-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Number of 0.031 0.38 0.380 0.128 1.01 0.357 -0.054 -0.53 0.332 
antenatal care 
visits 
Notes: Regressions include 24 community-level fixed effects, dummies capturing ethnicity, 
religion. occupation of household head. and materials used to make house. as well variables for 
age of the woman at childbirth, educational attainment and number of months in the previous 
year for which household had enough food. The time function is a polynomial of degree four. 
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there was no discontinuity in the number of antenatal care visits at the time 
of the SDIP's introduction. strengthening the plausibility of the overall 
findings. It seems unlikely that non-programme factors would have affected 
utilisation ofmaternity services without having an impact on antenatal care. 
Tables 8 and 9 provide impact estimates using the more restricted 
specification where time is modelled as a quadratic function. Some i1pportant 
differences in impact estimates between the two sets of regressio erge. 
The regressions based on the full sample indicate that t t3BIP had 
a positive impact on the probability of a delivery at a privat 
4ýth 
facility. 
In practice, such a finding is difficult t-o explain, unZthere was a 
misunderstanding in the community that the SDIP w-o covering the 
private sector. The other major difference is th findii 
ýa 
positive impact 
of the SDIP on utilisation of government maternit ' 
les 
in villages that 
le (I 
. 
ý'ýZ. 
Ye wo did not receive the women's group intervent 'ht specifications 
remain consistent in their finding of no impact 
X 
ither neonatal mortality 
or the caesarcan section rate. 
Table 8. Effect of the SDIP on the 
lQbability 
of a Neonatal Death and 
the Use of Health Care Services at4 
, 
ýPildbirth (Quadratic Time Function). 
Outcome All Villages NJ , Villages with Villages without 0 
Women's Groups Women's Groups 
Effect 
ýR; Jdo 
R2 Effect Pseudo R2 Effect Pseudo R2 4%4 
dy/dx SJQ' dy/dx dy/dx 
N l li 0 00 1 
'WO, 
eonata morta ty - 0 " 
Delivery at home t 
* 
5.25 
. . Delivery at 
government fag 
9 
D li V0 004 
4.18 
2 25 e very at prjXaýte . . 
facility 
Delivery 0.031 N Il 4.16 
h dance bird . 
Delivery with a 0.069 6.60 
health worker 
0.019 0.002 0.27 0.020 0.000 0.00 0.025 
0.212 -0.073 -4.33 0.201 -0.033 -3.17 0.186 
0.244 0.045 3.33 0.225 0.020 2.68 0.232 
0.330 0.002 1.86 0.402 0.000 0.77 0.188 
0.245 0.046 3.32 0.222 0.021 2.74 0.251 
0,245 0.110 5.58 0.218 0.042 3.74 0.236 
Delivery by -0-0004 -0.30 0.185 -0.002 -0.79 0.181 0.001 0.93 0.224 
cae-arcan wtion 
Notes: Regressions include 24 community-level fixed effects, dummies capturing ethnicity. 
religion, occupation ofhousehold head, and materials used to make house, as well variables for 
age of the woman at childbirth, educational attainment and number or months in the previous 
year for which household had enough food. The time function is a polynomial of degree two. 
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Table 9. Effect of the SDIP on the Number of Antenatal Care Visits 
(Quadratic Time Function). 
Outcome All Villages Villages with Villages without 
Women's Groups Women's Groups 
Effect R2 Effect R2 Effect R2 
Coeff. i-Stat. Coeff. I-Stat. Coeff. 
Number of antenatal -0.046 -0.75 0.379 -0.013 -0.14 0.356 -O. P4ýw-0.91 0.332 
care visits 
Arotes: Regressions include 24 community-level fixed effects, dumnýVZapturing ethnicity, 
religion, occupation of household head, and materials used to mak use, as well variables for ON! 
age of the woman at childbirth, educational attainment and nu Jýýmonths in the previous 
year for which household bad enough food. The time functionýu polynomial of degree two. 
DISCUSSIO 10 10 
While CCT programmes in Latin -NAa have been well-documented, 
there is little empirical evidenc, onnhether large-scale cash incentive 
t 
programmes in south Asia can im e health care seeking behaviour and 
health outcomes. This chapter es evidence of the SDIP's impact in 
one district of Nepal 
The results suggesý that DIP had a significant impact on utilisation 
of maternity services, dc>Qite known problems in the administration and 
uptake of the CCT. T,, hk--programme raised skilled birth attendance and 
reduced the chance 
e 
oman delivering at home. Even though the CCT 
represented a smali po; tion of the cost of delivery care to a household, it 
acted as a powejQZ6nough signal for behavioural change. The programme, 
however, fai&ý) have any impact on the caesarean rate, suggesting supply- 
side barrierkc Mstrain utilisation of emergency obstetric services rather than 
a lack oroplend. The results also showed no impact on neonatal mortality. 
The Sb hanged health care seeking behaviour at childbirth but not the 
health ot cloomes of the newborn. It may be the case that the impact oil 
utilisation was too modest to produce a detectable effect on mortality, or 
inadequate quality of care was the constraining factor in translating 
increases in utilisation into improved health. 
A closer examination of the results from the most flexible model shows 
that the impact estimates from the entire sample are driven by the villages 
with women's groups. In these villages, the impact of the SDIP on utilisation 
of maternity services and skilled birth attendance was substantial. There 
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remained, however, no impact of the programme on the caesarean section 
rate or neonatal mortality. These findings point towards the women's 
groups in Makwanpur as a useful ineans to communicate the SDIP to the 
public and highlight the importance of having a communication strategy as 
an integral part of implementation. There are implications for the impact of 
the programme in the rest of country, where indications are that awareness 
has been low. If the public are unaware of the programme's ben b. 1, they 
cannot be expected to change behaviour as a consequence. RJ4-jýhceivable 
that public awareness of the programme in the villages wiph*být women's 
groups spread slowly, causing a change in health care s, k7kfýg behaviour 
over time that could not be identified using our approgqj 
There are reasons to believe that the impact estimitto in our study area 
were greater than the country as a whole. Geogr<)t'Ql access to health 
facilities in the district is relatively good, whieryer)nany other districts in 
. gh I 
Y. M, 
Pically 
, )o 
Nepal, poor access represents more than simpj , gh transport cost -- it is a 
physical barrier to getting to the health y. M oreover, our sample 
included only rural households who a, ypically poorer than urban 
households. Economic theory woul ct that poorer households are 
likely to be more incentivised by the T. 
Of concern is the high incidencctQ catastrophic expenditure associated 
with OOP spending on institutWaelivery care, despite the inclusion of 13 
the CCT in the estimates. * ý. Vhes that the SDIP, by incentivising greater 
use of institutional delivery(r, s exposing more households to catastrophic 
payments. Moreover, theV, ýis no reason to assume that the health benefits of 
professional care necWily outweigh the economic costs. CCT pro- 
grammes in other coMbries have rarely encountered this tension because 
they have focused (&tow-cost preventive interventions (typically given free 
of charge) suchA-Sm"munisation or growth monitoring. But evidence from 
China sugge&jhýt health insurance can increase the risk of catastrophic 
expenditur. e, byraising utilisation of care (Wagstaff & Lindelow, ý 2008). 
Furthfr" WNhis issue of cost, there was anecdotal evidence showing that 
provid4'ýýay have price discriminated between patients, charging more to 
women w1io were given the CCT. 14 With such behaviour, the CCT provides 
no subsidy to the cost of care or protection against catastrophic payments. 
Greater transparency in the charging of user fees in Nepal would limit the 
extent to which health providers can price discriminate. More importantly, 
though, the SDIP should be linked to policies that offer better financial 
protection to households, focusing in particular on obstetric complications 
and poorer households - which are both associated with a higher incidence 
of catastrophic payments. The Government of Nepal recently abolished user 
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fees for delivery care in the public sector. If implemented well, the change in 
policy should offer considerable financial protection to households. Any 
further evaluation of the SDIP will need to be wary of this policy change as 
a possible confounder in any analysis of utilisation. 
The analysis of the determinants of uptake of the CCT suggest more 
households would be able to access the cash if the administratioQ process 
were simplified so that it did not work against those with no cocation. 
Problems in the disbursement of funds at the central ley widely 
acknowledged, but the results suggest administration at the f level also 
matters. It may be the case that certain types of healtý 
,; 
ility, such as 
health posts, need additional administrative support fro1qt)ie district health 
office to improve management of the SDIP. 1W 
The study raises the issue of targeting. One. QX major differences 
between the SDIP and Latin American CC N2 
ýmmcs 
is its universal 
nature. In Mexico, de Janvrv and Sadoula4 has highlighted the 
T Pec-, 
) 
inefficiencies associated with paying people ti what they would have done 
anyway. Since the CCT is given to those w Qýh t the condition, irrespective 
of whether they would have met tjý)*4ndition in the absence of the 
programme, the cost per marginal visit-can be very high. These inefficiencies 
arc likely to be greater in the SDIR utilisation of delivery care services is 
higher amongst the better-off emain eligible for the CCT. Also, we 
demonstrated another, if UID 
iýilsing, 
consequence of choosing not to 
target. The distribution "e CCT was skewed heavily in favour of 
relatively better-off famjlýes since they are most likely to attend health 
facilities. An obvious ', *Iication for the fine-tuning of the programme 
would be to target 2ýýhouseholds. However, the evidence regarding the 
feasibility of targe ""in low-income countries is not encouraging, and the 
cost of adminis n can be substantial. Given existing difficulties in the 
administrati the CCT, it is reasonable then that the SDIP does not 
target sc ouseholds; policyrnakers must accept the drawbacks and 
costs th t entails. Whether the SDIP represents value for money is a 
pressin -estion for further research, particularly given the additional 
inefficiencies that come hand in hand with not being able to target. 
NOTES 
1. An obstetric complication represents more of a health shock since it is, to 
some extent, unforeseen. 
2. While we include debt to the service provider in the total cost, it is not known 
whether households paid the amount still owed after the time of survey. 
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3. A small number of large tertiary hospitals in Kathmandu were not part of the 
programme in its first two years. 
4. In the least developed districts, women were also offered free care in addition 
to the CCT. Our study district was not one of the districts in which women from that 
district could benefit from the free delivery care component of the SDIP. 
5. A related concern is that health workers attending a home delivery, worried 
that they could forgo the provider incentive, might be reluctant to refer women to a 
health facility in the case of an emergency. 
6. An information pamphlet, for example, explains that 'more ben each to 
[the] poor, disadvantaged and marginalised women' and 'the [SDIP '% ributes to 
mitigate the barrier in seeking care, provides relief to the 
ýIfamilies 
(Government of Nepal. 2006). 
K 
7. In the absence of pre-implementation data, this chaptu i 
Nnot 
able to shed 
T 'Y t light on the question of whether the SDIP has affected delive 
Se 
spending and he 
financial burden it places on households. k__)ý 
8. Otherwise referred to as the OOP health care bu are. 
9. Mean number of deliveries per month captured b rveillance system was 22 1. 
10. Unlike (Borghi et al., 2006), we did not inclu 
teopportunity 
cost of time. 
,t a th in Table 5, once we 11. Note that there was no independent eýfett,, ), weal 
controlled for the place of delivery. 
12. As measured by a wealth ind d' d4§ýing principal components analysis 
from information about the ownership oMkAets. 
13. We acknowledge that the estanatts Of catastrophic expenditure may 
exaggerate the short-term disru t1v , cts of Paying for delivery care since 
childbirth typically is not a health sl 
ý, Fan hou 
il 
Pýt ý 
seholds can plan financially for the 
event. However, there are likely. important longer term effects that are not 
captured in measures of catasr li - expenditure. 
14. Among women who re&the CCT, the mean OOP payment to the health 
provider for a normal deliv was 1,774 NRS (95% Cl: 1304-2245), compared with 
968 NRS 95% CI: 791-1 
1 
imong those who did not receive any cash. 
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